MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Circuit Court) dismissing application for judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) not to grant protection visa – where first ground of appeal is unparticularised – whether it is the role of the Court on appeal to identify error where the appellant has not – whether the Tribunal properly considered the factual information provided by the appellant in visa application
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether appellant has raised a new ground of review that was not raised in the Circuit Court
Held: appeal dismissed – unparticularised ground of appeal must be rejected – Tribunal properly considered the appellant’s information
Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category:
Catchwords
Number of paragraphs:
29
Counsel for the Appellant:
The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Solicitor for the First Respondent:
Mr A Cunynghame of Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent:
The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs
Table of Corrections
8 January 2020
In paragraph 12, “[0]” has been replaced with “[10]”.
8 January 2020
In paragraph 24, “[00]” has been replaced with “[3]”.
ORDERS
VID 1512 of 2018
BETWEEN:
BJW16
Appellant
AND:
MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
ANDERSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 JUNE 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ANDERSON J:
Introduction and summary
The appellant appeals from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Circuit Court) dismissing the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal). The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (delegate) not to grant the appellant a protection visa (Visa).
For the reasons below, the appellant’s appeal to this Court is dismissed. The appellant’s first ground of appeal, as outlined below, does not particularise any…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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In this case, the appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) to refuse his application for a protection visa. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review, and the appellant appealed to the Court. The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Tribunal had properly considered the information provided by the appellant in his visa application. Additionally, the Court had to determine if the appellant had raised a new ground of review that was not raised in the Circuit Court.
The Court found that the appellant's first ground of appeal was unparticularised and did not specify any alleged error by the Tribunal or the Circuit Court. As such, the Court held that it was not its role to identify errors where the appellant had not. This aligns with the principle that an appeal requires the identification of specific errors and is not merely a second trial hearing. The Court also determined that the appellant did not raise a new ground of review against the Tribunal's decision; rather, he had argued in substance in the Circuit Court that the information he provided was not properly considered, making it unnecessary for him to obtain leave to raise this second ground of appeal. Furthermore, the Court found that the Tribunal had properly considered the appellant's information, noting inconsistencies in his evidence and rejecting his claims accordingly.
The Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the costs of the First Respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
For the reasons below, the appellant’s appeal to this Court is dismissed. The appellant’s first ground of appeal, as outlined below, does not particularise any alleged error of the Tribunal or the Circuit Court and must therefore be rejected. Furthermore, the argument by the appellant that the Tribunal did not properly consider the information he provided for the purposes of his Visa application must also be rejected. In particular, having recognised the clear inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence, it was open to the Tribunal to reject the appellant’s claim that he had previously been interrogated and tortured in Sri Lanka. Background The appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, arrived on Christmas Island on 15 July 2012 as an illegal maritime arrival. On 6 December 2012, the appellant applied for the Visa. The appellant’s claims were set out in a statement accompanying his Visa application forms. In summary, he claimed that:(a)he is a Tamil Hindu from the Puttlam District. His father was a fisherman who was captured by the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) on suspicion of involvement with the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE). His father was detained for three years, was then captured by another branch of the CID, and went into hiding;(b)in around March 2012, the appellant was taken by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) to their camp and interrogated and tortured for two to three hours. The SLA wanted him to join them;(c)he fears that he will be harmed by the CID and SLA because they will suspect him of being involved with the LTTE; and(d)he also fears returning to Sri Lanka because of the “Grease Men”, his Tamil race, his Hindu religion, and because he will be harmed for seeking asylum in Australia. On 22 August 2013, the appellant attended an interview with the delegate. On 18 December 2013, the delegate refused to grant the appellant the Visa.The Tribunal’s decision On 24 December 2013, the appellant applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. The appellant was represented by his registered migration agent throughout the proceedings in the Tribunal. On 31 March 2014, the appellant, through his representative, provided written submissions to the Tribunal. On 11 February 2016, the appellant appeared before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments with the assistance of a Tamil interpreter and his registered migration agent. On 23 February 2016, further written submissions were provided to the Tribunal. The submissions addressed, in part, concerns raised by the Tribunal with the credibility of the appellant’s claims. On 5 May 2016, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant the appellant the Visa. The Tribunal’s findings were summarised as follows at [5]-[14] of Circuit Court’s reasons:5.The Tribunal considered that the applicant’s claims about the treatment of his father were vague and lacking in detail. The Tribunal also noted various inconsistencies between his evidence given orally at the Tribunal hearing and his written claims in his protection visa application. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s claims about his father as credible and, in particular, did not accept that the applicant’s father had a scar as result of the war, or that his father had been detained for three years by the CID.6.The Tribunal noted conflicting evidence given by the applicant. As a result, the Tribunal did not accept that applicant had been contacted by the SLA or the CID about his father, or that weapons were found in his home, or that the applicant was taken to an army camp and interrogated and tortured, or that he was asked to join the SLA. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant’s father was in hiding or that the CID had come to the applicant’s home to look for his father.7.The Tribunal accepted that the Sri Lankan authorities may have performed routine checks in relation to the applicant’s whereabouts, but did not accept that there had been any specific inquiries by the authorities since the applicant left Sri Lanka. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s claims about weapons having been found in his home. Consequently, the Tribunal did not accept the claim that the applicant’s absence from his home would result in him being suspected by the authorities of any adverse activity.8.The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant, or any of this family members, had been of any interest to the authorities in the past and generally found that the applicant’s claims were inconsistent, lacking in detail, and were not credible overall.9.The Tribunal considered certain country information. On the basis of that information, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant faced a real chance of serious harm by reason of his Tamil ethnicity or his membership of a particular social group consisting of young Tamil males. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant faced a real chance of persecution based on an imputed political opinion arising from his Tamil ethnicity or his age.10.The Tribunal considered the applicant’s claim about grease men. The Tribunal noted that the applicant had not had any involvement with grease men previously. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant might face a real chance of serious harm from grease men if he were to return to Sri Lanka in the future.11.The Tribunal considered the issues surrounding the applicant’s illegal departure from Sri Lanka. The Tribunal considered that a member of his family would stand as guarantor for him if he were fined for leaving Sri Lanka illegally. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant might face a short period in remand if he returned to Sri Lanka and accepted that prison conditions might be poor. However, the Tribunal did not consider that anything the applicant might experience in that context would amount to serious harm for a Convention reason. Moreover, the Tribunal found that the Sri Lankan Immigrants and Emigrants Act was a law of general application which was not applied discriminately. Overall, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant would face a real chance of serious harm due to his illegal departure, or as a failed asylum seeker, or as a Tamil failed asylum seeker.12.The Tribunal noted the applicant’s evidence that he had been able to practice his religion freely in Sri Lanka. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant would face a real chance of serious harm by reason of his Hindu religion. The Tribunal considered the applicant’s claims individually and cumulatively and did not accept that the applicant faced a real chance of persecution for any reason.13.Similarly, the Tribunal did not consider that the applicant faced a real chance of significant harm. That was essentially based on the same reasons that the Tribunal had previously given in relation to serious harm. In relation to the prison conditions, the Tribunal did not consider that there was the required intention to cause harm and therefore did not accept that the applicant would face a real chance of significant harm if he were to be imprisoned for a short period of time. As mentioned, the Tribunal considered that the applicant’s family would assist him to pay any fine that might be imposed on him.14.The Tribunal considered that any questioning or fine that the applicant might receive would not amount to significant harm as the requirement that the harm be intentionally inflicted was not met. There was nothing before the Tribunal to indicate that the applicant might face a real chance of significant harm on the basis of his religion. All in all, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant faced a real chance of either significant or serious harm.The Federal Circuit Court’s decision
Decision
Reasons for decision
On 5 May 2016, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant the appellant the Visa. The Tribunal’s findings were summarised as follows at [5]-[14] of Circuit Court’s reasons:5.The Tribunal considered that the applicant’s claims about the treatment of his father were vague and lacking in detail. The Tribunal also noted various inconsistencies between his evidence given orally at the Tribunal hearing and his written claims in his protection visa application. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s claims about his father as credible and, in particular, did not accept that the applicant’s father had a scar as result of the war, or that his father had been detained for three years by the CID.6.The Tribunal noted conflicting evidence given by the applicant. As a result, the Tribunal did not accept that applicant had been contacted by the SLA or the CID about his father, or that weapons were found in his home, or that the applicant was taken to an army camp and interrogated and tortured, or that he was asked to join the SLA. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant’s father was in hiding or that the CID had come to the applicant’s home to look for his father.7.The Tribunal accepted that the Sri Lankan authorities may have performed routine checks in relation to the applicant’s whereabouts, but did not accept that there had been any specific inquiries by the authorities since the applicant left Sri Lanka. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s claims about weapons having been found in his home. Consequently, the Tribunal did not accept the claim that the applicant’s absence from his home would result in him being suspected by the authorities of any adverse activity.8.The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant, or any of this family members, had been of any interest to the authorities in the past and generally found that the applicant’s claims were inconsistent, lacking in detail, and were not credible overall.9.The Tribunal considered certain country information. On the basis of that information, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant faced a real chance of serious harm by reason of his Tamil ethnicity or his membership of a particular social group consisting of young Tamil males. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant faced a real chance of persecution based on an imputed political opinion arising from his Tamil ethnicity or his age.10.The Tribunal considered the applicant’s claim about grease men. The Tribunal noted that the applicant had not had any involvement with grease men previously. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant might face a real chance of serious harm from grease men if he were to return to Sri Lanka in the future.11.The Tribunal considered the issues surrounding the applicant’s illegal departure from Sri Lanka. The Tribunal considered that a member of his family would stand as guarantor for him if he were fined for leaving Sri Lanka illegally. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant might face a short period in remand if he returned to Sri Lanka and accepted that prison conditions might be poor. However, the Tribunal did not consider that anything the applicant might experience in that context would amount to serious harm for a Convention reason. Moreover, the Tribunal found that the Sri Lankan Immigrants and Emigrants Act was a law of general application which was not applied discriminately. Overall, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant would face a real chance of serious harm due to his illegal departure, or as a failed asylum seeker, or as a Tamil failed asylum seeker.12.The Tribunal noted the applicant’s evidence that he had been able to practice his religion freely in Sri Lanka. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant would face a real chance of serious harm by reason of his Hindu religion. The Tribunal considered the applicant’s claims individually and cumulatively and did not accept that the applicant faced a real chance of persecution for any reason.13.Similarly, the Tribunal did not consider that the applicant faced a real chance of significant harm. That was essentially based on the same reasons that the Tribunal had previously given in relation to serious harm. In relation to the prison conditions, the Tribunal did not consider that there was the required intention to cause harm and therefore did not accept that the applicant would face a real chance of significant harm if he were to be imprisoned for a short period of time. As mentioned, the Tribunal considered that the applicant’s family would assist him to pay any fine that might be imposed on him.14.The Tribunal considered that any questioning or fine that the applicant might receive would not amount to significant harm as the requirement that the harm be intentionally inflicted was not met. There was nothing before the Tribunal to indicate that the applicant might face a real chance of significant harm on the basis of his religion. All in all, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant faced a real chance of either significant or serious harm.The Federal Circuit Court’s decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
At the hearing, the appellant told me that he felt the Tribunal did not consider his case properly. In particular, the appellant said the Tribunal “did not believe [his] story that [he] was in a camp”. However, the appellant could not otherwise point to anything the Tribunal got wrong or failed to take into account. When I asked the appellant what he saw as the error in the Circuit Court’s decision, the appellant said that the Circuit Court did not believe his story. He did not wish to add anything to this complaint about the Circuit Court’s decision. The appellant finally told me that he was scared to return to Sri Lanka.ConsiderationGround of appeal (1) – Question of law that should be investigated Interpreted in its most favourable light, the appellant’s first ground of appeal appears to contend that that the Circuit Court’s order involves an error of law. Even if I accept that interpretation, the first ground of appeal does not identify the particular error by the Tribunal or the Circuit Court. It invites this Court to itself investigate the Circuit Court’s decision. Farrell J was faced with a similar situation in EJB17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCA 742. Her Honour expressed the following at [12] of that decision:While the difficulty faced by a self-represented litigant cannot be minimised, this Court cannot meaningfully engage with the appellant’s ground of appeal where the ground makes a general and unparticularised complaint of error by the primary judge. As pointed out by Bromwich J in FLW17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCA 352 at [17], it is well-established and beyond doubt that an appeal, even by way of a rehearing, requires the identification of error, and is not merely a second trial hearing. It is also not for the Court to perform the function of identification of error where the appellant has not. Where no identifiable error on the part of the primary judge has been alleged, let alone established, and none is otherwise apparent, the appeal must be dismissed with costs. The same analysis applies in this case in respect of the first ground of appeal. The absence of particularity in the identification of any error said to have been committed by the Tribunal or Circuit Court means that this ground of appeal must be dismissed.Ground of appeal (2) – Information provided in Visa application was not properly consideredNew ground of review? The Minister submitted that the appellant requires leave of the Court to raise this second ground, being a new ground of review which was not canvassed or raised before the Circuit Court: see Murad v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 73; 250 FCR 510 at [19], quoting VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; 238 FCR 588 at [46]-[48]. It should be recalled, however, that the appellant was not legally represented in the Circuit Court or this Court: see NAJT v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 134; 147 FCR 51 at [165]. Additionally and importantly, it is apparent from the grounds of review advanced in the Circuit Court—all “considerations” grounds—and the analysis set out in Circuit Court’s reasons that, in broad terms, the appellant did in substance argue in that Court that the information he provided to the Tribunal was not considered properly and the order of the Tribunal was not fair. For this reason, I do not accept that the appellant raised a new ground of review against the decision of the Tribunal. The appellant therefore does not require leave to raise this second ground of appeal.The appellant’s information was adequately considered