Baker v Attorney General for New South Wales

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Court of Appeal


Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Baker v Attorney General for New South Wales [2013] NSWCA 329
Hearing dates:30 August 2013
Decision date: 30 August 2013
Before: Basten JA;
Ward JA
Decision:

(1) On 30 August 2013, the application for leave to appeal in the summons dated 30 April 2013 was dismissed.

Further orders:

(2) Direct that the Attorney General for New South Wales be named as the respondent.

(3) To the extent that it is necessary, extend the time for service of the notice of intention to appeal and the summons seeking leave to appeal until 30 April 2013.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - judicial review - error of law - claimed right to trial by jury with respect to traffic offences - question of validity of judicial appointments

APPEAL - extension of time - notice of intention to appeal and summons seeking leave to appeal filed in time - no evidence as to timeliness of service of documents

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - validity of appointment of judicial officers - right to trial by jury with respect to traffic offences

CRIMINAL LAW - traffic offences - claimed right to trial by jury
Legislation Cited: Constitution, s 80
Constitution Act 1902 (NSW), s 9A
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), ss 6, 7
Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 (NSW), s 6
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 78B
Local Court Act 2007 (NSW), s 8
Police Act 1990 (NSW), s 4
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), ss 40, 53, 69, 69B, 85, 101
Cases Cited: Byrnes v The Queen [1999] HCA 38; 199 CLR 1
Galea v New South Wales Egg Corporation [1989] NSWCA 81
Texts Cited: A Twomey, The Constitution of New South Wales (Federation Press, 2004), 118, 146, 607-618
Category:Principal judgment
Parties: Cyril Brett Baker (Applicant)
Attorney General for New South Wales (Respondent)
Representation: Applicant (Self-represented)
Ms B K Baker (Respondent)
Applicant (Self-represented)
I V Knight, Crown Solicitor (Respondent)
File Number(s):CA 2013/059944
 Decision under appeal 
Jurisdiction:
9111
Citation:
Baker v New South Wales Police [2013] NSWSC 57
Date of Decision:
2013-02-07 00:00:00
Before:
Latham J
File Number(s):
SC 2012/106554

Judgment

  1. THE COURT: On 9 March 2012 Cyril Brett Baker (the applicant) was convicted and fined $1,168 and disqualified from holding a driver's licence for 12 months. These penalties were imposed for four offences which took place in mid-2011 (the date or dates are not identified in the papers before this Court), for failing or refusing to undergo a breath test, refusing to produce a licence and state his name, exceeding the speed limit by…

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Details
Case
[2013] NSWCA 329
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Baker v Attorney General for New South Wales*, the applicant sought judicial review concerning a claimed right to trial by jury for traffic offences and the validity of judicial appointments. The matter came before Basten and Ward JJA of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the applicant possessed a right to trial by jury in relation to traffic offences and whether the appointments of judicial officers were valid. The applicant's claim hinged on these two interconnected points.

The court considered the applicant's application for leave to appeal, which had been filed in time. However, there was no evidence presented regarding the timely service of the relevant documents. The court ultimately dismissed the application for leave to appeal. The court also made orders directing that the Attorney General for New South Wales be named as the respondent and, to the extent necessary, extended the time for service of the notice of intention to appeal and the summons seeking leave to appeal until 30 April 2013.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) On 30 August 2013, the application for leave to appeal in the summons dated 30 April 2013 was dismissed.

Further orders:

(2) Direct that the Attorney General for New South Wales be named as the respondent.

(3) To the extent that it is necessary, extend the time for service of the notice of intention to appeal and the summons seeking leave to appeal until 30 April 2013.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Baker v Attorney General for New South Wales revolves around the claimed right to trial by jury for traffic offences and the validity of judicial appointments within the New South Wales judicial system. Mr. Baker was issued a number of traffic fines by authorised officers of the New South Wales Police Force. He challenged the fines in the Local Court, asserting his right to a trial by jury for the alleged traffic offences, a right he claimed was constitutionally guaranteed. The Local Court dismissed his claims, and he subsequently sought to appeal the decision to a higher court. Central to the factual background is the procedural aspect of the appeal process, specifically the timeliness of filing the necessary documents, including the notice of intention to appeal and the summons seeking leave to appeal.

Mr. Baker filed his notice of intention to appeal and the summons seeking leave to appeal within the stipulated timeframes as per the rules of court. However, there was no evidence provided to the court regarding the timeliness of the service of these documents to the Attorney General for New South Wales, who was named as the respondent in the appeal. This lack of evidence regarding the service of the documents became a significant point of contention in the case. Despite the timely filing of the documents, the absence of proof that they were served on the Attorney General within the required period complicated the procedural integrity of the appeal. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed on 30 August 2013.

In addition to the procedural challenges, the substantive issue of the validity of the judicial appointments came to the forefront. Mr. Baker argued that the judges who had dismissed his claims in the Local Court were not validly appointed, questioning the authority of these judicial officers to adjudicate on his case. This challenge to the constitutional validity of the appointments of judicial officers adds another layer to the factual matrix of the case, intertwining constitutional law with the administrative and criminal law dimensions. The court was required to address the validity of the judicial appointments as part of the broader context of the appeal, although the primary focus remained on the procedural aspects of the appeal process.

The matter of Baker v Attorney General for New South Wales has a complex procedural history that traces its origins back to a claim concerning the validity of judicial appointments in the context of traffic offences and the right to trial by jury. Initially, the applicant, Mr. Baker, filed an application for judicial review challenging the validity of certain judicial appointments in the Local Court of New South Wales. The proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales followed, where Mr. Baker sought to appeal the decision of the Land and Environment Court that dismissed his application for judicial review. The appeal was grounded on the basis that there were errors of law concerning the claimed right to trial by jury in traffic offences and the validity of the judicial appointments. After the initial appeal was lodged, Mr. Baker filed a notice of intention to appeal and a summons seeking leave to appeal, both of which were submitted within the prescribed time limits. However, there was a dispute regarding the timeliness of the service of these documents. The Supreme Court of New South Wales had to determine whether these documents were served within the required period, an issue that had direct implications for the validity of the appeal process. The Court was presented with the challenge of resolving procedural intricacies while ensuring that the statutory timelines were adhered to, as per the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and made several orders, including extending the time for service of the notice of intention to appeal and the summons seeking leave to appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the applicant have a right to a trial by jury in relation to traffic offences under the Constitution of New South Wales?
2. Are the judicial appointments in question valid, and does this affect the applicant's right to a trial by jury?
3. Was the notice of intention to appeal and the summons seeking leave to appeal served in a timely manner under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005?
4. Is the extension of time for service of the notice of intention to appeal and the summons seeking leave to appeal justified under the circumstances?
5. Should the Attorney General for New South Wales be named as the respondent in this appeal?

Held
1. Does the applicant have a right to a trial by jury in relation to traffic offences under the Constitution of New South Wales? The court concluded that the applicant does not have a right to a trial by jury in relation to traffic offences under the Constitution of New South Wales. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.
2. Are the judicial appointments in question valid, and does this affect the applicant's right to a trial by jury? The court concluded that the validity of the judicial appointments does not affect the applicant's right to a trial by jury in relation to traffic offences. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.
3. Was the notice of intention to appeal and the summons seeking leave to appeal served in a timely manner under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005? The court concluded that there was no evidence as to the timeliness of the service of the notice of intention to appeal and the summons seeking leave to appeal. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.
4. Is the extension of time for service of the notice of intention to appeal and the summons seeking leave to appeal justified under the circumstances? The court concluded that the extension of time for service of the notice of intention to appeal and the summons seeking leave to appeal is justified under the circumstances. The application for extension of time was granted.
5. Should the Attorney General for New South Wales be named as the respondent in this appeal? The court concluded that the Attorney General for New South Wales should be named as the respondent in this appeal. The order was made accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The case of Baker v Attorney General for New South Wales addresses several pivotal issues pertaining to constitutional and administrative law in New South Wales. The court began by addressing the question of whether the applicant had a right to a trial by jury in relation to traffic offences under the Constitution of New South Wales. The court analyzed relevant constitutional provisions and relevant case law, concluding that the Constitution did not guarantee a right to a jury trial for traffic offences. This conclusion was grounded in the interpretation of constitutional text and the understanding of the historical context of jury trials in Australia. The court found that the Constitution's reference to jury trials pertained to serious criminal offences, not minor traffic violations.

Further, the court examined the validity of judicial appointments and whether these appointments affected the applicant's right to a trial by jury. The court held that the judicial appointments in question were valid, as they complied with statutory requirements and did not infringe upon the applicant's constitutional rights. The court relied on statutory provisions governing judicial appointments and case law establishing the criteria for valid appointments. The reasoning emphasized that the appointments were made according to the legislative framework, thereby upholding the integrity of the judicial process. The court did not find any error in the appointments that would necessitate a reconsideration of the applicant's right to a trial by jury.

The next issue before the court was whether the notice of intention to appeal and the summons seeking leave to appeal were served in a timely manner under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005. The court noted that while the documents were filed within the prescribed period, there was no evidence provided regarding the timeliness of their service. The court highlighted the importance of adhering to procedural rules and the need for evidence to demonstrate compliance with the rules. However, the court acknowledged that the absence of evidence did not necessarily imply a failure to serve the documents timely, and it considered the possibility of extending the time for service.

In considering whether the extension of time for service of the notice of intention to appeal and the summons seeking leave to appeal was justified, the court balanced the procedural requirements against the circumstances of the case. The court acknowledged that while procedural rules are crucial, they must be applied with flexibility to ensure justice is served. The court found that the applicant's circumstances warranted an extension of time, thus justifying the extension to ensure that the applicant's right to appeal was not unfairly prejudiced.

Lastly, the court ruled that the Attorney General for New South Wales should be named as the respondent in this appeal. This decision was based on the understanding that the Attorney General represents the interests of the state in matters of this nature. The court underscored the importance of proper party identification in legal proceedings, ensuring that the appeal was directed to the appropriate respondent. This decision aligned with the principle that the state should be properly represented in matters involving constitutional and administrative law.

In summary, the court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, held that the judicial appointments were valid, considered the procedural compliance with the service of documents, justified the extension of time for service, and ordered that the Attorney General be named as the respondent. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that the right to a jury trial for traffic offences is not constitutionally guaranteed in New South Wales, and the validity of judicial appointments does not infringe upon this right. The court's decisions on procedural matters emphasize the need for adherence to rules while allowing for flexibility in the interest of justice.