BQ & HM Doe Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank

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[1999] SASC 124

B Q & H M DOE PTY LTD V NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK

  1. LANDER J.       This is an appeal by a plaintiff from orders of a Master of this Court made on 28 October 1998 wherein the Master ordered that the plaintiff’s action against the defendant be struck out for want of prosecution and that the plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs to be agreed or taxed.

  2. There are a number of grounds of appeal raised to which I shall refer in detail a little later.

  3. The defendant argued that this appeal was incompetent because the order appealed against is an interlocutory order and the appellant required leave to appeal pursuant to s50(2) of the Supreme Court Act.

  4. In my opinion, the defendant’s argument is misconceived.

  5. Section 50(2) of the Supreme Court Act provides:

    “(2).. Subject to the rules of court, an appeal shall lie to a judge against a judgment, order, direction or decision of a master.”

  6. Rule 106.05 of the Supreme Court Rules provides for appeals against decisions of Masters.  That rule provides:

    “(1).. Subject to subrule (2) below an appeal from any assessment or award of damages or any other final finding, decision, direction, award or judgment, arrived at, made, given, directed or entered on the trial or hearing of any proceedings or of any question or issues by a Master lies to the Full Court and is to be governed by Rule 95.

    (2)Any appeal from a Master:

    (a)in relation to an order made under the Real Property Act 1885 or under Rule 60;

    (b)from an order, decision or judgment to which subrule (1) does not apply;

    (c)where the parties consent to the appeal being dealt with by a single Judge is to be to a single Judge and is to be governed by Rule 97.

    (3)... An appeal under subrule (2) is to be instituted within 7 days of the order, decision or judgment appealed from.”

  7. It can be seen from a reading of r106.05 that those matters which come within r106.05(1) must go to the Full Court for determination whilst any other matter including the matters in r106.05(2)(a) and (2)(c) go to a single judge.

  8. In neither case, in my opinion, is leave required.  The matter to be determined on an appeal from a Master is whether the subject matter comes within either subrule (1) or subrule (2) of r106.05.  Once it can be determined which of the rules governs the subject matter of the appeal then the appeal goes as of right to the appropriate court.

  9. The author of Civil Procedure South Australia, Butterworths, writes at page 10,947:

    “Appeals to single judges. Appeals from masters on interlocutory orders lie to a single judge under R 106.05(2)(b) and s 50(4) of the Supreme Court Act, and leave is required under s 50(3) of the Supreme Court Act: Collins v Emacord Autos Pty Ltd (Full Court (SA), Jud No S6418, 3 November 1997, unreported).”

  10. In my opinion, that statement is incorrect.  The case…

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Details
Case
[1999] SASC 124
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

BQ & HM Doe Pty Ltd initiated proceedings against the National Australia Bank (NAB) in February 1997, alleging negligence, misrepresentation, and a breach of the Trade Practices Act. The defendant responded by filing a defence in March 1997, which included pleas that the Statement of Claim did not disclose a cause of action in negligence and misrepresentation. The plaintiff subsequently filed an amended Statement of Claim in May 1997, and the defendant was granted leave to file a further defence by June 1998. Despite this, the defendant did not file its defence within the specified time, leading to further adjournments and discussions regarding security for costs. The plaintiff changed solicitors in June 1998, which resulted in further delays. The Master of the Court, Bowen Pain, eventually ordered the plaintiff to submit a proposed amended Statement of Claim within 21 days, but the plaintiff failed to do so by the deadline of 28 October 1998. Consequently, the Master struck out the plaintiff’s action for want of prosecution.

The legal issues in this case revolve around the circumstances under which a court may dismiss an action for want of prosecution and the appropriate criteria for making such a decision. The primary question is whether the Master's decision to strike out the plaintiff's action was justified, given the principles governing the dismissal of actions for want of prosecution and the conduct of the parties throughout the litigation. The court needed to determine if the plaintiff's failure to comply with the Master's order constituted sufficient grounds for dismissal, considering factors such as the length of the delay, the explanation for the delay, and any prejudice to the defendant.

The court held that the Master's decision to strike out the plaintiff's action was erroneous. It found that the Master's reasons for dismissal were flawed and did not adequately consider the principles governing the dismissal of actions for want of prosecution. The court emphasized that the decision to dismiss such an action should be based on the plaintiff's past conduct and whether it has caused prejudice to the defendant or affected the administration of justice. It was not necessary to establish that the plaintiff would not diligently prosecute the action in the future. The court also noted that there was no evidence of prejudice to the defendant or any significant fault on the part of the plaintiff. Furthermore, the plaintiff had not been in default of any orders or rules at the time the action was struck out. The court concluded that the most the defendant could have hoped for was an order refusing the plaintiff leave to file a further amended Statement of Claim, rather than dismissing the entire action. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the orders made by the Master were set aside, with the defendant's application to strike out the plaintiff's claim dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

LANDER J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LANDER J