SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil: Application)
CARUSO v BUILT IT PTY LTD (IN LIQ) (No 3)
[2019] SASC 147
Reasons for Decision of The Honourable Justice Parker
19 August 2019
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COURT SUPERVISION - AMENDMENT
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - PLEADINGS - STRIKING OUT - OTHERWISE ABUSE OF PROCESS
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - AMENDING, VARYING AND SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - ACTIONS TO REVIEW OR SET ASIDE JUDGMENT OR ORDER - WHERE FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION OR SUPPRESSION OF MATERIAL FACTS
CONTRACTS - BUILDING, ENGINEERING AND RELATED CONTRACTS - REMUNERATION - RECOVERY ON QUANTUM MERUIT
Two interlocutory applications concerning an amended notice of appeal filed on 29 July 2019 came before this Court. The appellant applied for leave to appeal in the terms of the amended notice of appeal, while the respondent applied for the amended notice of appeal to be struck out as an abuse of process.
The amended notice of appeal was filed following an earlier judgment of 22 July 2019 where, save for one exception in respect of the award of costs, the appellant was refused leave to appeal under s 471B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and permission under r 288(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA). The majority of the amended grounds of appeal extend beyond the limited scope of leave and permission granted to the appellant. To a large degree those grounds effectively repeat contentions advanced by the appellant at earlier stages in this proceeding.
The appellant seeks to justify this approach by referring to adverse findings recently made against the director of the respondent by the District Court in Commissioner for Consumer Affairs v Built It Pty Ltd [2019] SADC 66.
Held, per Parker J, dismissing the appellant’s application and upholding the respondent’s application:
1. From the time that the appeal was adjourned for argument, under r 294(2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, the appellant required the permission of the Court to amend the notice of appeal (at [18]).
2. Amended grounds 1 to 3 and 5 to 7 extend beyond the scope of leave and permission granted to the appellant. The appellant cannot pursue those grounds unless the Court grants leave under s 471B and permission under r 288(1)(b) and r 294(2) (at [19]).
3. Although the appellant has pursued this interlocutory application on the ostensible basis that he is seeking to revise the grounds of appeal, the practical effect of the application is to seek to re-open matters already decided against him and which are the subject of adverse orders made by the Court (at [13], [20]).
4. Section 6(2) of the Building Work Contractors Act 1995 (SA) does not preclude an unlicensed builder from recovering on a quantum meruit basis in a case where the building owner has accepted the benefit of the work performed (at [38]-[43]).
5. There is no…
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- Case
- [2019] SASC 147
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the amended grounds of appeal were reasonably arguable and whether they fell within the scope of the permission to appeal previously granted. The court held that the amended grounds 1 to 3 and 5 to 7 were outside the scope of the permission to appeal and were struck out under r 117 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules. The court found that it was not reasonably arguable that the Magistrate erred in respect of the award of the costs of the trial and interest. The court granted leave under s 471B of the Corporations Act and permission under r 288(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules for the appellant to appeal on ground 4 of the amended notice of appeal dated 29 July 2019.
In conclusion, the court dismissed the appellant's interlocutory application and upheld the respondent's interlocutory application in respect of grounds 1 to 3 and 5 to 7 of the amended notice of appeal. The court struck out grounds 1 to 3 and 5 to 7 of the amended notice of appeal under r 117 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules. The court granted leave under s 471B of the Corporations Act and permission under r 288(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules for the appellant to appeal on ground 4 of the amended notice of appeal dated 29 July 2019. The court ordered that the parties would be heard as to the costs of the two interlocutory applications dated 8 August 2019.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It was these two interlocutory applications which came before the Court on 12 August 2019.ConsiderationConsideration — leave to appeal in the terms of the amended notice of appeal In my judgment published on 22 July 2019, I examined the merits of a challenge to the overall decision of the Magistrates Court as to costs, and concluded that it was not reasonably arguable that the Magistrate erred in respect of the award of the costs of the trial and interest. My reasoning was as follows:[10][10] Caruso v Built It Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2019] SASC 125 at [106]-[115] (Parker J).Revised ground 12 contends that the Magistrate erred in law and fact in awarding the respondent costs on a solicitor/client basis from the end of day 2 of the trial although the defendant had been substantially successful on the indemnity costs and rate of interest arguments.The Magistrate noted that the power of a court to award costs is absolute and unfettered but must be exercised judicially. Ordinarily, costs are awarded on a party/party basis, but that principle may be departed from where there is some special or unusual feature. His Honour noted that it may be appropriate to consider awarding costs on a solicitor/client or indemnity basis where an action has been commenced, or continued, in circumstances where the applicant, properly advised, should have known that he had no chance of success.Against the background of those principles, the Magistrate considered the conduct of the appellant in the course of the litigation. In particular, his Honour referred to the mounting of the defence that the contract had been amended to refer to a tiled roof, the decision to refer to a multitude of documents and to advance ambiguous submissions which did not clarify any of the issues in dispute and the failure to prove numerous causes of action pleaded as part of the counterclaim. In this light, the Magistrate determined that it was appropriate to depart from the ordinary costs rule. However, his Honour declined to award costs on a solicitor/client basis for the entirety of the claim. His Honour explained that decision by stating that he was mindful of the significant discrepancy between the judgment sum and the amount of costs claimed and also took into account that the respondent did not participate in the conciliation conference and some other unspecified matters referred to by the appellant. His Honour also rejected the respondent’s claim for indemnity costs pursuant to the contract.The Magistrate stated that, as the trial progressed, it should have been clear to the appellant and his legal advisers that the likelihood of success was exponentially reducing. His Honour stated that the approach he was adopting expressed “the court’s disapproval of the defendant’s bloody minded approach to an unreasonable case.” As previously noted, the Magistrate ordered that the respondent was entitled to all costs up until the end of the second day of the trial on a party/party basis and thereafter on a solicitor/client basis. The Magistrate awarded interest at the contractual rate of 2% per month until 1 October 2014, being the date on which the claim commenced, and thereafter at the standard Court rate of 10% per annum until the date of judgment.The appellant asserts in his written submissions that it was successful on the costs and interest argument. That assertion goes beyond revised ground 12 which only asserts substantial success. It is the case that the costs claimed by the respondent have substantially reduced, primarily because it failed in its claim for contractual indemnity costs and only partly succeeded in its claim for interest at the contractual rate. However, the appellant failed in its claim that costs for the entirety of the proceedings should be on a party/party basis. Thus, both parties had mixed success. An appeal court will only intervene in relation to a costs order where a clear error has been identified or the exercise of the discretion is unreasonable or unjust. For permission to appeal to be granted against a costs order there usually needs to be an important question of principle that requires resolution as opposed to the application of a settled principle to particular facts.I do not consider it to be reasonably arguable that there is a clear error in the Magistrate’s decision with respect to costs, nor do I consider it reasonably arguable that the exercise of his Honour’s discretion was unreasonable or unjust. His Honour correctly stated the relevant principles and carefully applied those principles to the facts. Given the findings of fact made by the Magistrate and the concerns he expressed about the approach taken by the appellant to the proceedings, it might well be thought that his Honour was merciful in only deciding to award costs on a solicitor/client basis from the end of the second day of the trial. I also do not consider it reasonably arguable that the Magistrate erred in respect of the award of interest. His Honour provided a cogent and logical explanation for his decisions in respect of interest and I cannot detect any arguable error. The fact that the appellant may be dissatisfied is not, of itself, a basis to grant permission to appeal.(Footnotes omitted)