Aust Education Union (SA Branch) v Grieve No. Scgrg-95-29 Judgment No. S183

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AUSTRALIAN EDUCATION UNION, SOUTH
AUSTRALIAN BRANCH v GRIEVE
[1999] SASC 183

Full Court:  Doyle CJ, Perry and Martin JJ

  1. DOYLE CJ.       I agree with the orders proposed by Perry J, and with the reasons that he gives for making those orders.  There is nothing that I wish to add to those reasons.

  2. PERRY J.          The appellant is the successor to the South Australian Institute of Teachers Inc.  It sued the respondent, an architect, for damages alleging that he had failed properly to carry out the terms of his engagement in connection with the removal of asbestos from the ceiling of a building owned by the appellant at Greenhill Road, Parkside.  The trial judge, Williams J, dismissed the appellant’s claim.[1]  The appellant appeals to this Court against the order dismissing the action.

    [1]    See reasons for judgment dated 4 June 1998, judgment No S6705.

  3. The building in question was erected by the appellant in 1974.  Part of the building, called Raggatt House, is single-storeyed and includes a hall and associated amenities.

  4. The underside of the iron roof of Raggatt House, which included the roof over the hall, had during its construction been sprayed with asbestos as an insulating material.  There was a good deal of over-spray which resulted in the asbestos lodging on and becoming attached to beams and cross-members, and some also fell into the cavity brick wall.

  5. On about 6 April 1984, Mr Derek Bee, the appellant’s building caretaker, was checking some cabling in the ceiling cavity above the hall.  He discovered what he thought was asbestos, and immediately advised Ms Lee, the then General Secretary of the plaintiff.  She arranged for samples of the material to be taken and forwarded to Amdel on 9 April 1984.  Amdel confirmed that the material supplied contained asbestos.

  6. After the confirmation by Amdel that the sample submitted to it was asbestos, the appellant’s executive met and authorised Ms Lee to take the necessary steps for the removal of the hazard posed by the asbestos.

  7. On about 18 April 1984, Ms Lee met the respondent at her office.  The learned trial judge found that she explained to the respondent that the appellant wished to engage him as architect to deal with the problem, and that in the course of doing so she made it clear that the executive wanted to achieve “complete removal” of the asbestos.  Although the respondent admitted that he had no previous experience with asbestos removal, he agreed to accept the retainer.

  8. A series of meetings then ensued between Ms Lee and the respondent.  They both gave evidence before the trial judge, but understandably, given the lapse of time, neither had a precise recollection as to the content of the discussions.  However, the learned trial judge found, and there is no reason to doubt the finding, that the respondent raised as an option the possibility of the removal of the roof.  Ms Lee rejected that suggestion as being too extreme, and at the same time made it clear that cost…

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Details
Case
[1999] SASC 183
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Australian Education Union, South Australian Branch, appealed against a dismissal of its claim for damages against Grieve, an architect, for failing to properly carry out the terms of his engagement in connection with the removal of asbestos from the ceiling of a building owned by the appellant at Greenhill Road, Parkside. The trial judge, Williams J, dismissed the appellant’s claim, and the appellant appealed to the Full Court. The Full Court found that the trial judge had erred in his assessment of the evidence, and that the respondent was liable, either in breach of contract or in negligence, for failing to adequately inspect the work, for not ensuring that the extent of the removal of the asbestos was as complete as could practicably be achieved, and for not adequately and completely sealing off the affected areas with PVA paint. The Full Court allowed the appeal, quashed the order dismissing the plaintiff’s claim, and ordered that the matter be referred back for further hearing before the learned trial judge to determine the issues arising under the Limitation of Actions Act 1936, and if those issues were resolved in favour of the plaintiff, to assess the damages payable by the defendant.

The legal issues the court was required to decide were whether the respondent was liable for failing to adequately inspect the work, for not ensuring that the extent of the removal of the asbestos was as complete as could practicably be achieved, and for not adequately and completely sealing off the affected areas with PVA paint. The court also had to determine whether the action was statute barred, and if so, whether an extension should be granted. Finally, the court had to consider the issue of damages.

The court's reasoning and outcome was that the trial judge had erred in his assessment of the evidence, and that the respondent was liable for failing to adequately inspect the work, for not ensuring that the extent of the removal of the asbestos was as complete as could practicably be achieved, and for not adequately and completely sealing off the affected areas with PVA paint. The court found that the trial judge had not given proper weight to items of evidence which were either not in contest or not seriously capable of being challenged. The court also found that the learned trial judge had failed to consider and determine the issues raised under the Limitation of Actions Act 1936, namely, the question whether or not the action was commenced, within the meaning of s35, more than six years after the accrual of the cause of action, and if so, whether the plaintiff was entitled to an extension of time for the commencement of proceedings pursuant to s48 of the Act. The Full Court allowed the appeal, quashed the order dismissing the plaintiff’s claim, and ordered that the matter be referred back for further hearing before the learned trial judge to determine the issues arising under the Limitation of Actions Act 1936, and if those issues were resolved in favour of the plaintiff, to assess the damages payable by the defendant.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

DOYLE CJ PERRY J MARTIN J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DOYLE CJ, PERRY J, MARTIN J