Bell Group NV v Bell Group Finance Pty Ltd, Re Western Interstate Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Bell Group N.V. v Bell Group Finance Pty Ltd, in the matter of Western Interstate Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 1440

File number: WAD 191 of 2016
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 20 September 2018
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – cross-vesting application – application to cross-vest Federal Court proceedings to the Supreme Court of Western Australia – application brought pursuant to s 133H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – whether the cross-vesting is in the ‘interest of justice’ - considerations relevant to an application for cross-vesting – where, having regard to the interests of justice, it is ‘more appropriate’ for the proceeding to be determined by the Supreme Court
Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 564, 1337H, 1337H(2)
Cases cited:

Bell Group Ltd (In Liq) v Westpac Banking Corporation (1996) 18 WAR 21

Bell Group Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (2000) 104 FCR 305

Coshott v Crouch [2018] NSWSC 853

Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v 150 Investments Pty Ltd (2017) 120 ACSR 495

Re HIH Insurance Ltd (in liq) (2014) 104 ACSR 240

Insurance Commission of Western Australia v Woodings (No 2) (2017) 124 ACSR 45

Insurance Commission of Western Australia v Woodings (No 3) [2018] WASC 44

Seven Network (Operations) Limited and Anor v Amber Harrison [2017] NSWSC 405

Winpar Holdings Ltd v National Consolidated Ltd [2001] FCA 1663

Yara Pilbara Fertilisers Pty Ltd [formerly known as Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd] v Oswal (No 8) [2015] FCA 49

Date of hearing: 1 August 2018
Date of last submissions: 22 August 2018
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 56
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr AA D’Arcy
Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Lipman Karas
Counsel for the First Defendant: The First Defendant did not appear
Counsel for the Second and Fourth Defendants: Mr A Chai
Solicitor for the Second and Fourth Defendants: Ashurst Australia
Counsel for the Third Defendant: The Third Defendant did not appear
Counsel for the Fifth Defendant: Mr CRC Newlinds SC with Mr R Glasson
Solicitor for the Fifth Defendant: Dentons Australia
Counsel for Prospective Defendant: Mr D Sulan
Solicitor for Prospective Defendant: Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan
Table of Corrections
21 September 2018 In the Appearances on the cover page Solicitor for the Fifth Defendant has been amended from ‘Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan’ to ‘Dentons Australia’.

ORDERS

WAD 191 of 2016

IN THE MATTER OF WESTERN INTERSTATE PTY LTD ACN 000 224 395 (IN PROVISIONAL LIQUIDATION) AND BELL GROUP FINANCE PTY LTD ACN 009 165 182 (IN LIQUIDATION)

BETWEEN:

BELL GROUP N.V. (IN LIQUIDATION) ARBN 073 576 502

Plaintiff

AND:

BELL GROUP FINANCE PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 009 165 182

First Defendant

ANTONY LESLIE JOHN WOODINGS IN HIS CAPACITY AS LIQUIDATOR OF BELL GROUP FINANCE PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 009 165 182

Second Defendant

WESTERN INTERSTATE PTY LTD (IN PROVISIONAL LIQUIDATION) ACN 000 224 395 (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Defendant

INSURANCE COMMISSION OF…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1440
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Bell Group NV and Bell Group Finance Pty Ltd were parties to a legal dispute which was before the Federal Court of Australia. The matter involved an application to transfer or cross-vest the proceedings from the Federal Court to the Supreme Court of Western Australia, in accordance with section 133H of the Corporations Act 2001. The primary issue the court had to decide was whether the transfer of the proceedings to the Supreme Court was in the interest of justice. This determination required consideration of various factors, including the commonality of issues, potential conflicts in findings, the likelihood of delay, and the convenience of the parties involved.

The court examined the arguments presented by the parties and found that while there was minimal commonality of issues between the proceedings, the primary reason for the transfer was not solely based on this overlap. The court acknowledged the need for consistency in legal findings but noted that the circumstances of this case did not present a substantial overlap that would necessitate a transfer. The court also considered the argument regarding the likelihood of delay in the Supreme Court due to the larger number of parties involved, but ultimately found that the interest of justice favoured the transfer. The court concluded that it was more appropriate for the proceeding to be determined by the Supreme Court.

In light of the above, the Federal Court ordered the transfer of the proceeding to the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The court also decided that the costs associated with this application should be reserved for the court that ultimately determines the proceeding. This decision ensures that the costs are managed in a manner consistent with the resolution of the overall case.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The proceeding be transferred to the Supreme Court of Western Australia pursuant to s 1337H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

2. The costs of the transfer application be reserved.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

For all those reasons, having regard to the interests of justice, it is more appropriate that this proceeding be transferred. CONCLUSION It is a matter for the Supreme Court as to whether or not the transferred proceeding be case managed with the existing Supreme Court Bell proceedings and whether it be case managed by any particular judge. It is inappropriate that I make any suggestions, let alone orders in that regard as sought. In relation to the costs of this application, no party has suggested that costs should not follow the event or that some other order would be suitable. However, I consider that costs of the application should be reserved to the Court which ultimately determines this proceeding.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In relation to BGNV’s first argument, this is expressly no longer WAG’s position as evidenced by a letter tendered at the hearing of this application. While I accept the suggestion that WAG wishes to be heard is not a factor of great moment, I consider ICWA’s joinder application relevant. CONSIDERATION In my view, the commonality of issues is not a particularly significant consideration in respect of this application. I accept the submissions for BGNV that to the extent there is, or may become, a commonality of issues giving rise to potentially conflicting findings, this is, at its highest, a minimal factor for consideration in the present situation. I note the decision of Winpar Holdings Ltd v National Consolidated Ltd [2001] FCA 1663 (at [16]) and what was said there by Allsop J (as his Honour then was) concerning the inappropriateness of two courts deciding the same issues. However, accepting entirely the observations there stated as to the need for a ‘substantial’ overlap and the insufficiency of ‘mere’ overlap, those observations are directed to circumstances where the nature of the overlap is the reason pressed for the transfer. That is not the primary reason pressed for the transfer in this instance. Without traversing the entirety of the issues examined at very considerable detail by BGNV, I accept that the prospect for overlap is limited for a variety of reasons, not least of which is the fact that the events the subject of this proceeding relate to circumstances occurring several years before the events under examination in the Supreme Court. I also reiterate that I accept that there are other substantive tax related proceedings still being conducted in this Court. However, these tax matters are discrete and, as noted, they must be conducted in this Court due to this Court’s exclusive jurisdiction in respect of many of the claims ventilated. I also accept that those proceedings may have an impact upon the pool of funds available for distribution. Accepting BGNV’s arguments that there is very little overlap as the pleadings are presently structured (although with cross-claims and the joinder application, this may well change), BGNV contends that the argument by BGUK as to the likelihood of less delay on transfer is completely theoretical. BGNV points out that in the Supreme Court Bell proceedings there are six main parties, being, ICWA, BGNV, Mr Woodings and the related Bell Companies, Law Debenture Trust Corporation plc, WAG and the Commonwealth. Given the number of parties, BGNV says it has been notoriously difficult to find times for directions and other hearings that are both convenient to the Supreme Court and the parties. BGNV contends this problem would be compounded if the Federal Court proceeding were transferred to the Supreme Court to be case managed with the Supreme Court Bell proceedings. BGNV points out that at the moment if a hearing date in this Court is needed the convenience of only two parties needs to be accommodated given that Mr Woodings is not taking an active role in the litigation. If there is a transfer to the Supreme Court fixing a date for even a simple directions hearing will require finding a date convenient to seven parties and the Supreme Court. BGNV argues that this will inevitably increase the prospect of delay compared with the present position in this Court. Further, BGNV points to the fact that Pritchard J has indicated to the parties that available time next year is already quite limited for the Supreme Court.