Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v 150 Investments Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 51 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v 150 Investments Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 520

File number: NSD 1625 of 2016
Judge: YATES J
Date of judgment: 17 May 2017
Catchwords:

CORPORATIONS – application under s 1337H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – transfer of proceeding to the Supreme Court of New South Wales – application granted

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether to apply s 5(4) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth)

Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 79, 140, 233, 1337A, 1337B, 1337H, 1337L, Div 1 Pt 9.6A

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 21

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) s 5

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 15.01

Commercial Arbitration Act 2010 (NSW) s 8

Trustee Act 1925 (NSW) s 63

Cases cited:

Bankinvest AG v Seabrook (1988) 14 NSWLR 711

BHP Billiton Limited v Schultz (2004) 221 CLR 400; [2004] HCA 61

Bianca Hope Rinehart trading as Trustee of the Hope Margaret Hancock Trust [2017] NSWSC 282

Commissioner of Taxation v Residence Riverside Proprietary Limited as Trustee for the D& J Discretionary Trust and as Trustee for the D& J Investment Trust [2013] FCA 720

Dwyer v Hindal Corporate Pty Ltd (2005) 52 ACSR 335

Hancock v Rinehart (2015) 106 ACSR 207; [2015] NSWSC 646

James Hardie & Coy Pty Ltd v Barry (2000) 50 NSWLR 357; [2000] NSWCA 353

LNC Industries Ltd v B.M.W. (Australia) Ltd (1983) 151 CLR 575; [1983] HCA 31

R v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; Ex parte Barrett (1945) 70 CLR 141; [1945] HCA 50

Re McJannet; Ex parte the Australian Workers’ Union of Employees, Queensland & Ors(No 2) (1997) 189 CLR 654; [1997] HCA 40

Re Westgate Wool Co Pty Ltd (in liq) (2006) 206 FLR 190; [2006] SASC 372

Rinehart v Rinehart (2015) 108 ACSR 415; [2015] NSWSC 1201

Yara Pilbara Fertilisers Pty Ltd [formerly known as Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd] v Oswal (No 8) [2015] FCA 49

Date of hearing: 24 April 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 79
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr JC Giles SC with Mr C Colquhoun and Mr TE O’Brien
Solicitor for the Applicant: Corrs Chambers Westgarth
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Speed and Stracey Lawyers
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Speed and Stracey Lawyers
Counsel for the Third Respondent: Mr C Withers with Mr PR Gaffney
Solicitor for the Third Respondent: Yeldham Price O’Brien Lusk

ORDERS

NSD 1625 of 2016
BETWEEN:

HANCOCK PROSPECTING PTY LTD ACN 008 676 417

Applicant

AND:

150 INVESTMENTS PTY LTD ACN 070 550 159

First Respondent

GEORGINA HOPE RINEHART
Second Respondent

BIANCA HOPE RINEHART AS TRUSTEE FOR THE HOPE MARGARET HANCOK TRUST

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

YATES J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 MAY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.This proceeding be transferred to the…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v 150 Investments Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2017] FCA 520
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd applied for an order transferring the proceedings from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia to the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The application was made under section 1337H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which allows for the transfer of proceedings involving corporations to the Supreme Court if the matter is in the interest of justice. The court was required to decide whether section 5(4) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) applied, which provides that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over matters involving corporations, their directors, and other related parties. The court found that the application met the criteria for transfer under section 1337H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and that the matter was in the interest of justice. The court also found that section 5(4) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) applied, and therefore, the proceedings should be transferred to the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The court ordered that the proceeding be transferred to the Supreme Court of New South Wales, that the Registrar send a copy of each document filed, and of all orders made, in this proceeding to the appropriate officer of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, that the applicant pay the third respondent's costs of the third respondent's amended interlocutory application dated 24 April 2017, and that, subject to Order 3, the costs of the proceeding to date in this Court be costs in the cause to be continued in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. This proceeding be transferred to the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

2. The Registrar send forthwith a copy of each document filed, and of all orders made, in this proceeding to the appropriate officer of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

3. The applicant pay the third respondent’s costs of the third respondent’s amended interlocutory application dated 24 April 2017.

4. Subject to Order 3, the costs of the proceeding to date in this Court be costs in the cause to be continued in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Trust was created by a Deed of Settlement made on 27 December 1988 by Langley George Hancock. The beneficiaries were GHR and her four children (including BHR). After Mr Hancock’s death in 1992, GHR became the trustee of the Trust; the beneficiaries of the Trust were the four children. BACKGROUND The genesis of the broader dispute can be traced to 3 September 2011 when GHR raised with her children the prospect of extending the vesting date of the Trust, which was then 6 September 2011, to avoid the imposition of capital gains tax, provided certain releases were given to GHR in respect of her conduct as trustee, and provided certain other covenants were given by the children. This led to litigation in the Supreme Court by two of the children (BHR and John Langley Hancock (JLH)) seeking GHR’s removal as trustee (the Removal proceeding). The other two children, Hope Rinehart Welker and Ginia Hope Frances Rinehart, were joined as defendants. The Removal proceeding was commenced on 5 September 2011. It culminated in GHR being replaced as the trustee of the Trust by BHR in circumstances where, in the week before the final hearing of the Removal proceeding in October 2013, GHR declared her desire to be discharged as trustee of the Trust. One of the issues that remained in the Removal proceeding was whether BHR should be the new trustee of the Trust. In his reasons for judgment in the Removal proceeding (Hancock v Rinehart (2015) 106 ACSR 207; [2015] NSWSC 646), published on 28 May 2015, Brereton J recorded the following findings of fact: 32The current proceedings were precipitated by a letter from Mrs Rinehart dated 3 September 2011 – 3 days before the trust was due to vest – to the beneficiaries of the Trust, sent at her request by the chief financial officer of HPPL, Mr Jay Newby. By the letter Mrs Rinehart represented to the beneficiaries that the trust's tax advisors, PricewwaterhouseCoopers, had provided advice confirming that upon vesting, each beneficiary would become liable to pay CGT on the value of the trust estate to which they became entitled, which would be “very substantial”; that the shares could not be sold to a non-Hancock family group member or encumbered; and that the vesting of the trust and the consequent CGT liability would therefore lead to the bankruptcy of each beneficiary, with serious consequences and disabilities for them. She then informed them that these consequences could be averted by her extending the vesting date, but that she would do so only if they executed a deed poll, covenanting not to seek to query or challenge any act or omission of Mrs Rinehart in relation to the trust, and undertaking that if they intended to enter into marriage or a marriage-like relationship they would enter into a cohabitation or nuptial agreement excluding their partner from any claim in respect of the trust, HPPL or HDIO.33However, as documents ultimately obtained by the plaintiffs by discovery and subpoenas in the course of these proceedings would establish, Mrs Rinehart and Mr Newby had no such advice in respect of CGT; while it may not have been entirely unequivocal, the advice they had obtained was to the effect that CGT would not be payable upon the mere vesting of the trust. Moreover, the dispatch of the letter was intentionally delayed, so that the beneficiaries would have only one business day in which to obtain any professional advice they might require to consider their response. Indeed, Mrs Rinehart instructed Mr Newby to defer sending the letter until after Ginia had left New York to travel – thus further limiting her ability to obtain appropriate advice and increasing the pressure on her to succumb to its demands.34After the 3 September 2011 letter was sent, Mr Newby sought to persuade John of its accuracy, in that CGT would be payable on vesting, and to convince him to sign the deed proposed by Mrs Rinehart. He also pressed Bianca to sign the deed to avoid bankruptcy, and told her that she would have a tax liability of $142 million if the trust vested on 6 September 2011. On 4 September, Mrs Rinehart, by a further deed of amendment, deleted and replaced clause 6 of the trust deed, so as to extend the vesting date of the Trust to 1 July 2068. However, the beneficiaries were not told of this, and Mrs Rinehart and Mr Newby continued to press them to sign the proposed deed before 6 September 2011, ostensibly in order to avoid bankruptcy.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On 28 August 2015, White J made orders requiring GHR and HPPL to give discovery of, and to produce, certain classes of documents: Rinehart v Rinehart (2015) 108 ACSR 415; [2015] NSWSC 1201. In his reasons for judgment, White J noted (at [2]) that the Preliminary Discovery proceeding had been commenced to enable BHR and JLH to investigate and consider whether a claim should be brought against HPPL alleging underpayment of dividends in respect of the CS shares held by the Trust; whether a claim should be brought against GHR alleging inducement of breach of contract by HPPL and/or breach of trust if it had been the case that GHR had exercised control over HPPL to prevent the proper payment to the Trust of dividends in respect of the CS shares; and whether a claim should be brought against the directors of HPPL for breach of their statutory duties under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Corporations Act). His Honour also noted (at [3]) that BHR and JLH wished to investigate whether HPPL might be liable to them for knowing involvement in a breach of trust by GHR in preventing the payment of proper dividends on the CS shares. At [67] of his reasons for judgment, White J recorded his finding that, in their capacities as beneficiaries of the Trust, there was reasonable cause to believe that BHR and JLH might have a right of action against GHR and HPPL for short payment of dividends. In the course of those reasons, when dealing with a submission by GHR and HPPL that BHR and JLH had not demonstrated that they had made “all reasonable inquiries”, White J said: 93In the circumstances of this case, the plaintiffs made reasonable inquiries by researching available information from the Rio Tinto group, examining the constitution and financial statements of HPPL and by asking the defendants to explain the position. I do not understand why the defendants, if acting reasonably, would not simply have provided the explanations and information the plaintiffs sought. The potential dispute relates to the affairs of a private company controlled by Mrs Rinehart. Her children are the beneficiaries in respect of a minority parcel of shares and the plaintiffs are two of those children. No evidence was adduced for the defendants to explain why the information the plaintiffs sought could not readily have been provided. Nor was there any evidence as to any harm feared if such information had been provided. Instead, the plaintiffs' inquiries were met with abuse and obstruction. The fact that the defendants can now point to further inquiries the plaintiffs could have made does not indicate that they failed to make reasonable inquiries by those they did make. Between 25 September 2015 and 30 September 2016, HPPL produced documents in tranches pursuant to the orders made by White J. However, from as early as 31 October 2015, BHR commenced to raise questions with HPPL in respect of issues that had arisen following her review of the documents that had been produced. It is not necessary for me to detail that correspondence.