Aust Educ Union (Formerly Sait Inc) v Grieve No. Scgrg-95-29

Link copied
Case Copied 34 min read

AUST EDUC UNION (FORMERLY SAIT INC) v GRIEVE
[2000] SASC 381

WILLIAMS J

1. The requirements of the Full Court’s order

  1. On 4 June 1998, I dismissed the claim of the plaintiff for damages based upon an allegation that the defendant had failed properly to carry out the terms of his engagement as architect in connection with the removal of asbestos from the plaintiff’s building.  By order dated 13 May 1999, the Full Court allowed an appeal against my decision and quashed my order of dismissal of the claim; the Full Court ordered that, subject to the grant of an extension of time for commencement of the proceedings pursuant to the Limitations of Actions Act 1936 (SA) (“The Act”) the plaintiff recover damages to be assessed.  The matter has been referred back to me by the Full Court for further hearing of the issues arising under The Act and, (subject to the resolution thereof in favour of the plaintiff), the assessment of the damages payable by the defendant.

  2. The essence of the Full Court’s decision which I am required to apply is as follows:

    (1)... The defendant failed to make a personal inspection of work:

    (a).... following the removal of asbestos and before the application of PVA

    and

    (b)... at the conclusion of the job.

    The defendant failed to detect that the extent of asbestos removal and the extent of PVA treatment was inadequate.  If Mr Grieve had detected these deficiencies he should have given directions to the asbestos contractor to undertake remedial work.

    (2)... That by failing to inspect at the two critical stages abovementioned and by failing to give the consequential directions the defendant was liable (either in breach of contract or in negligence) in failing to ensure that the extent of the removal of the asbestos was “as complete as could practically be achieved” and that the affected areas were thereafter “adequately and completely sealed off with PVA paint”.

  3. My decision of 4 June 1998 in favour of the architect was reached upon the basis that he was entitled to rely upon the assessment of another expert, in this instance, the independent asbestos monitor who had been contracted to the job, but the Full Court’s decision required that the plaintiff personally undertake an inspection upon the two critical occasions.

  4. It is common ground between counsel for present purposes, that it is unnecessary to separately consider the two inspections which were required.  If the architect had inspected on either occasion, then the need for further work would have been apparent.  However, the failure to spray adequately with PVA paint would only have been apparent at the conclusion of the job.

  5. The application of the Limitations of Actions Act

  1. On 14 January 1994, the plaintiff became aware of the existence of loose asbestos in the ceiling cavity of Raggatt House; the present proceedings were commenced on 10 January 1995, that is within 12 months of the ascertainment by the plaintiff of what is claimed to be a “material fact”…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Aust Educ Union (Formerly Sait Inc) v Grieve No. Scgrg-95-29 and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2000] SASC 381
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Aust Educ Union (Formerly Sait Inc) versus Grieve, the plaintiff sought to adduce further evidence after the trial had concluded. The defendant opposed the application, arguing that the proposed evidence would not provide a significant benefit and could potentially lead to an unfair outcome. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of South Australia.

The court had to decide whether to allow the plaintiff to adduce further evidence after the trial had concluded, considering the Full Court's decision in Australian Education Union (SA Branch) v Grieve. The plaintiff argued that the new evidence would provide a more accurate calculation of damages, while the defendant argued that the proposed evidence was speculative and would not provide a significant benefit. Additionally, the plaintiff was not willing to recall witnesses for further cross-examination, which could potentially lead to an unfair outcome.

The court ruled that the proposed evidence was of limited value and may make the task of the plaintiff's counsel a little easier in terms of providing the plaintiff with some additional material on which to hang an argument. However, the court was not persuaded that any such calculation was likely to be any more realistic than would be the case if the existing evidence was not supplemented. The plaintiff was not willing to give an undertaking to recall witnesses if required for further cross-examination, which was a significant fact. The equilibrium which was established at the close of the last trial would be upset if any re-opening of the evidence was now allowed. The court ruled accordingly, and the plaintiff was not allowed to adduce further evidence.

The court's ruling was that the proposed evidence was of limited value, and the plaintiff was not willing to give an undertaking to recall witnesses if required for further cross-examination. The court was not persuaded that any such calculation was likely to be any more realistic than would be the case if the existing evidence was not supplemented. The equilibrium which was established at the close of the last trial would be upset if any re-opening of the evidence was now allowed. The court ruled that the plaintiff was not allowed to adduce further evidence.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Application to re-open the evidence On 20 December 1999 I heard an application by the plaintiff for leave to adduce further evidence. On 4 April 2000 I gave to the parties an intimation that there appeared to be a basis for receiving additional material, and I required the plaintiff to provide details of the proposed new evidence so that I could assess the extent to which each party might be at liberty to supplement its case. On 5 July 2000 (after further hearing the parties), I declined to allow any additional evidence and I gave reasons for my ruling; a copy of that ruling is set out below. In the circumstances disclosed in that ruling I have assessed damages upon the limited evidence which is available. Ruling delivered on 5 July 2000 The ruling and accompanying reasons were expressed as follows:“On 20 December 1999 I heard argument on the question as to whether I should give leave for further evidence to be called at trial after the completion of addresses but in light of the decision of the Full Court. (Australian Education Union (SA Branch) v Grieve [1999] SASC 183).On 4 April 2000 I intimated to the parties that I was favourably disposed to the plaintiff’s application and I directed the plaintiff to deliver a detailed statement of the proposed new evidence which the plaintiff wished to lead. I indicated that I wished to assess the extent to which I should allow the plaintiff to lead the additional material. I also required the plaintiff to provide a calculation of the plaintiff’s damages which on the plaintiff’s case was justified by the new evidence.The plaintiff complied with my directions and on 29 June 2000 I heard argument as to the future course of this matter.Having examined in detail the plaintiff’s proposed new material and having given consideration as to how it is to be applied, I am not disposed to allow this particular new evidence to be adduced. I make this ruling accordingly.There are a number of factors leading me to this conclusion:(1)... The proposed evidence is of limited value. It may make the task of the plaintiff’s counsel a little easier in terms of providing the plaintiff with some additional material on which to hang an argument. However, in terms of the justice of the case I am not persuaded that any such calculation is likely to be any more realistic than would be the case if the existing evidence is not supplemented. There is a degree of speculation in the proposed exercise.(2)The plaintiff is not willing to give an undertaking to recall witnesses if required for further cross-examination. This is a significant fact.(3)... The equilibrium which was established at the close of the last trial will be upset if any re-opening of the evidence is now allowed. I am on notice that the defendant may seek to use the opportunity (quite properly) to close some gaps in cross-examination which were identified in the opinion of the Full Court. I do not see that I would be able to stop this process and there is a real danger that the Full Court’s judgment will be undercut or subverted by the additional evidence. This is a telling factor.Short of allowing a substantial part of the case to be relitigated, I cannot find a way in which I can do justice to both sides by re-opening the evidence. Very little will be achieved by allowing the further evidence. There is a substantial risk of injustice associated with the proposed procedure.This is not a case where supplementary evidence could resolve an argument or remove an ambiguity. At best the further evidence will fuel the argument.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.