ARQ17 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ARQ17 & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2018] FCCA 3288
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Immigration Assessment Authority – safe haven enterprise (subclass XE-790) visas – combined application by two brothers – whether the Authority erred in its consideration of whether there were exceptional circumstances justifying it considering new information – whether the Authority constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction by misapprehending the material or s.473DD(b) of the Migration Act 1958 – whether the Authority unreasonably failed to consider exercising its powers under s.473DC of the Migration Act 1958.
Legislation:
Migration Act 1958, ss.473DC, 473DD, 473GB

Cases cited:

AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 111
BCQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 365
BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 254 FCR 221; [2017] FCA 958
CHF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 192
CRW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 710
CSR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474
CVS16 v Minister For Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 951
DGZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 12
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 (2017) 158 ALD 198; [2017] FCAFC 176
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 (2017) 253 FCR 475; [2017] FCAFC 210
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594; (2011) 119 ALD 1; (2011) 273 ALR 223; (2011) 85 ALJR 327; [2011] HCA 1
Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 353 ALR 600; (2018) 92 ALJR 481; [2018] HCA 16
Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173; (2015) 148 ALD 206; (2015) 327 ALR 8; (2015) 90 ALJR 197; [2015] HCA 50

First Applicant: ARQ17
Second Applicant ARS17
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
File number: MLG 322 of 2017
Judgment of: Judge Riley
Hearing date: 26 July 2018
Date of last submission: 26 July 2018
Delivered at: Melbourne
Delivered on: 14 November 2018

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the applicants: John Maloney
Solicitors for the applicants: Victoria Legal Aid
Counsel for the first respondent: Nick Wood
Counsel for the second respondent: None
Solicitors for the respondents: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

  1. The decisions of the Immigration Assessment Authority made on 3 February 2017 in matters numbered IAA16/01102 and IAA16/01103 be set aside.

  2. The matters be remitted to the Immigration Assessment Authority for determination according to law.

  3. The first respondent pay the applicants’ costs of the proceeding fixed in the sum of $7,328.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

MLG 322 of 2017

ARQ17

First Applicant

ARS17

Second Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This is an application for review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority.  In that decision, the Authority…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCCA 3288
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter came before Judge Riley of the Federal Court of Australia. The appellant sought judicial review of a decision by the Authority, arguing that the Authority had committed jurisdictional error by failing to provide reasons for its decision regarding the exercise of a discretion under section 473DD of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth). The core of the dispute concerned whether the Authority was obligated to explicitly state in its reasons whether it had considered, and how it had exercised, its discretion under section 473DD, particularly in relation to new information.

The legal issues before the Court were whether section 473EA of the *Migration Act* (Cth), when read with section 25D of the *Acts Interpretation Act 1901* (Cth), imposed an obligation on the Authority to provide reasons for its procedural decisions, specifically concerning the exercise of discretion under section 473DD. The appellant contended that the absence of any reference to this discretion in the Authority's reasons meant it had not been considered, or that the failure to provide reasons for its exercise constituted jurisdictional error. The Minister argued that the reasons requirement was confined to the ultimate decision and did not extend to procedural decisions made during the review process.

Judge Riley accepted the Minister's submissions, finding that section 473EA(1) of the *Migration Act* was directed to the ultimate decision on the review and the reasons for that decision, rather than to procedural decisions made along the way. The Court relied on the reasoning in *BCQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection* [2018] FCA 365, which held that section 473EA did not require a statement of decision to refer to procedural decisions taken during a review. The Court found this case to be relevant and indistinguishable from the present matter. The Judge concluded that there was no obligation on the Authority to give reasons for failing to state its reasons in respect of the discretion in section 473DD, and therefore no jurisdictional error had occurred.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as no error on the part of the primary judge had been established.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In BCQ16, Thawley J applied SZGUR to hold that:49. The appellant submitted that to infer that the Authority considered exercising its discretion without including a statement to that effect in its reasons, or not to infer that it did not consider the discretion where there is no reference to it in its reasons, would effectively immunise the Authority from judicial review of the reasonableness of any such failure. The appellant submitted that a statement of decision had to refer to the existence of a discretionary power in Part 7AA or it should be inferred that it was not considered. 50. I do not agree. That is not to say that there might not be particular circumstances in which it is appropriate to draw an inference that a discretionary power was not considered by reason, wholly or partly, of the absence of a reference to the discretion in the reasons. CRY16 may be an example of such a case, albeit dealing with a different discretionary power to that presently being considered. However, first, as I have said at [45] above, s 473EA does not require a statement of decision to refer to a procedural decision taken in the course of a review and, secondly, the statutory scheme is such that a challenge to the failure to exercise, or the exercise of, the discretionary powers in s 473GB are practically limited. … (emphasis added) BCQ16 concerned s.473GB of the Act, while the present case concerns s.473DD of the Act. Nevertheless, the Minister submitted that the principle applied with equal force to the present case. The Minister also relied on CVS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 951, which does concern s.473DD of the Act. In CVS16, Bromwich J said:25. … the appellant contends in the alternative that the Authority fell into jurisdictional error in failing to state its reasons in respect of the discretion in s 473DD. 26. Reliance is placed by the appellant on the terms of the reasons requirement in s 473EA, coupled with s 25D of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), together with CHF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 192 at [40]-[42]. The appellant submits that the absence of any statement in the Authority’s reasons as to whether the new information was or was not excluded under s 473DD left the parties in the dark. He submits that it was nothing more than supposition for the primary judge to have drawn the inference at [38] that the documents were not referred to because they were not considered to be material. 27. The submissions for the appellant refer to, but seek to distinguish, the decision of Thawley J in BCQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 365, wherein his Honour found, at [50], after quoting SZGUR at [31]-[32], that “s 473EA does not require a statement of decision to refer to a procedural decision taken in the course of a review and, secondly, the statutory scheme is such that a challenge to the failure to exercise, or the exercise of, the discretionary powers in s 473GB are practically limited”; see also Thawley J’s earlier observations in BCQ16 at [45]. The basis for distinction was said to be that both BCQ16 and SZGUR were concerned with the exercise of a discretion to gather information, rather than, as in this case, information relevant to the making of a finding on a material question of fact, citing SZGUR at [32]. 28. The Minister submits in response that: (1) the obligation to give reasons that is imposed by s 473EA(1)(b) of the Migration Act (when read with s 25D of the Acts Interpretation Act) is confined to the ultimate decision, and does not extend to procedural or antecedent decisions made during the review process; (2) CHF16 did not support the appellant because the Full Court in that case, at [49], did not consider it necessary to resolve the question of whether there was a statutory obligation to give reasons for the exercise of the discretion; (3) the decision in BCQ16 at [45] and [50] should be followed to the effect that “s 473EA does not require a statement of decision to refer to a procedural decision taken in the course of a review”; and (4) this case is not distinguishable from BCQ16 and SZGUR because the reasons that the appellant contends were required went to a procedural issue of whether otherwise prohibited material should be considered, not the ultimate findings on material questions of fact. 29. The Minister’s submissions must again be accepted. Far from finding that BCQ16 was distinguishable or should not be followed, I am satisfied both that it was correctly decided and that it is relevantly indistinguishable in its application to the present point. The same conclusion is inevitable without the benefit of BCQ16. Section 473EA(1) is directed to the decision, and reasons for decision, on the review itself, as well as the day and time that statement of reasons is made. Such a precise requirement, at a particular date and time, is inconsistent with procedural decisions along the way needing to be the subject of any record at all, let alone a formal record of the type that the appellant contends is required. That is especially so when the decision in question is as to a discretion to depart from a statutory mandate that otherwise prohibits consideration of such material. 30. There was no obligation on the Authority to give reasons for failing to state its reasons in respect of the discretion in s 473DD, and therefore no jurisdictional error in not doing so. It follows that no error on the part of the primary judge has been established and this ground of appeal must therefore fail.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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