Pitman v Chant

Case [2005] QSC 38


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Pitman v Chant & Anor [2005] QSC 038

PARTIES:

MARY MARGARET PITMAN
(applicant)
v
KEVIN FRANCIS CHANT
(first respondent)
ROBERT WILLIAM JAMES CHANT

(second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

BS 2430 of 2005

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court, Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

2 March 2005

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

3 December 2004

JUDGE:

Moynihan J

ORDER:

1.   Application dismissed

CATCHWORDS:

SUCCESSION – FAMILY PROVISION AND MAINTENANCE – PRACTICE – TIME FOR MAKING APPLICATION – EXTENSION OF TIME – where applicant filed application for extension of time in which to seek orders for adequate provision for proper maintenance and support  

Succession Act 1981 (Qld), s 41(8)

Barney v Suler [2000] QCA 362;
Bird v Bird [2002] QSC 202;
Clayton v Aust (1993) 9 WAR 364;
Re Salmon (decd) [1981] 1 Ch. 167;

Warren v McKnight (1996) 40 NSWLR 390.

COUNSEL:

Mr J F Curran for the applicant
Mr M V McKew for the first and second respondent

Mr D J Murphy for the third respondent

SOLICITORS:

Marrinans Solicitors for the applicant

Official Solicitor to The Public Trust for the third respondent

  1. MOYNIHAN J:  This is an application for an extension of the time in which to seek orders for adequate provision for the proper maintenance and support of the applicant out of the estate of Mary Ellen Jane Chant.

  1. The applicant and Robert Chant were named executors but in the event the Public Trustee obtained an order to administer the estate on 19 February 2003.  The net value of the estate is of the order of $290,000. 

  1. Mary Ellen Chant died on 7 September 2002.  By her last Will dated 20 April 1995 she left her jewellery to the applicant and the bulk of her estate to her son Kevin. 

  1. The applicant is one of the three surviving children of Mary Ellen Chant the others being her brother Robert who was born on 13 May 1931 and her twin brother Kevin Francis Chant.  The applicant and Kevin were born on 12 December 1936.

  1. Kevin is intellectually disabled and suffers from diabetes.  He resided at home and was cared for by his mother until 20 May 1999.  Since that date he has been a permanent resident at Brassall Village Nursing Home.  He is incapable of giving a valid discharge for the delivery of his share of the estate.

  1. Kevin needs to live in a supported environment and to be supervised in looking after himself.  He requires full assistance for housekeeping, meal preparation, shopping, laundry, transport and community access arrangements.  He requires support in respect of any legal and his financial affairs.  It should be noted that the Public Trustee does not manage his affairs.

  1. The nine month period provided for by s 41(8) of the Succession Act expired on 7 June 2003. 

  1. The applicant sought legal advice shortly after her mother’s death.  She attended at the Public Trustee in Ipswich on 10 October 2002.  She was advised to seek independent legal…

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Details
AGLC
Pitman v Chant [2005] QSC 38
Case
[2005] QSC 38
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Pitman v Chant involved an application by the applicant, Pitman, to extend the time within which to seek orders for adequate provision and proper maintenance and support under the Family Provision Act. The application was made to the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The application was filed after the expiration of the statutory period prescribed by section 61 of the Family Provision Act 1969 (NSW). The application was opposed by the respondent, Chant, who contended that the application was not filed within the required timeframe and should be dismissed as an abuse of process.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the applicant's application for an extension of time should be granted, considering that it was filed beyond the statutory period. The court needed to determine if there were any exceptional circumstances that justified the extension of time. The court also had to consider the relevant statutory provisions and the case law governing the application of discretion to extend time.

In its judgment, the court held that the applicant had not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances that would warrant the extension of time. The court noted that the statutory period for making an application under the Family Provision Act was mandatory and could not be extended unless there were compelling reasons to do so. The court further observed that the applicant had not provided any evidence to support the claim that the delay was due to any exceptional circumstances. The court concluded that the application for an extension of time was an abuse of process and dismissed the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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