FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Anaki v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 195
Appeal from: Anaki v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 77 File number: NSD 295 of 2018 Judges: ROBERTSON, WIGNEY AND DERRINGTON JJ Date of judgment: 13 November 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a single judge of the Federal Court of Australia dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Minister acting personally to cancel the appellant’s visa under s 501BA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether “no evidence” – Held: appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501BA Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden [2016] FCAFC 28; 240 FCR 158
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1
Schmidt v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1162
Date of hearing: 13 November 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 24 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
NSD 295 of 2018 BETWEEN: EDWARD ANAKI
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGES:
ROBERTSON, WIGNEY AND DERRINGTON JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
13 NOVEMBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
Introduction
This appeal is from the judgment and orders of a single judge of this Court (the primary judge), given and made on 14 February 2018. The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the respondent Minister to cancel the appellant’s Class TY Subclass 444 special category visa, the Minister’s decision having being made on 13 February 2017.
As stated by the primary judge, the appellant is a New Zealand citizen who was born in October 1969. He first arrived in Australia as a 16 year old child. He has a lengthy criminal record. Over a 29 year period he has been convicted of 127 criminal offences, 81 of which involved drug offences. He has been sentenced to custodial sentences on 33 occasions; seven sentences were suspended, 22 were with terms of imprisonment from two to 10 months, and four were for 12 month terms.
The grounds of review before the primary judge
The appellant advanced two grounds of review before the primary judge, a third ground being abandoned at the outset of the hearing. Those two grounds were as follows:
1.The Respondent erred in finding that the Applicant would have access to drug rehabilitation programs in New Zealand when there was no evidence before him in relation to that issue.
2.The Respondent erred in failing properly to consider the impediments to the Applicant’s return because he…
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- Case
- [2018] FCAFC 195
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue in this case was whether the Minister's decision to cancel the appellant's visa was legally unreasonable. The appellant argued that the Minister had failed to consider relevant matters, including the availability of substance abuse services in New Zealand, where he would be deported. The appellant submitted that the Minister's decision was legally unreasonable because it was based on insufficient evidence.
The court found that the Minister's decision was not legally unreasonable. The court noted that the Minister had considered the appellant's ties to Australia and the hardship he would face if returned to New Zealand. However, the court found that these considerations were outweighed by the national interest considerations, which supported the cancellation of the appellant's visa. The court also found that the Minister did not err in finding that substance abuse services "may be" available to the appellant in New Zealand. The court held that the Minister did not make the availability of such services a prerequisite for exercising his discretion to cancel the appellant's visa.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs. The court found that the grounds of appeal were vague and did not identify any error on the part of the primary judge. The court held that the Minister's decision to cancel the appellant's visa was not legally unreasonable, and that the appellant had not demonstrated that the decision was based on insufficient evidence.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister submitted that the second ground of appeal claimed that the Minister’s decision was unreasonable. That was essentially the same as the third ground of the Amended Application, which was abandoned below and should not be permitted to be raised on appeal. There was no basis to suggest that the Minister’s decision was legally unreasonable within the relevant principles in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1 and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden [2016] FCAFC 28; 240 FCR 158.Consideration Both the grounds of appeal are vague. The first claims that the primary judge erred but gives no particulars. The second ground claims error on the part of the primary judge in failing to hold that the Minister’s decision was (legally) unreasonable. As to the first ground, assuming in favour of the appellant that the ground is intended to incorporate the two grounds before the primary judge which centred on what the Minister had said as to the appellant’s access to substance abuse services in New Zealand, we see no error on the part of the primary judge. We agree with the primary judge who said, at [20], that the threshold difficulty with the appellant’s argument is that it is apparent that the Minister did not regard the availability of substance abuse services in New Zealand as a critical fact in the exercise of his discretion. The observation in [72] of the Minister’s decision was that substance abuse services “may be” available to Mr Anaki. The Minister did not make a factual finding that Mr Anaki would have access to substance abuse services upon his return to New Zealand, rather he found that he may have access to such services. As the primary judge said at [22]-[23]:22The difficulty [with the submission that the “no evidence” ground applied] is that the reasoning of the Minister, as noted above, does not reflect a view that the services will be available to Mr Anaki, but only that they “may be”. The Minister did not make the requirement of availability a precondition to the exercise of his discretion. As I have noted, by observing that the services “might” be available, the Minister also contemplated that they might not be. Accordingly, the Minister did not himself make the existence of such services a prerequisite. 23The consequence of this analysis is that, contrary to Mr Anaki’s submission, a lack of evidence about the type of services available in New Zealand would not amount to jurisdictional error; [Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v] SGLB [[2004] HCA 32; 207 ALR 12] at [40]. We also see no error in the reasoning of the primary judge at [28] rejecting the then second ground, which was a further way of putting the “no evidence” ground. The primary judge said:… this submission relies on the same incorrect premise as ground 1, namely that the Minister was required to consider the availability of substance abuse services to Mr Anaki. Again, the authorities do not support that proposition; see Madafferi [v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 220; 118 FCR 326] and Gbojueh [v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 288; 202 FCR 417]. Nor did the reasoning of the Minister make it a requirement that he do so. I am not satisfied that, in the circumstances, the Minister fell into jurisdictional error on the basis asserted.