FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FLW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 352
Appeal from: FLW17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1285 File number: NSD 977 of 2018 Judge: BROMWICH J Date of judgment: 15 March 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from orders of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for judicial review – where reasons of ex tempore judgment not published at time notice of appeal filed – where no identifiable ground of appeal in notice of appeal – held: appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 473DD Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; 259 ALR 429
SZTOG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 112
Date of hearing: 16 November 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 17 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Kay Hoyle Solicitor for the First Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 977 of 2018 BETWEEN: FLW17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BROMWICH J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 MARCH 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BROMWICH J:
Introduction
This appeal is from orders made by a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, following an ex tempore judgment. The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made on 9 November 2017. The Authority affirmed an adverse protection visa assessment made by a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, now known as the Minister for Home Affairs.
On 16 July 2013, the appellant, a citizen of Egypt, arrived in Australia by boat, and was therefore designated as an unauthorised maritime arrival. He was later permitted to apply for either a temporary protection visa or a safe haven enterprise visa, another class of protection visa. On 15 September 2016, he lodged a valid application for a safe haven enterprise visa.
The appellant had claimed to fear harm by reason of his conversion to the Shia Islamic faith and the adverse attention to which he would be subject from Sunni Muslims. He claimed that he came from a Sunni Muslim family. In his written claims, the appellant stated that he converted to Shia Islam about a year after attending a religious lecture by a Shia cleric in 2010. He claimed to fear Sunni Muslims, further claiming that Sunni Muslims believe that killing Shia Muslims will take them to heaven.
The delegate did not accept that the appellant had converted to…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 352
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the AAT had not erred in its application of the statutory provisions. It found that the letter did not constitute credible personal information that was previously unknown and could have affected the consideration of the appellant’s claims. The court further reasoned that the AAT was not under any statutory duty to seek or accept new information as per section 473DC(2) of the Act. The AAT had adequately considered the information provided under section 473CB and found that there were no exceptional circumstances justifying the consideration of the unsigned letter. The court affirmed that the AAT's assessment was rational and logical, and there was no legally unreasonable failure to exercise the power under section 473DC.
In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed. The court's decision underscored the importance of the AAT's role in reviewing decisions without the need to source additional information unless specified by the statutory criteria.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Authority considered whether to take account of the letter as “new information” bearing in mind the restrictions imposed by s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Authority’s reasons were as follows (at [7]):The letter from the Husseineyat Ale Yassin post-dates the delegate’s decision and I am satisfied that the document itself could not have been provided to the delegate before the decision was made. The applicant has not satisfied me that the letter constitutes credible personal information which was not previously known and which, if known, may have affected consideration of his claims. It is unclear what the Husseineyat Ale Yassin is. The letter is unsigned. It makes no mention of anything to do with the Shia faith and does not confirm that the applicant is a practising Shia. It states that the applicant had been attending the centre for three years, whereas at the TPV interview that applicant stated that in Sydney he had only attended the al Zahra mosque (noted in the delegate’s decision statement to be in Arncliffe). In these circumstances, the letter is of no assistance in assessing the applicant’s claim to be a convert to Shia Islam, or in addressing the delegate’s finding that the applicant’s attendance at a Shia mosque in Sydney was not conduct engaged in otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening his claims to refugee status. Given the extremely limited probative value of the letter and the fact that the applicant claimed at the TPV interview to have been attending Shia services and it would have been open to him to provide proof of that to the delegate even if he was not on notice that his conversion was in issue, I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances which justify consideration of the letter. The sole ground of review advanced before the primary judge was that the Authority had failed to carry out its statutory task by applying s 473DD of the Migration Act correctly. The primary judge did not accept that the Authority had made a jurisdictional error. His Honour held as follows (at [20]-[24]):The Court notes the High Court of Australia has more recently confirmed the application of the principles of legal unreasonableness in relation to the powers under s 473DC of the Act in Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16. I do not accept that the letter unsigned with the high level information described correctly by the Authority was material information that gave rise to circumstances in which it could be said to be legally unreasonable for the Authority to fail to exercise its powers under s 473DC(1) of the Act or in that regard under s 473DC(3) of the Act. Materially, the Authority was under no duty to get, request or accept new information as identified under s 473DC(2) of the Act. The nature of the process is one which, subject to the exercise of powers under ss 473DC, 473DD, 473DE and 473DF of the Act, the Authority must review the fast track reviewable decision by considering the review information provided to the Authority under s 473CB of the Act without accepting or requesting new information and without referring it to the applicant. It is apparent on the face of the Authority’s reasons in the present case that the Authority took into account the information under s 473CB of the Act.Mr Zipser submitted that an enquiry of Google was an obvious inquiry that could easily be made in the context of the Authority’s reference to it not being clear what the entity is. The Authority’s reasons reflect that the Authority understood the substance of the letter in relation to the applicant’s attendance at particular locations for particular sessions over a particular period. It was not the Authority’s task to take steps in the circumstances of the present case to obtain further information in relation to the applicant’s alleged conversion to the Shia faith. It was apparent from the delegate’s decision that this was a both dispositive issue before the delegate and clearly an issue of which the applicant was alive to and seeking to address in the submissions and new information which was provided to the Authority. The Authority provided rational and logical reasons that supported the finding that there were not exceptional circumstances to justify considering the letter. That reasoning of the Authority was not legally unreasonable. There was no obvious, easily ascertainable information that the Authority could take steps to access to determine whether the applicant had genuinely converted to the Shia faith. Identifying the nature of the entity described in the letter is not something that would have been an easily ascertainable fact in respect of a critical matter that would assist in the determination of the material issue in the present case, being whether the applicant had converted to the Shia faith.Indeed, the Authority took into account the possibility that the applicant had attended mosques of the Shia faith in its adverse determination. The Authority also pointed out inconsistencies between the alleged attendance at the particular centres for lectures, congregation, prayers and celebrations for over three years and the information that had been provided at the Temporary Protection visa interview. In those circumstances, the unsigned letter and its contents did not in the circumstances of the present case, give rise to circumstances in which it was legally unreasonable for the Authority to fail to exercise its power under s 473DC of the Act to get or seek further information in respect of the entity Husseineyat Al Yassin.I do not accept the Authority was uncertain as to the entity being one in respect of which it is alleged that the applicant had attended congregation, prayers and celebrations for over three years. The circumstances of the present case found by the Authority are not submitted to be legally unreasonable by the Authority, rather it is alleged that it was legally unreasonable for the Authority to fail to make enquiries to get further information in relation to the entity Husseineyat Al Yassin under s 473DC of the Act. I accept the first respondent’s submission that the Authority’s assessment of the letter was not affected by any legal error and that it is relevant to take into account the absence of any accompanying explanation in relation to the significance of the same in determining whether or not there is any legally unreasonable exercise of power. Further, there was no request in the present case for the Authority to exercise any power under s 473DC of the Act. The failure to examine the power under s 473DC of the Act in the circumstances of this case cannot be said to lack an evident and intelligible justification.I accept the first respondent’s submission that the Authority undertook the task by reference to the terms of the document itself and the absence of any explanation provided in support of the document’s significance. There was nothing evidently unintelligible about the consideration of whether a document had met the applicable statutory criteria without recourse to further information sourced by the Authority itself where that further information involving investigation of matters beyond the document. That is particularly so in the circumstances of the present case where the applicant was given the Authority’s letter to which I have referred, with a copy of the Practice Direction and giving the applicant an opportunity to put on submissions and new information and stating that the Authority must be satisfied there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering new information. There is no failure by the Authority to undertake this statutory task required under s 473DD of the Act and no legally unreasonable failure by the Authority to exercise the power to make inquiry as alleged in ground 1 of the amended application.