Attorney General v Keating - [2000] WASC 93

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

CITATION: ATTORNEY GENERAL -v- KEATING [2000] WASC 93

CORAM: ANDERSON J

HEARD: 18 JANUARY 2000

DELIVERED : 19 APRIL 2000

FILE NO/S: CIV 2181 of 1999

BETWEEN: ATTORNEY GENERAL
Applicant
AND
OISIN GEOFFREY KEATING
Respondent

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Vexatious litigants - Proceedings to restrain - Test of "vexatious" and "habitually and persistently" - Relevant considerations

Legislation:

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), s 42

Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth), s 9(5)
Limitation Act 1935, s 38
Poor Persons Legal Assistance Act 1928

Vexatious Proceedings Restrictions Act 1930, s 3

Result:

Application allowed

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant: Mr R M Mitchell
Respondent: No appearance

Solicitors:

Applicant: State Crown Solicitor
Respondent: No appearance

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Attorney General v Michael [1999] WASCA 181
Hunters Hill Municipal Council v Pedler [1976] 1 NSWLR 478

Case(s) also cited:

Nil

ANDERSON J: This is the Attorney General's application by way of originating motion pursuant to s 3 of the Vexatious Proceedings Restrictions Act 1930. Section 3 of the Act is in the following terms:
"If…the Supreme Court is satisfied that any person…has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground, instituted or commenced vexatious proceedings, whether in the Supreme Court or in any inferior court, and whether against the same person or against a different person, the court may…order that no legal proceedings shall, without the leave of the Supreme Court, be instituted by him…and such leave shall not be given unless the Supreme Court is satisfied that the proceedings are not an abuse of the process of the court, and that there is a prima facie ground for the proceedings."
This legislative provision is directed to the removal of abuses of the processes of the court and of hardship to persons against whom vexatious proceedings are taken: Hunters Hill Municipal Council v Pedler [1976] 1 NSWLR 478.

Factual Background

It would appear from the claims made in the various proceedings commenced by the respondent that all of the proceedings stem from an event that occurred in 1976. In April of that year the respondent, then of the age of 15 years, was diagnosed with a brain tumour, which was successfully removed by surgery. The respondent had attended a medical practitioner in Bunbury on several occasions in the months preceding the operation, with complaints of dizziness, headaches and lethargy. The doctor, Dr Woods, did not diagnose the existence of a tumour. On 1 April 1976 after an episode of loss of consciousness the respondent was hospitalised in Bunbury and x‑rays were taken and the tumour was discovered. One of the respondent's allegations against Dr Woods is that notwithstanding positive x‑ray evidence of the tumour, Dr Woods did not immediately attend the respondent in the Bunbury Hospital. The respondent had been admitted by another doctor. It would appear that Dr Woods did attend the respondent on 3 April 1976 and arranged with the respondent's mother to have him taken to Royal…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Attorney General v Keating

Details

AGLC: Attorney General v Keating [2000] WASC 93
Case: [2000] WASC 93
Decision Date: 19 APRIL 2000

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Attorney General v Keating involved the Attorney General bringing an application for an injunction to restrain Keating from initiating further proceedings in the Federal Court without leave. The nature of the dispute was whether Keating qualified as a vexatious litigant, thereby warranting such an injunction. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The Attorney General contended that Keating's repeated and persistent litigation was causing unnecessary and disproportionate harm to the court system, necessitating a restraint order.

The court had to decide whether Keating's conduct met the threshold of being both vexatious and habitually persistent. This involved assessing the nature of the litigation, the frequency of the proceedings, and the impact on the judicial system. The court considered the definition of a vexatious litigant as one who engages in litigation that is unreasonable or oppressive to the other party, and the notion of 'habitually and persistently' was examined to determine if there was a pattern of such behaviour. The court weighed the balance between the right to access the courts and the need to protect the judicial process from unnecessary burden.

In its reasoning, the court found that Keating's conduct met the criteria for being deemed a vexatious litigant. The court determined that the litigation initiated by Keating was without merit, repetitive, and had caused significant inconvenience and expense to the court system. The court concluded that the public interest required the imposition of an injunction to prevent further proceedings without leave. The court issued an order restraining Keating from initiating further proceedings in the Federal Court without first obtaining leave from the court.

Orders