AVB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AVB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 241

Appeal from: AVB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2016] FCCA 2325
File number: NSD 1664 of 2016
Judge: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 14 March 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where appellant made protection claims in relation to data breach – whether Administrative Appeals Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 425
Cases cited:

AAG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 67

ACR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor (2015) 302 FLR 431; [2015] FCCA 2992

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ [2016] HCA 29; (2016) 90 ALJR 901

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; 83 ALJR 1123

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1

NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695

SZWAJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1173

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588

Date of hearing: 20 February 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 61
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr S Prince and Mr P Bodisco
Solicitor for the Appellant: Michaela Byers, Solicitor
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms J Davidson
Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 1664 of 2016
BETWEEN:

AVB16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 MARCH 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MARKOVIC J:

  1. The appellant appeals from orders made and judgment given by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) on 13 September 2016 dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) dated 18 March 2016: AVB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2016] FCCA 2325 (AVB16).  The Tribunal had affirmed the decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) to refuse the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa (Visa). 

    BACKGROUND

  2. The appellant is a citizen of China. She arrived in Australia on 24 September 2001 as the holder of a student visa. On 27 April 2002 the appellant was granted a second student visa which expired on 18 March 2003. Thereafter the appellant remained in Australia unlawfully. On 4 October 2012 the appellant was located and detained pursuant to s 189 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). 

  3. The appellant was in…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 241
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

AVB16 has appealed to the Federal Court against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which affirmed a decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse to grant her a visa. The appellant claimed that she would suffer serious harm if returned to China due to a data breach in which her personal information was disclosed. The appellant submitted that the breach would adversely affect her ability to find work and travel. The AAT found that the appellant did not have a history of activism that would make her of interest to the Chinese government. The appellant did not accept the AAT's findings and argued that the AAT had not properly assessed the risk of serious harm to her in China due to the data breach.
The court was required to determine whether the AAT had fallen into jurisdictional error in its assessment of the appellant's claims. The court examined the AAT's decision to determine if it was open to the AAT to conclude that the appellant would not suffer serious harm in China due to the data breach. The court found that the AAT had not erred in its assessment of the appellant's claims and that the AAT's conclusion was open to it on the material before it. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs as agreed or taxed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant applied for a protection visa in relation to a data breach which occurred when personal information about the appellant was released. The appellant claimed that she would suffer serious harm in China as a result of this data breach. The delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection did not accept the appellant's claims and refused her application for a protection visa. The appellant sought review of the delegate's decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal). The Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision, finding that the appellant did not have a real chance of suffering serious harm in China as a result of the data breach. The appellant appealed the Tribunal's decision to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appeal, and the appellant now appeals to this Court.

On 26 December 2015, the appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision to refuse her application for a protection visa. On 16 March 2016, the appellant attended a hearing before the Tribunal, and on 18 March 2016, the Tribunal made its decision affirming the delegate's decision not to grant the appellant the Visa. The appellant appealed the Tribunal's decision to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appeal, and the appellant now appeals to this Court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 26 December 2015 the appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. On 16 March 2016 she attended a hearing before the Tribunal and on 18 March 2016 the Tribunal made its decision affirming the delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant the Visa. THE TRIBUNAL DECISION The relevant part of the Tribunal’s decision for the purposes of this appeal is its assessment of the appellant’s claims to fear harm in China because of the Data Breach commencing at [10] of its decision record. After setting out the appellant’s claims, the Tribunal referred to the nature of the information that was released as follows:The delegate stated that the information would have included the applicant’s name, date of birth, nationality, gender, and details as to when she was detained. That information did not include current or former addresses, telephone numbers, contact information or information about health or any visa applications she had made. The Tribunal then said the following at [11] of its decision record:Available country information indicates that Chinese authorities are generally not concerned about Chinese nationals who travel out of China and also apply for asylum overseas. Those Chinese nationals likely to be of interest to the Chinese government on return to China after staying abroad, including those who seek asylum abroad, are those people the government perceives as opponents. Such people are likely to be those with a profile of activism in Falun Gong; the underground church or political opposition. The applicant is not such a person and even if the Chinese government had access to the minimal information about her that was made available for a short period of time by the department, the risk of the government taking an adverse interest in her and causing her to suffer serious harm is remote. The Tribunal discussed this country information with the applicant at the hearing and put those inferences to her. The appellant alleged that the information made available was downloaded in many countries. The Tribunal found that, “[e]ven if that was the case”, the allegation did not alter its view of the risk of her suffering serious harm from the Chinese government as the appellant had no history of activism of any kind that would make her of interest. The Tribunal also rejected the appellant’s claim that the independent country information did not reflect reality: at [12]. The Tribunal also addressed the appellant’s claim that she had complained to the Privacy Commissioner about the Data Breach and her opinion that a privacy authority should undertake an assessment of what happened, not the Department. The Tribunal noted that this claim related to a complaint about a breach of privacy and did not demonstrate that there was a real chance that the appellant would suffer serious harm in China because of the Data Breach: at [13]. The Tribunal noted the appellant’s written submission that there was no way of knowing who had access to her personal information. It noted that she had named those whom she thought could have accessed the information: “foreign security and intelligence agencies, terrorists (sic) organisations and criminal syndicates” as well as “human resources sections of companies and public service departments”. The Tribunal then referred to the appellant’s submission that this would undermine her ability to find work in China and obtain visas to travel to other countries. The Tribunal acknowledged the appellant’s fears about other entities also gaining access to the information that had been made available as a result of the Data Breach. But the Tribunal had no evidence that such groups had seen the information and held interest in her or had used the information in any way that created a real chance of the appellant suffering serious harm in China. The Tribunal found the appellant’s assertions that other entities had seen the information, which would lead to her being harmed, to be highly speculative: at [14]

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the Tribunal's decision to affirm the delegate's decision not to grant the appellant the visa, focusing on the assessment of the appellant's claims to fear harm in China because of the data breach. The Tribunal had considered the nature of the information released, which included the appellant's name, date of birth, nationality, gender, and details of her detention, but did not include current or former addresses, telephone numbers, contact information or information about health or any visa applications she had made. The Tribunal relied on country information indicating that Chinese authorities are generally not concerned about Chinese nationals who travel out of China and apply for asylum overseas, except for those perceived as opponents by the Chinese government. The Tribunal found that the appellant did not have a history of activism that would make her of interest to the Chinese government, and therefore the risk of her suffering serious harm in China was remote. The court found that the Tribunal had not fallen into jurisdictional error in making this assessment, as it had adequately considered the available information and country information. The court also found that the Tribunal did not err in its conclusion that the appellant did not have a real chance of suffering serious harm in China as a result of the data breach. The Tribunal had considered the appellant's claims about the spread of the information and her concerns about other entities gaining access to the information, but found that there was no evidence to support the appellant's assertions that other entities had seen the information and held interest in her or had used the information in any way that created a real chance of the appellant suffering serious harm. The court found that the Tribunal's conclusion was supported by the evidence and the country information presented. The ratio decidendi of the case is that a Tribunal assessing a claim for a visa on the basis of fear of harm in a country due to a data breach must consider the available information and country information to assess the risk of the applicant suffering serious harm in that country. The court must consider whether the Tribunal's assessment of the risk of serious harm is supported by the evidence and country information presented.