Beverage Bottlers (SA) Ltd (in liq) v Abode Enterprises Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 77 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

BEVERAGE BOTTLERS (SA) LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) & ANOR v ABODE ENTERPRISES PTY LTD

[2009] SASC 272

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Vanstone, The Honourable Justice Layton and The Honourable Justice Kourakis)

3 September 2009

PROCEDURE - COURTS AND JUDGES GENERALLY - COURTS - DISMISSAL OF PROCEEDINGS FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION

The plaintiff commenced proceedings in the District Court on 23 September 1998 for rent due and payable under a lease, of which it claimed the defendants were guarantors pursuant to a Deed of Guarantee – no steps were taken in those proceedings between 23 October 2000 and 16 March 2007 – a Master of that Court dismissed the plaintiff’s action for want of prosecution on 15 February 2008 – the plaintiff appealed that decision to a Judge of that Court, who allowed the appeal – the defendants appealed the Judge’s decision to a single Judge of the Supreme Court, who referred the appeal to the Full Court for determination – whether the Judge erred in allowing the appeal – whether the plaintiff’s action should be dismissed for want of prosecution or as an abuse of process – whether the defendants were prejudiced by the delay in prosecuting the proceedings - whether general prejudice to the defendants can be inferred from the length of the delay - whether particular prejudice to the defendants arising from their reduced capability to bring third party proceedings.

Held (by Layton and Kourakis JJ, Vanstone J agreeing):  Both the decision of the Master and the decision of the Judge were affected by error – this Court is therefore required to consider the defendants’ application to have the plaintiff’s action dismissed for want of prosecution or as an abuse of process afresh – in an application to dismiss for want of prosecution it is the entirety of the prejudice that the defendant would suffer that is relevant, not merely prejudice arising out of the plaintiff’s period of inactivity – inaction on the part of the defendant is a relevant consideration, although it will not always mean that an application for want of prosecution will be dismissed – the defendants are not prejudiced by the death of a witness for the purposes of pursuing any third party claim - the plaintiff would still be within time to sue on the Guarantee as that time limit is 15 years - it would not be within time to sue on the contract as that time limit is 6 years.

(by Kourakis J, Vanstone J agreeing):  Determination of liability under the Deed of Guarantee and the defendants’ case on quantification of resulting damages have not been materially prejudiced by the delay – there can be a fair hearing of any third party claim brought by the defendant Lapointe - a real risk of prejudice has not been shown - a fair trial of the plaintiff’s alternative claims is still possible – the prejudice suffered by the defendants is discounted by reason…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Beverage Bottlers (SA) Ltd (in liq) v Abode Enterprises Pty... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2009] SASC 272
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Beverage Bottlers (SA) Ltd (in liq) v Abode Enterprises Pty Ltd, the plaintiff, Beverage Bottlers, initiated legal proceedings against the defendants, Abode Enterprises Pty Ltd, seeking recovery of rent owed under a lease, with the defendants being guarantors of the lease through a Deed of Guarantee. The plaintiff's inactivity in the proceedings from October 2000 to March 2007 led to the Master dismissing the case for want of prosecution, a decision later reversed by a Judge of the District Court. The defendants subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, which referred the matter to the Full Court for resolution. The central issues for the court were whether the Judge's decision to reverse the Master's dismissal was erroneous, whether the plaintiff's action should be dismissed for want of prosecution or due to abuse of process, and whether the defendants were prejudiced by the delay in prosecuting the case.

The Full Court found that both the Master's and the Judge's decisions contained errors, necessitating a fresh consideration of the defendants' application to dismiss the plaintiff's action. The court emphasised that the totality of prejudice to the defendants was relevant, not just that arising from the plaintiff's inactivity. It was also noted that the defendants were not prejudiced by the death of a witness for third-party claims, as the plaintiff could still sue on the Guarantee within the 15-year statute of limitations, although not on the contract due to the 6-year limitation. The Full Court concluded that the defendants' liability under the Deed of Guarantee and their case on damages quantification had not been materially affected by the delay, and there was no real risk of prejudice, allowing for a fair trial of the plaintiff's claims. The court also discounted the prejudice caused by the defendants' own inaction and failure to bring third-party proceedings earlier.

Layton J dissented, arguing that the plaintiff's delay was excessive and inexcusable, with no action taken for five and a half years, leaving the case in the same position as when it began. The court considered the risk or possibility of prejudice to the defendants due to the long delay, the destruction of the solicitors' file, and the presumptive prejudice. Layton J concluded that balancing all factors, the appeal should be allowed, and the plaintiff's action dismissed. However, the court clarified that a dismissal would not preclude the plaintiff from instituting new proceedings under the original pleadings but would prevent them from proceeding under the amended statement of claim as the six-year statute of limitations had expired. The court's decision underscored the importance of exercising discretion in the interests of justice, considering the wider effects of delay and the general prejudice to litigants, as highlighted by the High Court in Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

A dismissal of the action will not preclude the plaintiff from instituting new proceedings in the terms of the original pleadings. A dismissal will, however, preclude the plaintiff from instituting proceedings in the terms of paragraph 9A of the Amended Statement of Claim as the time limit for this type of action is six years and has therefore expired.Conclusion I return to the comments of Bray CJ in Ulowski, and refer again to the five paramount matters to be taken into account when exercising discretion upon an application to dismiss for want of prosecution. The discretion should always be exercised in the interests of justice. The interests of justice in situations of delay and prejudice have recently been highlighted by the High Court in Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University.[58] The High Court in Aon was considering the appropriateness of the granting of a late application for leave to amend. The Judges used the opportunity to make observations generally about the approach to be taken by courts, having regard to case management principles. The majority strongly expressed the view that the conduct of litigation was not simply a matter for the parties and that a court should have regard to the wider effects of the delay upon the Court and the prejudice to other litigants. It was not simply a costs matter.[59][58] (2009) 83 ALJR 951.[59] Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 83 ALJR 951 at 974-76, [93]-[103]; 977, [111]. See similar views expressed by French CJ at 960-2, [25]-[30] and Heydon J at 980-1, [133]-[134]. In expressing those views, the majority also rejected earlier reasoning of the Court in the case of Queensland v J L Holdings Pty Ltd,[60] to the extent that the Court in that case took a different approach.[60] (1997) 189 CLR 146. Specifically relevant to the circumstances in this case was the acknowledgment given by the majority to the general prejudice suffered not only by individual litigants but also by corporations and witnesses as a consequence of delay. As the majority indicated:[61]The views expressed by Lord Griffiths in Ketteman v Hansel Properties Ltd, that justice cannot always be measured in money and that a judge is entitled to weigh in the balance the strain the litigation imposes upon litigants, are also now generally accepted.…In Ketteman Lord Griffiths recognised, as did the plurality in J L Holdings, that personal litigants are likely to feel the strain more than business corporations or commercial persons. So much may be accepted. But it should not be thought that corporations are not subject to pressures imposed by litigation. A corporation in the position of a defendant may be required to carry a contingent liability in its books of account for some years, with consequent effects upon its ability to plan financially, depending upon the magnitude of the claim. Its resources may be diverted to deal with the litigation. And, whilst corporations have no feelings, their employees and officers who may be crucial witnesses, have to bear the strain of impending litigation and the disappointment when it is not brought to an end. The stated object in the Court Procedures Rules, of minimising delay, may be taken to recognise the ill-effects of delay upon the parties to proceedings and that such effects will extend to other litigants who are also seeking a resolution in their proceedings.[References omitted.][61] Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 83 ALJR 951 at 975-6, [100]-[101].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.