APM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

APM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 157

Appeal from: APM16 V Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2016] FCCA 2493
File number(s): NSD 1754 of 2016
Judge(s): O'CALLAGHAN J
Date of judgment: 23 February 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether contents of appellant’s written evidence not relayed in full in oral evidence – where appellant was asked numerous times to elaborate – whether illogical or irrational for decision maker to make adverse finding on credibility – whether procedural unfairness – appeal dismissed
Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2

APM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 291

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN (2016) 69 AAR 210; [2016] FCA 516

SZJYA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2008] FCA 911

Date of hearing: 13 February 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 27
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr R Webb SC
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Francois
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1754 of 2016
BETWEEN:

APM16
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

O'CALLAGHAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 FEBRUARY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’CALLAGHAN J:

  1. In APM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 291, I allowed an application by the appellant for leave to appeal. These reasons should be read in conjunction with those reasons.

  2. I subsequently limited the points to be argued on the appeal by an order made on 21 July 2017, as follows:

    1. The Federal Circuit Court erred because it failed to find that the second respondent’s findings at [30]-[34] were affected by jurisdictional error on the basis that it was illogical or unreasonable for the second respondent to disbelieve and reject the applicant’s claims in his statutory declaration that he was threatened, beaten and extorted by his first wife’s family (and associates of the family) only on the basis that, when asked by the second respondent through his interpreter about the events the subject of the statutory declaration, the applicant did not recite or recount in oral evidence all of the written claims and incidents detailed in his statutory declaration.

    2. For the same reason identified in ground one, the Federal Circuit Court erred because it failed to find that the second respondent’s findings at [30]-[34] amounted to a…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 157
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of APM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the Federal Court of Australia was called upon to determine the legality of a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, concerning the appellant's application for a visa. The appellant contested the Minister's decision on the grounds that his credibility was unfairly assessed due to the decision maker's failure to adequately relay his written evidence in oral testimony and the decision maker's alleged procedural unfairness in not allowing the appellant to fully elaborate on his oral evidence.

The court was required to decide two main issues. Firstly, whether the contents of the appellant's written evidence were adequately communicated to the decision maker during the oral testimony. Secondly, whether the decision maker's adverse credibility findings were illogical or irrational, and if the appellant's procedural fairness was compromised by not being given sufficient opportunities to elaborate on his oral evidence.

In its reasoning, the court noted that it must exercise a high degree of caution before finding jurisdictional error to avoid engaging in merits review. The court concluded that there was room for a logical and rational person to form the view that the appellant's testimony was not credible based on the inconsistencies between his written and oral evidence and the lack of satisfactory explanations for these discrepancies. The court held that the Tribunal was not required to explicitly state that the appellant's account was in doubt but must at least inquire about specific aspects of the account that may be open to doubt. The court dismissed the appeal on both the illogicality and procedural fairness grounds.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs, as agreed or assessed. The court's decision was based on the reasoning that the decision maker's adverse credibility findings were not illogical or irrational, and the procedural fairness was not breached as the Tribunal had provided the appellant with sufficient opportunities to elaborate on his oral evidence.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2, the Full Court of this court at [30] gave further guidance as to why this threshold must, necessarily, be high:…A high degree of caution must… be exercised before finding that adverse findings as to credit expose jurisdictional error in order to ensure that the Court does not embark impermissibly upon merits review … As such, to establish jurisdictional error based on illogical or irrational findings of fact or reasoning, extreme illogicality must be demonstrated measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions … Thus, even emphatic disagreement with the Tribunal’s reasoning would not be sufficient to make out illogicality … [citations and internal quotations omitted]Conclusion There is room for a logical or rational person to employ the reasoning set out in paragraph [12] above. It is not unreasonable for a decision maker to form the view that a person is not a credible witness, and that his testimony is not accurate, in circumstances where: (i) the witness’s written evidence contains statements that are not recalled in oral evidence; (ii) there are multiple opportunities for the witness to remedy this disparity by further questioning and he does not do so; and (iii) the only response given by the witness in response to such prompting is, at best, vague. In these circumstances, it could rationally be concluded that the appellant’s evidence was unreliable on the basis that he was unable to recall matters in his written evidence even after attempts to exhaust his memory. Accordingly, the illogicality and unreasonableness ground must fail.The procedural fairness ground As counsel for the appellant acknowledged during oral submissions, the procedural fairness ground is correlated with the set of facts that are said to give rise to the illogicality and unreasonableness ground. The Tribunal drew adverse inferences from the fact that the appellant failed to recount in oral evidence all of the incidents detailed in his written material. The appellant’s main contention on the procedural fairness ground is set out at paragraph [32] of his submissions as follows:…the Tribunal had an obligation during the hearing, by appropriate means, to afford the appellant an opportunity to give again evidence of the matters in the declaration which are referred to in the reasons… The appellant further submitted in oral submissions that, consistent with the principle restated in SZJYA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2008] FCA 911 (SZJYA) at [31], it is not open for a trial judge to “have made a finding that a matter had not been raised with the applicant at the hearing before the tribunal.” Counsel for the Minister, on the other hand, contended that SZJYA was confined to its facts. The Minister also referred to this passage from the decision of the High Court in SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 at [47]:First, there may well be cases, perhaps many cases, where either the delegate's decision, or the Tribunal's statements or questions during a hearing, sufficiently indicate to an applicant that everything he or she says in support of the application is in issue. That indication may be given in many ways. It is not necessary (and often would be inappropriate) for the Tribunal to put to an applicant, in so many words, that he or she is lying, that he or she may not be accepted as a witness of truth, or that he or she may be thought to be embellishing the account that is given of certain events. The proceedings are not adversarial and the Tribunal is not, and is not to adopt the position of, a contradictor. But where, as here, there are specific aspects of an applicant's account, that the Tribunal considers may be important to the decision and may be open to doubt, the Tribunal must at least ask the applicant to expand upon those aspects of the account and ask the applicant to explain why the account should be accepted.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established