FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| APF16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2018] FCCA 1973 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application to review decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether Tribunal failed to consider evidence or claims or acted unreasonably – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5CB, 36, 91R Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.1.09A |
| Applicant: | APF16 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 623 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Barnes |
| Hearing date: | 10 July 2017 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 25 July 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Karp |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Prominent Lawyers |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
The application be dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 623 of 2016
| APF16 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Background
This is an application for review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) dated 24 February 2016 affirming a decision of a delegate of the First Respondent not to grant the Applicant a protection visa.
The Applicant, a citizen of Lebanon, arrived in Australia in 2010 as the holder of a student visa. He applied for a protection visa in February 2014. In a statutory declaration of 6 February 2014 provided in support of his application he claimed to fear harm on return to Lebanon on the basis that he was a member of “a particular social group ie, Bisexual”. He claimed that since the age of approximately 15 he had been sexually attracted to both males and females, that he had had sex with both males and females, but that he had always maintained a sexual preference towards males. He claimed that he had had a few short-term sexual encounters with males in Lebanon (which were covert in light of prevailing…
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- Case
- [2018] FCCA 1973
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Minister's decision to refuse the protection visa was affected by jurisdictional error. Specifically, the Court was required to consider whether the delegate of the Minister had failed to properly consider all the information before them, including the applicant's claims of persecution, when making the assessment of the applicant's claims for protection.
Judge Barnes found that the delegate had failed to adequately assess the applicant's claims regarding the risk of harm they faced in their country of origin. The Court reasoned that a proper assessment required a detailed consideration of the specific circumstances and evidence presented by the applicant, and that the delegate's decision had not demonstrated this level of engagement. The legal principle applied was that a failure to properly consider relevant material constitutes a jurisdictional error, rendering the decision invalid.
The Court ordered that the Minister's decision be set aside and remitted to the Minister for redetermination according to law.
Background
Background to the litigation
The application was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration, who did not accept that APF16 was bisexual. APF16 sought review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal). He provided a statutory declaration from a man (referred to as NM) who claimed to be his partner, as well as statements from two other persons described as the Applicant’s friends. In addition, APF16 provided an email about volunteering to assist in relation to the 2016 Mardi Gras, a warning email from his employer, photographs of social activities, and a report from a counsellor. The response to the hearing invitation form stated that NM was the Applicant’s partner and that he wished to give oral evidence. The friends also sought to give evidence at the Tribunal hearing.
At the Tribunal hearing, APF16 and NM gave evidence (although in the transcript NM is referred to by a different name) as did the friends. After the hearing, APF16 provided further documentary evidence, country information, and a post-hearing statutory declaration of 23 February 2016 which sought to address concerns put to him during the Tribunal hearing. He described his central claims as claims that he was a homosexual in a sexual relationship with NM and that he could not live openly as a homosexual man in Lebanon.
In its reasons for decision, the Tribunal referred to the written evidence before it, including the witness statements and supporting documents provided by APF16. It summarised the claims he had made in support of his protection visa application. It recorded that it had received oral evidence from the Applicant’s claimed partner and two friends who had also provided statutory declarations and a further statement from the Applicant after the hearing.
The Tribunal stated that it had a number of concerns about the Applicant’s “changing, inconsistent and not credible evidence as to past events, and what he feared upon return to Lebanon.” It did not find the Applicant to be a credible witness in relation to what it described as “matters central to, and related to, many of his claims.” For reasons which it gave, the Tribunal found that the Applicant was not a truthful, reliable or credible witness and that the account of events and fears on which his protection claims were based was false. It was of the view that the Applicant was prepared to give false evidence and to rely upon false supporting evidence in order to achieve an immigration outcome.
The Tribunal observed that while the Applicant’s agent had complained that there were “significant interpretational errors” in the interview with the delegate, he had not provided requested details of such errors and the Applicant was unable to identify any such interpreting errors. The Tribunal did not accept that there was any prejudice or difficulty for the Applicant in the departmental interview.
The Tribunal went on to consider what it described as “[c]orroborative” evidence. It was of the view that the country information provided in relation to attitudes to homosexuality in Lebanon did not overcome its concerns with the Applicant’s evidence. The Tribunal did not accept that the activities undertaken by the Applicant to suggest that he was gay/bisexual overcame its concerns about his credibility and claimed orientation. The Tribunal found that the Applicant and his claimed partner were friends, but it was not prepared to give the photos any weight “in relation to the claim that the applicant is bisexual or homosexual or in a sexual relationship with his claimed partner.”
On the basis of its adverse credibility findings, the Tribunal concluded that it did “not accept that the applicant is or has ever been bisexual or homosexual”, and “that he has ever had any sexual attraction to, kissed or hugged or had any sexual encounters with, males, either in Lebanon or in Australia.” It did not accept that he came to Australia with a fear of persecution.
The Tribunal also addressed the Applicant’s activities in Australia. It noted that he had not suggested in his statement that anyone in Lebanon would be aware of such activities. It was prepared to accept that the Applicant and his friends had taken photographs that could suggest that he was bisexual/gay, that he had attended some gay nightclubs, and that he had signed up for a Mardi Gras workshop for 2016. The Tribunal found that he did so in order to strengthen his intended protection claims. Similarly, having regard to these findings and its adverse credibility finding the Tribunal found that any activities undertaken in Australia suggesting that the Applicant was gay/bisexual had been for the purposes of strengthening his protection visa claims and not for genuine reasons. Accordingly it disregarded the Applicant’s photographs, signing up for and joining a Mardi Gras workshop, posting gay websites on his Facebook profile, and attendance at some nightclubs for the purpose of assessing his refugee claims under the then applicable s.91R(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
The Tribunal observed that the Applicant had made no claims in relation to the general country situation in Lebanon other than those pertaining to his claimed bisexual/homosexuality which had not been accepted. It was not satisfied he faced a well-founded fear of persecution in Lebanon for a Convention reason. The Tribunal considered the complementary protection criterion in light of its findings that it did not accept that the Applicant was gay or bisexual or that he had ever been or that his claims in relation to his sexual orientation were true and its finding that it did not accept that he faced being forced to marry in Lebanon. The Tribunal considered the Applicant would return to Lebanon to live with his family and that he would find work, although he was depressed and would find it distressing to leave his businesses and friends in Australia.
In relation to the Applicant’s claims about posting gay websites on his Facebook profile, the Tribunal noted that he had not suggested in his statement that anyone in Lebanon would be aware of his activities in Australia. It observed that it was only when the Tribunal had raised with him at the hearing that it was difficult to understand why he would have posted numerous gay websites on his Facebook profile that the Applicant claimed that he would be “judged” in Lebanon because of these postings because he was from such a “dangerous country”. The Tribunal took into account the Applicant’s apparent lack of concern about the implications of others becoming aware of these “likes”, as well as his willingness to return to Lebanon for his sister’s wedding. In the circumstances, the Tribunal was not satisfied on the evidence before it that the Applicant would face a real risk of significant harm in Lebanon as a result of having “liked” these gay websites or that there was a real risk he would be imputed as homosexual or bisexual in Lebanon.
Further, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the other activities the Applicant had engaged in in Australia meant that he faced any risk of becoming known in Lebanon. It did not accept on the evidence before it that the Applicant’s circumstances would lead to a real risk of significant harm for him in Lebanon. It found that he did not meet the complementary protection criterion and affirmed the decision not to grant him a protection visa.
APF16 sought review by application filed in this court on 18 March 2016. He filed an amended application in May 2016. In pre-hearing written submissions, counsel for the Applicant foreshadowed seeking leave to rely on a proposed further amended application, a copy of which was attached to the submissions and was addressed in submissions for the Minister, who did not oppose the grant of leave. The Applicant intended to rely on the grounds in the further amended application, which were addressed by both parties. Despite not being formally filed, the court considered the grounds in the further amended application.
The Applicant's first two grounds were that the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by failing to lawfully consider evidence essential to the resolution of the review, specifically evidence that the applicant and his partner were in a sexual relationship, and by failing to consider an integer of a claim, specifically the claim that the applicant and his partner were in a sexual relationship. The Applicant submitted that although the Tribunal had purported to consider the evidence of his witness (NM) and also his two friends, it had not confronted or otherwise dealt with NM’s evidence that he and the Applicant were in a sexual relationship. The Applicant relied on Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16; (2014) 309 ALR 67, in particular the remarks of the Full Court of the Federal Court that the fact that a matter was not referred to in the Tribunal’s reasons did not necessarily mean it was not considered by the Tribunal at all.
The Minister submitted that neither ground engaged with the central dispositive issue before the Tribunal, which was said to be its finding that the Applicant lacked credit. The Minister contended that
This case came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia as an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) dated 24 February 2016. The Applicant, a Lebanese national, had applied for a protection visa on the basis of his claimed fear of persecution in Lebanon due to his sexual orientation. The delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refused his application, and the Applicant sought review of that decision by the AAT. The AAT affirmed the delegate’s decision, finding that the Applicant was not a credible witness and did not meet the criteria for a protection visa. The Applicant then sought review of the AAT’s decision in this Court, filing an application on 18 March 2016 and an amended application in May 2016. The Applicant sought leave to rely on a further amended application, which was granted by the Court. The Applicant argued that the AAT failed to properly consider certain evidence and committed legal errors in reaching its decision. The Court found that the AAT had considered the Applicant’s claims and evidence, including the claimed relationship between the Applicant and his partner, and had properly exercised its discretion in reaching its decision. The application for review was dismissed.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by failing to lawfully consider evidence essential to the resolution of the review.
2. Whether the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by failing to consider an integer of a claim.
3. Whether the decision was affected by legal unreasonableness by failing to consider the application of Migration Regulation 1.09A(3) in deciding the applicant’s matter.
Held
1. The Tribunal did not commit jurisdictional error by failing to lawfully consider evidence essential to the resolution of the review. The court found that the Tribunal understood and considered the evidence of the applicant's partner's claim that they were in a sexual relationship. The Tribunal rejected the applicant's credibility in relation to matters central to his claims, including his sexuality and claimed sexual experiences and relationships.
2. The Tribunal did not commit jurisdictional error by failing to consider an integer of a claim. The court determined that the Tribunal correctly understood and considered the claim and the evidence from the applicant's partner that the relationship with the applicant was of a sexual nature. The Tribunal did not accept this evidence or claim.
3. The decision was not affected by legal unreasonableness by failing to consider the application of Migration Regulation 1.09A(3) in deciding the applicant’s matter. The court concluded that the Tribunal's approach in not considering the exercise of the power under reg.1.09A(4) was within the area of its decisional freedom and was a possible, acceptable outcome which was defensible in respect of the facts and law. The court found that it has not been established that in the particular circumstances of this case the Tribunal's failure to consider the exercise of its power under reg.1.09A(4) was legally unreasonable such as to amount to a jurisdictional error.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissed the application for review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) that affirmed a decision of a delegate of the First Respondent not to grant the Applicant a protection visa. The Applicant, a citizen of Lebanon, had applied for a protection visa on the basis that he feared harm on return to Lebanon on the basis that he was a member of “a particular social group ie, Bisexual”. The Tribunal did not accept that the Applicant was bisexual or homosexual and did not accept that he had ever had any sexual attraction to, kissed or hugged or had any sexual encounters with males, either in Lebanon or in Australia. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the Applicant faced a well-founded fear of persecution in Lebanon for a Convention reason. The Applicant sought review of the Tribunal’s decision on the basis of three grounds. The first ground was that the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by failing to lawfully consider evidence essential to the resolution of the review. The second ground was that the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by failing to consider an integer of a claim. The third ground was that the decision was affected by legal unreasonableness by failing to consider the application of Migration Regulation 1.09A(3) in deciding the Applicant’s matter. The court rejected each of these grounds. In relation to the first and second grounds, the court found that the Tribunal had understood and considered the claim and the evidence of the Applicant’s partner (referred to in the reasons as NM) that the relationship with the Applicant was of a sexual nature. It had rejected this evidence and found that the Applicant was not bisexual or homosexual and had never had any sexual attraction to, kissed or hugged or had any sexual encounters with males, either in Lebanon or in Australia. In relation to the third ground, the court found that the Tribunal had not been legally unreasonable in failing to consider whether to consider any of the circumstances mentioned in reg.1.09A(3) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) in deciding the Applicant’s matter. The circumstances of this case did not call for the fulfilment of a purpose for which the power to have regard to the factors in reg.1.09A(3) was conferred. The criteria for a protection visa are set out in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and do not refer to the relationship status of the non-citizen applying for a protection visa. The Tribunal’s approach in this respect fell “within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”. The Tribunal’s approach was within the area of its decisional freedom. The ratio decidendi of this case is that a Tribunal is not legally unreasonable in failing to consider whether to exercise a statutory discretion if the circumstances of the case do not call for the fulfilment of a purpose for which the power to exercise the discretion was conferred. This is not a case in which the overriding duty on the Tribunal to review a decision required the Tribunal, acting reasonably, to consider the exercise of such power. The Tribunal’s approach in this respect fell “within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”.