FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| ANSON & MEEK | [2017] FamCAFC 257 |
| FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – final property orders – short marriage – where the property distribution only related to the parties’ Australian assets – where the major asset was a farming property purchased prior to the marriage – where the husband contributed the whole of the purchase price – where the primary judge attributed the increase in value of the farming property to the equal contributions of the parties during the relationship – where the s 75(2) adjustment gave significant weight to the wife’s reduced earning capacity – where the primary judge erred – where the primary judge failed to take into account the effect of market forces on the increased value of the farming property – where the primary judge failed to take into account contributions made during the post-separation period – where the primary judge’s finding as to the wife’s future earning capacity had no evidentiary basis – discussion of comparable cases – appeal allowed. |
| Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 144 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 79(4)(e) Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) |
| APPELLANT: | Mr Anson |
| RESPONDENT: | Ms Meek |
| FILE NUMBER: | CAC | 680 | of | 2014 |
| APPEAL NUMBER: | EA | 184 | of | 2016 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 7 December 2017 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Brisbane |
| PLACE HEARD: | Sydney |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Murphy, Aldridge & Cleary JJ |
| HEARING DATE: | 18 September 2017 |
| LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: |
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Details
- AGLC
- Anson & Meek [2017] FamCAFC 257
- Case
- [2017] FamCAFC 257
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In the case of Anson & Meek, the appeal concerns final property orders within a family law dispute. The marriage of the parties was of a short duration, and the property distribution involved only their Australian assets. The primary asset in question was a farming property purchased by the husband before the marriage, with the husband contributing the full purchase price. The primary judge attributed the increase in value of the farming property to the equal contributions of both parties during the relationship. However, the primary judge's decision was flawed due to several errors. Firstly, the primary judge failed to consider the impact of market forces on the property's increased value. Secondly, the judge did not take into account the contributions made by the parties during the post-separation period. Lastly, the primary judge's finding regarding the wife's future earning capacity lacked an evidentiary basis. These errors led to the appeal being allowed.
The legal issues before the court involved the proper assessment of contributions to the increase in value of the marital property and the appropriate consideration of market forces and post-separation contributions. The court had to determine whether the primary judge's decision accurately reflected the contributions made by each party and the relevant factors affecting the property's value. The court also needed to assess whether the primary judge's finding on the wife's future earning capacity was supported by the evidence. In addressing these issues, the court considered relevant precedents and established principles regarding property distribution in family law disputes.
The court's reasoning focused on the errors identified in the primary judge's decision. The court emphasised that the primary judge's failure to consider market forces and post-separation contributions led to an inaccurate assessment of the property's value and the parties' contributions. Additionally, the court found that the primary judge's finding regarding the wife's future earning capacity was not supported by the evidence, making the decision flawed. Based on these findings, the court concluded that the primary judge's decision was erroneous and that the appeal should be allowed. The orders included setting aside the primary judge's decision, remitting the matter to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for rehearing, and granting costs certificates to both parties.
The final orders of the court were to allow the appeal, set aside the primary judge's decision, and remit the matter to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for rehearing before a different judge. The court also granted costs certificates to both parties, allowing for the reimbursement of costs incurred in relation to the appeal and the new trial. These orders reflect the court's determination that the primary judge's decision was flawed and required correction.
The legal issues before the court involved the proper assessment of contributions to the increase in value of the marital property and the appropriate consideration of market forces and post-separation contributions. The court had to determine whether the primary judge's decision accurately reflected the contributions made by each party and the relevant factors affecting the property's value. The court also needed to assess whether the primary judge's finding on the wife's future earning capacity was supported by the evidence. In addressing these issues, the court considered relevant precedents and established principles regarding property distribution in family law disputes.
The court's reasoning focused on the errors identified in the primary judge's decision. The court emphasised that the primary judge's failure to consider market forces and post-separation contributions led to an inaccurate assessment of the property's value and the parties' contributions. Additionally, the court found that the primary judge's finding regarding the wife's future earning capacity was not supported by the evidence, making the decision flawed. Based on these findings, the court concluded that the primary judge's decision was erroneous and that the appeal should be allowed. The orders included setting aside the primary judge's decision, remitting the matter to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for rehearing, and granting costs certificates to both parties.
The final orders of the court were to allow the appeal, set aside the primary judge's decision, and remit the matter to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for rehearing before a different judge. The court also granted costs certificates to both parties, allowing for the reimbursement of costs incurred in relation to the appeal and the new trial. These orders reflect the court's determination that the primary judge's decision was flawed and required correction.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The appeal be allowed.
2.
The orders of Judge Hughes made on 29 September 2016 be set aside.
3.
The matter be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for rehearing before a judge other than Judge Hughes.
4.
The Court grants to the appellant a costs certificate pursuant to the provisions of s 9 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the appellant in respect of the costs incurred by the appellant in relation to the appeal.
5.
The Court grants the respondent a costs certificate pursuant to the provisions of s 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the respondent in respect of the costs incurred by the respondent in relation to the appeal.
6.
The Court grants both the appellant and the respondent a costs certificate pursuant to the provisions of s 8 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under this Act to the appellant and the respondent in respect of the costs incurred by the appellant and the respondent in relation to the new trial.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
In Planet Fisheries Pty Ltd v La Rosa (1968) 119 CLR 118 (“Planet Fisheries”) at 124–125, the Court said:…In support of this submission we were referred to what our brother Windeyer said in Chulcough v. Holley, and to the following cases as establishing such a norm or standard of the amount to be awarded for general damages in the case of injuries and disabilities of the kind experienced by the plaintiff: Bresatz v. Przibilla; Teubner v. Humble; Watts v. Rake; Australian Iron and Steel Ltd. v. Greenwood; Purkess v. Crittenden; O'Leary v. Woods; Parente v. Bell.We would emphatically reject this submission. It is the relationship of the award to the injury and its consequences as established in the evidence in the case in question which is to be proportionate. It is only if, there being no other error, the award is grossly disproportionate to those injuries and consequences that it can be set aside. Whether it is so or not is a matter of judgment in the sound exercise of a sense of proportion. It is not a matter to be resolved by reference to some norm or standard supposedly to be derived from a consideration of amounts awarded in a number of other specific cases. We cannot think that the passage cited from Chulcough v. Holley should be understood as expressing a contrary view. The principle to be followed in assessing damages is, in our opinion, not in doubt. It is that the amount of damages must be fair and reasonable compensation for the injuries received and the disabilities caused. It is to be proportionate to the situation of the claimant party and not to the situation of other parties in other actions, even if some similarity between their situations may be supposed to be seen. What was sought to be done in this case by the appellant's counsel, namely, to derive a norm or standard from a group of judgments of this Court reviewing awards of damages on appeal is erroneous. The same would be true if the same course were sought to be pursued in relation to awards of a Supreme Court or of a County or District Court. The judgment of a Court awarding damages is not to be overborne by what other minds have judged right and proper for other situations. It may be granted that a judge who is making such an assessment will be aware of and give weight to current general ideas of fairness and moderation. But this general awareness is quite a different thing from what we were invited by Planet's counse1 to act upon in this case. The awareness must be a product of general experience and not formed ad hoc by a process of considering particular cases and endeavouring, necessarily unsuccessfully, to allow for differences between the circumstances of those cases and the circumstances of the case in hand.(Emphasis added) (Citations omitted) In addition to rejecting the concept of establishing a norm or a range, the passages emphasised seem to us to speak directly against the express consideration of comparable judgments at all. Planet Fisheries was followed or noted with approval by Gibbs and Stephen JJ in Sharman v Evans (1977) 138 CLR 563 at 572; Gaudron J in Van Gervan v Fenton (1992) 175 CLR 327 at [9]; by the Court in Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Limited (1993) 178 CLR 44 at [23] and [29] (although there was a suggestion that a judge could offer a jury some guidance in the assessment of damages) and by Hayne J in Rogers v Nationwide News Pty Limited (2003) 216 CLR 327 at [69].
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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