ALR17 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ALR17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 182

Appeals from:

ALR17 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 3407; 340 FLR 306

DYG18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCCA 1142

File numbers: QUD 889 of 2018
NSD 883 of 2019
Judges: NICHOLAS, GRIFFITHS AND GLEESON JJ
Date of judgment: 18 October 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – fast track review process under Pt 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Immigration Assessment Authority is obliged by obligations of procedural fairness to put to referral applicants for comment any matters it considers adverse to them – where the appellants’ procedural fairness cases did not particularise any adverse material which they say was not put to them – no practical injustice – appeals dismissed, with costs
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 46A, 51A, 57, 65, 473BA, 473CB, 473DA, 473DB, 473DD, 473FA, 473GA, 473GB

Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Annetts v McCann [1990] HCA 57; 170 CLR 596

Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 7; 252 CLR 38

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 34

CRJ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1404

DBE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 942

DGZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 12; 258 FCR 551

DYG18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCCA 1142

Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; 159 CLR 550

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH [2015] HCA 40; 256 CLR 326

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ [2016] HCA 29; 259 CLR 180

Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 113 CLR 475

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; 353 ALR 600

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; 214 CLR 1

Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 23; 241 CLR 252

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; 228 CLR 152

Twist v Randwick Municipal Council [1976] HCA 58; 136 CLR 106

Date of hearing: 26 August 2019
Date of last submissions: 16 October 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 37
Counsel for the Appellant in ALR17 and the Appellants in DYG18: V Kline (on a direct access basis)
Counsel for the Respondents in ALR17 and the Respondents in DYG18: B Kaplan
Solicitor for the Respondents in ALR17: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Solicitor for the Respondents in DYG18 MinterEllison

ORDERS

QUD 889 of 2018
BETWEEN:

ALR17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

NICHOLAS, GRIFFITHS AND GLEESON JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

18 OCTOBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed. 

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Details
Case
[2019] FCAFC 182
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In ALR17 v Minister for Home Affairs, the appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka who entered Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival, sought judicial review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to affirm the delegate's refusal of his Safe Haven Enterprise visa application. The appellant argued that he was denied procedural fairness because the IAA failed to inform him of adverse material or provide him an opportunity to respond. The court was required to determine whether the IAA was obliged to put to referral applicants for comment any matters it considered adverse to them under the fast track review process in Pt 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

The court held that the appellants' procedural fairness cases did not particularise any adverse material which they said was not put to them. The court further held that the obligation to afford procedural fairness to parties in controversy depends upon the particular statutory framework and what is appropriate in terms of procedural fairness depends on the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the inquiry, the subject matter and the rules under which the decision-maker is acting. The court found that the circumstances of the case must include an appropriate identification of the material which is said to be adverse and in respect of which the person affected was denied an opportunity to comment. As the appellants had not identified the adverse material, their appeals must be dismissed.

The court dismissed both appeals, with appropriate orders for costs. The appellants were ordered to pay the first respondent's costs, as agreed or taxed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before addressing these matters, it is desirable to set out briefly the relevant background to each appeal. Summary of background facts in ALR17 The appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, entered Australia as an “unauthorised maritime arrival”. After the Minister lifted the bar under s 46A(2) of the Act, the appellant applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa (SHEV). He claimed protection on the basis that, if he returned to Sri Lanka, he would be persecuted because of his Tamil race, Catholic religious beliefs, membership of particular social groups comprising failed Sri Lankan asylum seekers and members of the Catholic Youth Committee of the Parish of St Sebastian’s and an imputed pro-Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam political opinion. After the delegate refused his application on 20 August 2016, the matter was referred automatically to the IAA on 2 September 2016 for review under Pt 7AA of the Act. The IAA affirmed the delegate’s decision. Its reasons for doing so may be summarised as follows:(a)Having regard to country information, the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of serious harm based on the practice of his religion, nor of being harmed for being a Catholic Christian ([9]).(b)While accepting that the appellant had been involved in a number of community projects, including distributing food after the civil war ended, this did not, and would not, draw him to the attention of the authorities. The IAA found that he would not be targeted because of his community work ([11]). (c)While accepting that the appellant had a low level involvement in human rights rallies in 2011/2012, the IAA found that this did not bring him to adverse attention by the authorities then, nor would it in the future ([12]).(d)While accepting that it was plausible that the appellant came to the attention of the CID after a rally in 2012 this was because the CID saw the appellant as a means of gathering information, but it was significant that the appellant made no complaints in 2012 about any CID harassment of him ([14]).(e)The IAA was not satisfied that visits to the appellant’s family home since he left Sri Lanka were visits from the CID, but rather were visits as part of a general bureaucratic process in Sri Lanka relating to the registration of citizens ([16]-[17]). The above summary is not an exhaustive account of the IAA’s reasons for rejecting the appellant’s claims for protection. The appellant sought judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA). His principal ground of review was that he had been denied procedural fairness by the IAA because it failed to inform him of the nature of the material before it or of any conclusions adverse to him which were open on the material before it, or provide him an opportunity to respond. The appellant’s core proposition was that, despite the terms of s 473DA of the Act, his right to be heard in relation to matters adverse to him had not been excluded by that or any other provision in Pt 7AA. That is because any such exclusion:(a)was not expressed in clear and unmistakable language;(b)there was no “clear manifestation of a contrary statutory intention”, citing Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; 159 CLR 550 at 584;(c)there were no “plain words of necessary intendment”, citing inter aliaAnnetts v McCann [1990] HCA 57; 170 CLR 596 at 598;(d)the text was not “unambiguously clear” and “the court will approach the construction of the statute with a presumption that the legislature does not intend to deny natural justice”, citing Twist v Randwick Municipal Council [1976] HCA 58; 136 CLR 106 at 110; and(e)the text was not expressed with “irresistible clearness”, citing Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 23; 241 CLR 252 at [15].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is, however, both unnecessary and inappropriate to take the matter of statutory construction any further in these proceedings. That is simply because, as emphasised above, the appellants have not identified the “adverse material” which lies at the heart of their procedural fairness complaint. It is well established that the obligation to afford procedural fairness to parties in controversy depends upon the particular statutory framework and what is appropriate in terms of procedural fairness depends on the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the inquiry, the subject matter and the rules under which the decision-maker is acting (see, for example, Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1963) 113 CLR 475 at 503-504 per Kitto J and Kioa at 584-585 per Mason J). The circumstances of the case must include an appropriate identification of the material which is said to be adverse and in respect of which the person affected was denied an opportunity to comment. That has not occurred in these appeals and, therefore, they must be dismissed. Conclusion For these reasons, both appeals will be dismissed, with appropriate orders for costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.