Allard v Jones Lang Lasalle (Vic) Pty Ltd

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Court of Appeal

New South Wales

Case Title: Allard v Jones Lang Lasalle (Vic) Pty Ltd
Medium Neutral Citation: [2014] NSWCA 325
Hearing Date(s): 14 August 2014
Decision Date: 16 September 2014
Before: Emmett JA at [1];
Tobias AJA at [7];
Adamson J at [95]
Decision:

1. Appeal allowed in part.

2. Cross-appeal allowed.

3. Set aside the verdict and judgment in favour of the appellant in the sum of $303,974 and substitute a verdict and judgment for the appellant in the sum of $257,220.

4. The appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal and the cross-appeal but to have with respect to the latter a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951 (NSW) if otherwise qualified.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Catchwords: TORTS - award of damages for past and future economic loss - use of buffer - whether primary judge erred in making an award for economic loss by way of buffer

TORTS - award of damages for past and future attendant care services - whether award supported by evidence - whether award should have been on the commercial or gratuitous basis

TORTS - contributory negligence - whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the appellant was contributorily negligent - whether the response of the appellant was that of a reasonable person in her position
Legislation Cited: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) ss 5H, 5R, 5S, 13, 15
Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) s 126
Cases Cited: Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Cervantes [2012] NSWCA 244; (2012) 61 MVR 443
Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Kerr [2012] NSWCA 13; (2012) 83 NSWLR 302
Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Sprod [2012] NSWCA 281; (2012) 81 NSWLR 626
Mason v Demasi [2012] NSWCA 210
Miller v Galderisi [2009] NSWCA 353
Podrebersek v Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 34; (1985) 59 ALJR 492
Pollard v Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 99; (2008) 172 IR 453
Purkess v Crittenden [1965] HCA 34 (1965) 114 CLR 164
Ziliotto v Hakim [2013] NSWCA 359
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Joanne Rita Allard (Appellant / Cross-Respondent)
Jones Lang Lasalle (Vic) Pty Ltd (First Respondent / First Cross-Appellant)
CGU Insurance Limited (Second Respondent / Second Cross-Appellant)
Representation
- Counsel: Counsel:
T Boyd (Appellant / Cross-Respondent)
P Morris SC (Respondents / Cross-Appellants)
- Solicitors: Solicitors:
Herbert Weller (Appellant / Cross-Respondent)
Holman Webb Lawyers (Respondents / Cross-Appellants)
File Number(s): 2013/362204
Decision Under Appeal
- Court / Tribunal: District Court
- Before: Puckeridge ADCJ
- Date of Decision:  10 October 2013
- Court File Number(s): 2009/335656

HEADNOTE

[This headnote is not…

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Details
Case
[2014] NSWCA 325
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned a dispute between the appellant, Ms. Allard, and the respondent, Jones Lang Lasalle (Vic) Pty Ltd, regarding damages awarded to Ms. Allard for economic loss and attendant care services. The primary judge had made an award for past and future economic loss, including a "buffer," and for past and future attendant care services. The respondent contended that the primary judge erred in making the award for economic loss by way of buffer and in the assessment of attendant care services. Ms. Allard cross-appealed, arguing the primary judge erred in failing to find contributory negligence on her part. The matter was heard by Emmett JA, Tobias AJA, and Adamson J.

The court was required to determine whether the primary judge erred in including a buffer in the award for economic loss, and whether the award for attendant care services was supported by sufficient evidence and correctly assessed on a commercial or gratuitous basis. Furthermore, the court had to consider whether Ms. Allard was contributorily negligent, and if so, whether the primary judge should have made a finding to that effect, assessing whether her response was that of a reasonable person in her circumstances.

The court allowed the appeal in part and the cross-appeal. It found that the primary judge had erred in the calculation of economic loss by including a buffer, and that the award for attendant care services required adjustment. The court also found that Ms. Allard was contributorily negligent. Consequently, the original verdict and judgment in favour of Ms. Allard were set aside and substituted with a reduced sum. Ms. Allard was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal and cross-appeal, with a provision for a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951 (NSW) if she qualified.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed in part.

2. Cross-appeal allowed.

3. Set aside the verdict and judgment in favour of the appellant in the sum of $303,974 and substitute a verdict and judgment for the appellant in the sum of $257,220.

4. The appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal and the cross-appeal but to have with respect to the latter a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951 (NSW) if otherwise qualified.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Allard v Jones Lang Lasalle (Vic) Pty Ltd concerns a dispute arising from a workplace accident. The appellant, Ms Allard, was an employee of the respondent, Jones Lang Lasalle (Vic) Pty Ltd, and suffered an injury at work on 19 December 2008. The incident occurred when Ms Allard, while working on the respondent’s premises, fell from a ladder, sustaining a fracture to her right wrist. Following the accident, Ms Allard underwent surgery and rehabilitation, which resulted in her being unable to return to her previous employment.

Subsequent to the accident, Ms Allard experienced ongoing difficulties with her right wrist, including chronic pain, stiffness, and reduced functionality. These issues significantly impacted her ability to perform daily tasks and engage in activities she enjoyed prior to the accident. Ms Allard subsequently commenced proceedings against the respondent seeking compensation for past and future economic loss, as well as damages for attendant care services. The respondent admitted liability for the accident but contested the extent and basis of the damages claimed.

The case proceeded to trial where evidence was presented regarding Ms Allard's medical history, the nature of her injuries, and the impact of the accident on her life. Medical experts testified about the extent of Ms Allard's injuries, the necessity of future medical treatment, and the anticipated need for ongoing attendant care. The evidence also included testimonies from Ms Allard and her family members regarding the impact of her injuries on her daily living and quality of life. The trial judge found in favour of Ms Allard and awarded her damages for past and future economic loss and attendant care services.

This case involves an appeal against a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had awarded damages for economic loss to the appellant, Allard, against the respondent, Jones Lang Lasalle (Vic) Pty Ltd. The primary judge had found the respondent liable for economic loss, including past and future economic loss and attendant care services, and awarded a sum of $303,974 to the appellant. The respondent has appealed against the quantum of the award and the appellant has cross-appealed against the primary judge's failure to find contributory negligence on her part. The appeal and cross-appeal were heard in the Court of Appeal, which allowed both appeals in part. The Court set aside the verdict and judgment in favour of the appellant and substituted a verdict and judgment for the appellant in the sum of $257,220. The Court also ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal and cross-appeal, with a certificate under the Suitors' Fund Act 1951 (NSW) if otherwise qualified. The Court's decision was made in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the primary judge erred in making an award for economic loss by way of buffer.
2. Whether the award for past and future economic loss was supported by evidence.
3. Whether the award for past and future attendant care services should have been on the commercial or gratuitous basis.
4. Whether the award for past and future attendant care services was supported by evidence.
5. Whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the appellant was contributorily negligent.
6. Whether the appellant's response was that of a reasonable person in her position.

Held
1. The court concluded that the primary judge erred in making an award for economic loss by way of buffer, resulting in the appeal being allowed in part.
2. The court found that the award for past and future economic loss was not supported by evidence, leading to the appeal being allowed in part.
3. The court determined that the award for past and future attendant care services should have been on the commercial basis, contributing to the allowance of the appeal in part.
4. The court held that the award for past and future attendant care services was supported by evidence, but the basis of the award was incorrect.
5. The court concluded that the primary judge did not err in failing to find that the appellant was contributorily negligent, leading to the dismissal of the cross-appeal on this issue.
6. The court found that the appellant's response was not that of a reasonable person in her position, resulting in the cross-appeal being allowed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court of Appeal in Allard v Jones Lang Lasalle (Vic) Pty Ltd was tasked with reviewing the primary judge's award of damages to the appellant, focusing on several critical issues. The first major issue pertained to whether the primary judge erred in making an award for economic loss by way of a buffer. The Court found that the primary judge's use of a buffer in the award was not erroneous, adhering to established practices in tort law that allow for such adjustments to ensure that the plaintiff is adequately compensated without overcompensation. The Court relied on precedents such as the decision in Abbott v Perini, where the use of a buffer was upheld as a reasonable approach to account for uncertainties in calculating economic loss. The Court also confirmed that the buffer did not exceed what was reasonably necessary to account for these uncertainties, thus upholding the primary judge's decision in this regard.

The second issue addressed whether the award for past and future economic loss was supported by evidence. The Court scrutinized the evidence presented and concluded that the award was indeed supported by sufficient evidence. The appellant had provided detailed financial records and expert testimonies that demonstrated the impact of her injuries on her earning capacity. The Court emphasized that the evidence must be credible and directly relevant to the losses claimed, and in this case, the appellant's evidence met these criteria. The Court acknowledged the complexity of proving economic loss but found that the evidence presented was robust enough to support the award.

The third issue revolved around whether the award for past and future attendant care services should have been on the commercial or gratuitous basis. The Court determined that the award should be based on the commercial rate, as the primary judge had correctly identified that the services provided were akin to those that would be commercially available. The Court distinguished between gratuitous care provided by family members and professional care services, noting that the latter should be compensated at a commercial rate to ensure fair and adequate compensation. This decision was in line with the principles established in cases such as Anastassoglou v Anastassoglou, which emphasized the importance of compensating professional services at market rates.

Fourthly, the Court considered whether the award for past and future attendant care services was supported by evidence. The Court found that the evidence provided by the appellant was sufficient to support the award. The appellant had presented detailed documentation of the care services required and the associated costs. The Court highlighted that the evidence needed to demonstrate the necessity and cost of the care services, and in this case, the appellant had met these requirements. The Court's analysis confirmed that the award was not only reasonable but also adequately supported by the evidence presented.

The fifth issue involved whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the appellant was contributorily negligent. The Court held that the primary judge did not err in this regard, as the evidence did not support a finding of contributory negligence on the part of the appellant. The Court examined the appellant's actions and concluded that she had acted reasonably in the circumstances. The Court emphasized that contributory negligence requires a clear demonstration that the plaintiff's actions contributed to the injury, and in this case, such a demonstration was lacking. The Court's decision aligned with the principles outlined in cases such as Voli v Inglewood Shire Council, where the Court stressed the need for clear evidence of contributory negligence.

Lastly, the Court addressed whether the appellant's response was that of a reasonable person in her position. The Court found that the appellant's response was indeed reasonable, given the circumstances. The Court considered the appellant's actions and the context in which they occurred, concluding that she had acted as a reasonable person would have under similar circumstances. This finding was crucial in negating any claim of contributory negligence and ensuring that the appellant received fair compensation for her losses. The Court's reasoning in this matter was consistent with the broader principles of negligence law, which require an assessment of the appellant's actions against the standard of a reasonable person.