Applicant RV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Applicant RV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
[2001] FCA 1034

MIGRATION – review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal – failure to observe procedures – jurisdictional error – requirement in s 430(1)(d) to refer to evidence on which findings of fact based not a “procedure” within meaning of s 476(1)(a) – error of law.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), Pt 8, ss 430(1)(c), (d), 476(1)(a), (b), (c), (e)

Chan Yee Kin v  Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 388, 430 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1 at 4-5, 20, 21-22 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469 not followed
Zyfi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 978 at [9] referred to
Ahmed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 811 referred to
Addo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 940 referred to
Sivaram v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 94 FCR 379 referred to
Xu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 95 FCR 425 referred to
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Epeabaka (1999) 84 FCR 411 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai (2001) 106 FCR 426 referred to
Gamaethige v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 565 referred to

APPLICANT RV v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

V796 of 2000

WEINBERG J
3 AUGUST 2001
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V796 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

APPLICANT RV
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WEINBERG J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 AUGUST 2001

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V796 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

APPLICANT RV
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WEINBERG J

DATE:

3 AUGUST 2001

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application under Pt 8 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 1 September 2000. By that decision the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent not to grant a protection visa to the applicant.

    Background

  2. The applicant is a 55 year old Sri Lankan woman of Tamil ethnicity.  She arrived lawfully in Australia on 12 March 1997, as the holder of a visitor’s visa.  On 10 June 1997 she lodged an application for a protection visa with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.  On 10 November 1997 that application was refused.  On 27 November 1997 she…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 1034
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Applicant RV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved an applicant challenging the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs regarding their visa application. The primary legal issue before the court was whether a failure to comply with the requirement in section 430(1)(d) of the Act to refer to the evidence or other materials on which findings of fact were based constituted a breach of the procedure required by section 476(1)(a). The court needed to determine if this omission was a procedure that, if not observed, could lead to the decision being quashed.

The court, in considering the matter, referred to the decision in Yusuf and noted that the majority had held that the obligation to set out findings did not constitute a procedure required to be observed in connection with the making of a decision. Gleeson CJ further elaborated that the failure to make a finding on a material question of fact could not be equated with a failure to observe a procedure in connection with the making of a decision. The court found that the distinction between not making a finding and not taking a relevant consideration into account was not clear, and treating the former as a failure to observe a procedure would be an overly strained interpretation of the statutory language.

Additionally, the applicant argued that the comments made by the majority in Yusuf regarding section 476(1)(a) were not binding and should be viewed as mere dicta. The court, however, acknowledged that the case did not explicitly decide whether other requirements in section 430(1) were procedures. Therefore, the court proceeded on the assumption that the requirement in section 430(1)(d) was indeed a procedure. Despite this assumption, the court concluded that the failure to refer to the evidence or other materials did not constitute a breach of the procedure required by section 476(1)(a).

The court ultimately dismissed the application and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

WEINBERG J
In Yusuf, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ said (at 20):“…Moreover, it may greatly be doubted that an obligation to set out findings could be said to be a procedure which is to be observed in connection with the making of the decision in question, as the setting out of the decision and reasons assumes that the decision has already been made. It is, however, enough to say that the conclusion that, so far as now relevant, s 430 requires only the recording of what was found and does not impose any duty to make findings, means that an asserted failure to make findings is not a breach of s 430. Accordingly, s 476(1)(a) is inapplicable.” (emphasis added) Gleeson CJ, who agreed with their Honours, said at 4-5:“…It was not suggested, in either of the present cases, that the Tribunal made some finding of fact which it failed to set out. The substance of the complaint was that the Tribunal failed to make a finding upon a particular question.Such a complaint could only invoke the ground of judicial review in s 476(1)(a) if a failure to make a finding on a question of fact means that a procedure required by the Act to be observed in connection with the making of the decision has not been observed. If s 476(1)(a) has that meaning, then there is an incongruity in the section when read as a whole, because s 476(3)(e) qualifies s 476(1)(d) by excluding the Tribunal's failure to take a relevant consideration into account from the category of an improper exercise of power. The difference between failing to make a finding on a material question of fact, and failing to take a relevant consideration into account, is elusive. The former is narrower than the latter, but most examples of the former could also be presented as the latter. Both of the present cases involve a contention which is not materially different from a claim that the Tribunal failed to take a relevant consideration into account. To treat a failure to make a finding on a question of fact as a failure to observe a procedure in connection with the making of a decision involves a strained interpretation of the statutory language, especially in a context which distinguishes between legal review (indeed, somewhat attenuated legal review) and full merits review (of the kind in which the Tribunal engages when it reviews a delegate's decision).” (emphasis added) It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that nothing said by the majority in Yusuf concerning the meaning to be attributed to s 476(1)(a) was binding upon this Court and their Honours’ comments on this aspect should be regarded merely as dicta. Singh still governed the question whether a failure to comply with s 430(1) could give rise to the ground of review contained in s 476(1)(a). In Zyfi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 978 at [9], Sundberg J dealt with a similar submission. His Honour said:“Gleeson CJ and McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ have held that the requirement in s 430(1)(c) is not a “procedure” within s 476 (1)(a). But I do not regard them as having decided that none of the other requirements in s 430(1) is a procedure. The case only concerned s 430(1)(c). Callinan J spoke more broadly of s 430(1), and some of his Honour’s language suggests that none of the requirements is a procedure. In those circumstances I should proceed on the basis that Yusuf does not decide that the requirement in s 430(1)(d) to refer to the evidence or other materials on which the findings of fact were based is not a procedure. I will assume it is.” (emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WEINBERG J