BHM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BHM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 917

Appeal from: BHM15 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 2974
File number: NSD 2257 of 2017
Judge: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 19 June 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether leave should be granted to appellants to raise new ground of appeal not raised before the primary judge – whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal did not consider evidence that corroborated the first appellant’s claims – appeal allowed.
Cases cited:

BJT15 v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 1084

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP (2010) 184 FCR 485

NAJT v Minister for Immigration (2005) 147 FCR 51

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59; [2003] HCA 30

SZDGC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1638

SZNCY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 691

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588

WAIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 80 ALD 568; [2004] FCAFC 74

Date of hearing: 31 May 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 62
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr N Poynder
Solicitor for the Appellants: Stephen John Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms S Palaniappan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 2257 of 2017
BETWEEN:

BHM15

First Appellant

BHN15

Second Appellant

BHO15

Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 JUNE 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Grant leave to the appellants to rely on the ground of appeal.

2.The appeal be allowed.

3.The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.

4.Order 1 of the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) made on 4 December 2017 be set aside and in its place:

(a)order absolute in the first instance for a writ of certiorari to remove into the Court, for the purpose of it being quashed, the decision of the second respondent dated 5 June 2015 to affirm a decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant protection visas to the applicants; and

(b)order absolute in the first instance for a writ of mandamus directing the second respondent to review, according to law, the decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant protection visas to the applicants.

5.Within 14 days of the date of these orders the parties file and serve written submissions, not exceeding 2 pages in length, in relation to Order 2 made in the Federal Circuit Court on 4…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 917
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of BHM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellants sought leave to raise a new ground of appeal before the court, challenging the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The primary issue was whether the Tribunal erred in not considering evidence that corroborated the first appellant's claims. The court had to determine if the Tribunal's failure to consider the evidence led to a miscarriage of justice and whether the Tribunal was required to explicitly find that the first appellant lied before rejecting the corroborative evidence.

The court found that the Tribunal's adverse credibility finding was sufficient to reject the corroborative evidence. The court reasoned that when a decision maker has conducted a hearing and reached the tentative conclusion that the applicant's claims have been fabricated, it is open to them to reject evidence that would corroborate the applicant's account. However, this does not mean that any evidence of corroboration could be rejected outright. The decision maker must assess the nature, content, and quality of the corroborative evidence before determining to reject it. In this case, the court held that the Tribunal was entitled to reject the corroborative evidence as it was proffered by a witness whose credibility had been destroyed, and there was no other evidence to prove its provenance. The court also clarified that the Tribunal is not relieved from giving consideration to corroborative evidence and that it must still be assessed and weighed in the balance with all the other evidence.

Based on the court's findings, the appeal was allowed, and the first respondent was ordered to pay the appellants' costs of the appeal. The court also set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court and directed the second respondent to review, according to law, the decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant protection visas to the applicants.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Grant leave to the appellants to rely on the ground of appeal.

2. The appeal be allowed.

3. The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.

4. Order 1 of the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) made on 4 December 2017 be set aside and in its place:

(a) order absolute in the first instance for a writ of certiorari to remove into the Court, for the purpose of it being quashed, the decision of the second respondent dated 5 June 2015 to affirm a decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant protection visas to the applicants; and

(b) order absolute in the first instance for a writ of mandamus directing the second respondent to review, according to law, the decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse to grant protection visas to the applicants.

5. Within 14 days of the date of these orders the parties file and serve written submissions, not exceeding 2 pages in length, in relation to Order 2 made in the Federal Circuit Court on 4 December 2017 and the issue of the costs of that proceeding and indicate whether that issue can be determined on the papers.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons which follow, leave to raise the new ground on appeal should be granted and the appeal should be allowed.BACKGROUND The following background facts, which I understand to be uncontroversial, are based substantially on the appellants’ submissions. On 13 May 2013 the Wife and Child travelled to Pakistan, returning to Australia on 23 July 2013. On 26 August 2013 the Wife lodged her application for the Protection Visas. The Husband and Child applied for protection as members of the Wife’s family unit and do not have their own protection claims. In her statement annexed to the application for the Protection Visas the Wife claimed that:·she was a Christian from Rawalpindi. Her parents had permitted the Hosanna Church to occupy part of one of their properties and her father had given money to the churches to provide accommodation, food and lodging for poor Christians who were exploited by Muslims;·her father was also an Elder of the Emmanuel Church;·she was involved, with her family, in visiting Christian suburbs and the homes of people living in poverty in search of talented Christian children who, with the consent of their parents, were brought to the churches for education;·upon completing her studies in 2007 she became involved full time in the church and was also involved in visiting remote Christian villages in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Her uncle and aunt lived in Peshawar in the NWFP and she travelled there frequently with her father. She was shocked to find talented Christian youths from poor families in that area who had been forcibly converted to Islam. She persuaded her father to permit her to bring these youths to Rawalpindi and accommodate them in the churches. She was assisted by Reverend Pastor Titus (Pastor Titus) of the Hosanna Church;·in September 2008 she was offered a job at the Church World Service Pakistan/Afghanistan (CWSP/A) as an accounts assistant and was later promoted to assistant finance manager. At CWSP/A she was able to provide Pastor Titus with contact details of international organisations so that he could, in turn, contact them and inform them of the predicament of Christian children in the NWFP and Balochistan;·in about 2009 Pastor Titus started travelling to Peshawar representing these organisations and met many church priests in the NWFP and Balochistan. He became well known as a person trying to protect Christian children held captive by militants. Because of his work, Pastor Titus was arrested, tortured and beaten by militants and police officers. He later died of a heart attack;·her father heard from police officers that militants were planning to track down the Christians involved in taking Christian youths who had been converted to Islam. Her father advised her to apply to travel overseas. The Wife told her father that she and the Husband, who at the time was her fiancé, had applied for overseas study scholarships and were awaiting the outcome of those applications;·the Husband obtained a scholarship to further his studies overseas and they married on 2 January 2011 so that she could accompany him as a dependant. She then moved to her Husband’s home in Rawalpindi;·the police subsequently visited her father to question him about her involvement with Pastor Titus. Her father denied any such involvement. The police also visited her uncle and aunt in Peshawar and beat her aunt’s son when he objected to their accusations against her;·the Wife moved to an uncle’s house for further protection while she awaited the issue of her visa to travel to Australia. Her uncle drove her to and from her workplace;·once in Australia she was told by her parents that the police had returned to look for her and that her father continued to receive anonymous calls threatening to take her away because of her involvement in transporting Muslim youths from Peshawar. The local mullah also told her father that local terrorist groups had informed him that she had been involved in transporting Muslim children to Rawalpindi together with Pastor Titus but her father convinced the mullah that only Pastor Titus was involved. Her father told her that she could return to Pakistan once her husband had completed his course in Australia;·after the birth of the Child in August 2012, the Wife’s parents and two sisters visited her in Australia and told her that the situation in Pakistan was getting worse for Christians. Her father again told her that she should return to Pakistan only when her Husband had completed his studies;·she was very happy when told by her Husband that his course would be completed in mid-2013 as she could take the Child to Pakistan and live with her family. At the time her Husband’s house that she had lived in before departing Pakistan was being rented by tenants. They decided to terminate their tenancy and on 13 May 2013 the Wife left Australia with the Child and returned to Pakistan to arrange for the house to be cleaned and to ready it for her Husband’s arrival;·on 12 July 2013, while travelling with her brother and the Child back to their house at about 7.30 pm, they were intercepted by a car carrying three people in Shilwar Kameez (a type of traditional dress) with beards and guns. She was dragged out of the car by one of the people and another snatched the Child. The Wife started screaming and passersby came to help. The men left telling her that while she had managed to escape this time, next time she would not escape and that she should “count the number of days before [she] die[s]”;·her father took her to the police station and she lodged a first incident report (FIR). The police officers told her that it would not be wise to stay on any further as they would not be able to save her from the militants who were aware of her involvement with Pastor Titus. The police told her father that she should leave the country before she could be murdered or shot dead; and·she spoke to her Husband who told her to come back to Australia immediately. She moved to her uncle’s house until she boarded a flight to Australia.

Decision

Reasons for decision

After considering each of the Wife’s claims, the delegate summarised his findings. While the delegate accepted that the Wife was a Christian, he did not accept that she was the author of her own narrative; that she visited Christian village people in Peshawar and NWFP to promote and raise the profile of children and youths being forcibly recruited to Islam; that she was directly involved in the re-conversion of Muslim children and youths to Christianity or that she was involved in transporting them to Rawalpindi; that she was involved in “rescuing” former Christian females who had been abducted in Peshawar and NWFP; or that she promoted the Christian religion. For those reasons the delegate noted that he was entitled to make an adverse credibility finding.TRIBUNAL DECISION On 17 June 2014 the appellants sought review of the delegate’s decision. On 28 May 2015 the Husband and Wife appeared before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments. They were assisted by an interpreter in the Urdu language. At the commencement of the hearing the Wife provided the Tribunal with a number of documents, including a letter dated 8 May 2015 from the Hosanna church in Rawalpindi (Hosanna Church Letter) and a letter from the Australian Indian Christian Church in Sydney. The Hosanna Church Letter attested to the Wife’s involvement in the church and noted that following the death of Pastor Titus “she faced threats due to her involvement in bringing and reconversion of these children back to Christianity” and that she “was attacked by armed men in July 2013”. In its decision record (DR) under the heading “Findings” the Tribunal addressed three issues:(1)“The [Wife’s] evidence about the events which led to her departure from Pakistan in July 2011”;(2)“Delay in seeking protection and the [Wife’s] willingness to return to Pakistan in 2013”; and(3)“Conclusions on credibility”. In relation to the first issue, the Tribunal set out the Wife’s claims and evidence before making its findings commencing at [17] of the DR. In doing so, the Tribunal said that:·given that someone from the church she attended every Sunday, which was operated in a building owned by her father, had been apprehended and badly treated in August 2010 because of the same work the Wife had done, it seemed “improbable” that the first inquiry to her family to locate her whereabouts was not made until February 2011 and that no further inquiries were made until after the Wife left Pakistan: DR at [17];·it “had difficulty accepting” that the Hosanna church, where Pastor Titus was based, was not searched by the police or militants until February 2011 when the local mullah sent people: DR at [17];·it was “very sceptical” of the Wife’s responses in relation to the Tribunal’s concern as to why there was only one attempt in February 2011 to locate her at the Hosanna church and that its “scepticism was enhanced by the [Wife’s] own behaviour from the time [Pastor Titus] was apprehended in August 2010”: DR at [19];·it did not accept that the Wife would have behaved the way she did, by continuing to attend the Hosanna church until April 2011, continuing to attend work until her departure for Australia and doing very little to actually avoid being apprehended beyond leaving Pakistan, once she knew that the police and others were looking for her. The Tribunal did not believe that the Wife would think that the police would simply not pursue her after visiting her father in February 2011 when he told the police that she was not involved: DR at [22]; and·did not believe that the Wife would fail to make some attempt from August 2010, when Pastor Titus was apprehended and maltreated, to live covertly.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At [30], [32]-[33] and [36]-[38] their Honours said:30We do not agree with the contention that it is necessary to find expressly that a party has lied before concluding that a piece of evidence which might corroborate the party’s account should be rejected. We do not read McHugh and Gummow JJ as saying that a precondition to the exercise which is described at [49] of their reasons is a finding that the party who is tendering the corroborative evidence in support of the party’s evidence has lied.…32 But even if it is a precondition, a finding that the first respondent’s claims were not credible and that she had fabricated her claim is tantamount to a finding of lying. It is a finding that the party making the claims has made those claims up. To make up claims is to lie about the existence of those claims.33Thus, consistently with Applicant S20/2002 77 ALJR 1165; 198 ALR 59 it was open to the RRT to assess the credit of the first respondent and then, in the light of that assessment, consider what weight should be given to the witness statement. This was the process followed by the RRT which it described in the sentence “Given the adverse credibility finding, the Tribunal does not give weight to the document”. Although expressed in the most cryptic terms, this statement shows that the RRT made an assessment of the value of the witness statement and then considered its effect in the light of the view it had formed to that point about the credibility of the first respondent.…36 When a decision maker has conducted a hearing of the kind which is conducted by the RRT and has heard the applicant, and has reached the tentative conclusion that the applicant’s claims have been fabricated, the decision maker is entitled in our opinion to reject evidence which would, if accepted, have corroborated the applicant’s account. That does not mean that any evidence of corroboration could be rejected. It would depend upon the nature, content and quality of the corroborative evidence before a decision-maker could determine to reject it out of hand. In this case, as we have said, the document which is said to be the corroborative evidence is a document written in the Chinese language which has been interpreted, no doubt faithfully, into the English language and purports to be a statement of Lu. The applicant, whom the RRT believed was not a credible witness, proffered it as Lu’s statement, but there was no other evidence other than the applicant’s say so that it was. There is nothing irrational about the RRT in those circumstances rejecting the document by giving it no weight. In circumstances where the provenance of the document is unproved, but it is proffered by a witness whose credibility has been destroyed, the document has no more credit than the person proffering it. Consequently, the alternative argument relied upon by the appellants, outlined at [22] above, cannot be sustained.37Several further observations should be made concerning the type of situation addressed in Applicant S20/2002 77 ALJR 1165; 198 ALR 59. The case does not relieve the RRT from giving consideration to corroborative evidence. It concerns only the timing of that consideration. The case establishes that the RRT does not act irrationally, and thereby fall into jurisdictional error, by first making an assessment of the applicant’s credit and then giving attention to the corroborative evidence. 38 The RRT would fall into jurisdictional error if, after making an adverse credibility finding, it simply refused to consider the corroborative evidence. Applicant S20/2002 77 ALJR 1165; 198 ALR 59 does not sanction a practice of disregarding corroborative evidence. It still requires that the corroborative evidence be assessed and weighed in the balance with all the other evidence. Consequently, the observation concerning the dicta of McHugh and Gummow JJ at [49] in Applicant S20/2002 77 ALJR 1165; 198 ALR 59 made in SZDGC 105 ALD 25 at [23] is probably misdirected. Those observations addressed the situation where the corroborative evidence was disregarded. Consideration