North East Equity Pty Ltd v Proud Nominees Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

North East Equity Pty Ltd v Proud Nominees Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 1

Citation: North East Equity Pty Ltd v Proud Nominees Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 1
Appeal from: North East Equity Pty Ltd v Proud Nominees Pty Ltd (No 4) [2010] FCA 700
Parties: NORTH EAST EQUITY PT LTD (ACN 009 248 819) v PROUD NOMINEES PTY LTD (ACN 074 270 938) and DAVID LEWIS PROUD
File number: WAD 204 of 2010
Judges: MANSFIELD, GREENWOOD AND BARKER JJ
Date of judgment: 19 January 2012
Catchwords:

TRADE PRACTICES – consideration of the construction of s 51A of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (now in an amended form as s 4 of the Australian Consumer Law, Schedule 2, to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)) – consideration of a challenge to the primary judge’s finding that the respondents had discharged the evidential burden under s 51A(2) of the Trade Practices Act and a challenge to the finding that the appellant had failed to discharge the persuasive onus under s 51A(1) of the Trade Practices Act – consideration of the evidential burden and the persuasive onus under s 51A in circumstances where a representation as to a future matter is shown to have come to pass, or not shown not to have come to pass.

CONSUMER LAW – consideration of the evidential burden arising under s 51A(2) of the Trade Practices Act and the persuasive onus arising under s 51A(1) of the Trade Practices Act.

Legislation: Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 51A
Cases cited: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Universal Sports Challenge [2002] FCA 1276; cited
Fubilian Catering Services Ltd v Compass Group (Australia) Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1205; cited
McGrath v Australian Naturalcare Products Pty Ltd (2008) 165 FCR 230; cited.
Date of hearing: 10 February 2011
Date of last submissions: 10 February 2011
Place: Perth
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 86
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr C Colvin SC with Mr D Cuerden
Solicitor for the Appellant: Ilberys Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr PG McGowan
Solicitor for the Respondents: David Deakin Davies & Co, Solicitors

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 204 of 2010

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

NORTH EAST EQUITY PT LTD (ACN 009 248 819)
Appellant

AND:

PROUD NOMINEES PTY LTD (ACN 074 270 938)
First Respondent

DAVID LEWIS PROUD
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

MANSFIELD, GREENWOOD AND BARKER JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

19 JANUARY 2012

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 204 of 2010

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

NORTH EAST EQUITY PT LTD (ACN 009 248 819)
Appellant

AND:

PROUD NOMINEES…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCAFC 1
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of North East Equity Pty Ltd v Proud Nominees Pty Ltd, the primary judge ruled in favour of the respondents, finding that they had satisfied the evidential burden under section 51A(2) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), and that the appellant had not discharged the persuasive onus under section 51A(1) of the same Act. The appellant, North East Equity, challenged these findings, arguing that the respondents did not have reasonable grounds for making representations concerning future performance and grading of a Bruynooghe system. The Full Court was required to determine whether the primary judge's findings were correct and whether the appellant had suffered loss or damage due to the respondents' conduct.

The Full Court examined the primary judge's findings and the evidence presented. The primary judge had concluded that Mr Tana, the appellant's representative, had conducted his own investigations and had a "knowledge and understanding" of the Bruynooghe system. However, the primary judge also found that Mr Tana relied on the respondents' representations, which were based on Mr Proud's extensive knowledge and experience. The Full Court found no error in the primary judge's conclusion that the respondents had reasonable grounds for their representations, and thus the appellant had not discharged the persuasive onus. The Full Court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the respondents' costs.

The Full Court further considered the primary judge's assessment of damages, finding errors in the primary judge's reasons. The Full Court noted that the primary judge had failed to address the merits of the alternative approach to the date for determining the true value of the new line in the hands of the appellant, had not accounted for additional power costs in the damages calculation, and had inappropriately treated notional benefits and expenses. The Full Court set aside the primary judge's orders dismissing the application and remitted the matter for further consideration of damages. The Full Court did not find that each representation constituted a contravention of section 52, but assumed this for the sake of the damages analysis.

In summary, the Full Court upheld the primary judge's findings concerning the respondents' reasonable grounds for their representations and the appellant's failure to discharge the persuasive onus. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs. The Full Court also noted errors in the primary judge's damages assessment and remitted the matter for further consideration.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The primary judge found that Mr Tana had made his own investigations of the Bruynooghe system. He had acquired a “knowledge and understanding” of the Bruynooghe system ([43], [44] and [329] of the principal judgment). That is not to say that Mr Tana did not rely on the representations of the respondents. The primary judge found that he did so rely. Mr Tana seemed content and enthusiastic after his own investigations as to the capacity of the Bruynooghe equipment to function to the performance level suggested by Mr Proud. Mr Proud’s more extensive knowledge and experience of the Bruynooghe system; the tanks in operation; Bruynooghe’s personnel; and, the experience of the Kalfresh operation, provided a basis for the primary judge’s finding that Mr Proud had a reasonable basis for the representation as to grading. Conclusion The primary judge did not err in finding that the respondents had adduced evidence of reasonable grounds in discharge of the evidential burden concerning the temperature and grading representations and did not err in finding that the appellant had failed to discharge the persuasive onus. It is therefore not necessary to consider the question of damages, the subject of the second matter remitted to the primary judge. It follows that the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

That finding was said to be correct and ought not to be disturbed. The Full Court’s consideration of the primary judge’s assessment of damages In the first appeal, the Full Court then considered whether the primary judge’s reasons exposed any error in the assessment of loss and damage. Since the reasons revealed error in failing to address the merits of the alternative approach to the date for determining the true value of the new line in the hands of the appellant; a failure to bring to account the additional power costs in the damages calculation; and inappropriate treatment of notional benefits and notional expenses, the orders of the primary judge dismissing the application were set aside and the matter remitted to the primary judge to formulate reasons for the conclusion that s 51A did not assist the appellant and for further consideration of the question of damages in light of the Full Court’s reasons: (see [23] of these reasons). In analysing the question of whether the primary judge erred in fact or in law in assessing whether the appellant had suffered loss or damage by conduct of the respondents in contravention of s 52 for the purposes of s 82, the Full Court simply assumed (for the sake of the damages analysis as to contended error) that each representation, as found, constituted a contravention of s 52 having regard to the lacuna in the reasons. At [122] the Full Court said that the question “should be answered on the footing that each of the representations as found constitutes a contravention of s 52, having regard to the lacuna described earlier” [emphasis added]. The Full Court did not “find” that each representation as found by the primary judge constituted a contravention of s 52. The examination of the contended errors in the damages assessment recognised: the primary judge’s finding that the representations induced the appellant to enter the contract; the appellant relied upon the representations; and, the appellant would not have signed the contract and entered into the related arrangements but for the representations, thus giving rise to the “no transaction” methodology in the approach to the loss and damage calculation. In the result, the Full Court in the first appeal accepted (as did the respondents) that the primary judge had failed to address the s 51A case in terms of the required stepped analysis, and the exposed reasons did not reveal the reasoning for the conclusion at [346] that it was not necessary to do so (grounds 7 and 10). The present appeal On 6 July 2010 the primary judge, on remitter, dismissed the appellant’s claim (order 2) and made consequential orders as to costs (orders 3 and 4). The appellant appeals from orders 2, 3 and 4 and relies upon three grounds:(1)the primary judge is said to have erred in fact and in law in finding that the respondents had adduced “evidence to the contrary” for the purposes of s 51A(2) and erred in failing to find that the respondents had failed to do so;(2)the primary judge is said to have erred in fact and in law in finding that the appellant had failed to prove that the respondents did not have reasonable grounds for making the representations for the purposes of s 51A(1);(3)by reason of the errors reflected in grounds 1 and 2, the primary judge erred, it is said, in failing to address the issue of damages the subject of the remitter and ought to have found loss and damage suffered by the appellant in particular alternative amounts.