Baker v Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia) Ltd

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CITATION: Baker v Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia) Ltd [1999] NSWCA 245
FILE NUMBER(S): CA 40111/98
HEARING DATE(S): 9 July 1999
JUDGMENT DATE:
10 August 1999

PARTIES :


Robert Baker - Appellant
Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia) Pty Ltd - Respondent
JUDGMENT OF: Sheller JA at 1; Giles JA at 2; Davies AJA at 22
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Compensation Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S) : 17927/96
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Truss CCJ
COUNSEL: Appellant - M J Ward
Respondent - J P Sewell
SOLICITORS: Appellant - Ward Maxwell & Co
Respondent - HIH Winterthur Workers Compensation (NSW) Pty Ltd
CATCHWORDS: WORKERS COMPENSATION - s 106E(1) - can not commence court proceedings until 12 weeks after a claim for compensation is duly made - whether mandatory.
DECISION: Appeal dismissed with costs.

        THE SUPREME COURT
        OF NEW SOUTH WALES
        COURT OF APPEAL

        CA 40111/98
        CC 17927/96

        SHELLER JA
        GILES JA
        DAVIES AJA

        Tuesday 10 August 1999

BAKER v ROTHMANS OF PALL MALL (AUSTRALIA) LTD

JUDGMENT

1    SHELLER JA: I agree with Giles JA.

2    GILES JA: The appellant alleged that he had been injured over the years 1993 to 1996 inclusive in the course of his employment by the respondent. On 6 December 1996 he filed an application for determination in the Compensation Court. He claimed weekly payment of compensation, and lump sum payments for permanent injury and by way of compensation for pain and suffering. According to the particulars, the lump sum payments for permanent injury claimed under s 66 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (“the Act”) were in respect of “10% permanent impairment of the back”, “15% permanent impairment of the neck”, and “15% permanent impairment of the left arm at or above the left elbow”.

3 At that time s 106E(1) of the Act, since repealed, provided -
            “106E(1) A worker cannot commence court proceedings in respect of compensation under section 66 until:
            (a) 12 weeks after a claim for the compensation is duly made; or
            (b) if the person on whom the claim is made has, within that 12 weeks, proceeded to deal with and decide the claim with reasonable promptness and duly applied under section 131 for reference of the matter to a medical panel - 14 days after the medical panel has given its certificate under that section;
            whichever is later. However, this subsection does not prevent the commencement of court proceedings by a worker in respect of compensation under section 66 after a period of 16 weeks has elapsed since a claim for compensation was duly made, so long as the worker has responded to any offer of settlement made to the worker during that period.”

4 By s 106E(7) court proceedings could nonetheless be commenced “in such circumstances (if any) as may be prescribed by the regulations”.

5 The making of a claim for compensation was regulated by s 92 of the Act and cl 39 of the Workers Compensation (General) Regulation 1995 (“the Regulation”). By s 92 the claim had to be…

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Details
Case
[1999] NSWCA 245
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Baker v Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia) Ltd*, the appellant, Baker, appealed to the Court of Appeal of New South Wales against a decision that dismissed his proceedings. The dispute concerned the commencement of court proceedings for a workers compensation claim.

The central legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether section 106E(1) of the relevant legislation, which stipulated that court proceedings could not be commenced until 12 weeks after a claim for compensation was duly made, imposed a mandatory requirement. The appellant argued that the proceedings were validly commenced, while the respondent contended that the statutory time bar had not yet expired.

The Court of Appeal, comprising Sheller and Giles JJA and Davies AJA, held that section 106E(1) was a mandatory provision. Their Honours reasoned that the language of the section clearly indicated an intention to prevent the institution of proceedings before the expiry of the 12-week period, thereby allowing for a period of assessment and potential resolution of the claim by the insurer. The court applied the principle that statutory provisions prescribing a time within which a right may be exercised or a proceeding may be commenced are generally mandatory unless the contrary intention appears.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established