Barr Rock Pty Ltd v Blast Ice Creams Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 23 min read

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Barr Rock Pty Ltd v Blast Ice Creams Pty Ltd & Ors [2011] QCA 252

PARTIES:

BARR ROCK PTY LTD
ACN 092 300 680
(applicant)
v
BLAST ICE CREAMS PTY LTD ACN 128 535 571 in its own capacity and as trustee for the C & S ROTOLONE FAMILY TRUST
(first respondent)
CAMILLO JOSEPH ROTOLONE
(second respondent)
SUZANNE ELIZABETH ROTOLONE
(third respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 3734 of 2011
DC No 3598 of 2010

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Civil)

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

23 September 2011

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

1 September 2011

JUDGES:

Chesterman JA, Philippides and North JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDERS:

1.  Grant the applicant leave to appeal,

2.  Set aside the orders of the District Court,

3.  Allow the appeal by striking out:

(i)     paras 11, 12, 13, 14, 18 of the counterclaim and paras 29 and 30 (to the extent that they refer to paras 11, 12 and 13),

(ii)     para 31 of the counterclaim,

(iii)    paras 26 and 28(a) of the counterclaim,

(iv)    para 35(iv) of the counterclaim.

4.  Grant the respondents leave to re-plead,

5. The respondents pay half the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the application at first instance, and the appellant’s costs of this application and appeal on the standard basis.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL – RIGHT OF APPEAL FROM INTERLOCUTORY DECISION – LEAVE TO APPEAL – PROCEDURE – where applicant sought leave to appeal under s 118(3) District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) – where learned primary judge refused to strike out specified paragraphs in the respondents’ counterclaim in respect of an application brought pursuant to r 171 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) – whether leave should be granted – whether orders of the primary judge gave rise to a substantial injustice – whether primary judge’s discretion not to strike out the specified paragraphs miscarried – where discretion required to be exercised anew – whether specified paragraphs of counterclaim should be struck out

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 36
District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), s 118
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 31A
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 52
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 171

Banque Commerciale SA (In liq) v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279; (1990) 92 ALR 53; [1990] HCA 11, cited
Bond Corporation Pty Ltd v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd (1987) 14 FCR 215; [1987] FCA 84, cited
Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697, cited
Colston v McMullen [2011] QSC 60, cited
Dawnlite Pty Ltd v Riverwalk Realty Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 249, cited
Gould v Mount Oxide Mines Ltd(In liq) (1916) 22 CLR 490; [1916] HCA 81, cited
H 1976 Nominees Pty Ltd v Galli (1979) 40 FLR 242;

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Barr Rock Pty Ltd v Blast Ice Creams Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2011] QCA 252
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Barr Rock Pty Ltd v Blast Ice Creams Pty Ltd, the respondent, Blast Ice Creams Pty Ltd, sought leave to appeal an interlocutory decision of the District Court of Queensland. The primary judge had declined to strike out certain paragraphs of the counterclaim lodged by the respondent. The appeal raised questions regarding the procedure for granting leave to appeal, the exercise of discretion by the primary judge, and whether the refusal to strike out the specified paragraphs resulted in a substantial injustice. The court was required to determine whether the primary judge's exercise of discretion was flawed and if the discretion should be exercised anew.

The legal issues before the court centred on the interpretation and application of section 118(3) of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 and the principles governing interlocutory appeals. The court needed to assess whether the primary judge's refusal to strike out the specified paragraphs in the counterclaim was an abuse of discretion and whether such refusal led to a substantial injustice. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the discretion to strike out the counterclaim should be exercised anew in light of the arguments presented.

The court granted leave to appeal, concluding that the primary judge's discretion should be exercised anew. The court found that the refusal to strike out the specified paragraphs of the counterclaim did indeed result in a substantial injustice. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the specified paragraphs of the counterclaim were struck out. The court also granted the respondents leave to re-plead and ordered the respondents to pay half of the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the application at first instance, and the appellant’s costs of this application and appeal on the standard basis.

The final orders of the court included granting the appellant leave to appeal, setting aside the orders of the District Court, allowing the appeal by striking out specific paragraphs of the counterclaim, granting the respondents leave to re-plead, and directing the respondents to pay the appellant’s costs on the standard basis. This decision underscores the importance of correctly exercising discretion in interlocutory proceedings and the potential consequences of such errors on the outcome of litigation.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Grant the applicant leave to appeal,

2. Set aside the orders of the District Court,

3. Allow the appeal by striking out:

(i) paras 11, 12, 13, 14, 18 of the counterclaim and paras 29 and 30 (to the extent that they refer to paras 11, 12 and 13),

(ii) para 31 of the counterclaim,

(iii) paras 26 and 28(a) of the counterclaim,

(iv) para 35(iv) of the counterclaim.

4. Grant the respondents leave to re-plead,

5. The respondents pay half the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the application at first instance, and the appellant’s costs of this application and appeal on the standard basis.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.