BARNES v SOLIMAN - [2016] SADC 39

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil: Appeal Against a Master's Decision)
BARNES v SOLIMAN
[2016] SADC 39
Judgment of His Honour Judge Slattery
18 April 2016
PROCEDURE - COURTS AND JUDGES GENERALLY - COURTS
PROCEDURE - DISCOVERY AND INTERROGATORIES - DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS - DISCOVERY OF DOCUMENTS
Appeal from a decision of a Master requiring the plaintiff to make disclosure of documents in two particular categories in a personal injuries case. Whether the documents required to be disclosed were directly relevant in the proceedings. Whether the orders of the learned Master requiring the plaintiff to make disclosure under the second category of documents went beyond those documents identified by the learned Master as being directly relevant. Whether the judgment of the learned Master disclosed any appellable error. Whether, if error be shown, it was appropriate to review the exercise of the discretion of the learned Master.
Held:
1. The pleadings of the defendant only generally put matters in issue and therefore circumscribed the question of direct relevance under 6R136 District Court (Civil) Rules.
2. An error in the exercise of the discretion of the learned Master of the kind described in House v The King may be detected.
3. The Appeal Court may substitute its own exercise of discretion for that of the learned Master.
4. Order accordingly.
5. Appeal allowed with costs.
Finsbury Print Pty Ltd & Anor v CPI Graphics Pty Ltd & Ors (No 2) [2006] SASC 352; Scott v Johnson & Ors [2010] SASC 277; Harris Scarfe Ltd v Ernst & Young (No 4) (2005) 1993 SASR 300; Rehn v Australian Football League & Ors [2003] SASC 159; Sky City Adelaide Pty Ltd v The State of South Australia [2009] SASC 34; Jewel River Pty Ltd v Captured Pty Ltd [2009] SADC 2; ADX Building Systems Pty v Adelaide Fibrous Plasterboard Linings Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2009] SADC 7; George v Dowling (1992) 57 SASR 579; Mac Audio & Acoustical Consultants Pty Ltd (in liq) v Eddy [1999] SASC 443; Manos v Maros (2007) 249 LSJS 67; FMV Stanke Holdings Pty Ltd v O'Meara (2007) 252 LSJS 87; Oxer v Astec Paints Australia Pty Ltd [2008] SASC 210; Beverage Bottlers (SA) Ltd (In Liq) v Abode Enterprises Pty Ltd [2009] SASC 272; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Stan Rowe Brewer LLP v Just Costs Ltd [2014] All ER (D) 265, considered.

BARNES v SOLIMAN
[2016] SADC 39
JUDGE SLATTERY

On 2 October 2015 District Court Master Norman published his reasons for decision on an application brought by the defendant dated 20 August 2015 (FDN8 and FDN9) seeking further disclosure by the plaintiff and for non-party disclosure. The plaintiff appeals against the orders made by the learned Master that require disclosure to be made by the plaintiff. There is no appeal in relation to the non-party disclosure aspect.
At one level, the description of the orders of the Master as requiring further disclosure is misleading. At the time that the application was taken on 20 August 2015, no disclosure had been made by the plaintiff and it was not until shortly before the hearing of the application before the learned Master (which occurred on 22 September 2015) that the plaintiff actually made disclosure to the defendant. It appears clear enough that the application was treated as one under Rule 136(1)(a) of the District Court (Civil) Rules. That Rule relevantly reads as follows:-
136—Obligation to disclose documents
(1)     Each party must disclose the documents that are, or have been, in the party's possession and—
(a)are directly relevant to any issue raised in the pleadings or affidavits files in lieu of pleadings; or
(b)     are to be disclosed by order of the Court.
(2)     The disclosure is made by filing in the Court a list of documents in the approved form.
The relevant questions arising under the application of this Rule are to identify the meaning of the expression “directly relevant” and the identification of “any issue raised in the pleadings…” The only alternative to an application under Rule 136(1)(a) is an application under Rule 136(1)(b) but in this instance, the application of the defendant was not brought under that second subparagraph. It will not be considered further.
The matter came before the learned Master on an application by the defendant for the following orders:-
1.   That the plaintiff do within 21 days make disclosure and provide the defendant copies of all documents relevant to her claim including but not limited to the following:
1.1Documents evidencing details of all General Practitioners, General Practitioner practices, psychologists and psychiatrists consulted by the plaintiff since 5 years prior to the motor vehicle accident of 5 June 2012 to date;
1.2Documents relating to her travel overseas between approximately 15 May 2014 and mid December 2014 and any overseas travel undertaken by the plaintiff since the subject motor vehicle accident, including itineraries, all photographs taken during any such overseas trips, documents evidencing work performed whilst overseas and documents evidencing any courses undertaken whilst overseas since the motor vehicle accident;
1.3....
2.   …
3.   …
As I have earlier indicated, the application was for the plaintiff to make disclosure. The subparagraphs of the application specified particular documents sought in such disclosure. Before considering the matter further and the affidavit material filed in support of the application, it is appropriate to canvass the pleadings.
This is a motor vehicle accident claim involving an accident that occurred in 2012 at the intersection of Woodville Road and Torrens Road, Woodville. The motor vehicle driven by the defendant turned to cross the westbound carriageway of Torrens Road into Woodville Road and in doing so turned directly into the path of the plaintiff’s motor vehicle. There occurred what is colloquially described as a “t-bone” collision between the two motor vehicles. Questions of negligence and responsibility for the collision are not relevant to this application as liability has been admitted. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff allegedly suffered injuries to her cervical spine, thoracic spine, right dominant shoulder subacromial bursitis and impingement syndrome, injury to her right wrist with a ganglion and psychiatric injuries. The plaintiff alleges that she has suffered disabilities described as:-
1.   Chronic pain, discomfort and restriction of movement of the cervical spine;
2.   Pain and discomfort to the right scapulathoracic region;
3.   Pain, discomfort and restriction of movement of the right wrist including reduced strength;
4.   Chronic pain, discomfort and significant restriction of movement of the right shoulder;
5.   Permanent scar to the right wrist;
6.   Nightmares and flashbacks of the accident;
7.   Poor concentration and low motivation;
8.   Sleep disturbances;
9.   Intermittent cervicogenic headaches;
10. Depression and anxiety.
After pleading the general nature of the treatment that she has received, the plaintiff then pleads in paragraph 5.4 of the Statement of Claim the general effect of the injuries and the effect of the resulting disabilities on her capacity to work. She pleads:-
1.   The plaintiff has suffered periods of total incapacity and at all other times a partial incapacity in relation to her pre-accident employment as a catering assistant and generally;
2.   The plaintiff has a permanently reduced ability to undertake various activities associated with her pre-accident employment which involves above shoulder work, lifting, repetitive shoulder movements, prolonged sitting, overhead activity and repetitive right wrist activities;
3.   The plaintiff has a permanently reduced physical and psychological aptitude for work with consequent impairment of her earning capacity.
The plaintiff then pleads in paragraphs 5.5 and 5.6 the sequelae of those injuries as follows:-
1.   The plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer a significant impairment of her ability to lead a normal life for a period of in excess of 7 days;
2.   The plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer a loss of enjoyment of the amenities of life;
3.   The plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer difficulties in carrying out her usual domestic, household and gardening duties;
4.   The plaintiff has an impaired ability to enjoy and participate in social and recreational activities.
In paragraph 5.6, the plaintiff pleads past and future pain and suffering, loss of earning capacity and loss of superannuation benefits amongst other losses.
In his Defence, the defendant relevantly pleads at paragraph 4 that he does not know and therefore cannot admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Statement of Claim. Therefore, the defendant makes no direct plea in respect of the allegations of the plaintiff about the injuries, the loss of aptitude for work and the consequences of such conditions. The defendant pleads in paragraph 5 of the Defence that even if the plaintiff has suffered any loss of earning capacity attributable to her injuries, she has sufficiently recovered such that she can resume her pre-accident sporting, social, domestic, recreational and other activities. He alleges that she can now resume her normal working duties or other equivalent employment and is therefore not suffering any permanent impairment of her working capacity or alternatively that she has sufficient residual earning capacity to obtain suitable employment elsewhere.
The pleadings in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Defence do not specifically address the detailed allegations made by the plaintiff about the general effect of the injuries and resulting disabilities on her capacity to work, upon her enjoyment of life and the economic and non-economic losses that she has suffered. This cursory review of the Defence indicates that the pleader has not specifically addressed some quite unusual pleadings of the plaintiff in the Statement of Claim. I refer in particular to paragraph 5.4.3 of the Statement of Claim where the plaintiff alleges (after having alleged periods of total incapacity and partial incapacity for work, and periods of permanently reduced ability to undertake activities associated with, for example, prolonged sitting) that she has a permanently reduced physical and psychological aptitude for work with consequent impairment of her earning capacity.
As I expressed to Counsel in argument, I consider this to be a very significant plea by the plaintiff and if proved to the satisfaction of the trial Judge, it could be the basis of a very large claim for damages by the plaintiff. I consider (and suggested) that it was a matter that required specific attention but no specific attention seems to have been paid to that plea by those preparing the Defence of the defendant.
The defendant’s application for disclosure was supported by an affidavit of a solicitor in the firm acting for the defendant. The affidavit refers to a report of Dr Jules Begg, Psychiatrist who indicates at page 4 of his report dated 4 November 2013 that as a result of the accident, there might have been a slightly increased propensity to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (on the part of the plaintiff) on the basis of a pre-existing phobia to vomiting. A second report referred to in the affidavit is that prepared by Dr John Meegan, Occupational Physician, dated 4 March 2014. At page 2 of that report, Dr Meegan refers in a general way to the fact that the plaintiff had previously seen a psychologist. There had been no disclosure by the plaintiff of her having seen treating doctors, psychologists or psychiatrists apart from having seen her General Practitioner since the date of the accident. The affidavit of the solicitor then asserts that the records were relevant to assessing the extent of the plaintiff’s pre-accident psychiatric symptoms and the effects, if any, that there have been upon those symptoms and her psychiatric state generally resulting from the subject accident. Notwithstanding the assertions in the affidavit, no attempt was made to file any amended Defence in the action and it must be assumed that the defendant was content to rely upon the contents of his filed Defence.
The second matter raised in the solicitor’s affidavit was that the plaintiff had completed a job application in which she disclosed an intention to spend 2014/2015 living and working overseas. She had enrolled to complete a course for teachers of English as a second language in Prague between 22 April and 25 May 2014. She also indicated that she intended to undertake two additional full day courses in Business English and teaching young learners as well as working elsewhere overseas. The advice received from the plaintiff solicitors indicates that the plaintiff was overseas between 16 May 2014 and mid-December 2014. All of the travel documents and other material sought in order 1.2 described above were sought on the basis that they are alleged to be relevant to the plaintiff’s claim for loss of amenities, impaired ability to enjoy and participate in social and recreational activities, past loss of earning capacity, future loss of earning capacity and past and future paid involuntary services. Again, no indication is given in the affidavit of the solicitor of any intention to amend the Defence of the defendant to plead any matters disclosed to the defendant’s solicitors and as recounted in the affidavit of the solicitor for the defendant.
The plaintiff filed an affidavit sworn 15 September 2015. That affidavit discloses that the plaintiff travelled to Japan in late November 2013 (post the collision) for two weeks to visit friends. She did not undertake any work or studies whilst in Japan. She said she travelled to Europe between 16 May 2014 and 14 December 2014. She completed the teacher’s course in Prague in about June 2014 and that was a four week course. She said she worked at Bucksmore Education, Cambridge as a Counsellor between July and August 2014 for a period of about 5 weeks. She also said she did not perform any additional studies or work in the period between 16 May and 14 December 2014 and spent the majority of that time in Europe visiting friends mainly in England but also in Italy and the Czech Republic. She refers to items 1.1.27 and 1.1.28 of her List of Documents which discloses the documents in her possession, custody or power concerning her work and studies whilst in the United Kingdom.
On the first topic namely the question of the psychological issue, the plaintiff says as follows:-
10. From a young age I have had a fear of vomiting. I have consulted two different psychologists in about 2007 and then again in about 2011. I don’t recall the names of the psychologists I consulted. I am not sure how many occasions I attended the psychologists however I believe it was no more than two sessions each. I believe it was Dr Margo Nole at Norwood that referred me to the psychologist.
11. I have also had three sessions of psychological counselling between about March 2015 and May 2015 with Ms Vanessa Mills in Parkside…
The plaintiff went on to explain that she consulted with the psychologist Ms Mills on issues other than those related to her previous psychologists. There may be no challenge to that factual assertion.
Directly relevant documents
On the question of documents that are directly relevant, there are some principles that are to be drawn from the decided authorities and which may be summarised as follows:-
1.   Discovery is not to be made of a class of documents unless all of the documents in the class are directly relevant.[1]
2.   The issue of direct relevance is to be determined by reference to the pleadings.[2]
3.   A document will be directly relevant if it tends to prove or disprove a matter which is in issue.[3]
4.   A document will not be directly relevant if there is merely a chance that the document will prove or disprove a matter in issue.[4]
[1]    Finsbury Print Pty Ltd & Anor. v CPI Graphics Pty Ltd & Ors. (No. 2) [2006] SASC 352 per Judge Lunn (24 November 2006).
[2]    Scott v Johnson & Ors. [2010] SASC 277 at [6] per White J (17 September 2010).
[3] Ibid at [6]; Harris Scarfe Ltd v Ernst & Young (No. 4) (2005) 1993 SASR 300 at [15].
[4] Ibid; see also Rehn v Australian Football League & Ors. [2003] SASC 159; Sky City Adelaide Pty Ltd v The State of South Australia [2009] SASC 34 (Judge Lunn 18 February 2009).
The learned Master first addressed the question of the plaintiff’s alleged physical injuries. He identified the pleading of the plaintiff that she suffers a permanently reduced physical and psychological aptitude for work with consequent impairment of her capacity to earn and that the defendant denied that allegation and pleaded that the plaintiff had recovered from her injuries sufficiently. The learned Master reasoned that the plaintiff had put her psychological condition into issue and that issue had been joined by the defendant on that plea. The learned Master then reasoned that medical records before and after the accident about the psychiatric and psychological condition of the plaintiff and whether there was any such impairment and if so, was it sustained as a result of the collision or aggravated in consequence of the collision was a directly relevant matter. The learned Master also reasoned that if the plaintiff’s current psychiatric and psychological condition was in issue in the matter, so also was any pre-existing condition suffered by the plaintiff. On that basis, the learned Master made an order for production of the documents sought by the defendant.
On the question of the plaintiff’s overseas travel, the learned Master reasoned that if the plaintiff was able to travel independently overseas and perform work overseas, then it would be open to the defendant to present that information to treating medical practitioners so that they could comment on the likelihood of persisting physical or psychological symptoms attributable to the accident.
The learned Master concluded that all of the documents sought by the defendant were directly relevant to matters generally in issue and that any documents touching upon those matters would therefore be directly relevant and that fairness dictated that the defendant should have access to the documents. On the issue of overseas travel by the plaintiff, the learned Master placed emphasis upon the fact that the plaintiff had failed to mention in her affidavit whether she had in her possession any travel documents such as tickets, booking slips, receipts or invoices or whether those documents were in her power or control. They might be sought, for example, from a travel agent or an airline. Similar sentiments applied to the question of the photographs. At paragraph [78] of his decision, the learned Master indicated that Counsel for the plaintiff had submitted that it would not be oppressive for the plaintiff to disclose photographs which would provide evidence as to the plaintiff’s ability to travel independently, to work, to study and to show the activities which she undertook whilst overseas. The learned Master formed the view that all of those documents will touch upon issues the subject of the proceedings where the plaintiff allegedly has a significant incapacity.
The plaintiff criticised order 1.1 made by the learned Master. The plaintiff complains that an order for production of the medical records would disclose evidence of consultations in the period five years before the accident which may have no connection to attendances concerning the alleged psychological injury which existed both before and allegedly after the collision. Those records would have no connection with anything to do with the effects of the collision or the injuries in the collision. The plaintiff complained that the class of documents on its face was not directly relevant in the sense that there are documents within it that cannot be said to be directly relevant.[5] The plaintiff also submitted that the content of the order in relation to the second category of document is also too broad and goes beyond the reasoning of the learned Master in his decision. The plaintiff submitted that the breadth of this order would include every piece of paper generated during the plaintiff’s overseas trip. The example given was a receipt for the purchase of any coffee, a stub for a bus trip, for clothes purchased, food purchased or entertainment enjoyed by the plaintiff during her trip. The plaintiff submitted that there was no issue disclosed within the pleadings that made that type of document directly relevant to the issues in the matter. Therefore, the order was too broad for it to encompass documents that were only directly relevant. The plaintiff contends that in light of the authorities and in light of the breadth of the orders made by the Master having regard to the issues arising in the proceedings, there has been an error of law by the learned Master which ought to be corrected.
[5] Sky City Adelaide Pty Ltd at [10].

The defendant contended before me that regard must be had to the fact that this was an application for discovery of documents. Prior to that time, the plaintiff had refused to make discovery of any document and a List of Documents was only provided a day or two before argument. The defendant contended that there are and must be other documents relevant at paragraphs [70]-[79] of the learned Master’s decision.
I have given consideration to the learned Master’s decision and I have kept in mind that it is not appropriate to take a highly technical approach when dealing with this type of application. It is better to take a robust and not over technical approach to these matters. Adopting that approach, it appears that the learned Master has not applied the test applicable under Rule 136(1)(a) when he decided at paragraph [76] that “…All of these matters are accordingly generally in issue, so any documents touching upon them will be directly relevant. Fairness dictates that the defendant should have access to the documents…” Even though I think that the approach of the learned Master would be appropriate under R136(1)(b), I think that the learned Master’s position was circumscribed by the defendant’s pleadings. As I have earlier indicated, the defendant has not applied to amend his Defence to more specifically plead to the factual assertions by the plaintiff of the sequelae of the accident. In the absence of such necessary pleadings, the operation of 6R 136(1)(a) becomes quite narrow.
The plaintiff has conceded the direct relevance of a number of documents relating to her psychological and psychiatric condition in the period prior to the accident. So much is plain from the affidavit material filed by the plaintiff as well as the pleadings. And those matters are to be assessed in the background that despite her academic record and training, prior to the collision the plaintiff was employed in the sale of baguettes because it offered part-time work that she could complete in her then physical and mental state. It is no stretch of the imagination to identify that the defendant would wish to thoroughly examine this aspect of the background of the plaintiff. No doubt the defendant will wish to pursue these matters before and at trial but that assumption does not assist the defendant in this application. One matter that immediately comes to mind is the enquiry that may be made of the employer of the plaintiff in June 2012. There are many other matters that also come to mind but they are matters for the defendant.
On the question of the plaintiff’s incapacities, the defendant emphasised that the plaintiff at the time of the accident was working selling baguettes but only on a part time basis. She was unable to return to that work because of her disabilities. On reflection, it may be thought that the academic qualifications of the plaintiff meant that she was or should be qualified to perform other more difficult tasks than selling baguettes at the time of the accident. Then, in light of her significant overseas trip where she undertook studies, worked and travelled for a period of about 9 months, those matters need to be assessed in light of the allegations by the plaintiff of chronic pain, discomfort, restrictions of movement, restrictions to the movement of the right shoulder, poor concentration, low motivation, headaches and anxiety. All of those matters are issues for the medical evidence. Therefore, this type of document sought by the defendant is directly relevant and disclosure should be made of those documents that are directly relevant.
My approach to the determination of this appeal
The correct approach in the determination of this appeal is as set out in the decision of her Layton J in McLean v DID Pty Ltd (2010) SASC 33:
[21]This reasoning has not received acceptance in other decisions of the District Court.[6] Indeed, the reasoning appears to be inconsistent with the treatment of Rule 97 of the former Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) (the “1987 Rules”) by Mulligan J in George v Dowling.[7] Similarly, it seems to be inconsistent with the approach taken by Wicks J in Mac Audio & Acoustical Consultants Pty Ltd (in liq) v Eddy,[8] when his Honour said of the 1987 Rules (at [6]):
This appeal is by way of re-hearing and not by way of re-hearing de novo: SCR 97.17. An appellate court is required to make an independent assessment of the material that was before the learned Magistrate and may draw any inferences from the facts which may be appropriate: Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531. An appellate court, hearing an appeal is not, however, entitled to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate in the court below unless an error in the exercise of discretion can be detected: Mullett v Gabriel (1989) 52 SASR 330 at p333. For this purpose there will be such an error where matters which should have been taken into account were not taken into account or where matters which should not have been taken into account were taken into account.
[22]In addition, several recent decisions of the Full Court of this court have required a court to find error before exercising the discretion afresh.[9] Accordingly, counsel’s submission should not be accepted. Instead it is appropriate to follow the well known rules in House v The King,[10] which case sets out the circumstances in which an appellate court would disturb an exercise of discretion. In that case the High Court[11] said (at 504-5):
“The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred.
[23]Accordingly, it is necessary that the appellant identify an error by the Master of the kind described in House v The King before any appeal should be allowed.
[6] See eg Jewel River Pty Ltd v Captured Pty Ltd [2009] SADC 2, [25]-[32]; ADX Building Systems Pty v Adelaide Fibrous Plasterboard Linings Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2009] SADC 7, [47].
[7] (1992) 57 SASR 579, 582.
[8] [1999] SASC 443.
[9] Manos v Maros (2007) 249 LSJS 67, 77 [50]; FMV Stanke Holdings Pty Ltd v O’Meara (2007) 252 LSJS 87, 111 [141]; Oxer v Astec Paints Australia Pty Ltd [2008] SASC 210, [33]; Beverage Bottlers (SA) Ltd (In Liq) v Abode Enterprises Pty Ltd [2009] SASC 272, [114].
[10] (1936) 55 CLR 499.
[11] Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ.
In making my decision in this Appeal, I have also had regard to whether special circumstances exist that would justify me setting aside the decision of the learned Master in allowing this Appeal. If the Master’s decision resulted in blatant unfairness and/or injustice then special circumstances may exist justifying the setting aside of the Master’s decision. Common law authority on this point is now well understood and I need not repeat it here.[12]
[12] See Stan Rowe Brewer LLP v Just Costs Ltd [2014] All ER (D) 265.
In the result I have formed the view that the learned Master has made an error of law in reaching his decision. I agree with the plaintiff’s submissions that the test of disclosure applied by the learned Master was not appropriate because it was not the test applicable on the question of whether particular documents are directly relevant and therefore whether disclosure should be made of those documents by the plaintiff. I also agree that under the second category, the breadth of the order means that the plaintiff is required to disclose documents that are not directly relevant. This was demonstrably not the intention of the learned Master when he drafted his orders. I am of the view that there has been an error in the exercise of the discretion by the learned Master and I am in a position to exercise the discretion afresh. This is what I have done below.
I have set out hereunder orders for further disclosure by the plaintiff in light of these reasons. It may well be the case that the documents disclosed, or to be disclosed by the plaintiff may, in turn, give rise to other applications but that is a matter to be seen.
Although I am mindful of the fact that I am not entitled to substitute my own discretion for that of the learned Master, in these particular circumstances it is necessary for me to allow the appeal of the plaintiff against the decision of the Master and to make different orders. The basis of my reasoning is that I accept the criticisms made by the plaintiff of the orders made by the learned Master. I would therefore substitute my decision for the decision of the Master in the following terms:-
The Court orders that:
1.   The plaintiff do by 19 April 2016 make disclosure and provide to the defendant copies of all documents relevant to her claim including the following:-
1.1    Documents evidencing or identifying (or both) the name and place of practice of every medical practitioner or medical practice of every nature, description and qualification or any other person or entity consulted by the plaintiff in the period from 4 June 2007 to 5 June 2012 inclusive on the following topics:-
1.1.1Any psychological or psychiatric injury or condition suffered by the plaintiff in that period;
1.1.2Any physical, mental or other sequelae of any psychological or psychiatric injury or condition suffered by the plaintiff in that period of time;
1.1.3The physical, mental or other sequelae of any such psychological or psychiatric injury or condition suffered by the plaintiff in that period of time and the plaintiff’s capacity for work of any nature or description in that same period of time;
1.2    Documents that are in the possession, custody or power of the plaintiff that are connected with the plaintiff’s overseas travel in the period from 1 May 2014 to 31 December 2014 but limited to the following topics:-
1.2.1The date, duration of air travel time, route and carriers used by the plaintiff for the embarkation, duration and return to Australia for such travel;
1.2.2The employment undertake by the plaintiff;
1.2.3The salary received by the plaintiff for such employment;
1.2.4The nature of the duties performed by the plaintiff during such employment;
1.2.5Any course of study or training undertaken by the plaintiff; and
1.2.6Any tour undertaken by the plaintiff in any place outside of Australia.
1.3    Any PAYG statements and other documents evidencing the plaintiff’s income in each of the financial year since the date of the accident the subject of these proceedings.
I will hear the parties as to consequential orders. The plaintiff shall have the costs of this appeal.