Vexatious Proceedings Act - Proceedings commenced by litigant over a period of ten years - Exaggerated and repetitious claims - Proceedings seldom pressed to a conclusion - Restrictive order granted - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Criminal Code, s 85, s 124, s 143, s 336, s 473, s 409(1)(c), s 409(1)(d), s 444(1)
Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Defendants) Act 1996, s 5
Fines, Penalties and Infringement Notices Enforcement Act 1994
Mental Health Act 1996
Rules of the Supreme Court, O 78 r 1, O 78 r 4, O 55
Transfer of Land Act 1893

Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 1930, s 3

Result:

Application allowed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant: Ms J C Pritchard
Respondent: No appearance

Solicitors:

Applicant: Crown Solicitor
Respondent: No appearance

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Attorney General v Keating [2000] WASC 93
Attorney General v Michael [1999] WASCA 181
Hunter v Webb, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 940399; 5 August 1994
Hunters Hill Municipal Council v Pedler [1976] 1 NSWLR 478
Re Vernazza [1960] 1 QB 197
Rodgers v Simpson [2001] WASCA 223

Case(s) also cited:

Attorney General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481

HASLUCK J: This is an application brought by the Attorney General of the State of Western Australia pursuant to provisions of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 1930. The applicant seeks an order that no legal proceedings shall be instituted by the respondent, Lindsay Hunter, in the Supreme Court, or in any inferior Court, unless the said Lindsay Hunter shall first obtain leave in accordance with the Act.
Section 3 of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 1930 ("the VPR Act") provides that if the Supreme Court is satisfied that any person has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground, instituted or commenced vexatious proceedings, and whether against the same person or against a different person, the Court may, after hearing that person or giving him an opportunity of being heard, order that no legal proceedings shall be instituted without leave of the Supreme Court. Such leave shall not be given unless the Supreme Court is satisfied that the proceedings are not an abuse of the process of the Court, and that there is prima facie ground for the proceedings.
I will return to the legal principles applicable to issues arising under this provision later. However, as the respondent was not represented at the hearing before me, it is necessary to begin by turning to the procedural history of the present application.

Procedural Matters

Order 78 Rule 1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides that an application under the VPR Act 1930 shall be made by originating motion. Related rules…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Attorney General v Hunter

Details

AGLC: Attorney General v Hunter [2002] WASC 189
Case: [2002] WASC 189
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, the Attorney General of the State of Western Australia, sought an order under the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 1930 that the respondent, Lindsay Hunter, should not be able to commence legal proceedings in any court unless he first obtained leave of the Supreme Court. The court was required to determine whether the respondent had habitually and persistently instituted vexatious proceedings in the Supreme Court or in any inferior Court. The court found that the respondent had brought numerous proceedings over a period of ten years which were exaggerated, repetitive, seldom pressed to a conclusion and without reasonable ground. The court held that the respondent's conduct met the criteria for vexatious proceedings and granted the order sought by the applicant.

Orders