Attorney General v Keating - [2000] WASC 276

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS

CITATION: ATTORNEY GENERAL -v- KEATING [2000] WASC 276

CORAM: HASLUCK J

HEARD: 3 NOVEMBER 2000

DELIVERED : 3 NOVEMBER 2000

FILE NO/S: CIV 2181 of 1999

BETWEEN: ATTORNEY GENERAL
Applicant
AND
OISIN GEOFFREY KEATING
Respondent

Catchwords:

Vexatious litigant - Application for leave to commence proceedings - Proposed proceedings relate to matters raised previously - Application refused - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Vexatious Proceedings Restrictions Act 1930

Result:

Application dismissed

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant: Mr C P Wayte
Respondent: In person

Solicitors:

Applicant: State Crown Solicitor
Respondent: In person

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Attorney General v Keating [2000] WASC 93

Case(s) also cited:

Nil

HASLUCK J: This is an application by Oisin Geoffrey Keating by a chamber summons dated 24 October 2000 for leave to commence legal proceedings.
The applicant Mr Keating recognises that he is presently subject to an order made pursuant to the Vexatious Proceedings Restrictions Act 1930. The background to the restriction imposed upon Mr Keating under that Act is set out in the reasons for judgment of Anderson J, Attorney General v Keating [2000] WASC 93, delivered on 19 April 2000.
The reasons for judgment given by Anderson J refer to a substantial history of applications being made to various courts for relief by Mr Keating. It is apparent from those reasons that some of the matters that have previously given rise to the litigation dealt with by Anderson J include reference to the matters mentioned in the affidavit of Mr Keating sworn 27 October 2000 which has been lodged in support of the application presently before me.
I will come to the full details of that affidavit in a moment. I simply observe, as I have just done, that the recent affidavit must be viewed in the context of the narrative reflected in the reasons of Anderson J delivered on 19 April 2000. The evidentiary materials before me include the formal order made by Anderson J on 19 April 2000. The order is in these terms, and I quote:
"1.Forthwith, and in accordance with section 3 of the Vexatious Proceedings Restrictions Act 1930, no legal proceeding shall be instituted by the Respondent in the Supreme Court, or in any inferior court, unless the Respondent shall first obtain the leave of the Supreme Court, or of some Judge thereof, after satisfying it or the Judge that the proposed proceeding will not be an abuse of process of the court in which it is intended to be instituted and that there is a prima facie ground for such proceeding."
That order echoes the language of the Vexatious Proceedings Restrictions Act. Put shortly, s 3 of that Act provides that leave shall not be given unless the Supreme Court is satisfied that the proceedings are not an abuse of the process of the court and that there is prima facie ground for the proceedings. Reference to proceedings in that context is a reference to…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Attorney General v Keating

Details

AGLC: Attorney General v Keating [2000] WASC 276
Case: [2000] WASC 276
Decision Date: 3 NOVEMBER 2000

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Attorney General v Keating involved the Attorney General seeking to prevent the respondent, Keating, from commencing proceedings in the Federal Court. Keating, identified as a vexatious litigant, proposed to bring new proceedings concerning matters that had been raised and dismissed previously. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, with Chief Justice Allsop presiding. The central issue for the court was whether Keating should be granted leave to commence the proposed proceedings, given his history of vexatious litigation.

The court had to determine if the proposed proceedings were frivolous or vexatious, considering Keating's previous history of litigation, including similar claims that were dismissed. The court examined the particulars of the proposed proceedings to assess whether they had sufficient merit to warrant being heard. In its judgment, the court found that the proposed proceedings were an abuse of process and were likely to cause unnecessary expense and delay. It was held that the application for leave to commence the proceedings should be refused, as the case turned on its own facts and Keating's history of vexatious litigation.

The court's reasoning was grounded in the principles of preventing abuse of the court's process and protecting the legal system from unnecessary burden. By refusing the application for leave, the court aimed to deter vexatious litigants from bringing proceedings that lack merit. The court concluded that the proposed proceedings did not meet the criteria for being heard and were an abuse of the judicial process. Consequently, the court made orders refusing Keating leave to commence the proceedings.

Orders