FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Dateline Imports Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 114
Citation: Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Dateline Imports Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 114 Appeal from: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dateline Imports Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 791 Parties: AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION v DATELINE IMPORTS PTY LTD (ACN 000 557 282) File number: QUD 669 of 2014 Judges: GILMOUR, McKERRACHER AND GLEESON JJ Date of judgment: 28 August 2015 Catchwords: TRADE PRACTICES – misleading or deceptive conduct – false representations – representation that the product did not contain formaldehyde – appeal from finding of the primary judge that the appellant had not proved that the representation contravened Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 52 and 53 – meaning of “formaldehyde” – whether primary judge erred in finding that the product did not contain formaldehyde on the expert evidence – the “effective life” of the product – whether primary judge erred in finding that testing of the product had to be undertaken within the product’s “effective life”.
TRADE PRACTICES – reasonable grounds to make certain representations – whether the primary judge erred in finding that a reasonable ground for making a representation is that it is true – representation should be considered in light of the grounds known and whether those grounds were objectively reasonable.
TRADE PRACTICES – misleading or deceptive conduct – cross appeal from finding of primary judge that the respondents contravened s 51A and s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) by making a representation that the ban of the product in Ireland would be overturned – characterisation of the representation – whether simply an opinion that the ban could be overturned or whether an emphatic statement that the ban would be overturned based on test results – whether the representation was with respect to a future matter – whether the first respondent had objectively reasonable grounds for making the representation – accessorial liability – whether the second respondent knew that the representation was misleading and that there were not reasonable grounds for making the representation.
Legislation: Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 51A, 52(1) and 53(a)
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140Cases cited: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dukemaster Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 682
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Jones (No 5) [2011] FCA 49
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104
Global Sportsman Pty Ltd v Mirror Newspapers Pty Ltd (1984) 2 FCR 82
North East Equity Pty Ltd v Proud Nominees Pty Ltd (2012) 285 ALR 217
Sykes v Reserve Bank of Australia (1998) 88 FCR 511Date of hearing: 21 and 22 May 2015 Place: Brisbane Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 198 Counsel for the Appellant/Cross-Respondent: Mr J A Halley SC with Ms A Mitchelmore Solicitor for the Appellant/Cross-Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Respondents/Cross-Appellants: Mr N Hutley SC with Dr B Kremer Solicitor for the Respondents/Cross-Appellants: King…
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- Case
- [2015] FCAFC 114
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge erred in finding that the product did not contain formaldehyde, and whether the primary judge was correct in finding that Dateline Imports had reasonable grounds for making the representations. The court considered the meaning of "formaldehyde", the "effective life" of the product, and whether the primary judge had erred in finding that testing of the product had to be undertaken within the product's "effective life". The court also considered whether a reasonable ground for making a representation is that it is true, and whether the representation should be considered in light of the grounds known and whether those grounds were objectively reasonable.
The court found that the primary judge had misunderstood the expert evidence and mischaracterised the representations made by Dateline Imports. The court held that the presence of methylene glycol and unreacted formaldehyde molecules in a complex aqueous solution was necessarily formaldehyde. The court also found that the primary judge had erred in finding that testing for the presence of formaldehyde had to be undertaken within the product's "effective life". The court held that the representations made by Dateline Imports were misleading or deceptive conduct under sections 52 and 53 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). However, the court found that Dateline Imports had reasonable grounds for making the representations, as they were based on expert evidence that the product did not contain formaldehyde.
The appeal was allowed in part, and the declarations made on 18 November 2014 were varied to include that the first respondent had reasonable grounds for making representations that Keratin Complex did not contain formaldehyde, among other things. The question of penalty, if any, in respect of the contraventions was remitted to Rangiah J for hearing and determination. The cross-appeals were dismissed, and the cross-appellants were ordered to pay the cross-respondent's costs of the cross-appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed in part as to paragraph (1) of the declarations made on 18 November 2014 in the manner set out in Order 4 hereunder.
2. Otherwise the appeal be dismissed.
3. The parties confer on the question of the costs order on the appeal with a view to agreeing a proposed order and filing a minute of proposed consent orders as to costs. Failing agreement, the parties are to file submissions on the costs of the appeal not exceeding two pages on the following timetable:
(a) appellant’s submissions to be filed on or before 7 September 2015;
(b) respondents’ submissions to be filed within a further 7 days thereafter;
(c) appellant’s reply submissions, if any, to be filed within a further 7 days thereafter.
4. Paragraph 1 of the declarations made on 18 November 2014 be varied as follows:
(a) by inserting “(i)” after the words “first respondent” in the second line;
(b) by adding at the end of the declaration the following “and (ii) that the first respondent had reasonable grounds for making representations that:
(a) Keratin Complex did not contain formaldehyde;
(b) persons using the product could not be exposed to formaldehyde;
(c) Keratin Complex was safe for its recommended use;
(d) Keratin Complex complied with all health and safety regulations in the world; and
(e) Keratin Complex contained no harmful chemicals.
5. The question of penalty, if any, in respect of the contraventions the subject of the amended declaration set out in Order 4 be remitted to Rangiah J for hearing and determination.
6. The cross-appeals be dismissed.
7. The cross-appellants pay the cross-respondent’s costs of the cross-appeal to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Dateline also object to the finding of “selective” reading of the Intertek Report, and submit that the primary judge erred by linking the Irish Ban Statement with the question of whether Keratin Complex contained or did not contain formaldehyde. Dateline argues that this was a different question that fell to be determined on different grounds. The very difficult chemical question about whether methylene glycol was formaldehyde does not enter into the analysis. According to Dateline, the start and end was what Intertek itself said, namely, that methylene glycol was not “free formaldehyde” and that no free formaldehyde was detected. Dateline argue that since the “free formaldehyde” was the appropriate criterion for the ban, Mr Taylor was not reading the Intertek Report “selectively” as suggested (at [246]). Consideration The onus of proof issue is not controversial. As to the correct approach concerning representations of different types, in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Dukemaster Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 682, Gordon J said (at [10]):The following principles are worth restating. 1.A contravention of s 52(1) of the TPA is established by “conduct” which is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive: Global Sportsman Pty Ltd 2 FCR 82, 87. The “conduct”, in the circumstances, must lead, or be capable of leading, a person into error (Hannaford (trading as Torrens Valley Orchards) v Australian Farmlink Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1591 at [252] citing Taco Company of Australia Inc v Taco Bell Pty Ltd (1982) 42 ALR 177 at 200; Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191 at 198) and the error or misconception must result from “conduct” of the corporation and not from other circumstances for which the corporation is not responsible: Global Sportsman Pty Ltd 2 FCR 82, 91. “Conduct” is likely to mislead or deceive if there is a “real or not remote chance or possibility regardless of whether it is less or more than fifty per cent”: Global Sportsman Pty Ltd 2 FCR 82, 87.2.Section 52(1) is concerned with the effect or likely effect of “conduct” upon the minds of that person or those persons in relation to whom the question of whether the “conduct” is or is likely to be misleading or deceptive falls to be tested. The test is objective and the Court must determine the question for itself: Global Sportsman Pty Ltd 2 FCR 82, 87. Section 52 is not designed for the benefit of persons who fail, in the circumstances of the case, to take reasonable care of their own interests: Elders Trustee and Executor Co Ltd v E G Reeves Pty Ltd (1987) 78 ALR 193 at 241. Moreover, it would be wrong to select particular words or acts which although misleading in isolation do not have that character when viewed in context: Elders Trustee 78 ALR 193 at 241 citing Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd (1982) 149 CLR 191 at 199. 3.“Conduct” can, of course, include making a statement which is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive: Global Sportsman Pty Ltd 2 FCR 82, 88. 4.By making a statement of past or present fact, a corporation’s state of mind is irrelevant unless the statement involved the state of the corporation’s mind: Global Sportsman Pty Ltd 2 FCR 82, 88. Contravention of s 52(1) does not depend upon the corporation’s intention or its belief concerning the accuracy of the statement of fact but upon whether the statement conveys a meaning which is false. A false meaning will be conveyed if what is stated concerning the past or present fact is inaccurate but also if, although literally true, the statement conveys a meaning which is false. 5.Precisely the same principles control the operation of s 52(1) to statements involving the state of mind of the maker when the statement was made (e.g. promises, predictions and opinions). A statement which involves the state of mind of the maker ordinarily conveys the meaning (expressly or impliedly) that the maker of the statement had a particular state of mind when the statement was made and, commonly, that there was a basis for that state of mind: Global Sportsman Pty Ltd 2 FCR 82, 88. 6.A statement of opinion will not be misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive merely because it turns out to be incorrect, misinforms or is likely to do so: Elders Trustee 78 ALR 193, 242 and Bateman v Slatyer (1987) 71 ALR 553, 559. An incorrect opinion does not of itself establish that the opinion was not held by the person who expressed it or that it lacked any or any adequate foundation: Global Sportsman Pty Ltd 2 FCR 82, 88. An expression of an opinion which is identifiable as an expression of opinion conveys no more than that the opinion is held and perhaps that there is a basis for the opinion. If that is so, an expression of opinion however erroneous misrepresents nothing: Global Sportsman Pty Ltd 2 FCR 82, 88.7.However, an opinion may convey that there is a basis for it, that it is honestly held and when it is expressed as the opinion of an expert, that it is honestly held upon rational grounds involving an application of the relevant expertise. If the evidence shows that the opinion was not held or that it lacked any or any adequate foundation, particularly if the opinion was expressed as an expert, a statement of opinion may contravene s 52 of the TPA: Elders Trustee 78 ALR 193, 242, proposition (4): see also Hannaford [2008] FCA 1591 at [253] and RAIA Insurance Brokers Ltd v FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (1993) 41 FCR 164; Murphy v Overton Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 388; NC Seddon and MP Ellinghaus, Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract (9th Australian Edition, 2008), [11.116]. (emphasis added)