Alcock v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Alcock v Commonwealth of Australia [2009] FCA 1478

ROBERT JAMES ALCOCK v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA and STATE OF VICTORIA

VID 435 of 2008

RYAN J
17 DECEMBER 2009
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 435 of 2008
BETWEEN:

ROBERT JAMES ALCOCK
Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Respondent

STATE OF VICTORIA
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RYAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 DECEMBER 2009

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The further amended statement of claim and application filed herein on 11 September 2009 be struck out with no immediate leave to re-plead or amend.

2.The plaintiff pay the first and second respondent’s costs of and incidental to the motions on notice respectively filed 16 October 2009 and 8 October 2009, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

3.        Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Order be stayed until further order.

4.Liberty be reserved to any party to apply on not less than 48 hours notice in writing to the other parties.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 435 of 2008
BETWEEN:

ROBERT JAMES ALCOCK
Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Respondent

STATE OF VICTORIA
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RYAN J

DATE:

17 DECEMBER 2009

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. Before the Court are two motions on notice, one filed by each respondent. The relief claimed in each is substantially similar to the relief claimed in the other: summary judgment pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“the Federal Court Act”); alternatively that the proceedings be dismissed pursuant to O 20 r 5 of the Rules of this Court; alternatively that the pleadings as they now stand be struck out pursuant to O 11 r 16 of those Rules. The background to the proceedings, so far as it is relevant, has been set out in my reasons for interlocutory orders made in this matter on 4 August 2009: Alcock v Commonwealth of Australia [2009] FCA 820 (“the earlier reasons”), at [4]-[12]. It is therefore unnecessary to rehearse again the factual circumstances of the dispute between the parties or its procedural history.

  2. The orders made in consequence of the earlier reasons were in these terms:

    1.        The amended statement of claim filed on 8 September 2008 be struck out.

    2.The applicant have leave, if so advised, to file and serve by 11 September 2009 a further amended statement of claim in substitution for the amended statement of claim referred to in paragraph 1 of this Order.

    3.In the event of an exercise by the applicant of the leave granted by paragraph 2 of this Order, the applicant by 11 September 2009 file and serve a further amended application conforming with the further amended statement of claim filed…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 1478
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Alcock v Commonwealth of Australia, the plaintiff sought to bring proceedings against the Commonwealth, with a focus on the interpretation and application of Section 31A of the Federal Court Act. This section allows for the court to grant summary judgment if it is satisfied that the opposing party has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending or prosecuting the proceeding. The Commonwealth, as the respondent, moved for summary dismissal of the plaintiff's claims on the grounds that they lacked merit and had no reasonable prospect of success. The legal issues before the court were primarily centred on whether the plaintiff's claims met the threshold of having a reasonable prospect of success, as required by Section 31A of the Federal Court Act. The court had to determine whether the plaintiff's claims were so unmeritorious that they warranted summary dismissal, without proceeding to a full hearing.

The court examined the nature of the plaintiff's claims, the arguments presented by both parties, and the relevant case law to assess whether the plaintiff's claims had any reasonable prospect of success. The court noted the discretion provided by Section 31A and the need for a cautious approach in exercising this power. The court also considered the similarities between the test for summary dismissal under Section 31A and the common law test for determining whether a jury could reach a verdict for the plaintiff. After a thorough analysis, the court found that the plaintiff's claims did not meet the threshold for having a reasonable prospect of success and granted summary judgment in favour of the Commonwealth.

As a result of the court's decision, the plaintiff's further amended statement of claim and application were struck out, with no immediate leave to re-plead or amend. The plaintiff was ordered to pay the Commonwealth's costs of and incidental to the motions, which were to be taxed in default of agreement. The orders were stayed until further notice, and liberty was reserved for any party to apply for further orders with appropriate notice. This decision underscores the importance of the threshold for reasonable prospect of success under Section 31A and the discretionary nature of the court's power to grant summary judgment.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The further amended statement of claim and application filed herein on 11 September 2009 be struck out with no immediate leave to re-plead or amend.

2. The plaintiff pay the first and second respondent’s costs of and incidental to the motions on notice respectively filed 16 October 2009 and 8 October 2009, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Order be stayed until further order.

4. Liberty be reserved to any party to apply on not less than 48 hours notice in writing to the other parties.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

RYAN J DEANE J
As mentioned, each of the respondents moves under s 31A of the Federal Court Act, either for judgment in its favour or, alternatively, for dismissal of the proceedings. Section 31A was inserted into the Federal Court Act by the Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth), with effect from 1 December 2005. It is now in these terms: 31A Summary judgment(1)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(2)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(3)For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:(a)hopeless; or(b)bound to fail;for it to have no reasonable prospect of success.(4)This section does not limit any powers that the Court has apart from this section.(5)This section does not apply to criminal proceedings. It has been acknowledged on several occasions that s 31A “lowers the bar for obtaining summary judgment”, the bar having previously been set by authorities such as Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1948) 78 CLR 62 and General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125: Dandaven v Harbeth Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 955 per Gilmour J at [5]. See also, on this point, Jewiss v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2006] FCA 1688 per Mansfield J at [26]; Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 372 per Finkelstein J at 381-2; and per Gordon J at 406. The latter authority has also been discussed more recently in Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 117, where a Full Court of this Court refined the views expressed in Jefferson Ford and emphasised that the power reposed in this Court by s 31A is discretionary, and is to be exercised with an eye to all of the circumstances of the case. The Full Court said, in Kowalski, that: [28]It may be observed that the word ‘may’ in the expression ‘may give judgment’ in s 31A(1) and s 31A(2) is, in the context in which it is used, permissive, not mandatory. Furthermore the use of the word ‘unmeritorious’ in the Explanatory Memorandum and both of the second reading speeches, along with the use of the word ‘unsustainable’ in both of the second reading speeches, indicates that a generally cautious approach should still be adopted to the exercise of the Court’s powers under s 31A.In relation to the use of the word ‘may’ it is instructive to note the recent observations of Gordon J in Jefferson Ford at [128]. However, in our respectful opinion, the preconditions for the exercise of the relevant power, which require value judgments to be made in the absence of a full and complete factual matrix and full argument thereon, lead us to the view that a discretion is reposed in the judge hearing the relevant application to grant summary judgment.[29]The concept of ‘no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting’ a proceeding, which is a relevant issue where summary dismissal is sought under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act, was addressed by Rares J in Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd (ACN 114 658 070) v GE Capital Finance Australasia Pty Ltd (ACN 070 396 020) (2006) 236 ALR 720. At [43] his Honour said:‘… The concept of a party having “no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting a proceeding” has some similarity to the test at common law for determining whether a jury properly instructed could reach a verdict for the plaintiff. …’ [emphasis added]At [44] Rares J said:[44] In a case to which s 31A applies, where there is a real issue of fact to be decided in the sense identified in the above principle [a reference to [43] and to Hocking v Bell (1945) 71 CLR 430 at 441-2], and, possibly, where there is a real issue of law of a similar kind, it is obviously appropriate that the matter goes to trial. …’[30]In White Industries Australia Ltd v FC of T (2007) 160 FCR 298 (‘White Industries’) Lindgren J said at [50] that s 31A ‘is concerned with the bringing and defending of proceedings, not just with pleadings; with substance, not just with form’. [31]It remains a matter for a judge hearing a summary dismissal application to exercise some discretion as to whether questions of law that have been raised are so difficult that they ought not to be decided summarily.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: RYAN J, DEANE J