Cawood and Cawood
[2008] FMCAfam 291
•2 April 2008
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| CAWOOD & CAWOOD | [2008] FMCAfam 291 |
| FAMILY LAW – Property – two pool division – revisionary interests – lump sum spousal maintenance. |
| Family Law Act1975 (Cth) |
| Bird v Bird [2002] QSC 202 James & James (1978) FLC 90-487 Jones v Dunkel (1958) 101 CLR 298 |
| Applicant: | MS CAWOOD |
| Respondent: | MR CAWOOD |
| File number: | BRC776 of 2007 |
| Judgment of: | Burnett FM |
| Hearing dates: | 18 & 19 October 2007 |
| Date of last submission: | 19 October 2007 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 2 April 2008 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Ms Carew |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Eaton Lawyers |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Ms Hogan |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Hopgood Ganim Lawyers |
ORDERS
That the parties submit a draft minute of order giving effect to this judgment by 4.00pm on 16 April 2008.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Cawood & Cawood is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
BRC776 of 2007
| MS CAWOOD |
Applicant
And
| MR CAWOOD |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
In this proceeding the Applicant Ms Cawood (the wife) seeks property settlement orders pursuant to section 79 of the Family Law Act against her former husband, Mr Cawood (the husband). Broadly she seeks orders that an account be taken of the assets, liability and financial resources of the parties and that she receive 80% of the pool. In addition she seeks orders that 10% of the pool received by her be attributed as a lump sum spousal maintenance for her.
For his part the husband by his response seeks orders that the assets, liabilities and financial resources of the parties be split 50/50 save for those assets which can be identified as bequests due to each of the husband and the wife from their respective parents. In respect of those bequests the husband seeks orders that he receive 20% of the value of the wife’s interest in the estate of her late father and that he otherwise wholly retain the interest in the estate of his late mother.
Each of the parties also seeks specific orders concerning the disposition of assets in contemplation of them succeeding and obtaining final relief in terms of the orders sought.
Background
The husband and wife married in 1969. They remained married and living together continuously until August 2004 when they separated. The parties ultimately divorced in October 2005 with the divorce being made absolute on 26 November 2005.
There were four children to the marriage the youngest of whom was born in 1978. That child (L) is now aged 30 years. The eldest of the parties’ four children (D) born in 1971 is now aged 37 years. The parties’ children ceased being dependent many years ago.
There is some dispute at the margin concerning when the parties first met and the relationship first developed. Given the extent of length of marriage between the parties together with issues of financial and non financial contributions as expanded upon below I do not think that dispute has any moment save for the assistance that it provided me in assessing the respective credibility of each of the husband and the wife.
At the time the parties commenced their relationship neither had any assets to speak of. The parties knew each other from their teenage years. At that time the husband lived at M and the wife lived on a small mixed farming operation operated by her parents at B. Throughout the marriage the parties acquired property being principally the former matrimonial home and superannuation. Aside from those interests the other most significant assets acquired included interests by each of the husband and wife acquired upon the deaths of their respective parents.
The ambit and extent of the property pool was largely agreed. Issues between the parties centred upon;
a)The treatment of the wife’s reversionary interest;
b)The value of the wife’s reversionary interest;
c)Add backs by each of the husband and wife to the property pool;
d)Contribution entitlements on the part of the husband in the wife’s reversionary interest; and
e)Contribution entitlements on the part of the wife in the husband’s inheritance.
Two pools or one?
It was submitted on behalf of the husband that a two pool approach should be adopted in assessing the overall entitlements of the parties to the division of the matrimonial estate. This was particularly so because the assets broadly fell into two distinct and identifiable groupings. The first group of assets are the conventional assets accumulated by the parties in the course of the marriage. They are the former matrimonial home, chattels and the superannuation of each of the husband and wife. The second group of assets are the revisionary interest of the wife’s in the estate of her late father and the husband’s interest in his late mother’s estate which was received following the separation of the parties.
A two pool approach is permissible. In my view it is also appropriate in this case. In this instance the common assets are assets to which, in broad terms and the ordinary course, each party is entitled to claim an equal entitlement. They should be discretely considered in that context having regard to the usual section 79 factors.
The reversionary interest claims are however more complicated. In particular issues in respect of contribution require discrete consideration. Even in broad terms it is not likely that there would be an equal entitlement upon a consideration of section 79 factors. Given the disparity of values between the common pool assets and the reversionary assets the risk is that in lumping the assets together there is a real possibility of a perception of skewing of distribution in favour of one party against the other. Discrete treatment will enable the parties to appreciate the courts approach particularly to the issue of assessment of the relative contributions to be allowed in respect of the estate interests.
The approach which I prefer and adopt does not seek to afford any arithmetic precision to the division of the assets. It merely seeks to afford an outcome that is capable of arithmetic appreciation.
This approach permits an appropriate weighting to be given to the differently sourced property making up the pool. That is to say, the customary matrimonial assets comprising the former matrimonial home, chattels and superannuation which accumulated through the course of the parties’ relationship and the estate interests. In my view it is better to approach the assets on a pool by pool basis given the differing sources of pool assets. That approach appears both permissible and particularly appropriate in cases involving assets of that kind: Bonnici & Bonnici [1992] FLC 92-272.
Property Pool
As earlier discussed I consider a two pool process appropriate. The first pool totals $1,410,885.07 made up as follows[1]:
[1] Save for add backs the quantum of each item has been agreed between the parties as set out in the comparative pool table set out in the Husband’s Counsel’s submission. The add back figure applied is explained later in the judgment.
Former matrimonial home, Property E
$867,500
Furniture and contents in the husband’s possession
$3,000
Vintage car
$10,000
Nissan motor vehicle
$5,000
Camper trailer
$3,000
Camping equipment and tools in the husband’s possession
$4,000
Husband’s termination benefits (presently in Suncorp cash management account 084xxx)[2]
$102,905.40
Wife’s Suncorp everyday options account
$998
Husband’s savings account number 0832xxx
$13,000
Husband’s entitlement to superannuation with Q
$150,925.74
Husband’s entitlement to superannuation with A
$6,549.50
Wife’s superannuation entitlement with Suncorp Easy Superannuation
$4,515.30
Sub Total
$1,313,319.68
Add Backs
$97,565.39
Total value of property pool
$1,410,885.07
[2] The actual payout was $113,066.95. Tax of $13,789.74 was paid leaving a net payout of $99,277.21. The sum has been on deposit. I assume the present balance includes accretions.
Add Backs
Wife’s Use of Funds
The husband received a redundancy payment upon his redundancy from P Pty Ltd. For taxation reasons this money was invested in the wife’s name. Most recently it was invested in a Suncorp cash management account the details of which are recorded in account trail number 6 to the letter from Hopgood & Ganim dated 12 June 2007.
Account number 5xxx was closed on 10 March 2007 and account number 084xxx was opened. The opening balance of that account was $167,328.63.[3]
[3] Even allowing for interest the sum must include more than the initial $99,277.21 received by the wife on behalf of the husband.
Its balance is now approximately $142,000.
The wife says she spent $31,565.39 on legal fees. It is impossible to reconcile that figure with the wife’s evidence. (See the arithmetic impossibility apparent from examination of paragraphs 40, 41, 42 and 43 of the wife’s affidavit filed 13 July 2007). Given the wife had no visible means of support beyond her mother and a small pension a sum of money this size could only have been extracted from the matrimonial estate. That sum should be added back.
The husband however alleges that there were total draw downs of $66,000. That was made up in two parts; the first being a draw down of $26,000 and the second a draw down of $40,000.
The $26,000 draw down is said to have been sourced from the superannuation funds. An examination of the statement of transactions for Suncorp account 084xxx (the account with a present balance of approximately $142,000) demonstrates the two sums were withdrawn. A sum of $6,000 was withdrawn on 16 July 2007 and a sum of $20,000 was withdrawn on 17 August 2007. Given the dates of those draw downs they could not possibly be in respect of payments deposed to in the affidavits sworn 13 July 2007 and filed that day. They are clearly extra draw downs and also constitute premature dispositions of matrimonial estate by the wife in her favour. They too should be added back.
Finally the wife also withdrew a further cheque of $40,000 on 12 October 2007 which was then directly paid to her present solicitors on the record in respect of their legal fees. Again given the timing of that cheque that could not possibly relate to the payments deposed to in the affidavit filed in July.
It follows on my reckoning that the draw downs by the wife totalled $97,565.39 and that that sum should be added back. Whilst it seems highly likely these sums were applied to the payment of legal costs the fact remains the wife has had recourse to the funds for her own use and should thereby account back to the matrimonial estate.
Interest received
The husband claims that the wife has received interest totalling $22,647.48 from the redundancy payout. The wife disputes that she has received interest accruing on that account and it is contended for the husband that she admits she received the benefit of $11,039.76. Generally any interest accrued has accrued to specific accounts. The withdrawal from those accounts has been examined so I do not consider it appropriate to make any further allowance on account to these allegations.
Shares disposed of
The wife held shares in Telstra Corporation at separation then having the value of $1,356.[4] She says those shares were subsequently sold realising a value of $1,356.[5] She says that sum was used in part to pay for living expenses. Given the modest amount involved her explanation in that regard does not appear implausible despite the fact that it lacks particularity. In the circumstances I do not consider it appropriate to include as an add back.
[4] Affidavit of the wife filed 13 July 2007 paragraph 25.
[5] Paragraph 43 of the affidavit.
Suncorp fixed deposit
In her affidavit in reply the wife refers in paragraph 17 to three deposits totalling approximately $24,000. She says those monies were used by her to pay solicitors and living expenses. Her affidavit is very unclear. However as I have earlier observed concerning the wife’s affidavit filed 13 July 2007 the sums referred to therein as being paid to solicitors must have come from some source given the wife’s modest means. Having regard to the quantum involved bearing a close proximity to the legal costs spent to date as deposed to in that affidavit, it seems probable that these funds (including the Telstra shares) were the likely source of funds to pay the legal costs approximating $31,500. In the circumstances whilst I consider this as an appropriate add back, it has directly been incorporated into the figures discussed above.
Husband’s legal costs
The source of funds for the husband’s legal costs has been the bequest received by him from his mother. For reasons that are dealt with elsewhere in this judgment I consider the funds received by the husband from his mother’s estate should not be included in the matrimonial pool in the same way in which I treat the bequests received by the wife. Upon that basis the deployment of those funds by the husband cannot be seen to have reduced the overall value of the matrimonial pool. As I have determined elsewhere in this judgment the wife had no interest in the funds bequeathed by the husband’s mother to him and accordingly he could not thereby be seen to have diminished the value of the overall estate by their use. That position is in contrast to the position as I have found it insofar as it concerns the bequests made by the wife’s father to the wife in respect of which I am satisfied the husband does have a material interest.[6]
[6] Chorn & Hopkin (2004) FLC94-204 at page 79320 [para 49], [para 51]. [para 56], and [para 58]; Harrington & Harrington (2007) FamCA451.
In the circumstances I assess the total of add backs at $97,565.39.
Value of Estate interests
Each of the husband and wife are the beneficiaries under the wills from their respective parents. In the case of the wife her father died while the parties were still together. His will largely left the estate to the wife with a life interest in the income of the assets to the wife’s mother as particularised below. The husband’s only surviving parent was his mother who died after the separation of the parties. She left her estate equally to the husband and his brother as particularised below.
Inclusion in matrimonial estate of husband’s bequest
The husband’s mother’s will was dated 23 March 1989. She died on in February 2007. At the time of her death his mother was suffering dementia. At the time of separation I am satisfied she had mental capacity yet she took no steps to amend her will. Had she intended to make a bequest in favour of the wife she would have; but she did not. However I think that in the circumstances I can infer her will took account of the fact of the separation of the husband and wife.
In the case of the husband he is entitled to a bequest from the estate of his late mother for a sum of about $221,958.02. From that sum he has received $55,000 which has been spent on legal fees and $40,000 on credit card debt and personal loan repayments leaving a balance of $126,958 remaining.
Given the timing of the husband’s mothers death and that no evidence was adduced to demonstrate that there had been any contribution by the wife to the bequest received by the husband I do not consider his bequest should be included in the matrimonial assets.
Inclusion in matrimonial estate of wife’s bequest from father
The wife was a principal beneficiary under her late father’s will. He died on 6 January 2000 leaving the bulk of his estate to the wife. There were two small bequests totalling $30,000 to the wife’s siblings. The estate comprised principally of the farm and associated farm chattels. It was left to the wife with a life interest to the wife’s mother. The husband claims to have made significant contributions to the estate that the wife received by way of bequest under her father’s will.
In determining this matter it is necessary to first ascertain the value of the wife’s reversionary interest. Then an assessment of the husband’s contributions is required.
The material detailing the wife’s evidence on the subject of the wife’s interest under the will was generally presented in a very confusing manner. However two matters bear upon assessing the valuation of the wife’s entitlement under the will they being:
a)The reversionary value of the estate given the mother’s life interest; and
b)The contingency of a Part IV Succession Act claim being made by the wife’s siblings and an award being granted in their favour.
Reversionary value
Under the father’s will the mother was to have a life interest in the,
“land and farm at B together with all improvements erected thereon…to use and occupy…for such period as she shall desire…and on the death of [the mother] or on her ceasing to reside in the dwelling erected on the said land whichever event shall occur first I direct my trustees to transfer the said land and the improvements erected thereon to [the wife] for her own use and benefit absolutely”.
The land the subject of the bequest was resumed and its value converted into cash. The purpose of the resumption was for the use of the land as a refuse tip. There was an argument concerning the valuation of the land. That dispute resulted in a hearing before the Land Court. Unfortunately the outcome was unfavourable to the estate and it was ordered to pay the Council’s costs. No estimate of costs was directly provided in the evidence although in a report by Mr C he refers to a sum of $26,788.40 in respect of that matter. I adopt that figure as reflecting the costs to the estate of the proceedings.
Despite the property having been resumed and its value converted into money that sum represents the capital value of the estate. The mother retains an entitlement to the life interest in the converted estate; in Re Bladon. Dando v Porter.[7] As discussed below it appears the funds received on the sale of the land were intermingled with other funds. This has in turn created a dispute concerning the estate’s capital value. The wife contends that a sum of $74,000 which was settled upon her by the father for other purposes has been intermingled with these funds and that accordingly the balance of account presently said to be held in respect of the sale of the land overstates that holding by about $74,000.
[7] [1912] 1CH45.
In her affidavit filed 13 July 2007 the wife valued the interest in the inheritance at $535,517.06. In a letter dated 20 June 2007 forwarded on her instructions by her solicitors it was said that the value of the estate was $382,897.17.
In addition in instructions to Mr. C, accountant, a sum of $526,422.14 was provided as the value of the estate.
The husband challenges that account principally in respect of the $74,000 deduction claimed by the wife. But in any event his principal source of information has been the material provided to him by the wife. Accordingly I do not regard any concessions by him on that point as being particularly useful.
As noted the principal asset in the estate is a fund of money. The principal source of that fund are proceeds received by the estate following the compulsory acquisition of the farm. In a solicitors letter it is contended that this amount totals $569,197.17.[8]
[8] See letters dated 20 June 2007 and 8 June 2007 from Eaton Lawyers to Hopgood & Ganim.
For his part the husband’s solicitors claim the fund totals $570,000. There is no material difference between the two figures. It appears that the husband’s solicitor has simply rounded off.
More significantly there is no clear explanation in the affidavit material explaining the difference identified above between these figures provided by the wife’s solicitors only a matter of weeks apart.
The husband’s solicitors sought to shed light on the situation by undertaking an analysis of the wife’s accounts. There were significant deficiencies and difficulties in the performance of this task. First the husband did not have access to all of the source material. Therefore there are many gaps and unexplained entries. The so called “account trails” were not overly helpful in resolving the problem.
Furthermore the explanation contained in the wife’s solicitor’s correspondence appears to confuse capital and cash flow. That is to say, the wife’s solicitor never properly articulated what was in fact received in the compensation claim but rather left that matter for reconstruction. The focus of her correspondence appeared to be on the transfer of various sums from one account to the other. The paucity of information accompanying the description of transfers rendered the correspondence almost meaningless on this issue.
Additionally the wife’s response was to then allege that some of the sums referred to in the funds were themselves the subject of discreet trusts. In particular there was an assertion that approximately $74,000 of the fund held relates to a trust settled by the father in about 1994. The wife seeks to reduce the value of the revisionary interest by $74,000 on account of a fund she says was settled in 1994. That settlement was alleged to be for the purpose of providing care to both the father and the mother in their old age. Ultimately that matter requires an assessment of the truthfulness of the wife’s assertions.
I did not find her a particularly impressive witness. I consider her to be so embittered by the breakdown of her relationship with the husband that she now views all these matters in a jaundiced manner and lacks balance in her statements.
In her affidavit of 13 July 2007 the wife says the sum of $28,703 was her mother’s. If so one wonders why it was conceded in paragraph 26 of her affidavit as part of the total of the inheritance at $535,517.06. Later in paragraph 27 she then says that only $175,000 of the $266,817.06 relates to the sale of the farm. If so, and accepting the $28,703 was the mother’s, what of the balance outstanding, namely $63,114.06? No explanation was provided. The figures did not appear to relate to any of the other figures in the case.
Overall the wife’s arithmetic simply fails to compute even broadly with the case advanced. Further the case advanced is internally inconsistent in that the confusing body of evidence proffered does not enable any useful conclusion to be drawn. It was not assisted by the provision of a further series of inconsistent figures to Mr C.
The account trails undertaken by the husband’s solicitor are of some assistance in identifying the source of funds and thus in their final characterisation as either matrimonial property or trust property.
Account trails 1, 2 and 3 relate to funds held by the deceased father and mother. They passed to the mother on the father’s death and did not form part of the estate. Trail 1 and 2 note in account 04xxx a deposit of $87,000 on 20 September 1999 as the original deposit. The balance appears to have changed as interest accumulated.[9] Account trail 3 also appears to have been a joint account owned by the father and mother and which vested in the mother upon the father’s death. It did not fall into the estate.
[9] The addition of interest (said to have been dispersed) to the former account balance renders the opening balance for the subsequent new account. It is upon that basis that I infer that interest was in fact accumulated rather than dispersed.
Trail 4 appears to incorporate part of the proceeds of sale of the farm. Curiously in the wife’s affidavit she deposed that the proceeds were said to have been $175,000 of the $266, 817.06[10] in that account. The opening balance for that account was $289,599.24. There is no explanation for the difference between the $266,817 and the $175,000; or in the difference between the sum attributed of $266,817 and the actual opening balance of $289,599.24 being a sum of $22,782.38.
[10] Affidavit of the wife filed 13 Jul 2007 para 27.
The wife says the sum of $20,080 recorded at annex N as a deposit on 28 September 2000 represents the accumulated balance of the initial $10,000 settlement. However it is not inconceivable that in fact that sum (being the $22,782.38) represents the accumulated value of that trust. That appears to be a more likely situation as the future value of $10,000 over ten years invested at 7% compounded at annual rests approximates at $20,000 (the rate would have had to have been approximately 12% per annum to achieve the same return over
6 years).
In the circumstances I find that on balance it is more likely than not that the opening balance of account trail 4 was made up of $266,817.06 received following the sale of the farm together with $22,782.38 being the proceeds of the trust established by the father and which had accumulated since 1994. That latter sum, the $22,782.38 does not form part of the estate.
Account trail 5 relates to the sale of the farm. It forms part of the estate.
Account trail 6 relates to the husband’s redundancy payment. It is not part of the estate but part of the matrimonial property pool.
Account trail 7 and 8 should be dealt with together. Account trail 7 (account 7xxx) closed on 13 January 2005. Its balance was then $358,008.66. On 13 January 2005 account 0836xxx (account trail number 8) opened. Its opening balance was $388,080.67. It appears this amount was opened with the transfer of the closing balance from account trail 7 and a further deposit of $30,072.01. None of the parties provided any useful evidence concerning the provenance of these funds. It is however worth nothing that these transactions occurred after separation and at a time when the parties were embroiled in this property dispute. In those circumstances it would have been well apparent to the wife that in terms of these proceedings it was to her advantage to characterise as much of the fund as possible as being her mother’s money rather than estate funds.
The overall estate was not a mythical magic pudding. It did not simply self replenish upon its use. I am satisfied that somewhere within the untangled series of entries funds were merely transferred about from account to account leaving the overall account proceeds intact. Account trails 7 and 8 were merely part of that process.
Unfortunately the exercise undertaken by the husband’s solicitors did nothing to resolve the issue concerning what was the quantum of the estate funds and whether or not the $74,000 had been measured within that fund or otherwise.
Accepting the sums of $255,000 and $266,817.06 were received in respect of the sale of the farm the sum of $521,817.06 should be allowed as a minimum in respect of the funds in the estate. That figure still stands well short of the sums contended for by each of the husband and the wife by their respective solicitors in correspondence. The conflict is impossible to reconcile on the evidence (or lack of it). In the premises I adopt the figure of $570,000 being the figure which has been broadly accepted by both parties through their solicitors as representing the value of the trust fund. Given the unaccounted for funds received into various accounts I am content that the likely provenance of the approximately $50,000 difference is to be found in funds which the father held at the time of his death in his own name and which the wife has shuffled about over time[11].
[11] The evidence was that the father owned other real estate. No evidence was adduced concerning its disposition. Given the ???? circumstances of the father and mother it would be entirely consistent with future value – Total value $554,911; Discount rate – 5%; Term – 6 years; Present value – $428,233.
In respect of the fund settled for the health care of the father and mother the wife says that fund now has a value of approximately $74,000. The balance of account 7xxx at least as at September 2003, supports that position. However those funds are separate and distinct from the funds received into the estate. They should be treated separately from the estate funds despite the wife earlier intermingling them with estate funds. I am not satisfied that the estate fund as I have earlier determined it to be includes the $74,000 settlement. I do not allow it.
It follows that the capital value of the estate is made up as follows:
$570,000.00
Less legal fees $26,788.40
Less house modifications $2,000.00
Plus 1990 Nissan 4 door $4,700.00
Plus 1990 Nissan 2 door $3,750.00
Plus farm plant and equipment $5,250.00
Sub Total: $554,911.60
In his report Mr C adopted a number of assumptions for calculating the present value of the reversionary interest. The least contentious of those assumptions are:
a)A discount factor of 3% be applied;
b)A life expectancy of 6 years for the mother be adopted.
In addition he also assumed that the income received from the capital in the estate would not be capitalised but rather would be expended by the mother. In his report he allows for care costs at $664 per week. No evidence was adduced in support of that figure. I ignore it. Further there was no evidence about the costs of care beyond the sum of $211 per week the wife deposed to.[12] The wife’s evidence does not inform the court of her needs. (See form 13 filed 20 October 2005 which provides no particulars). History provides a good basis for foretelling the future. I expect the wife’s needs into the future will continue to be modest. She has the comfort of knowing funds are available should she require them together with the sum settled upon her by the father. Mr C’s present value calculation assumes that all the cash flow will be exhausted in ongoing maintenance of the wife’s mother. However despite there being an absence of evidence to demonstrate an absolute need for the cash flow, as contended by the wife and assumed by Mr C, I expect those funds would be consumed if for no other reason but to ensure they not be permitted to fall into the reversionary part of the estate. In the circumstances I assess the value of the reversionary at $428,233.
[12] See wife’s affidavit filed 13 September 2007, paragraph 92.
Succession Act Claim
Part IV of the Succession Act (Qld) provides for family provision. On application made under section 41(1) a Court may in its discretion order that such provision as it thinks fit should be made out of the estate of the deceased for the deceased’s child. The time for making such an application is within 9 months of the death of the deceased; section 41(8). The Court however does have a discretion to extend the time.
In this case the father died in January 2000. In June of that year (within 6 months of the date of death) notice was given of an intention to make claim. It is clear from the solicitor’s letter dated 5 July 2000, Exhibit 4. Despite the wife’s siblings having notice of the death of their father and ostensibly having received advice as to their rights under the Succession Act no application was made. Now over 8 years have passed since the death of the father without any application having been made.
In Bird –v– Bird[13] White J examined in some detail the principles apposite to extensions of time under section 41(8) of the Succession Act. Four matters were identified the first of which concerned the sufficiency of any explanation for delay in making the claim. In this case no evidence was advanced. The first of the four matters requiring consideration could have been satisfactorily addressed by the wife’s siblings but was not. Another matter which is relevant in the current context is the prospect of success that the wife’s siblings may enjoy in any such application. At this stage the evidence suggests that upon their estrangement from the father in the mid 1960’s there was no further contact between the siblings and their father. This is despite the fact that the evidence is that the wife’s siblings continue to live within the locality. I note the wife challenged this but called no evidence to support her case.
[13] [2002] QSC 202
Another consideration concerns unconscionable conduct on the part of the Applicant for such relief. In this case it would have been well apparent to the siblings that after they left the farm there would have been a need for substitute assistance to fill the void created by their departure. Although estranged from the family it would not have been unforeseen that the husband in this case would have been the likely candidate for fulfilling that role.
Overall I do not consider the siblings have any realistic prospects of success in any application to extend time for the bringing of a family provision application. Further given the absence of any direct evidence from the siblings at the trial I am not satisfied that they do intend to bring any such application in any event; Jones v Dunkel.[14]
[14] (1958) 101 CLR 298
Inclusion in matrimonial estate of prospective bequest from wife’s mother
The evidence is that the mother has savings of approximately $200,000. That is in addition to the $74,000 which was settled by the father upon trust for the future care needs of the mother and father. Upon the death of the mother the wife will inherit those sums. Those sums have a present value of approximately $274,000. For reasons which I have examined earlier I consider allowance should be made for the drawing upon those funds for the needs of the mother.
As discussed above I do not consider the capital value of that fund will be diminished. The income generated from those funds will more than adequately cover the expenses and financial needs of the mother (and for that matter the wife). I am satisfied that the capital sum will remain intact for the balance of the life expectancy of the mother. The wife should inherit that fund. While there is always a risk that the mother could change her will to the disadvantage of the wife I do not consider the likelihood of that occurring to be so significant as to warrant any discount for that factor. For reasons identified above I consider there has been some indirect financial contribution by the husband to the sum through the course of this long marriage. This is particularly so a the mother’s savings would have been enhanced by the husband’s general contribution to the household of the wife’s father and mother thereby sparing them some labour expenses thus permitting them a better capacity to save.
Assuming a discount rate of 3% (as recommended by Mr C) over
6 years (being the life expectancy of the mother) the fund has a present value of approximately $229,470.
The significance of this matter to my mind relates to the s.75(2) factors discussed below. The wife’s mother is elderly; she has a future life expectancy of six (6) years; this wife has been providing her long term day to day care for some years; and the wife’s siblings are estranged. There appears to be a high probability that the wife solely will inherit her mother’s estate. Accordingly I do think it appropriate that I have regard to that matter in that context; De Angelis & De Angelis (2003) FLC 93-133 at p.78, 246.
Financial contributions
At about the time of the commencement of their relationship the wife was working as a factory worker . She continued working in that capacity until 1971 when their first child was born. It was agreed between the husband and the wife that when the wife commenced having children she would cease full time employment and become a homemaker and be primarily responsible for the care of the children. The husband agreed to assume financial responsibility for the family.
The husband was employed initially as an apprentice with P Pty Ltd. He remained in that employment until 1997 when he took up employment with the Queensland Government following the offer of a redundancy package by P Pty Ltd.
From time to time the wife undertook various part time positions as circumstances would permit.
Neither the husband or the wife were employed in highly remunerative employment. They had four children in the space of five years and one assumes that they were not relieved of the financial burdens and responsibilities of parenting until the early 1990’s. Throughout that time the husband’s income appears to have been predominantly paid into an account which was operated and managed by the wife. So too was any income which she received.
During this time the parties had purchased as joint tenants the former matrimonial home located at Property E. After acquiring the land the parties entered into a contract for the construction of a house upon that land which project was funded by borrowings from the Commercial Bank of Australia. Save for the resumption of a small section of the allotment for the purposes of a footpath the parties retained that property in its original form. The property is now unencumbered.
In addition to the acquisition of that property the husband also received a redundancy payout of $99,277.21 net following he being made redundant at P Pty Ltd in July 1996. The parties sensibly invested that money in a term deposit in the name of the wife to minimise their tax obligations.
The only other property acquired by the parties during the course of the marriage (aside from household items and chattels) was an interest in a hairdressing salon which the parties ultimately decided to close because of its unprofitable trading.
The husband made the most significant financial contributions throughout the course so the marriage. He was in paid employment throughout the marriage and his income was applied to funding the acquisition of most of the matrimonial property. The wife initially worked after marriage. Although she took time out of the workforce following the birth of the children of the parties she resumed work after the children were old enough and thereby did make direct financial contribution to the development of the matrimonial estate.
Non financial contributions
During the course of the marriage the wife and husband engaged in a number of renovations and improvements to the former matrimonial home. They included the construction of two extra bedrooms, a pool room, a spa, concreted an extra patio area in the back of the property; concreting paths and driveways; construction of a retaining wall; installation of an irrigation system; construction of a 40’ shed; and the construction of horse stables.
Although the wife did not contribute directly to many of those improvements she made a significant indirect contribution by undertaking responsibility for the care of the children while those activities were being undertaken. Clearly without that assistance the husband could not have undertaken those improvements with any efficiency or at all.
In addition the wife, in the course of performing her duties as a homemaker, maintained the former matrimonial home. The wife was clearly entitled to credit for that contribution.
It was also submitted on behalf of the wife that allowance should be made for gifts provided by her parents to both parties: Gosper & Gosper (1987) FLC 91-818. The gifts contended for included three years rent free accommodation, a guarantee provided by the wife’s father of a loan used by the parties to fund construction of a house and the loan of various equipment and vehicles. While I accept these events occurred their benefit was not quantified. In any event the matters contended for were in the nature of good will offerings and not property. However the indulgences did constitute a financial contribution albeit minor. The nature of the contributions were clearly to benefit both parties. Principally they related to accommodation and the rental, then subsequent acquisition of a house property. They did not put the wife’s father to any actual expense or out of pocket outlay. Given the evidence of their nature I do not consider they were intended to solely benefit the wife: Kessey & Kessey (1994) FLC 92-495 at 81,150. This case is entirely distinguishable from Pellegrino & Pellegrino (1997) FLC 92-789 on its facts. In this case the rental benefit afforded to the parties was provided by a friend to the wife’s father. It was not his gift although recognition is provided for his introduction of that gift to the parties.
Contribution to welfare of the family
The husband concedes that the wife was primarily responsible for the care of the children including those parenting activities which extend beyond immediate care of the children. Her contribution in this regard relieved the husband of the need to apply himself to those matters and thus apply himself to his work. In adopting this role the wife was deprived of the ability to make a greater financial contribution.
Having regard to the contribution factors I consider an equal allowance should be made for the distribution of the matrimonial property between the husband and the wife.
All up, concerning the first pool, I consider an appropriate apportionment of that pool between the parties at 50/50.
Husband’s contribution to wife’s reversionary interest
Although generally a party cannot be regarded as contributors significantly to an inheritance received late in a relationship and certainly not after it has terminated: Bonnici & Bonnici (1992) FLC 92-273 at 75,020 that rule does not apply in unusual circumstances. Such circumstances may include the care of the testator prior to death or other particular services to protect a property: James & James (1978) FLC 90-487. In this case for reasons that follow I accept the husband did make specific contribution to the wife’s father’s estate and some allowance should be made for that contribution.
The wife’s parents operated a small fixed farming operation from the farm. The farm was approximately 180 acres in size. . From all accounts the farming operation was a hands on operation. One can reasonably infer that the farm was not particularly profitable as neither party makes reference in their material to employment of farmhands. Furthermore the uncontested evidence is that the farm itself was subsequently resumed by the P Shire Council for the expansion of the Shire’s refuse tip. It can be inferred it was not prime real estate.
The husband says that he assisted working on the farm at weekends. The work was physically demanding. That statement is not inconsistent with his evidence that many of the chores involved, helping to load and unload 44 gallon drums of animal food and scraps and to assist in cleaning the troughs and cleaning the animals. He says that but for his relationship with the wife he would not have undertaken the work.
The husband was never paid for any of his duties although the wife suggests that the husband received benefits in kind of the nature of horse riding. The physical cost and effort involved certainly appears to have outweighed any benefits. This is particularly so when it is considered that the husband would ride a bicycle from his residence at M out to the farm, a cycle time of approximately one and a half hours each way.
In 1965 the husband turned 17 and finished school. He then obtained employment as an apprentice tradesman with P Pty Ltd. Despite that he continued to assist the wife’s family on the farm every weekend even after he commenced full time employment. At about this time he also obtained a drivers licence and a car. This enabled him to provide further assistance to the family enterprise by driving to local bakeries and farm suppliers to collect food scraps and bags of chaff to feed the animals. This also enabled him to assist the wife’s family through the week as he was able to undertake these tasks weekdays on his way home from work. The husband says that this not only involved effort on his part but also expense because he had to pay for the petrol necessary to undertake that exercise.
The husband swore that by 1966 he and the wife had been going out for approximately two years. He says that he felt at that time that he was treated as a member of the wife’s family. He said that he wife had two older brothers, who left the family farm and cut their ties with the wife and her parents when they joined the Church of God in about 1966. Apparently the wife’s siblings had also worked on the farm but by reason of their new religious beliefs could not have contact with the animals. Accordingly they left the farm leaving it to the wife, the husband and the wife’s parents to operate the farm. There was also the occasional assistance by the wife’s cousin.
The husband says that the decision by the wife’s brothers to leave the farm caused a great deal of difficulty with the family farming business particularly because the parents felt that they had been abandoned by their sons. He says that by reason of these matters the wife’s father told the husband that the wife would inherit the estate. He believes that the wife’s father thereafter amended his will to leave the majority of the estate to the wife. He swore that the rift in the family that was caused by the siblings leaving the family farm had not been repaired at the time of the wife’s father’s death on 6 January 2000.
The objective material supports that evidence. No evidence was adduced by the wife to contradict those matters deposed to by the husband. In particular I note that despite the father dying in January 2000 and the contents of his will being known to the wife’s siblings from no later than July 2000 the wife’s siblings have taken no action to enforce any rights that might be available to them following the will. That failure is particularly salient in the context of a will which essentially excluded them but for a token bequest made in favour of each of them. I note that despite the assertion that the siblings still reside in the region neither of them were called to give evidence in respect of these matters to challenge the evidence given by the husband.
The husband says that he worked on the farm under the direction of the wife’s father and that he had a very good relationship with him. He says that he often discussed with him family business and family finances and that discussions ensued on the assumption that he and the wife would marry and that he would formally become part of the family. He swore that the father said words to the effect that all his work on the farm would not be wasted as when he and the wife married and the husband became a son-in-law he stood to gain in the future because everything that was owned by the father would be going to the wife and therefore indirectly to him, the husband. Statements of that kind are consistent with the social values then current in the mid to late 1960’s in working families.
I accept the husband’s evidence on this matter as true. The father’s statement is consistent with the husband having visited the wife’s parent’s property for almost five years, the wife’s siblings having ceased contributing to the property for the preceding three years and throughout that entire time the husband having made the contributions he did. By the time that statement was made the husband had demonstrated commitment to the wife’s family over both time and by effort. Further the statements were made by the father who was of a generation where marriage involved a lifetime commitment and where the chauvinistic attitudes of the time resulted in the financial affairs being vested in the hands of the male of the household rather than the female.
Furthermore given the estrangement of the wife’s siblings it is apparent that the husband became a substitute son. Because of that matter the husband’s other assertions concerning his ongoing assistance of the father with the maintenance of the property which he subsequently acquired, also have a ring of truth about them, and, accord with commonsense. In particular I accept the submission made on behalf of the husband that the wife’s submission to the contrary is contradictory. For instance it was not challenged that the father taught the husband many skills such as how to operate heavy farm equipment such a bulldozers and other machinery. If the father had not developed any working relationship with the husband then it is unlikely that the father would have been prepared to assist the husband in that regard.
The husband also said that through the course of the marriage he assisted the wife’s father with the maintenance of investment properties which the father had acquired. The maintenance included repairing washing machines and refrigerators and with cleaning and painting of the properties. There is evidence to demonstrate that these activities, particularly painting and some repair activities, were not performed by the husband. That evidence is not inconsistent with the husband’s evidence. The husband did not assert he undertook all these duties. However I accept he did undertake a significant proportion of them. As with the farm activities, the nature of the activities that the husband swears to having undertaken were activities that might have been undertaken by the wife’s siblings. They were in fact undertaken by the husband as substitute for the wife’s siblings.
In the course of cross examination of Ms Cawood it was quite obvious that she was particularly embittered in her attitude toward her former husband. So much was evident by her inability to make even the smallest concession that Mr Cawood had made any positive contribution to the marriage. For instance when it was suggested that he had assisted around the house by undertaking domestic chores a concession that he had assisted in the garden was one which appeared to me to have been reluctantly provided. When cross examined about contributions made by her former spouse to Ms Cawood’s parents’ household, in particular the farm at B, I found her evidence to be incredible. Ms Cawood deposed that during a period of courtship between the parties (which courtship appears to have extended over a period of approximately four years) Mr Cawood attended at the B farm where Ms Cawood then lived with her parents and for some time with her siblings. Despite the fact that the farm was a small family affair Ms Cawood swore that Mr Cawood never made any contribution to that household. At face value Ms Cawood’s evidence was that
Mr Cawood attended at the property and lounged about while those about him actively engaged in the day to day tasks involved in running a small mixed farming operation. Furthermore she deposed that on occasions when he was asked to contribute and assist about the farm he would up and leave and return to Brisbane on the premise that he had work to undertake with his employer as a tradesman in Brisbane
Later in the relationship and after the parties had married Ms Cawood’s father acquired rental properties in Brisbane. Mr Cawood submitted that he assisted in the maintenance of those properties. From cross examination on those matters the only concession that was made concerning Mr Cawood’s involvement in those activities was that he attended occasionally and only when paid.
In my view Ms Cawood’s evidence on these matters is counter intuitive and does not sit comfortably with other objective facts. Although
Ms Cawood’s father did not attend the wedding of Mr and Ms Cawood the basis for his non attendance was a dispute he had with
Ms Cawood’s siblings and his desire not to have to meet with them at the wedding. I accept that it was not the wife’s relationship with the husband and her proposed marriage to him which was the cause of difficulty resulting in the husband’s father-in-law not attending the wedding but instead the difficulty between the father and his sons. Indeed it would appear odd that the wife’s father would later engage the husband after the marriage to undertake repair works about his rental properties if bad blood existed between them long before those events and which no doubt would have been exacerbated if there had been a marriage against his will. Furthermore it strikes me as odd that the parties would have been assisted into their first home on a “grace and favour” basis if the father felt as strongly about the husband as the wife now says he did.
I do not accept the wife’s evidence concerning the lack of contribution by the husband in respect of indirect matters relevant to either the household or the extended household of the wife’s parents.
Evidence supporting the wife on this issue was also adduced from a
Ms V. She gave evidence that she was a close friend of the wife. She knew the wife for a short time prior to the husband meeting her. Throughout that period of approximately four years leading up to the marriage she too says she visited the farm. She said she visited the farm every four to six weeks and that the purpose of her visit was principally social. She said that on the occasions she visited she noted that the husband would ride horses. She also noted that on occasions she (that being Ms V) would assist in the collection of scraps for the animals. She does not recall the husband participating in any active working tasks. She did however concede that she was not necessarily present on every occasion that the husband was at the property and that accordingly it is possible that the husband undertook work activities on occasions when she was not there. Given Ms V’s evidence that the relationship between the parties did not commence until a short time before the parties married it does seem curious that Mr Cawood’s presence would have been for precisely the same social purpose as
Ms V.
I am satisfied that the husband made a significant contribution to the preservation and maintenance of the wife’s father’s property.
That contribution included not only assistance on the farm but also assistance to the father in respect of investment properties that he subsequently acquired including rental properties and a farm at C including assistance on the 40 acre farming property located at Property B which the wife’s father purchased a short time before the parties married.
The wife’s parents did make some contribution to the advancement of the parties’ property interests early in the marriage. That particularly occurred by the wife’s father’s introduction of the parties to the owner of a farm property previously owned by the parents and where the parents had previously resided at B. That property had been the parents’ home until 22 October 1968 when it was sold by the father. The father arranged with the purchasers to allow for the husband and wife to reside on that property from 10 May 1969. The husband and wife were not required to do any work on the property in exchange for the rent free accommodation and were able to reside in the residence on that property until they completed the construction of their own house in 1971. Despite the fact that the property was particularly spartan in that it did not have electricity or town water (and one assumes sewerage) the opportunity of rent free accommodation for the early years of the parties’ marriage enabled them to accelerate their savings to assist in the acquisition and construction of their matrimonial home.
Overall I consider the husband is entitled to an allowance of 15% of the wife’s reversionary interest in her late father’s estate on account of his direct contributions made over the course of his relationship with the wife.
Section 75(2) considerations
Section 75(2)(a)
The husband and wife are each 59 years of age. They both appear to be in reasonable health although the wife is manifesting symptoms of chronic fatigue, depression, arthritis and bad headaches. These symptoms appear consistent with her age.
Section 75(2)(b)
The husband is presently employed with Q and notionally has a further six years before he will reach compulsory retirement age. He is presently in receipt of income of approximately $53,000 per annum plus superannuation. The wife is unemployed and in receipt of a carer’s benefit. Her occupation is now caring for her aged mother. Given the age of the wife and having regard to her employment history and occupational achievements it is unlikely that she will ever return to the workforce. This is particularly so if her aged mother survives in accordance with her anticipated life expectancy. Aside from those matters the parties’ respective property and financial resources are tied into these proceedings.
Section 75(2)(d)
The husband’s financial commitments in respect of support are set out in his financial statement, Form 13 filed 10 July 2007. Broadly he expends his total average weekly income. In addition the husband receives rental in kind as he presently occupies the former matrimonial home. None of the husband’s listed items of expenditure appear unreasonable.
The wife receives only a nominal amount of income. In her affidavit filed 13 July 2007 she noted that she was not in receipt of any social security pension and that she preferred it to remain that way. She swore that she was essentially dependent upon her mother’s charity to have food and a roof over her head and a vehicle to drive. While her intention not to receive social security may appear noble it is unrealistic. Ultimately her mother will die and the wife will have to vacate the residence which she presently occupies with her mother. The wife is not a woman of means and accordingly even allowing for property settlement she will not have sufficient funds to sustain herself in accordance with her previous standard of living. Even allowing for a social security income it is obvious that the wife could possibly be disadvantaged in the event that her circumstances change over the next six years. The six year timeframe is significant because that approximates with the balance of the husband’s working life and also accords with the life expectancy of the wife’s mother.
At the conclusion of the husband’s working life it is obvious from the financial position of the parties that he and the wife would only enjoy a very modest retirement. It seems likely that even having regard to their present financial resources they will require some social security assistance. That position would ensure irrespective of whether the parties were married or divorced.
It follows that in terms of maintenance requirements for the wife the real issue for resolution is whether or not there should be discreet provision made for spousal maintenance in the interim.
For the wife it was submitted that she has no capacity to earn an income but the husband has a $322 week surplus. It was submitted that that sum should be capitalised for a period of six years and awarded to her by way of lump sum spousal maintenance.
For the husband it was contended that the wife has not demonstrated any need. Strictly that matter appears to be correct. The wife’s financial statement does not assist in resolving questions of need by the wife for spousal maintenance in her favour. In any event the wife largely addresses the question of need in her own statement where, as I have earlier noted, she stated that she lives principally on the charity of her mother. Although the wife employs the emotive term “charity” the reality appears to be that the mother has a source of capital which is drawn upon to provide for her sustenance in old age including the costs of maintaining her household. The wife is sustained by drawings made by the mother in that regard. Although it is clear that the wife is not paid a stipend or any remuneration for providing care to her mother the costs of board and a motor vehicle appear to be benefits she enjoys by reason of the care that she provides to her mother.
Despite accepting her expenses of approximately $100 per week the wife does claim to need more than that to live on as that allowance makes no provision for clothes, shoes, makeup, entertainment, hobbies and holidays.
Section 75(2)(e)
While the husband has no responsibilities to support any other person the wife does have responsibilities in respect of her mother. However given the mother’s financial position that responsibility does not adversely impact upon the matrimonial estate. Indeed the matrimonial estate appears to enjoy some minor benefit from that situation.
Section 75(2)(f)
The wife is in receipt of a carer’s benefit. She may shortly also be eligible for an age pension subject to the manner in which she organised her financial affairs.
Section 75(2)(g)
The parties each enjoyed a very modest standard of living when they were together. Following their divorce they each continue to live at a very modest standard.
Section 75(2)(j)
The wife in particular has made considerable contribution to the income earning capacity property and financial resources of the husband. This has occurred particularly because of her contribution to his career by assuming the principal household and housekeeping responsibilities. Furthermore there was contribution by her through her family particularly in recent times. By reason of the wife’s family the husband has been spared the need to make a particular contribution toward maintenance and the upkeep of the wife who largely enjoys those benefits by reason of her involvement as her mother’s carer.
Section 75(2)(k)
The marriage lasted approximately 29 years. In accordance with the agreement of the parties the wife ceased work upon the arrival of their first child. Although she has obtained various forms of employment in the interim the marriage has largely left her unskilled. Irrespective of her age the marriage has adversely affected the earning capacity of the wife.
Section 75(2)(n)
The apportionment of the matrimonial pool in accordance with section 79 will ensure that the wife has a significant capital sum which is properly invested should afford her a reasonable income stream. In addition I am mindful of her prospective inheritance from her mother as discussed above.
Having regard to all the matters required to be considered by section 75(2) I do not consider that the wife should be afforded any additional weighting in the property distribution.
Just and equitable
The parties to this marriage were married for approximately 29 years. They met as teenagers. During the period of their courtship the husband assisted his prospective wife’s father in a small mixed farming operation conducted on the outskirts of Brisbane. Following the marriage of the parties the husband continued to assist his wife’s family in circumstances where the wife’s two brothers had become estranged. The husband became a substitute son. The parties had four children the youngest of whom is now 30 years of age. In the meantime both the husband and the wife each worked diligently in progressing the family unit. The husband was the principal wage earner and the wife was the principal provider of domestic and household services. Toward the end of the marriage the wife’s father died leaving his property (including a farm property) to the wife subject to a life tenancy to the wife’s mother. The farm property was subsequently acquired by the local authority and a net sum of approximately $500,000 was realised in respect of that compulsory acquisition. The husband did make a not insignificant contribution to that estate through the course of his long marriage. A number of years after the father’s death the parties separated. The husband remained in the matrimonial home and the wife took up residence with her mother who is aged and of ailing health. The wife and the mother continue to reside on the late father’s property and will continue to do so into the foreseeable future although at the pleasure of the local authority. The husband continues to work although he will achieve statutory retirement in approximately 6 years time. It is likely that the wife will continue providing care to her mother throughout that period. Approximately 3 years following separation the husband’s mother died leaving a sum of approximately $200,000 to him. There was no suggestion of any contribution to the deceased’s estate by the wife in the same manner that there has been by the husband to the deceased father’s estate. Despite orders being sought for lump sum spousal maintenance I do not consider it appropriate in the circumstances. Upon a consideration of the section 75(2) factors no allowance has been made for spousal maintenance. All up having regard to the property pool valued at $1,410,885.07 the division of property on a 50%/50% basis will result in an allowance in the award of $705,442.53 in favour of the husband and $705,442.53 in favour of the wife. In addition the husband has the benefit of a $200,000 bequest from the estate of his late mother although I do not consider this sum falls into the matrimonial property pool. I consider an additional 15% should be allowed for the husband on account of the wife’s reversionary interest in her father’s estate by reason of his direct contribution to that estate. It has a present value of $428,233. The value of the husband’s entitlement under this head is $64,234.95. I note the wife is the proposed sold beneficiary of her mother’s estate.
All up the husband will receive $769,677.48 and the wife $1,069,440.58 Overall having regard to the circumstances I consider that apportionment as just and equitable in all of the circumstances.
Lump Sum Spousal Maintenance
The wife seeks express orders for spousal maintenance. This matter follows the resolution of the s.79 claim: Clauson & Clauson (1995) FLC 92-595 at 81,907. Following the decision under s.79 which I have determined above I am not satisfied such orders are necessary or appropriate in this case. First from the wife’s evidence I am not satisfied that any immediate need has been demonstrated; second by reason of my orders in the property settlement the wife will have more than sufficient funding to maintain herself. This situation will be significantly enhanced on the death of her mother. Finally I do not think the husband will have the relative means to pay spousal maintenance once property settlement is effected despite there being a present surplus of income over expenses. Once the house is sold he will have to purchase a new dwelling and/or pay rent. That matter will significantly reduce his present cash flow surplus.
I dismiss the wife’s claims for lump sum spousal maintenance.
Orders
I order that the parties submit a draft minute of order giving effect to this judgment by 4.00pm on 16 April 2008
I certify that the preceding one hundred and twenty-eight (128) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Burnett FM
Associate: Beverley Schmidt
Date: 2 April 2008
0
2
0