APF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 44 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

APF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 524

Appeal from: APF16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1973
File number: NSD 1465 of 2018
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 16 April 2019
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court dismissing the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming a decision of the Minister’s delegate to refuse to grant the appellant a protection visa – where the appellant claimed to fear significant harm if returned to his country of nationality by reason of his sexual orientation – where the Tribunal dismissed corroborative evidence in support of the appellant’s claims on the basis of adverse credibility findings against the appellant – whether the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in rejecting  the corroborative evidence – where there was an absence of reasoning regarding the corroborative evidence – failure to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration of the corroborative evidence

Held:  appeal allowed

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 65, 91R(3)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 1.09A(3), 1.09A(4)

Cases cited:

BZD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 94

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 175

Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS (2014) 309 ALR 67

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165

SZDGC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1638

WAIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 74

Date of hearing: 15 February 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 64
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr G Schipp (Pro Bono)
Solicitor for the Appellant: Prominent Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J McGovern
Solicitor for First the Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submits to any order of the Court, save as to the question of costs

ORDERS

NSD 1465 of 2018
BETWEEN:

APF16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 APRIL 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 25 July 2018 be set aside and in place of those orders, it be ordered that:

(a)the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be set aside;

(b)the matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to be heard and determined according to law; and

(c)the first respondent pay the costs of the applicant, to be assessed if not agreed. 

3.The first respondent pay the costs of the appellant, to be assessed if not agreed. 

Note:…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read APF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] FCA 524
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved an appeal by a Lebanese national, who arrived in Australia on a student visa in 2010 and applied for a protection visa in 2014. The appellant claimed that he would suffer significant harm if returned to Lebanon due to his sexual orientation. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal dismissed his application, affirming the delegate's decision to refuse to grant the protection visa. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision. The appellant appealed to the Federal Court, arguing that the Tribunal erred in rejecting corroborative evidence supporting his claims. The court was required to decide whether the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by not giving proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the corroborative evidence provided by the appellant.

The court found that the Tribunal failed to provide adequate reasoning for rejecting the corroborative evidence, which included statutory declarations from individuals who corroborated the appellant's claims about his sexual orientation and fear of persecution in Lebanon. The court noted that the Tribunal's adverse credibility findings against the appellant did not negate the need to consider the corroborative evidence. The court emphasised that a decision-maker must consider the totality of the evidence that bears upon the facts to be found, including corroborative evidence, unless there are rare circumstances where a party's credibility has been so destroyed that the corroborative evidence is of no weight. The court concluded that the Tribunal did not provide sufficient reasoning for disregarding the corroborative evidence and, therefore, fell into jurisdictional error.

The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court and remitting the matter to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to be heard and determined according to law. The court also ordered that the respondent pay the costs of the appellant.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 25 July 2018 be set aside and in place of those orders, it be ordered that:

(a) the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be set aside;

(b) the matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to be heard and determined according to law; and

(c) the first respondent pay the costs of the applicant, to be assessed if not agreed.

3. The first respondent pay the costs of the appellant, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

At the time of hearing the appeal, submissions for the appellant were filed only shortly prior to the appeal due to the appointment of pro bono counsel. The Minister was given leave to file further submissions in response if necessary. No further submissions were filed. BACKGROUND The appellant is a Lebanese national. He arrived in Australia on a student visa in November 2010. In February 2014, he applied for a protection visa. That visa was refused by the delegate in June 2014. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision in February 2016. The appellant’s protection claims were that he was a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations on the ground that he is gay or bisexual and fears harm upon returning to Lebanon on the basis of his sexual identity. The term ‘gay’ has been used interchangeably with the term ‘homosexual’ in consideration of his claims and therefore also in these reasons. IN THE TRIBUNAL The Tribunal considered the appellant’s circumstances individually and cumulatively, but found he did not meet the requirements that engage Australia’s protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. It based its decision on adverse credibility conclusions. The Tribunal concluded that the appellant was prepared to give false evidence in order to achieve a favourable migration outcome. That conclusion was based on a number of concerns the Tribunal had with the appellant’s claims; notably the Tribunal:(a)was concerned with the appellant’s claims about his sexuality and sexual preferences, particularly in light of inconsistencies with his statement and evidence. The Tribunal specifically noted inconsistencies in respect of the appellant’s evidence about his sexual attraction, sexual encounters and a prior relationship with a girl. The Tribunal also considered the appellant had provided evasive evidence regarding his claimed bisexuality;(b)was also concerned that the appellant was prepared to give false evidence, rely upon false supporting evidence and make false claims in order to be granted a protection visa. Two examples it gave were of the appellant’s willingness to change his evidence in response to the Tribunal’s concerns in relation to information about his usual occupation as a student and the conversations with his employer about his performance; (c)was further concerned with the appellant’s claim that he was interested in discovering himself and his sexuality when he also claimed to have made no efforts to investigate the gay scene or homosexual activities in Lebanon. The Tribunal considered this evidence to be evasive and undermining of his credibility; and(d)took issue with the appellant’s claims that he could not let anyone in Lebanon know about his sexual orientation and his claimed fear of harm arising from people finding out he is bisexual. He gave changing evidence, the Tribunal said, about the contact with his family members, his posting of material relating to his sexuality on Facebook and his return to Lebanon in 2013 after making those posts. The Tribunal considered that it was ‘more likely that the [appellant] posted these websites for the purposes of his forthcoming protection visa claim’.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Ultimately, the Tribunal concluded the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Lebanon, nor was there a real risk that he would suffer significant harm if removed from Australia to Lebanon. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision. The evidence Three statutory declarations were lodged with the Tribunal prior to the hearing. The declarants (to whom I will refer as Mr X, Mr Y and Ms Z respectively) made statements which went to the appellant’s claim concerning his sexual orientation. The evidence was to the following effect:(1)Mr X declared on 8 February 2016 that:(a)he had been in a relationship with the appellant for approximately six months;(b)he returned to his native Germany, but immediately applied for another visa to be back with the appellant;(c)he and the appellant had been residing together since January 2016; (d)the appellant relied on him for emotional and physical support; and(e)he loved the appellant very deeply. (2)Mr Y declared on 4 February 2016 that:(a)the appellant and Mr X were very close friends of his and he saw them almost daily;(b)when the appellant met Mr X ‘his life completely changed’;(c)the appellant and Mr X were witnesses at his wedding; (d)the appellant’s biggest fear and what keeps him awake at night is the thought of losing Mr X; (e)should the appellant be forced to return to Lebanon he would lose Mr X and repress himself sexually; and(f)the thought of being forced to return to Lebanon has the appellant stressed and depressed. (3)Ms Z declared on 4 February 2016 that:(a)she met the appellant through her husband and since then the three of them have become extremely close friends;(b)she was delighted to have met the appellant’s partner, Mr X, ‘recently’;(c)she has seen a positive change in the appellant and he has a completely new direction and new take on life;(d)she believes Australia is the only place the appellant can live his life and be happy;(e)in Australia the appellant can live a normal and stress free life as a ‘gay man’; and(f)the appellant’s biggest fear is having to return to Lebanon, losing Mr X and being deprived the life he is living in Australia. Also in evidence before the Tribunal, relevantly, was a letter from a counsellor attesting to the appellant’s level of stress and depression, an email confirming that the appellant had signed up as a volunteer for a Mardi Gras workshop and various other documents, including articles reporting of the treatment of homosexuals in Lebanon. Mr X gave evidence during the hearing to the effect that he was the appellant’s partner and was having a physical relationship with him. Claims as to the appellant’s sexual orientation were corroborated by Mr Y and Ms Z who also gave evidence. In its decision, the Tribunal noted that prior to the hearing, the appellant had provided ‘some witness statements and supporting documents’. It summarised the claims made by the appellant in his protection visa application and supporting statement, including the claim that the appellant was bisexual. The Tribunal noted that the delegate’s interview with the appellant and the delegate’s reasons for rejecting the application were before it. The Tribunal also noted that witnesses had given evidence.

Decision

Reasons for decision

There are other authorities which may also not have been cited to the primary judge but are relevant to this consideration of principle. One is WAIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 74 where the Full Court (Lee, Moore and RD Nicholson JJ) said (at [27]):Such a circumstance may arise where an applicant’s claims have been discredited by comprehensive findings of dishonesty or untruthfulness. Necessarily, such findings are likely to negate allegedly corroborative material. (See: S20/2002 per McHugh, Gummow JJ at [49]). Obviously to come within that exception there will need to be cogent material to support a conclusion that the appellant has lied. Alternatively, if the purportedly corroborative material itself is found, on probative grounds, to be worthless it will be excluded from consideration by the Tribunal in assessing the credibility of an applicant’s claims. However, it will not be open to the Tribunal to state that it is unnecessary for it to consider material corroborative of an applicant’s claims merely because it considers it unlikely that the events described by an applicant occurred. In such a circumstance the Tribunal would be bound to have regard to the corroborative material before attempting to reach a conclusion on the applicant’s credibility. Failure to do so would provide a determination not carried out according to law and the decision would be affected by jurisdictional error. (See: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 per McHugh, Gummow, Hayne JJ at [82]-[85]).(Emphasis added.) Further, in SZDGC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1638, Finkelstein J said (at [23]):It is only necessary to deal briefly with the second ground. The complaint is that the tribunal failed to “consider the corroborative evidence in the form of the Summons against the husband of the applicant and the Administrative Penalty Order, before making the adverse credibility finding”. I take it to be a trite proposition that a decision-maker required to find facts, whether the decision-maker be a judge or an administrative official, must consider the totality of the evidence that bears upon the facts to be found. That requires the decision-maker to consider any direct evidence of the existence of the fact in issue together with any corroborative evidence that bears on that issue. This is nothing more than common sense. There may be circumstances where it is not necessary to pay due regard to corroborative evidence. In Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 at [49] McHugh and Gummow JJ said “it is not unknown for a party’s credibility to have been so weakened in cross-examination that the tribunal of fact may well treat what is proffered as corroborative evidence as of no weight because the well has been poisoned beyond redemption”. That proposition is no doubt true. But the circumstances for its application will be rare indeed. Even experienced advocates can only point to a handful of cases where a witness’ credit has been so badly destroyed in cross-examination that it is possible to make findings of fact based on that evidence alone and simply disregard any corroborative evidence. (Emphasis added.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by noting that the Tribunal had dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review based on adverse credibility findings. The Tribunal rejected the corroborative evidence provided by three statutory declarations and other supporting documents, which were intended to corroborate the appellant's claims regarding his sexual orientation and fear of persecution if returned to Lebanon. The court examined whether the Tribunal had erred in law by dismissing the corroborative evidence without proper consideration.

The court cited the decision in WAIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 74, which held that a Tribunal cannot disregard corroborative evidence merely because it considers the events described by an applicant unlikely to have occurred. The court also referenced SZDGC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1638, which emphasised that a decision-maker must consider all evidence that bears upon the facts to be found, including corroborative evidence.

The court found that the Tribunal had failed to properly consider the corroborative evidence in light of the established legal principles. The Tribunal dismissed the evidence without providing reasons, which constituted an absence of reasoning. Furthermore, the Tribunal did not give the corroborative evidence the proper, genuine and realistic consideration required by law. The court concluded that the Tribunal's failure to properly consider the corroborative evidence amounted to a jurisdictional error.

The ratio decidendi of the decision is that a Tribunal must properly consider all corroborative evidence presented by an applicant, even if it is unlikely that the events described by the applicant occurred. A failure to do so constitutes a jurisdictional error. The court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders made by the Federal Circuit Court, and remitted the matter to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for reconsideration according to law.