NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
CITATION:
Bevillesta Pty Ltd v D Tannous No 2 Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 277
FILE NUMBER(S):
2008/288054
HEARING DATE(S):
29 September 2010
JUDGMENT DATE:
27 October 2010
PARTIES:
Bevillesta Pty Ltd - Appellant
D Tannous No 2 Pty Ltd - First Respondent
Gabriel Rahme - Second Respondent
J & J Rahme Pty Ltd - Third Respondent
JUDGMENT OF:
Allsop P McColl JA Handley AJA
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:
Supreme Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):
SC 2008/288054
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:
Barr AJ
LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION:
7 May 2010
COUNSEL:
CT Barry QC with JE Richards - for the Appellant
RW Washington - for the Respondents
SOLICITORS:
Shand & Associates - for the Appellant
Benjamin & Khoury - for the Respondents
CATCHWORDS:
COSTS – whether appropriate to order that costs should be payable forthwith – unreasonable conduct – failure to act expeditiously in conduct of proceedings – failure to assist in furthering overriding purpose – s 56 – 58, s 98, Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) – UCPR 42.7
LEGISLATION CITED:
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Corporations Law
Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth)
Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW)
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW)
Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005
CATEGORY:
Principal judgment
CASES CITED:
Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc [1981] HCA 39; (1981) 148 CLR 170
Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Limited [1993] HCA 15; (1993) 177 CLR 485
BPM Pty Ltd v HPM Pty Ltd (1996) 14 ACLC 857
D Tannous (No 2) Pty Ltd v Bevillesta Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 782
Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 432; (2002) 55 NSWLR 1
Horrobin v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1997] NSWCA 154
House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499
Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72
Re Will of Gilbert (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 318
Skinner v Jeogla Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 15; (2001) 37 ACSR 106
Thunderdome Racetiming and Scoring Pty Ltd v Dorian Industries Pty Ltd (1992) 36 FCR 297
Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning [1947] HCA 21; (1947) 74 CLR 492
Wentworth v Wentworth [2000] NSWCA 350; (2001) 52 NSWLR 602
TEXTS CITED:
DECISION:
1. Grant leave to appeal in relation to the primary judge’s refusal to order that the costs orders in paragraphs 2, 11 and 12 of the orders made on 30 April 2010 be recoverable forthwith insofar as they were made against each corporate respondent. 2. Appellant to file a notice of appeal confined to the fourth ground of appeal in the draft notice of appeal included in the White Book again confined to those orders insofar as they concerned the corporate respondents. 3. Appeal allowed. 4. In addition to the orders made by the primary judge, order that the corporate respondents pay…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Bevillesta Pty Ltd v D Tannous No 2 Pty Ltd and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2010] NSWCA 277
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the primary judge had erred in exercising their discretion by refusing to order that the costs awarded to the appellant against the corporate respondents be paid forthwith. This involved an examination of the relevant provisions of the *Civil Procedure Act 2005* (NSW) and the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), particularly in relation to the court's power to order the immediate payment of interlocutory costs.
The Court of Appeal reasoned that while the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 no longer contained the specific guidance previously found in the Supreme Court Rules 1970 regarding when interlocutory costs could be ordered payable forthwith, the overarching discretion to "otherwise order" was preserved. The court noted that the former rule's inclusion of "justice otherwise demands it" indicated that the discretion was broad and guided by the demands of justice, rather than being confined to a closed list of circumstances. The court found that the primary judge's refusal to order costs forthwith, in circumstances where the appellant contended for such an order due to the conduct of the proceedings, was an error.
Consequently, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. It ordered that the corporate respondents pay the costs the subject of specific earlier orders forthwith, in addition to the orders made by the primary judge. The court also made specific orders regarding the costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal itself, including a certificate under the *Suitors' Fund Act 1951* (NSW) if qualified.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Grant leave to appeal in relation to the primary judge’s refusal to order that the costs orders in paragraphs 2, 11 and 12 of the orders made on 30 April 2010 be recoverable forthwith insofar as they were made against each corporate respondent. 2. Appellant to file a notice of appeal confined to the fourth ground of appeal in the draft notice of appeal included in the White Book again confined to those orders insofar as they concerned the corporate respondents. 3. Appeal allowed. 4. In addition to the orders made by the primary judge, order that the corporate respondents pay the costs the subject of paragraphs 2, 11 and 12 of the orders made on 30 April 2010 forthwith. 5. The third respondent, Gabriel Rahme, to pay the costs of the application for leave to appeal insofar as it concerned the question whether the costs he was ordered to pay in paragraphs 2, 11 and 12 of the orders made on 30 April 2010 be payable forthwith. 6. Subject to paragraph 5 above, the first and second respondents are to pay the costs of the application for leave to appeal and of the appeal. 7. The respondents to have a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951 (NSW) if qualified.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Washington submitted that the primary judge had a full discretion to make the costs payable forthwith or at the conclusion of the litigation: s 98(1), CP Act. He contended that the costs orders Barr AJ made related to “principally the rendering into a far more justiciable form (and a form compliant with the orders of Hall J) the substantive allegations of the remaining plaintiffs”. He argued that when his Honour made his orders, he was aware of the strength of the respondents’ case and their financial position as well as their contention that the appellant’s conduct had contributed to that position and that those were factors which supported the exercise of his Honour’s discretion in the respondents’ favour not to order the costs be payable forthwith.Consideration Prior to the adoption of the UCPR, the position as to whether interlocutory costs could be ordered to be paid prior to the conclusion of proceedings was governed by Pt 52A r 9 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW) which relevantly provided:“(1) Where before the conclusion of any proceedings, other than proceedings entered in the Commercial List or the Technology and Construction List, the Court makes an order for the payment of costs or a motion is refused with costs, the costs shall not, unless the Court otherwise orders, be payable until the conclusion of the proceedings.….(3) Where in any proceedings:(a) it appears to the Court that:(i) a party has been subject to unreasonable delay or default on the part of any other party,(ii) the proceedings are unreasonably protracted, or(iii) justice otherwise demands it, or(b) a costs order is made under r 43 or r 43A,the Court may order that costs, or a specified amount on account of costs, be payable forthwith.” I have earlier set out UCPR 42.7 which now governs this issue. It no longer contains the guidance as to when a costs forthwith order could be made previously found in Pt 52A r 9(3). However, as the following discussion makes apparent, Pt 52A r 9(3) featured only briefly in procedural history. In Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd Barrett J held that Pt 52A r 9(3) did not comprise an exhaustive catalogue of the circumstances in which the court may order that costs be payable forthwith but, rather, the words “unless the Court otherwise orders” in Pt 52A r 9(1) were sufficient to preserve a discretion to make such an order in circumstances not within r 9(3). His Honour pointed out (at [5]) that the r 9(3) list “was added, with effect from 1 March 2000, by rules made by the Rules Committee on 20 December 1999” and was part of the collection of measures whose object was “to make it clear that the overriding purpose of the rules is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in civil proceedings”. Barrett J also observed (at [7]) that the debate about the effect, if any, of the introduction of r 9(3) was “somewhat sterile” having regard to the fact that one of the circumstances in which that rule contemplated the making of an order that costs, or a specified amount on account of costs, be payable forthwith was where “it appears to the Court that ... justice otherwise demands it”. In his Honour’s view that was “in the nature of a restatement of the guiding principle which would, in the ordinary course, be applied in determining, under r 9(1), whether it is appropriate that the court ‘otherwise orders’.” His Honour (at [8]) found comfort in reaching this conclusion in the following observation of Olney J in Thunderdome Racetiming and Scoring Pty Ltd v Dorian Industries Pty Ltd (1992) 36 FCR 297 (at 312), a decision on the provision of the Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) similar to r 9(1):“The rule does not suggest any particular criteria by which the court should be guided in approaching such an application, and accordingly I take the view that the discretion should be exercised in favour of a party who establishes that the demands of justice require that there be a departure from what appears to be the general practice envisaged by the rule, namely, that an order for costs of an interlocutory proceeding should not entitle a party to have a bill of costs taxed until the principal proceeding in which the interlocutory order was made is concluded.”