AZAEF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AZAEF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 3

Appeal from: AZAEF & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 808
File number: SAD 103 of 2015
Judges: BESANKO, GRIFFITHS AND WHITE JJ
Date of judgment: 18 January 2016
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court – application by an infant child and her half‑brother for protection visas – where the appellant and her half-brother made separate claims of persecution – where the independent protection assessor rejected the claims as he did not believe the half-brother’s evidence – whether the primary judge erred in not holding that the assessor was obliged to give notice to the appellant or her guardian that he did not believe the half-brother’s evidence – whether the primary judge erred in not holding that the Minister breached his duties to the appellant by not taking steps to investigate and obtain material in relation to the appellant – whether the primary judge erred in not finding that the assessor made inconsistent findings of fact.

Held: Appeal allowed.

Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act 1946 (Cth) ss 4AAA, 6, 6A

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 16.01

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 46A, 48B, 195A

Cases cited:

Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd [1994] FCA 293; (1994) 49 FCR 576

DZDAO v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FMCA 1

Jaffarie v Director‑General of Security [2014] FCAFC 102; (2014) 226 FCR 505

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550

NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 38; (2014) 220 FCR 1

Odhiambo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 194; (2002) 122 FCR 29

Plaintiff M61/2010E v The Commonwealth of Australia and Others; Plaintiff M69/2010 v The Commonwealth of Australia and Others (Offshore Processing Case) (2010) 243 CLR 319

Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Another; Plaintiff M106/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Another (Malaysian Declaration Case) (2011) 244 CLR 144

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; (2003) 214 CLR

Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (1992) 175 CLR 218

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 231 ALR 592

Date of hearing: 24 August 2015
Registry: South Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 131
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr S Ower
Solicitor for the Appellant: McDonald Steed McGrath
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr K Tredrea
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent entered a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

SAD 103 of 2015

BETWEEN:

AZAEF (BY HER LITIGATION…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 3
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of AZAEF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an appeal by an infant child and her half-brother against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which rejected their application for protection visas. The court was required to decide whether the primary judge erred in not holding that the independent protection assessor was obliged to give notice to the appellant or her guardian that he did not believe the half-brother’s evidence, whether the primary judge erred in not holding that the Minister breached his duties to the appellant by not taking steps to investigate and obtain material in relation to the appellant, and whether the primary judge erred in not finding that the assessor made inconsistent findings of fact.

The court found that the primary judge erred in not holding that the independent protection assessor was obliged to give notice to the appellant or her guardian that he did not believe the half-brother’s evidence. The court held that the procedural fairness obligations owed to the appellant were owed to her guardian, and that the assessor should have put the guardian on notice of his disbelief of the half-brother’s evidence and his intention not to rely upon it in relation to the appellant’s case. The court also found that the primary judge erred in not holding that the Minister breached his duties to the appellant by not taking steps to investigate and obtain material in relation to the appellant. The court held that the Minister had a duty to take his own steps to investigate and obtain material in respect of the appellant’s status, and that he had breached this duty by allowing the appellant’s half-brother to make claims and present material on her behalf.

The court found that the primary judge did not err in not finding that the assessor made inconsistent findings of fact. The court held that the assessor’s findings were consistent, as he did not accept that the appellant would face persecution in Vietnam, and that the appellant’s claims were not supported by the evidence.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and orders made by the primary judge, and in lieu of those orders, made new orders. The court declared that the independent protection assessor failed to observe the requirements of procedural fairness, and restrained the Minister from removing the appellant or causing or allowing her to be removed from Australia until her claims to be a person to whom Australia has protection obligations have been assessed according to law, and the Minister has decided that the appellant is not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations. The court also ordered the Minister to pay the appellant’s costs of the proceeding and the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The judgment and orders made by the primary judge on 9 April 2015 be set aside.

3. In lieu of the orders made by the primary judge:

(a) the Court declares that:

in recommending to the first respondent that the appellant not be recognised as a person to whom Australia has protection obligations, the second respondent failed to observe the requirements of procedural fairness; and

(b) the first respondent be restrained from removing the appellant or causing or allowing the appellant to be removed from Australia until:

(i) the appellant’s claims to be a person to whom Australia has protection obligations have been assessed according to law; and

(ii) the first respondent has decided that the appellant is not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations; and

(c) the first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the proceeding as agreed or assessed.

4. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This case is not concerned with the Minister’s power under s 6A of the IGOC Act and nothing was put to the Court about the exercise of that power. As the authorities make clear, an exercise of the power can engage the provisions of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth): the Malaysian Declaration Case at 204 [146] per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ.The Facts It is necessary to examine the facts in some detail. Upon her arrival in Australia, the appellant completed or had someone complete on her behalf a “Biodata” form. In addition, she seems to have made a request for consular access, although the fate of her application is not known on the evidence before this Court. The appellant’s half-brother was interviewed by officers of the Department on 23 May 2011. It seems that this interview was partly recorded in writing and that an observer from an organisation called Life Without Barriers was present at the interview. On 15 August 2011, the appellant’s half-brother in his own name and in that of the appellant, made an application for two lawyers and identified “Refugees Convention” as relevant to his request. On 1 November 2011, the appellant executed a form entitled “Consent to Release Personal Information to an IAAAS Provider”. IAAAS is the Immigration Advice and Application Assistance Scheme. A client information leaflet before the Court provides the following information about the scheme. The scheme is funded by the Australian Government and gives “free, independent and professional advice and assistance to ‘offshore entry persons’ seeking asylum in Australia”. An IAAAS provider is a registered migration agent or a qualified person who will interview the party requesting assistance and explain immigration procedures to him or her, assist with the preparation and lodgement of a request for a Protection Obligations Determination, and advise of the progress and the outcome of the process and liaise with the Department during the Protection Obligations Determination process. The scheme is not one which includes the provision of legal advice and “many IAAAS agents are not lawyers”, the providers are registered migration agents, “who are professional and independent and qualified to give migration advice and assistance with applications”. As at 10 November 2011, the IAAAS provider in the case of the appellant and her half-brother was Ms Ruth Hogarth from Australian Migration Options Pty Ltd (formerly Libby Hogarth and Associates). On or about 10 November 2011, the appellant and her half-brother signed a “request” form which included details in support of their claims to be refugees and this, together with a detailed statement taken from the appellant’s half-brother, were provided to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. Ms Ruth Hogarth also signed the request and she completed a form stating that she had been appointed as the migration agent for the appellant and her half-brother. The other information provided to the Department was the personal particulars of the appellant’s half-brother for the purposes of a character assessment.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It is also evident from the outline of written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister in the appeal, that the Minister understood that the appellant’s procedural unfairness case included an allegation that an appropriate opportunity to respond to the assessor’s credibility concerns regarding the half-brother’s evidence was not provided. This is apparent from [12.3] of that outline, which stated (emphasis added):12.3There was no procedural unfairness as a result of the Assessor relying on the evidence of [the appellant’s] brother (notwithstanding that the brother was found to be an unreliable witness). The Appellant was represented before the Assessor and the representative was invited to address the Assessor upon his credibility concerns as to the brother’s evidence. In other words, the Minister’s response in relation to this aspect of the appellant’s procedural unfairness case was to say that it was sufficient that Ms Murphy, as migration agent representing the appellant, had an opportunity to address the assessor regarding his credibility concerns. Furthermore, during the course of the oral hearing before the Full Court, White J squarely raised with Mr Ower (who appeared for the appellant) whether the procedural fairness case included the orthodox claim. Mr Ower confirmed that it did, as is reflected in the following extracts from page 30 of the transcript (emphasis added):WHITE J: Perhaps, had the Minister become involved, then exactly the same might have occurred. So I’m wondering whether the real point of your case is the failure of the assessor, as you would say, to put the appellant, by one means or another, on notice of her disbelief of the stepbrother and her intention not to rely upon his evidence in relation to her case.MR OWER: That would be formulating the second ground of appeal in accordance with perhaps more orthodox views of procedural fairness, but when one looks at that in terms of putting it back to the appellant, clearly, at her age, she would not have been able to do anything about it. As your Honour would have seen from the very perfunctory interview with her, to be told that at the interview would be of no utility.WHITE J: When I said to the appellant by one means or another, I was - - - MR OWER: Yes.WHITE J: - - - intending to embrace, by that, doing it via the Minister in his capacity as guardian - - -MR OWER: Yes. And - - -WHITE J: - - - or, if there has been a delegation or something else to Mr McDougall, via Mr McDougall, but by some means, by someone who is competent to do so, putting them on notice that this was the position.MR OWER: Yes. And, in my respectful submission, that’s clearly the case in terms of ground 2 and a complete answer to the learned federal circuit judge’s finding at paragraph 37, page 357, where his Honour found that:Given that the first applicant was not capable of making claims or giving evidence before the assessor, the assessor’s procedural fairness obligations are taken to be owed to the second applicant.…

Decision

Reasons for decision

The IP assessor was not satisfied that the appellant was an orphan. He was not satisfied that she would be vulnerable to trafficking, sexual exploitation, or forced labour or exposure to diseases such as HIV. He did not accept that the appellant would have an unfavourable socio-political profile such that she would face persecution in Vietnam. He did not accept that she faced a risk of persecution because she was a Catholic, or a serious risk of harm because she had departed Vietnam illegally and sought asylum abroad. The IP assessor said (at [232]):To sum up so far, I do not accept on the evidence before me that [the appellant] would be denied an education, denied identity documents, harassed because of her religion, or harassed because of her family’s political profile, let alone for any Convention-related reason.The Decision of the Federal Circuit Court The appellant and her half-brother raised six grounds in their application for judicial review. The first ground was that the Minister, as the appellant’s guardian and fiduciary, was required to take his own steps to investigate and obtain material in respect of the appellant’s status. Instead of doing that, he allowed the appellant’s half-brother to make claims and present material on her behalf and for those claims to be assessed on the appellant’s behalf in accordance with the “so-called Protection Obligation Determination process”. The appellant and her half-brother claimed that this constituted a breach of the Minister’s duties as guardian and fiduciary and that the protection assessment had miscarried. The Federal Circuit Court judge rejected this ground. He held that the Department had established guidelines concerning unaccompanied minors who claimed protection and that those guidelines allowed the Minister to receive advice and assistance under the IAAAS and the appointment of an independent observer (Life Without Barriers) to observe and act in the best interests of the child at any interviews held by the Department. The judge said that the Minister and the IP assessor had followed established procedure and that, therefore, it could not be said that he had breached his duties to the appellant. The judge said that the ground must also fail “for the simple reason that any putative breach of the IGC Act by the Minister would not lead to the conclusion that the Assessor made an error of law in making the recommendations”. The second ground raised two matters. The first matter was that it was alleged that the IP assessor had no evidence before him to the effect that the appellant was not an orphan, or that she was not a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations, and yet he made findings to this effect. The second matter was that the Minister should not have allowed the appellant’s half-brother to make claims and present material on her behalf once the IP assessor had made findings about the half‑brother’s credibility. At that point, the Minister should have taken his own steps to investigate and obtain material in respect of the appellant’s claim. The judge dealt only with the first aspect. He rejected the ground on the basis that the onus was on the appellant and her half-brother to establish their claims and they had not done so.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established