HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Gibbs C.J., Mason, Murphy, Aickin and Brennan JJ.
AMERICAN DAIRY QUEEN (Q'LD.) PTY. LTD. v. BLUE RIO PTY. LTD.
4 December 1981
Crown Lands (Q.)
Crown Lands (Q.)—Parks and reserves—Reserve—Land placed under control of trustees—Sublease—Dealing Validity—Statute—Construction—Expressio unius est exclusio alterius—The Land Act 1962-1981 (Q.), Pt XI.
Decisions
December 4.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
GIBBS C.J. I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment prepared by my brother Mason and agree with them. (at p679)
2. I would accordingly allow the appeal and would restore the order made by Matthews J. subject to the variation, which the appellant conceded should be made, that the injunction restraining the respondents "from selling, subleasing or otherwise dealing with or disposing of any interest in the land" should be qualified by the words "in any way inconsistent with the plaintiff's rights as mortgagee in possession of the sub-lease". (at p679)
MASON J. The sole question for determination in this appeal involves the interpretation of Pt XI of The Land Act of 1962 (Q.), as amended, ("the Act") and, specifically, whether a sublessee under those provisions may transfer or mortgage his interest. (at p680)
2. Part XI of the Act deals with "Grants, Reserves and Reservations for Public Purposes". (at p680)
3. Section 334 (1) provides that: "The Governor in Council may from time to time grant in trust, or by Order in Council reserve and set apart, any Crown land which, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, is or may be required for any public purpose." (at p680)
4. Section 335 (1) provides inter alia that:
"The Governor in Council may, by Order in Council, place any land reserved and set apart for any public purpose under the control of trustees; and may declare the style or title of such trustees and the trusts of the land." (at p680)
5. By an Order in Council dated 17 December 1964, amended by a further Order in Council dated 11 December 1969, the land the subject of this appeal and known as Reserve R.924 ("the Reserve") was permanently reserved and set aside as a reserve for park and recreation purposes. The Reserve is at Southport and has on it a kiosk and other buildings and is adjacent to a swimming area. The Order in Council placed the Reserve under the control of the Council of the City of the Gold Coast ("the Trustee") as trustee pursuant to s. 335 of the Act. (at p680)
6. On 4 May 1971 the Trustee leased the Reserve to Blue Rio Pty. Ltd. ("Blue Rio"), the first respondent, for a period of thirty years. Blue Rio subleased the Reserve to Selden Pty. Ltd. ("Selden") for a period of twenty years from 15 November 1973. Selden assigned the sublease to the appellant, American Dairy Queen (Q'ld) Pty. Ltd., who in turn assigned to one Franks, each assignment being for valuable consideration. Franks, in order to secure…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read American Dairy Queen (Qld) Pty Ltd v Blue Rio Pty Ltd and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [1981] HCA 65
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the respondent had validly terminated the franchise agreement. This involved considering whether the appellant had committed breaches of its obligations under the agreement, and if so, whether those breaches were of a nature that entitled the respondent to terminate. A key issue was the proper construction of the termination clause within the franchise agreement and whether the respondent had complied with any notice requirements stipulated therein before purporting to terminate.
The Court's reasoning focused on the principles of contract law, particularly regarding the interpretation of express terms and the consequences of breach. It was held that the respondent's purported termination was invalid. The Court found that the appellant had not committed the breaches alleged by the respondent, or alternatively, that any breaches were not of a fundamental nature that would justify termination under the terms of the agreement. The Court emphasised the importance of adhering strictly to the contractual provisions governing termination, including any notice periods or opportunities to remedy breaches, before a party can lawfully bring a contract to an end.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The Court ordered that the respondent's purported termination of the franchise agreement was of no force or effect, and the appellant was granted an injunction restraining the respondent from acting on the termination.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi