Arms v WSA Online Ltd (ACN 081 121 495)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Arms v WSA Online Ltd (ACN 081 121 495) [2003] FCA 835

SIMON ARMS  v  WSA ONLINE LIMITED (ACN 081 121 495),  JAMES HOUGHTON and JAMES STUDENT

V 228 of 2001

RYAN J
8 AUGUST 2003
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 228 of 2001

BETWEEN:

SIMON ARMS
Applicant

AND:

WSA ONLINE LIMITED (ACN 081 121 495)
First Respondent

JAMES HOUGHTON
Second Respondent

JAMES STUDENT
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

RYAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 AUGUST 2003

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant have leave to file and serve by 29 August 2003 an amended statement of claim.

2.The second respondent’s motion on notice dated 11 April 2003 stand over to 24 September 2003 at 9.30 am.

3.        The directions hearing herein be adjourned to 24 September 2003 at 9.30 am.

4.The respondents’ costs thrown away as a result of the amendment made pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Order and the costs of the applicant and the second respondent of the hearing on 16 May 2003 be reserved.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 228 of 2001

BETWEEN:

SIMON ARMS
Applicant

AND:

WSA ONLINE LIMITED (ACN 081 121 495)
First Respondent

JAMES HOUGHTON
Second Respondent

JAMES STUDENT
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

RYAN J

DATE:

8 AUGUST 2003

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This case concerns the applicant’s attempt to establish an internet business which was to allow individuals to purchase wines, directly over the internet, from various producers.  Crucial to its success was the operation of a credit card payment system for purchases made on the applicant’s website.  The first respondent (“WSA”) was engaged to create the website and the second and third respondents were employees of WSA who are alleged to have met with the applicant and to have made various representations in the course of WSA’s retainer.  In essence, the applicant claims that he was induced to enter into an agreement for the creation of the website by various false or misleading representation made by the respondents, particularly representations as to both the suitability for his purposes of an ANZ Bank internet credit card payment facility and the manner in which that ANZ product would operate.  The applicant alleges that the respondents told him that the ANZ internet credit card payment facility would allow purchasers to make credit card payments via the internet site, whereby funds would be credited directly to the  bank accounts of each winery supplying the wine which would only have to fill out a form to be included in this system.  The applicant contends that, in the result, the system could not remit funds to a winery unless the winery had been individually approved by each credit card provider and, as a consequence, funds had to be remitted to the applicant, thereby incurring delay and higher transactional costs which adversely affected his…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCA 835
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Arms v WSA Online Ltd (ACN 081 121 495) involved a dispute where the applicant, Arms, alleged negligent misrepresentation and breach of statutory duty against WSA Online Ltd. The primary contention was that the applicant had not sufficiently detailed in his pleadings facts that would establish the alleged cause of action under s 75B. The applicant's claims centred around specific representations made by WSA Online's employee, Mr Houghton, regarding the functionality and benefits of an e-commerce platform designed for Arms' business. The court examined whether these representations, if proven, would amount to knowing involvement in contraventions.

The central legal issues revolved around the adequacy of the applicant's pleadings to establish knowing involvement in contraventions and the reasonable reliance on the alleged negligent misrepresentations. The court needed to determine whether the applicant had sufficiently detailed facts to support his claims of negligent misrepresentation and breach of statutory duty, particularly concerning the future viability and profitability of the business, which was allegedly represented by Mr Houghton. The court also had to consider whether the applicant could reasonably rely on the representations made by Mr Houghton, who was primarily a website designer.

In its reasoning, the court found that the statement of claim was defective in several respects but noted that it might be possible to rectify these defects by amending the statement of claim. The court held that the applicant's claim of reliance on statements regarding the future profitability of the business was problematic unless additional facts could be pleaded to establish a reasonable basis for such reliance. The court concluded that while the claim based on negligent misstatement was arguable, it required further particulars and potentially additional claims under the Fair Trading Act to address the deficiencies. The court granted the applicant leave to amend his statement of claim, reserving costs for further argument.

The final orders of the court included granting the applicant leave to file an amended statement of claim by a specified date, standing over the second respondent's motion until the amendment was made, and reserving costs for further argument. This decision provided the applicant with an opportunity to rectify the deficiencies in his pleadings while allowing the respondents time to consider the amendments and respond accordingly.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant have leave to file and serve by 29 August 2003 an amended statement of claim.

2. The second respondent’s motion on notice dated 11 April 2003 stand over to 24 September 2003 at 9.30 am.

3. The directions hearing herein be adjourned to 24 September 2003 at 9.30 am.

4. The respondents’ costs thrown away as a result of the amendment made pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Order and the costs of the applicant and the second respondent of the hearing on 16 May 2003 be reserved.

Background

Background to the litigation

The central contention advanced on behalf of the second respondent is that the applicant has not adequately set out in his pleadings facts which, if made out, would disclose the cause of action alleged under s 75B which is discussed at [3] above. Keifel J, in Batten v CTMS Ltd [1999] FCA 1576 at [29], indicated as follows what is required to establish “knowing involvement”; ‘That leaves the question whether the Minister could be said to have been “knowingly concerned” in the contraventions as alleged. It must be recalled that this refers, again, to involvement in a contravention. The applicants’ case goes so far as to allege some knowledge and an interest in an overall plan, but not all aspects of how it was secured. Mere knowledge of the prospect that a contravention will, or has, occurred will not suffice. It must be shown that the respondent in question had knowledge of the facts which establish the contravention and that they acted in some positive way in connection with it: Bell v Australasian Recyclers (WA) Pty Ltd (1986) ATPR 40-644; 47, 222; Sent & Petres & Collier v Jet Corporation of Australia Pty Ltd (1984) 2 FCR 201; R v Tannous (1987) 10 NSWLR 303, 307-8.’ (emphasis added) The only particulars given as to what, allegedly, was known or actively done by the second respondent are contained in the applicant’s further and better particulars dated 16 August 2002 which are in these terms:‘The Second Respondent’s (Mr Houghton’s) representation was partly in writing and partly oral.In late January 2000 and early February 2000, the Applicant (Arms) had at least 2 meetings with James Student and James Houghton which began at the offices of WSA Online, and which were then conducted at the Fringe Cafe on the corner of Shakespeare Grove and Acland Street in St Kilda (the Cafe). The first of these meetings was held in the last week of January 2000.During the course of the meetings between Arms, Mr Student and Mr Houghton, Arms discussed with Mr Houghton the nature of Arm’s business and Mr Houghton said, in substance, to Arms as follows: (a)He was aware of a financial transactions product called ANZeGate, which would be “perfect” for the Arms Business. (b) The ANZeGate product would enable the secure processing and management of orders from visitors to the Business’ website direct to the winery and the payment from the visitor direct to the winery via the Business’ website.(c)The visitor to the Website would make a purchase, the transaction would be cleared and the order placed with the winery that delivers direct to the customer. Mr Houghton explained to Arms that the payment would be automatically deposited into the wineries’ accounts with a maximum of 2.5% having been already deducted for transaction fees.(d)The ANZeGate would facilitate payment by visitors to the Business’ website to the wineries by all major credit cards.(e)The transaction fees payable in respect of the use of credit cards by visitors to the Business’ website would be paid by the wineries, and that the transaction fees payable by the wineries would be between 2 and 2.5%.At a further meeting, which Arms attended at the Cafe in approximately mid-February 2000 with James Houghton and James Student, Arms advised both Mr Houghton and Mr Student that the on-line transaction facilitation was crucial to his business and Arms needed to know how this would work so that Arms could advise the wineries about this. At this meeting, Mr Houghton gave Arms a document, which he said summarised how the ANZeGate product would operate. This document may be inspected at the offices of the Applicant’s solicitors. Mr Houghton said, in substance, in reference to this document/memo that: (f)ANZeGate would allow e-commerce purchases to be cleared directly into the bank account of the relevant winery;(g)each of the member wineries would be individual merchants for the purposes of credit card transactions;(h)each of the wineries could go online to review their transactions at any time and all transaction reports will flow via WSA;(i) wineries could be added to the system by simply filling in a form and paying a small set-up fee;(j)all transactions would be cleared directly into the wineries’ business’ bank account without the set-up costs associated with setting up single client accounts; and(k)WSA would control the transactions, which were conducted via Arms’ website.At a meeting between Arms, James Houghton and James Student in approximately mid-February 2000 at the Cafe, Mr Houghton and Mr Student gave Arms a further document titled “Auscellardoor”. This document may be inspected at the offices of the Applicant’s solicitors. They said that this document was an outline of the benefits for Arms to discuss with wineries for them entering agreements with Arms in relation to his business. Arms discussed this document with Mr Houghton and Mr Student, and they both told Arms that:(l)the wineries would not be required to process credit card transactions as all orders would already be cleared before the wineries received the money; and (m) the money for each sale would be deposited straight into the wineries’ bank account.In approximately mid-March 2000, Arms had a meeting with James Student and James Houghton at the Cafe at which they gave Arms a document. This document may be inspected at the offices of the Applicant’s solicitors. Arms made notes on the reverse of the last page of matters, which were discussed at the meeting. Mr Houghton said to Arms that:(n)he was confident by 2003 Auscellardoor could be turning over $4 million per annum;(o) using the website constructed by WSA, Arms would be able to set up a separate and unique website for wineries which would link into Arms’ website for transactions only and that Arms would be able to attract a set-up fee of around $250 with additional monthly charges between $25 and $50 for the services provided;(p) through operating the website designed by WSA, Arms would have a competitive advantage over retail sites; (q) the website developed by WSA for the Business would develop an email list to provide regular communication about the Business, wineries, new offers, and could be the basis of a future loyalty rewards program; and (r) the website would be operational by mid-May 2000.Mr Houghton went through the flow diagrams on page 5 of the document and in that context explained to Arms that the visitor to the website would make a purchase, the transaction would be cleared and the order placed with the winery who delivers direct to the customer. Mr Houghton explained to Arms that the payment would be automatically deposited into the wineries’ accounts with a maximum of 2.5% having been already deducted for transaction fees.In March 2000, Arms met with James Student and James Houghton at the Cafe. At this meeting, Mr Student and Mr Houghton gave Arms the Trade Presentation Kit which represented the completion of Phase 1 of the services to be provided by WSA and which was to be used by Arms in promoting his business and his website to wineries. The Trade Presentation Kit included a form for the wineries to complete their bank details for the purpose of depositing money from sales into their accounts, as well as a brochure and a mock up of the website. The brochure may be inspected at the offices of the Applicant’s solicitors. In addition, Arms had created some standard form ‘agreement’ documents, which were to [scil. be] the basis of his relationship with each of the wineries Arms signed up to the Business. This document may be inspected at the offices of the Applicant’s solicitors. Arms showed this document to James Student and James Houghton and asked them both if there were any further details Arms would require from the wineries in order to effectively run his Business and operate his website. Mr. Houghton told Arms there was not.’

Decision

Reasons for decision

RYAN J
Two representations in the present case are, when considered as allegedly negligent misstatements, in a different category from the others. The second representation in 7(c) and the representation in 7(i) go to the future viability and profitability of the business. On the face of the pleading, no foundation has been laid for establishing reliance on statements by the second respondent as a mere employee going to the future viability or profitability of the website. No fact has been pleaded to suggest that the second respondent had particular skills or experience in conducting internet-based businesses, as opposed to designing and constructing websites. The claim of reliance on a website designer’s representations as to the future profitability of an internet business raises echoes of Norris v Sibberas (1990) VR 161 where the plaintiff claimed to have relied on optimistic statements made by a real estate agent about the future prospects of a business which she had been engaged to sell. In that case, the appellant agent did not possess, or purport to possess, the expertise in business planning of an accountant, although she did have experience of the motel market and motel management. It was from the latter, narrower, perspective alone, it was held, that reasonableness of reliance on her representations as to financial viability had to be assessed. Here it has not been alleged that the second respondent professed any relevant experience in businesses that trade over the internet, as opposed to construction of a site to facilitate the conduct of such a business. The distinction is neither subtle, nor artificial, and it appears to me that it is crucial to the applicant’s case in negligent misstatement against the second respondent. Insofar as it is sought to erect that case on par 7(i) and what I have referred to as the second representation in 7(c), that part of the claim against the second respondent should be struck out unless additional facts with appropriate particulars can be pleaded to provide a foundation for claiming that the applicant reasonably relied on those statements as made by the second respondent. The remaining alleged representations at pars 7(a), (b) (c), (d), (e) and (f) would appear to be matters presumptively within the expertise of a website designer specifically engaged to design and construct the applicant’s site and, prima facie, they are representations, upon which, if proved, the applicant could reasonably have relied. It appears to me that the applicant’s case based on negligent misstatement is, at least in part, arguable.Conclusion It will be apparent from the examination undertaken above that the statement of claim is defective in several respects. However, it may be possible to overcome all or some of those defects by removing certain allegations against the second respondent, by pleading additional material facts and by adding a claim under the Fair Trading Act which should cause the respondents no material prejudice which cannot be compensated by costs. I shall therefore order that the applicant have leave to amend his statement of claim. The second respondent’s notice of motion will be stood over until after that has been done to allow that respondent an opportunity to consider whether those of his objections which I have upheld have been overcome. In accordance with the usual rule, the applicant would have to pay the respondent’s costs thrown away as a result of the amendment for which I shall grant leave. However, to afford an opportunity for full argument, I shall reserve those costs and the costs of the applicant and the second respondent of the hearing on 16 May 2003.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: RYAN J

The court examined the applicant's statement of claim and found it to be defective in several respects. The central contention was whether the applicant had adequately set out facts in his pleadings to disclose a cause of action under s 75B. The court referred to previous case law, particularly Batten v CTMS Ltd, to establish the standard required for "knowing involvement" in a contravention. The applicant's particulars regarding the second respondent's knowledge and actions were insufficient to meet this standard. The court further considered the applicant's case based on negligent misstatement and found it to be at least in part arguable, particularly with respect to certain representations within the expertise of a website designer. However, the applicant's reliance on the second respondent's representations about the future viability and profitability of the website business was deemed unreasonable, as there were no allegations suggesting the second respondent had relevant experience in internet-based businesses. The court concluded that the applicant's case against the second respondent should be struck out unless additional facts were pleaded to provide a foundation for claiming that the applicant reasonably relied on those statements. The ratio decidendi of this decision lies in the requirement for adequate particulars in pleadings to disclose a cause of action under s 75B and the assessment of the reasonableness of reliance on representations made by a party with relevant expertise. The court distinguished the current case from Norris v Sibberas by emphasising the need for the party relying on the representations to have relevant experience in the subject matter of the representations.