Caruso v Built It Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application)

CARUSO v BUILT IT PTY LTD (IN LIQ) (No 2)

[2019] SASC 125

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Parker

22 July 2019

MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT - PROCEDURE - TIME FOR APPEAL AND EXTENSION

CORPORATIONS - WINDING UP - CONDUCT AND INCIDENTS OF WINDING UP - PROCEEDINGS BY OR AGAINST THE COMPANY - LEAVE TO PROCEED - WHETHER LEAVE REQUIRED

CORPORATIONS - WINDING UP - CONDUCT AND INCIDENTS OF WINDING UP - PROCEEDINGS BY OR AGAINST THE COMPANY - LEAVE TO PROCEED - WHEN LEAVE GRANTED

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - INTERFERENCE WITH JUDGE'S FINDINGS OF FACT

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW - PARTICULAR CASES - OTHER MATTERS - COSTS

This is an interlocutory application by the appellant concerning the listing of an appeal.

The appellant seeks, in effect, to proceed with his appeal against the judgment of the Magistrate. Two issues arise. First, whether the appeal is taken to have been discontinued and lapsed under r 296(2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA). Secondly, whether the appeal is subject to a stay under s 471B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). In respect of the latter issue, the appellant contends that leave under s 471B is not required to proceed with the appeal, on the basis that the appellate proceeding has a “defensive” character. In the alternative, if leave under s 471B is required, the appellant contends that leave should be granted.

Held, per Parker J, granting leave under s 471B of the Corporations Act and r 288(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules for the appellant to appeal on a limited point in respect of costs:

1.  To the extent that there is any inconsistency, the specific provisions of the Supreme Court Civil Supplementary Rules 2014 (SA) dealing with appeals to a single judge must prevail over the provisions of the Supreme Court Civil Rules that refer to appeals generally (at [18]).

2.  The setting down of appeals to a single judge is governed by supp r 232 and not by r 296. Rule 296(2) did not operate to deem the appeal to have been discontinued and lapsed (at [15]-[22]).

3.  An appeal to the Supreme Court of South Australia is a “proceeding” within the meaning of s 471B (at [35]-[55]).

4.  The present appeal does not fall within the scope of the exception to s 471B for “defensive proceedings” (at [35]-[57]).

5.  Leave is required under s 471B to proceed with the appeal (at [58]).

6.  For the Court to grant leave under s 471B, the proceeding must have a solid foundation in law and fact and give rise to a serious dispute. In the context of an appeal, the question is whether the appeal is reasonably arguable (at [59]-[63]).

7.  Revised grounds 1 to 11 now advanced by the appellant are not…

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Details
Case
[2019] SASC 125
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Caruso v Built It Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) involved an appeal by the appellant against a judgment awarded in the Magistrates Court of South Australia. The respondent, Built It Pty Ltd, had originally filed a claim against the appellant for money owed for building work completed between May 2013 and March 2014. On 14 September 2017, the Magistrate ruled in favour of the respondent, awarding them $33,938.50 plus interest and costs. The appellant subsequently appealed this decision, but the appeal faced complications due to the respondent's liquidation by the Federal Court of Australia on 22 November 2017. The legal issues before the court included whether the appeal was deemed discontinued under r 296(2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules due to the delay in setting it down for hearing, and whether the appeal was subject to a stay under s 471B of the Corporations Act following the respondent's liquidation.

The court found that the appeal was not automatically discontinued and lapsed under r 296(2) because the appeal was to a single judge, governed by different rules concerning the setting down of appeals. The court also determined that the appeal was not stayed by s 471B of the Corporations Act, as the specific provisions governing appeals to a single judge did not mandate such a stay. Consequently, the court granted leave to the appellant to appeal solely on the issue of the principle to be applied in determining the costs payable concerning the argument about costs and interest, while denying leave on other grounds. The appellant was required to file a compliant notice of appeal within seven days and serve it on the respondent’s solicitor. The court further ordered that the parties would be heard regarding the costs of the interlocutory application.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, I grant leave under s 471B of the Corporations Act and r 288(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules for the appellant to appeal only on ground 12 set out in the handwritten revised notice of appeal handed up to the Court on 1 May 2019. That appeal is limited to the principle to be applied in determining the costs payable by the appellant in respect of the argument about costs and interest. I otherwise refuse leave to appeal under s 471B of the Corporations Act and to the extent that the appeal concerns orders for costs (other than to the extent already stated) I also refuse permission under r 288(1)(b). I will also make certain orders concerning the notice of appeal. Background On 1 October 2014, the respondent commenced proceedings against the appellant in the Magistrates Court for moneys payable for building work that it undertook between about May 2013 and March 2014. On 14 September 2017, a Magistrate awarded judgment against the appellant in the amount of $33,938.50 “plus interest and costs to be agreed or taxed”. The Magistrate did not specify at that time the basis upon which costs were to be determined. In the absence of any contrary indication, it must be understood that costs were awarded on a party/party basis. On 5 October 2017, the appellant appealed against the order that he was liable to pay $33,938.50 to the respondent. It is this appeal which is the subject of the present interlocutory application. On 21 November 2017, the respondent applied for the award of costs and interest on either a contractual indemnity basis in the sum of $121,528.63 or an indemnity basis. The costs claimed at that time comprised solicitor fees in the sum of $61,278.80, counsel fees totalling $30,800 and court fees of $292. On 22 November 2017, the Federal Court of Australia made an order for the winding up of the respondent. The respondent contends that, as a result of this order, the appeal was automatically stayed by force of s 471B of the Corporations Act. The respondent also contends that because the appeal filed on 5 October 2017 was not set down for hearing within six months, r 296(2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules operated to deem the appeal to have been discontinued and lapsed on 5 April 2018. For the reasons explained below, I do not consider that r 296(2) applied because this appeal was to a single judge. On 5 May 2018 the appellant filed a reply to the respondent’s application for costs, advancing the position that costs should be awarded on a party/party basis. The delay of almost six months has not been explained. On 27 April 2018, the appellant filed an interlocutory application under s 471B of the Corporations Act, seeking leave to bring an application to set aside the Magistrate’s judgment under r 104 of the Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 2013 (SA). The application was heard by Doyle J, who dismissed the application on 1 June 2019.[1] His Honour found that the proposed application under r 104, which requires proof that judgment was obtained through fraud or an irregularity, did not have a solid foundation in fact or law. The appellant did not at that time seek leave under s 471B to continue with the appeal against the decision of the Magistrate.[2] [1] Caruso v Built It Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] SASC 71.[2] Ibid at [2] (Doyle J).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Accordingly, I consider that revised ground 12 is reasonably arguable in so far as it refers to the principle to be applied in assessing the costs of the argument about the award of costs and interest. I will therefore grant permission to appeal in respect of that matter only.Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, I grant leave under s 471B of the Corporations Act and permission under r 288(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules for the appellant to appeal only on ground 12 in the handwritten revised notice of appeal handed up to the Court on 1 May 2019. That appeal is limited to the principle to be applied in determining the costs payable by the appellant in respect of the argument about costs and interest. I otherwise refuse leave to proceed with the appeal under s 471B of the Corporations Act and to the extent that the appeal concerns orders for costs (other than to the extent already stated) I also refuse permission under r 288(1)(b). If the appellant intends to proceed with the appeal on ground 12, within seven days he must file a notice of appeal that is consistent with my ruling and that complies in all relevant respects with the Supreme Court Civil Rules. That notice must also be served upon on the solicitor for the respondent within seven days. I will hear the parties as to the costs of the interlocutory application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant seeks, in effect, to proceed with his appeal against the judgment of the Magistrate published on 14 September 2017. Two issues arise. First, whether the appeal is taken to have been discontinued and lapsed under r 296(2). Secondly, whether the appeal is subject to a stay under s 471B of the Corporations Act.Operation of r 296(2) Neither party made detailed submissions about the operation of r 296 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules and the corresponding discretionary powers of the Court. However, both parties considered that r 296(2) had operated to deem the appeal to have been discontinued and lapsed. The parties nevertheless focused their submissions on s 471B of the Corporations Act. Rule 296(2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules relevantly provides that:(2)Unless an appellate proceeding is set down for hearing within 6 months after the proceeding is commenced or a longer time allowed by the Court, the proceeding is taken to have been discontinued and lapses. Despite the dismissal of an appellate proceeding under this rule, the Court may, for special reasons, reinstate the appellate proceeding. I consider that the parties were mistaken in their view that the appeal had been discontinued and lapsed under r 296(2) on 5 April 2018 because it was not set down for hearing within six months. My reasons follow. Division 1 of Part 5 of Chapter 13 of the Supreme Court Civil Supplementary Rules 2014 (SA) deals with appeals to a single judge. An appeal from the Magistrates Court lies to a single judge. Thus, the present appeal lay to a single judge and was governed by Division 1 of Part 5 of Chapter 13 of the Supplementary Rules. To the extent that there is any inconsistency, the specific provisions of the Supplementary Rules dealing with appeals to a single judge must prevail over the provisions of the Rules that refer to appeals generally. While supp r 234 does not apply in the present case, for completeness I note that if a single judge refers an appeal from the Magistrates Court to the Full Court then the appeal will be subject to the Rules applicable to appeals direct to the Full Court, including the setting down of the appeal. The terms of supp r 234 reinforce my conclusion that, in cases where supp r 234 does not apply, the setting down of appeals to a single judge is governed by supp r 232 and not by r 296. Supplementary Rule 232 deals with the setting down of appeals to a single judge in the following terms:232—Setting down appeal(1) An appeal that is to be heard by a single Judge will be allocated to a single Judge appeal sittings month being a month the first day of which is no sooner than 21 calendar days after the date of filing. (2) The first day of the sittings month is usually the first Monday of the calendar month, except for January. (3) The Registrar will forward a notice to the parties confirming the sittings month to which the appeal has been allocated. (4) During the previous month, the Registrar will publish in the Court’s case list a warning list of appeals that will be listed for hearing in the following month.(5) A party is not required to set the appeal down.