APM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

APM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 291

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: APM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2016] FCCA 2493
File number: NSD 1754 of 2016
Judge: O'CALLAGHAN J
Date of judgment: 22 March 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether decision attended by sufficient doubt to warrant grant of leave – whether substantial injustice would result if leave refused – application for leave to appeal allowed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 36(2)(a) and (aa)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1A)

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r 44.12

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 1.34, 35.12(2)(d)

Cases cited:

ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

Kaur v Minister For Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 233 FCR 507

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407; [2000] HCA 1

Minister for Immigration v MZYNN (2012) 133 ALD 479; [2012] FCA 1177

NAIS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 470

NAKX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1559

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 108

Date of hearing: 9 March 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 32
Counsel for the Applicant: Applicant appeared in person

Counsel for the First Respondent:

Mr R White

Solicitor for the First Respondent:

Mills Oakley

Counsel for the Second Respondent:

The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1754 of 2016
BETWEEN:

APM16

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

O'CALLAGHAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 MARCH 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to r 1.34 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) the requirement that the applicant make his application for leave to appeal in the manner and form specified in the rules be dispensed with.

2.The application for leave to appeal filed 10 October 2016 is allowed.

3.The applicant file and serve a notice of appeal in accordance with Part 36 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

4.The appeal be heard at a date and time to be fixed by the Court.

5.The costs of the interlocutory application be costs in the cause on appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’CALLAGHAN J:

  1. This is an application for leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) dismissing the applicant’s judicial review application under r 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). A decision under r 44.12 is…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 291
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of APM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, APM16, sought leave to appeal an interlocutory decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The dispute involved the applicant's immigration status and the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The applicant contested the decision on various grounds, including the Minister's handling of credibility issues and procedural fairness. The court was required to determine whether the decision was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant granting leave and whether a substantial injustice would result if leave was refused. Additionally, the court had to address whether the Tribunal's credibility findings were subject to judicial review.

The court considered the legal principles guiding the review of credibility findings in immigration cases, emphasizing that while credibility findings are primarily the function of the primary decision-maker, they are not immune from judicial review. The court referenced several authorities, including McHugh J’s comments in Ex parte Durairajasingham, which highlight that findings on credibility are the primary function of the decision-maker but do not preclude judicial review. The court also noted that adverse credibility findings might involve jurisdictional errors, such as failure to afford procedural fairness, lack of a logical or probative basis, unreasonableness, or other grounds as discussed in relevant case law.

The court concluded that the decision was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant the grant of leave to appeal. The court found that the primary judge's reliance on certain authorities did not support the proposition that adverse credibility findings are immune from judicial review. Instead, the court underscored that adverse credibility findings could involve jurisdictional errors and must be reviewed in detail. The court allowed the application for leave to appeal and directed the applicant to file and serve a notice of appeal, with the appeal to be heard at a future date to be fixed by the court. The costs of the interlocutory application were ordered to be costs in the cause on appeal.

The final orders included dispensing with the requirement for the applicant to make the application for leave to appeal in the specified manner, allowing the application for leave to appeal, directing the applicant to file and serve a notice of appeal, scheduling the appeal for a future date, and ordering the costs of the interlocutory application to be costs in the cause on appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to r 1.34 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) the requirement that the applicant make his application for leave to appeal in the manner and form specified in the rules be dispensed with.

2. The application for leave to appeal filed 10 October 2016 is allowed.

3. The applicant file and serve a notice of appeal in accordance with Part 36 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

4. The appeal be heard at a date and time to be fixed by the Court.

5. The costs of the interlocutory application be costs in the cause on appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The primary judge’s observation that credibility findings are a matter for the Tribunal par excellence relies on a decision of this Court in Minister for Immigration v MZYNN (2012) 133 ALD 479; [2012] FCA 1177 at [33] and a decision of the High Court in NAIS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 470 at [9]. The relevant paragraphs cited by the primary judge are, however, not authority for the proposition that adverse credibility findings are immune from judicial review. The proposition that credibility is a matter for the Tribunal par excellence derives from McHugh J’s observations in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407; [2000] HCA 1 where his Honour observed (at [67]):In addition, the prosecutor alleges that the Tribunal breached s 430(1) by failing to set out reasons for its finding that the prosecutor’s claim that members of PLOTE tried to recruit him were "utterly implausible". However, this was essentially a finding as to whether the prosecutor should be believed in his claim – a finding on credibility which is the function of the primary decision maker par excellence. If the primary decision maker has stated that he or she does not believe a particular witness, no detailed reasons need to be given as to why that particular witness was not believed. The Tribunal must give the reasons for its decision, not the sub-set of reasons why it accepted or rejected individual pieces of evidence. In any event, the reason for the disbelief is apparent in this case from the use of the word "implausible". The disbelief arose from the Tribunal's view that it was inherently unlikely that the events had occurred as alleged. (Emphasis added.) In ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174, the Full Court of this Court said (at [82]-[83]):[82] The appellants contended that the Tribunal misunderstood the evidence regarding the appellant mother’s dowry in making critical adverse credibility findings. In particular, they submitted that the Tribunal had misapprehended evidence relating to the contents of the nikahnama which provided the basis for the Tribunal’s conclusion that the appellant mother had sought to mislead the Tribunal about the dowry.[83] Many of the relevant legal principles which guide the review or a judicial review of findings concerning credibility were recently discussed by the Full Court in CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146 (CQG15) at [36]–[44] per McKerracher, Griffiths and Rangiah JJ. They may be summarised as follows:(a) McHugh J’s oft quoted comments in Ex parte Dumairajasingham (which were cited by the primary judge in the proceedings here) to the effect that a finding on credibility is the function of the primary decision-maker (or Tribunal) par excellence, does not mean that such findings are not susceptible to review for jurisdictional error on several potential grounds;(b)the issue whether or not a credibility finding is tainted by jurisdictional error is “a case specific inquiry” and it is not one which should be analysed by reference to fixed categories or formulas (SZRKT at [77] per Robertson J);(c)in each case, what the decision-maker has decided must be analysed in detail in order to determine whether or not a jurisdictional error has occurred (SZRKT at [77] per Robertson J); and(d)without derogating from what is said above regarding the danger of relying too heavily on “fixed categories or formulas” (which includes the danger of blindly repeating McHugh J’s comments in Ex parte Dumairajasingham), adverse credibility findings might involve jurisdictional error on recognised grounds such as:(i)failure to afford procedural fairness;(ii)reaching a finding without a logical or probative basis;(iii)unreasonableness; and/or(iv)other grounds as discussed by Flick J in SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1089 ; 233 FCR 451 at [20]–[21] and in SZSHV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 253 at [31], as referred to approvingly by the Full Court in CQG15 at [40]–[42].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established