FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AWN16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 1095
Appeal from: AWN16 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCCA 3033 File number: VID 1248 of 2019 Judge: BURLEY J Date of judgment: 31 July 2020 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where cl 866.222 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) disallowed by the Senate after the delegate’s decision but before review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether Tribunal erred in failing to remit the application to the delegate – whether Tribunal was unreasonable and therefore fell into jurisdictional error – whether Tribunal erred in failing to consider to exercise its power to inquire – whether Tribunal should have exercised power to inquire – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36(2)(a), s 36(2)(aa), s 415
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) cl 866.222
Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrival) Regulation 2013 (Cth)
Explanatory Memorandum to the Migration Reform Bill 1992 (Cth)
Cases cited: AWN16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 3033
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32; (2004) 78 ALJR 992
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; 241 CLR 594
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; 83 ALJR 1123
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Lay Lat [2006] FCAFC 61; 151 FCR 214
SZGME v Minister for immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 91; 168 FCR 487
WAGJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 277
Date of hearing: 17 July 2020 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 43 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A. Krohn Solicitor for the Appellant: Ambi Associates Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr A. Roe Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
VID 1248 of 2019 BETWEEN: AWN16
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BURLEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
31 JULY 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
1......... INTRODUCTION
[1]
2......... GROUND 1 – ERROR IN APPLYING THE LAW
[6]
3......... GROUND 2 – LEGALLY UNREASONABLE
[16]
4......... GROUND 3 – FAILURE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT A RELEVANT CONSIDERATION
[38]
5......... DISPOSITION
[43]
BURLEY J:
1. INTRODUCTION
The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka of Hindu Tamil ethnicity. He arrived in Australia by boat as an unauthorised maritime arrival in 2012. On 14 November 2012 the appellant made an application for a Protection (Class XA) visa. On…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 1095
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court addressed the appellant's contention that the Tribunal erred by not considering the exercise of its power to inquire into the authenticity of the documents. The court held that the Tribunal was not obligated to make its own inquiries to assist the appellant’s case or investigate the appellant’s claims. The High Court's observations in SGLB were cited, emphasizing that the Tribunal is not required to obtain evidence if an applicant requests it. The court found that there was sufficient evidence before the Tribunal to assess the reliability of the documentary materials, including country information about the prevalence of forged documents in Sri Lanka and the inconsistencies in the appellant’s accounts. Therefore, the Tribunal did not fall into jurisdictional error by not inquiring into the documents.
In its judgment, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent’s costs. The decision underscored that the Tribunal's role is to make a decision based on the evidence presented, and it is not under a duty to seek out additional evidence unless it is provided by the parties involved. The court’s ruling was grounded in the principle that it was the appellant’s responsibility to present reliable evidence to support his claims.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The primary judge did not err in concluding that ground 2 should be dismissed.4. GROUND 3 – FAILURE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT A RELEVANT CONSIDERATION In ground 3 the appellant contends that the FCCA erred in not finding that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in that it failed to consider a relevant consideration, or an integer of the claim, or a material question of fact. The particulars appended to the ground rely on one matter, namely that the Tribunal failed to exercise its power to inquire into corroborative documents from the Sri Lankan court, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the High Commissioner for Human Rights. He submits that this is a case where, like in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; 83 ALJR 1123 at [25], there is an “obvious inquiry about a critical fact, the existence of which is easily ascertained”, namely whether the documents from the Red Cross and the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka were genuine. In oral submissions the appellant pointed to the fact that a distinctive registration number and a telephone number appear on the face of the Red Cross card. The appellant submits that the Tribunal failed to consider the exercise of its power to inquire as to whether important corroborative documents were present. In my view ground 3 is not made out. The Tribunal does not have a duty to make its own inquiries in order to make the appellant’s case or to investigate the appellant’s claims. In SGLB the High Court (Gummow ACJ and Kiefel J) said of a similar argument (citations omitted):[43] This ground of error is misconceived for two reasons. First, there was evidence before the Tribunal to assist it in determining how to deal with the question of unreliability. There was the Turner report and the fact that the respondent did not object to providing evidence either at the hearing or by affidavit following the hearing. Secondly, whilst s 427 of the Act confers power on the Tribunal to obtain a medical report, the Act does not impose any duty or obligation to do so. Rather, s 426 provides that, even if an applicant requests that the Tribunal take oral or written evidence from a witness (such as a medical practitioner or psychiatrist), the Tribunal is not required to obtain such evidence. Thus, the Tribunal is under no duty to inquire. In the present case, there was evidence available for the Tribunal to form the view that the documentary materials advanced in corroboration of the claims were unreliable. These included country information that forgery of official documents in Sri Lanka is not uncommon, the general unreliability of the appellant’s version of events, the inconsistencies identified by the Tribunal between the documents proffered and the appellant’s failure, despite assurances that he would do so, to provide the originals of the documents, which were said to be in the possession of his family in Sri Lanka. As the Full Court has observed in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Lay Lat [2006] FCAFC 61; 151 FCR 214 at [76], “[i]n an inquisitorial process, it was for the respondent to put whatever evidence or argument he wished to the decision-maker to enable her to reach the requisite state of satisfaction”.