FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BHM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 917
Appeal from: BHM15 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 2974 File number: NSD 2257 of 2017 Judge: MARKOVIC J Date of judgment: 19 June 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether leave should be granted to appellants to raise new ground of appeal not raised before the primary judge – whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal did not consider evidence that corroborated the first appellant’s claims – appeal allowed. Cases cited: BJT15 v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 1084
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP (2010) 184 FCR 485
NAJT v Minister for Immigration (2005) 147 FCR 51
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59; [2003] HCA 30
SZDGC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1638
SZNCY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 691
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588
WAIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 80 ALD 568; [2004] FCAFC 74
Date of hearing: 31 May 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 62 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr N Poynder Solicitor for the Appellants: Stephen John Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms S Palaniappan Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 2257 of 2017 BETWEEN: BHM15
First Appellant
BHN15
Second Appellant
BHO15
Third Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MARKOVIC J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 JUNE 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Grant leave to the appellants to rely on the ground of appeal.
2.The appeal be allowed.
3.The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.
4.Order 1 of the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) made on 4 December 2017 be set aside and in its place:
(a)order absolute in the first instance for a writ of certiorari to remove into the Court, for the purpose of it being quashed, the decision of the second respondent dated 5 June 2015 to affirm a decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant protection visas to the applicants; and
(b)order absolute in the first instance for a writ of mandamus directing the second respondent to review, according to law, the decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant protection visas to the applicants.
5.Within 14 days of the date of these orders the parties file and serve written submissions, not exceeding 2 pages in length, in relation to Order 2 made in the Federal Circuit Court on 4…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 917
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Tribunal's adverse credibility finding was sufficient to reject the corroborative evidence. The court reasoned that when a decision maker has conducted a hearing and reached the tentative conclusion that the applicant's claims have been fabricated, it is open to them to reject evidence that would corroborate the applicant's account. However, this does not mean that any evidence of corroboration could be rejected outright. The decision maker must assess the nature, content, and quality of the corroborative evidence before determining to reject it. In this case, the court held that the Tribunal was entitled to reject the corroborative evidence as it was proffered by a witness whose credibility had been destroyed, and there was no other evidence to prove its provenance. The court also clarified that the Tribunal is not relieved from giving consideration to corroborative evidence and that it must still be assessed and weighed in the balance with all the other evidence.
Based on the court's findings, the appeal was allowed, and the first respondent was ordered to pay the appellants' costs of the appeal. The court also set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court and directed the second respondent to review, according to law, the decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant protection visas to the applicants.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Grant leave to the appellants to rely on the ground of appeal.
2. The appeal be allowed.
3. The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.
4. Order 1 of the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) made on 4 December 2017 be set aside and in its place:
(a) order absolute in the first instance for a writ of certiorari to remove into the Court, for the purpose of it being quashed, the decision of the second respondent dated 5 June 2015 to affirm a decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant protection visas to the applicants; and
(b) order absolute in the first instance for a writ of mandamus directing the second respondent to review, according to law, the decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant protection visas to the applicants.
5. Within 14 days of the date of these orders the parties file and serve written submissions, not exceeding 2 pages in length, in relation to Order 2 made in the Federal Circuit Court on 4 December 2017 and the issue of the costs of that proceeding and indicate whether that issue can be determined on the papers.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
At [30], [32]-[33] and [36]-[38] their Honours said:30We do not agree with the contention that it is necessary to find expressly that a party has lied before concluding that a piece of evidence which might corroborate the party’s account should be rejected. We do not read McHugh and Gummow JJ as saying that a precondition to the exercise which is described at [49] of their reasons is a finding that the party who is tendering the corroborative evidence in support of the party’s evidence has lied.…32 But even if it is a precondition, a finding that the first respondent’s claims were not credible and that she had fabricated her claim is tantamount to a finding of lying. It is a finding that the party making the claims has made those claims up. To make up claims is to lie about the existence of those claims.33Thus, consistently with Applicant S20/2002 77 ALJR 1165; 198 ALR 59 it was open to the RRT to assess the credit of the first respondent and then, in the light of that assessment, consider what weight should be given to the witness statement. This was the process followed by the RRT which it described in the sentence “Given the adverse credibility finding, the Tribunal does not give weight to the document”. Although expressed in the most cryptic terms, this statement shows that the RRT made an assessment of the value of the witness statement and then considered its effect in the light of the view it had formed to that point about the credibility of the first respondent.…36 When a decision maker has conducted a hearing of the kind which is conducted by the RRT and has heard the applicant, and has reached the tentative conclusion that the applicant’s claims have been fabricated, the decision maker is entitled in our opinion to reject evidence which would, if accepted, have corroborated the applicant’s account. That does not mean that any evidence of corroboration could be rejected. It would depend upon the nature, content and quality of the corroborative evidence before a decision-maker could determine to reject it out of hand. In this case, as we have said, the document which is said to be the corroborative evidence is a document written in the Chinese language which has been interpreted, no doubt faithfully, into the English language and purports to be a statement of Lu. The applicant, whom the RRT believed was not a credible witness, proffered it as Lu’s statement, but there was no other evidence other than the applicant’s say so that it was. There is nothing irrational about the RRT in those circumstances rejecting the document by giving it no weight. In circumstances where the provenance of the document is unproved, but it is proffered by a witness whose credibility has been destroyed, the document has no more credit than the person proffering it. Consequently, the alternative argument relied upon by the appellants, outlined at [22] above, cannot be sustained.37Several further observations should be made concerning the type of situation addressed in Applicant S20/2002 77 ALJR 1165; 198 ALR 59. The case does not relieve the RRT from giving consideration to corroborative evidence. It concerns only the timing of that consideration. The case establishes that the RRT does not act irrationally, and thereby fall into jurisdictional error, by first making an assessment of the applicant’s credit and then giving attention to the corroborative evidence. 38 The RRT would fall into jurisdictional error if, after making an adverse credibility finding, it simply refused to consider the corroborative evidence. Applicant S20/2002 77 ALJR 1165; 198 ALR 59 does not sanction a practice of disregarding corroborative evidence. It still requires that the corroborative evidence be assessed and weighed in the balance with all the other evidence. Consequently, the observation concerning the dicta of McHugh and Gummow JJ at [49] in Applicant S20/2002 77 ALJR 1165; 198 ALR 59 made in SZDGC 105 ALD 25 at [23] is probably misdirected. Those observations addressed the situation where the corroborative evidence was disregarded. Consideration