B & the Estate of Coburn

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FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

B & THE ESTATE OF COBURN AND ORS [2020] FamCA 548
FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Stay of costs order – Where an order was made that the applicant (a barrister) be jointly and severally liable with the second respondent (a solicitor) for the costs of the first respondent fixed in the sum of $100,000 – Where the applicant seeks a stay of that order pending appeal – Where the first respondent does not consent to a stay – Consideration of the principles relevant to an application for a stay pending appeal to an intermediate appellate court – Where the onus is on the applicant to establish a proper basis for the stay – Where the applicant has failed to establish such a basis – Where the application for a stay is dismissed.
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth), r 22.11
Aldridge & Keaton (Stay Appeal) [2009] FamCAFC 106
Alexander & Ors v Cambridge Credit Corporation (1985) 2 NSWLR 685
Anderson & Senior (Stay Appeal) (2013) 50 Fam LR 21
Australian Workers' Union v Pilkington (Aust) Ltd [2000] 101 FCR 35
Berry v Green (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, de Jersey CJ, McMurdo P and Demack J, 7 June 1999)
Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1996) 134 ALR 460
Cook’s Construction Pty Ltd v Stork Food Systems Australasia Pty Ltd [2008] 2 Qd R 453
Croney v Nand [1999] 2 Qd R 342
Friscioni & Friscioni [2009] FamCAFC 43
Griffiths v Australian Postal Commission (1987) 87 FLR 139
Gronow & Gronow [1979] 144 CLR 513
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Jennings Construction Limited v Burgundy Royale Investments Pty Limited (1986) 161 CLR
Maher v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2008] VSCA 122
Pilkvist & Coburn (Deceased) [2020] FamCA 92
Re Middle Harbour Investments Ltd (in liq) (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Moffitt P, Glass and Mahoney JJA, 15 December 1976)
Robinson and Higginbotham (1991) FLC 92-209
Stewart v Tsueneaki [2012] ACTSC 159
Tabtill Pty Ltd v Creswick [2011] QCA 66
Virgtel Ltd and Anor v Zabusky and Ors (No 2) [2009] QCA 349
APPLICANT: Ms B
1st RESPONDENT: Coburn and Mr E as legal personal representatives of the Estate of Coburn & Ors
2nd RESPONDENT: Ms F
3rd RESPONDENT: Ms Pilkvist
FILE NUMBER: BRC 2525 of 2009
DATE DELIVERED: 9 July 2020
PLACE DELIVERED: Brisbane
PLACE HEARD: Brisbane
JUDGMENT OF: Carew J
HEARING DATE: 29 June 2020

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr G. Page QC by direct brief
SOLICITOR FOR THE 1ST RESPONDENT: Mr P. Sheehy
FOR THE 2ND RESPONDENT: Appearance excused
FOR THE 3RD RESPONDENT: Appearance excused

Order

  1. The application for a stay of paragraph 2 of the Order made 19 February 2020 be dismissed.

  2. The names of the legal practitioners who are the subject of the Order made 19 February 2020 are to be [anonymised] from the reasons for judgment dated 9 July 2020 prior to any public dissemination.

Note:…

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Details
Case
[2020] FamCA 548
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for costs against a legal practitioner, Ms B, by the respondent in proceedings concerning a de facto relationship. The dispute arose from Ms B's conduct of the applicant's case, particularly concerning the jurisdictional basis of the claim and the date of separation of the de facto relationship. The court was asked to determine whether Ms B's conduct warranted a costs order against her, and if so, on what basis.

The central legal issues before the court were whether Ms B had breached her duty to ensure the court had jurisdiction to hear the matter, whether her conduct was improper or unreasonable, and whether these failures justified an award of costs against her. Specifically, the court had to consider the conflicting statements made by Ms B regarding the date of separation, her failure to correct the applicant's evidence or withdraw from the proceedings when it became apparent the court lacked jurisdiction, and whether her conduct amounted to a serious breach of court rules or improper/unreasonable behaviour.

Carew J found that Ms B's conduct was indeed improper and unreasonable, constituting a serious breach of her duty under rule 1.08(1)(a) of the relevant rules. The court noted that Ms B had made conflicting submissions about the date of separation, including suggesting the relationship was ongoing, then proposing a date of separation that was inconsistent with the applicant's evidence and the events of the respondent's move to a nursing home. Crucially, the applicant's evidence remained consistent throughout the proceedings, and it was Ms B's representations and attempts to amend the application that were inconsistent and ultimately failed to establish a jurisdictional basis for the claim. The court concluded that Ms B's failure to give proper consideration to the futility of the claim, or to withdraw from the proceedings if her advice was not taken, warranted an award of costs against her on an indemnity basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Contrary to those submissions, the reasons for judgment[23] include the following:[23]Pilkvist& Coburn (Deceased) [2020] FamCA 92. 34. In relation to the claim against the applicant’s solicitor and barrister, it is submitted by the respondent that the best that can be said for the applicant’s legal representatives is that they were ignorant of the law, but ignorance is no defence to a claim for costs, particularly in circumstances where the jurisdictional requirement, namely, a breakdown of the de facto relationship, was brought to the attention of the legal representatives during a case management hearing on 2 April 2019. The conduct of the legal representatives on that occasion led to the expression of a concern that the legal representatives may have been attempting “to fashion the evidence to create a jurisdictional basis for a claim that did not, in fact, exist”. It is submitted that a finding on that issue is not necessary to found a costs order against the legal representatives. I agree.…38.[Ms B] refers to an attachment to her submissions described as “my updated agenda for a conference with the solicitor and the client”. [Ms B] submits that on an unspecified date it was “clearly established with the client that the de facto relationship ended when [the respondent] was removed from his home to the Nursing home”. I note that the respondent was removed by third parties from his home on 23 July 2014 and taken to hospital. He was moved to a nursing home on 29 July 2014.…40. … it is curious, given [Ms B’s] submission as to when the end of the relationship was “clearly established”, that the applicant’s evidence in chief was not corrected at the commencement of the trial to reflect that. It is also curious that when [Ms B] sought to amend the Initiating Application at the end of the trial it was to state that the end of the relationship was the 26 July 2014 i.e. not the date when the respondent was removed from the home nor the date he commenced to live in a nursing home. The application for leave was not granted as it was contrary to the applicant’s evidence. I further note that when the matter was before me for a case management hearing on 2 April 2019, [Ms B] initially submitted that the relationship was still ongoing as at 2 April 2019 and moments later (when it was brought to her attention by opposing counsel that the Court would have no jurisdiction if the relationship were ongoing) submitted that the parties separated on 6 December 2016 i.e. five months after the proceedings were commenced. When asked by me what happened on 6 December 2016, [Ms B] said that was when separation occurred. Nothing in the applicant’s evidence at trial supports the submission that the parties separated on 6 December 2016 and no attempt to clarify her representations to the Court on 2 April 2019 were forthcoming from [Ms B].41. [Ms B’s] written submissions conclude with the following submission:I submit that my conduct shows no evidence of negligence, there was no improper conduct on my part, nor was there other misconduct or default that would merit an order against me. I had no knowledge that the client would give completely different evidence at the trial.(emphasis added)42. A difficulty with [Ms B’s] submission is that the applicant’s oral evidence during cross-examination at trial was consistent with her evidence in chief and consistent with her statements in each of the four iterations of the Initiating Application i.e. there was no final separation. In other words the applicant did not give “completely different evidence at trial”. …44. A costs order can be made against a lawyer where they have failed to comply with the Rules or where their conduct has been improper or unreasonable. There is no requirement for a finding of negligence or professional misconduct or default. Of course, not every failure to comply with the Rules would warrant a costs order. In my view, it would only be in cases where the failure is clear and the consequences serious that costs against a lawyer would be warranted. Likewise, not every example of a lawyer acting improperly or unreasonably would necessarily warrant a costs order. The discretion to award costs should be exercised with caution bearing in mind the competing public policy interests. I am also mindful that the applicant has not waived legal professional privilege and in those circumstances, not every relevant fact may be known to me.45. However, the Initiating Applications in their various iterations do not establish an entitlement to advance the claim at law. I do not accept that this fundamental deficiency can be excused as a mere error when the evidence in chief of the applicant also failed to establish the legal entitlement to advance the claim. The applicant’s evidence did not change during the proceedings. To the contrary, it remained consistent.…49. [Ms B] was not retained (as far as I know) at the time of commencement of the proceedings but she was involved in the case on 2 April 2019 at a case management hearing before me. [Ms B’s] conduct during the case management hearing on that day was troubling and the circumstances of that hearing are set out in my earlier reasons for judgement which should be read with these reasons. [Ms B] has never adequately explained the conflicting statements she made on that date. While I am conscious that the applicant has not waived legal professional privilege and therefore approach this matter with some caution, the submissions made by [Ms B] on 2 April 2019, namely, that the parties separated on 6 December 2016 were not consistent with the applicant’s evidence at trial. The applicant’s evidence at trial was however consistent with the first version submitted by [Ms B] on 2 April 2019, namely, the relationship was still intact.50. In [Ms B’s] written submissions dated 21 November 2019 she submits that “it was clearly established” on an undisclosed date during a conference with the solicitor and client that the de facto relationship ended when the respondent “was removed from his home to the Nursing Home”. The applicant’s evidence was not consistent with that submission. In any event, the respondent was removed from the home on 23 July 2014 and commenced to live in the nursing home on 29 July 2014 yet at the end of the trial [Ms B] suggested the date of separation was 26 July 2014 (when her client was initially evicted from the home), a date inconsistent with what [Ms B] now says was “clearly established” prior to trial.51. Although [Ms B] submits that she considered withdrawing during the trial, it could not be said that her attempts to do so were made within a reasonable time, given what she knew or ought to have known at least as early as 2 April 2019, namely, that the Court did not have the power to make the order sought. The fact that [Ms B] decided not to withdraw because she contends that [Ms F] swore at her and threatened to sue her for negligence does little to commend her or indeed [Ms F’s] (if accurately portrayed) professionalism. [Ms B] also incorrectly submits that the applicant’s case changed during the trial. As already noted, the applicant’s evidence as contained in her trial affidavit, her statements on each of the four iterations of the Initiating Applications, and her oral evidence remained consistent.52. [Ms B’s] breach of the duty imposed by r 1.08(1)(a) to ensure that the Court had the power to make the order sought was serious. [Ms B’s] failure to give proper consideration (or any consideration at all) to the futility of the claim or, if she did, to withdraw from the proceedings if her advice was not taken, amounts to improper or unreasonable conduct. The circumstances as they involve [Ms B] are of an exceptional kind and warrant an award of costs on an indemnity basis.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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