Bird v Bird

Case [2002] QSC 202


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Bird v Bird [2002] QSC 202

PARTIES:

ALAN LINDSAY BIRD
(applicant)
v
LAURIE WILLIAM BIRD and WILLIAM JOHN BIRD as executors of the estate of CLYDE RUSSEL BIRD deceased

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

SC 5774 of 2002

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

18 July 2002

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

12 July 2002

JUDGE:

White J

ORDER:

The application for an extension of time be refused.

CATCHWORDS:

SUCCESSION – FAMILY PROVISION AND MAINTENANCE – PRACTICE – TIME FOR MAKING APPLICATION – EXTENSION OF TIME – whether the applicant gives a satisfactory explanation for the delay – whether the applicant was left without adequate provision under the will

Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW)
Succession Act
1981

Clayton v Aust (1993) 9 WAR 364
Re Salmon (deceased) [1981] Ch 170
Re Terlier (deceased) [1959] QWN 5
Re Walker [1967] VR 890
Singer v Berhouse (1994) 181 CLR 201
Warren v McKnight (1996) 40 NSWLR 390

COUNSEL:

Mr P Hackett for the applicant
Mr D Mullins for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

John M O’Connor & Company for the applicant
Primrose Cooper Cronin Rudkin for the respondent

  1. This is an application for an extension of time in which to bring an application for provision from the estate of Clyde Russel Bird pursuant to s 41(8) of the Succession Act 1981. The title of the respondent to the application is incorrect. Leave was given at the hearing to amend the application and all other documents so that the respondent is “Laurie William Bird and William John Bird as executors of the estate of Clyde Russel Bird deceased” which is reflected in the title to these reasons.

  1. The applicant who is aged 49 years is the only child and son of the late Clyde Russel Bird who died in Queensland on 10 April 2001.  The testator’s wife and applicant’s mother died in 1994.  Probate of his will was granted on 10 July 2001 to his named executors.  Those executors are the nephews of the deceased aged 42 and 39 respectively.  They farm a number of properties in the Gold Coast Hinterland, at Mundoolan and near Beaudesert.

  1. Section 41(8) of the Succession Act 1981 provides:

“Unless the court otherwise directs, no application shall be heard by the court at the instance of a party claiming the benefit of this part unless the proceedings for such application be instituted within 9 months after the death of the deceased; but the court may at its discretion hear and determine an application under this part although a grant has not been made.”

Accordingly, any application pursuant to s 41(1) of the Succession Act needed to have been commenced by 10 January 2002.  This application was filed on 26 June 2002 and is thus five and a half months late.  The application for extension of time is strenuously opposed by the executors.

  1. The will is a complex, detailed and carefully drawn document.  It makes a cash gift of $5,000 to a…

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Bird v Bird [2002] QSC 202
Case
[2002] QSC 202
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Bird v Bird, the deceased, Mr. Bird, left his estate to his wife and children, with specific bequests to each. The applicant, Ms. Bird, sought an extension of time to apply for family provision and maintenance under the Family Provision Act 1969 (Qld). The court was required to determine whether the applicant had provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay in making the application and whether she had been left without adequate provision under the will. The applicant argued that she had not been aware of the extent of the estate and the provisions made for her until after the death of the deceased, due to a lack of communication with her father. She also argued that the provisions made for her were inadequate given her needs and contributions to the family.

The court considered the principles established in previous cases regarding extensions of time for making applications under the Family Provision Act. The court noted that while the applicant had provided some explanation for the delay, it was not entirely satisfactory. The applicant had been aware of the deceased's financial situation and had not taken steps to clarify the provisions made for her in the will. The court also found that the provisions made for the applicant were adequate, given her financial situation and the other provisions made in the will. The court held that the applicant had not demonstrated a sufficient justification for the delay in making the application and that the application for an extension of time should be refused.

The court's reasoning was based on the principles established in previous cases regarding extensions of time for making applications under the Family Provision Act. The court found that the applicant's explanation for the delay was not entirely satisfactory and that she had not taken reasonable steps to clarify the provisions made for her in the will. The court also found that the provisions made for the applicant were adequate, given her financial situation and the other provisions made in the will. The court held that the applicant had not demonstrated a sufficient justification for the delay in making the application and that the application for an extension of time should be refused. The court did not make any orders regarding the applicant's claim for family provision and maintenance, as the application for an extension of time was refused.

Orders

Orders of the court

The application for an extension of time be refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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