FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AEK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 131
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- Case
- [2016] FCAFC 131
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issues before the Full Court were whether the primary judge erred in rejecting the appellant's claim that the Tribunal's failure to invite him to a further hearing amounted to jurisdictional error, and whether the primary judge erred in failing to find the Tribunal was unreasonable in the legal sense and whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness. The Full Court considered the relevant statutory provisions, including sections 422, 425, and 428 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and the Full Court’s earlier decision in Liu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.
The Full Court found that the primary judge did not err in rejecting the appellant’s jurisdictional error claim. The Court held that the statutory provisions did not require the Tribunal to invite the appellant to a further hearing after it was reconstituted. The Court noted that the statutory framework for the conduct of a merits review of a protection visa decision, as it then stood, did not mandate a further hearing in such circumstances. The Court also found that the Tribunal was not required to provide procedural fairness in the manner claimed by the appellant. The Court held that the Tribunal had provided the appellant with an opportunity to give evidence and present arguments at the initial hearing, and that the Tribunal’s decision was not unreasonable or unfair.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent. The Full Court held that the primary judge’s decision was not plainly wrong or clearly erroneous, and that there was no basis for the Court to overrule its earlier decision in Liu. The Court also found that the appellant had not demonstrated that the primary judge’s decision involved an error of law or a failure to consider relevant material.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Finally, it is relevant to note s 430, which provided that where the Tribunal made a decision on a review it must prepare a written statement as specified in that provision (other provisions operated to oblige the Tribunal to notify the review applicant and other persons of its decision and to provide a copy of its written statement under s 430). Consideration of the parties’ contentions and determination of the appealGround 1 – Is Liu plainly incorrect? The appellant submitted that Liu should be overruled for the reasons given in SZHKA at [20]-[21] per Gray J and at [29]-[34] per Gyles J. In oral address the appellant’s counsel went so far as to submit that these two decisions of the Full Court represented “a double standard” in the Court’s prior jurisprudence, there was an “apparent duplicitousness of the authorities” and there was “no coherent justification” for treating the circumstances in Liu and SZHKA differently. He submitted that the Court had no option but to “pick one” of those authorities and to overrule the other, which “has to be plainly wrong”. For the reasons which follow, we do not consider that the two decisions are irreconcilable or that Liu is plainly wrong. It is well settled that the Full Court will follow an earlier indistinguishable Full Court decision unless it is satisfied that the earlier decision is “plainly wrong” or “clearly erroneous” and that it is insufficient to so conclude merely because the matter is one on which minds might differ (see for example, Endeavour Energy v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia [2016] FCAFC 82 at [13] per North, Jessup and Reeves JJ and the cases cited therein and Transurban City Link Ltd v Allan [1999] FCA 1723; 95 FCR 553 at [29] per Black CJ, Hill, Sundberg, Marshall and Kenny JJ). The parties accepted that this was the proper test. It was also common ground that the relevant statutory provisions in the Migration Act as set out above were in the same form when Liu and SZHKA were decided. A close analysis of the reasoning in Liu and the obiter observations made on that decision by Gray and Gyles JJ in SZHKA is required. The Full Court’s decision in Liu Liu involved two appeals which were heard together, one involving Mr Liu and the other involving Mr Ahmed. The appeals were from the first instance decisions of Wilcox J in Liu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 49 and Hely J in Ahmed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 506; 184 ALR 343. The same Tribunal member had conducted separate hearings in respect of these two matters but the member resigned before making any decision. The Tribunal was then reconstituted under s 422 by a different Tribunal member to finalise both reviews. Neither appellant was invited to appear before the reconstituted Tribunal, however, in Mr Ahmed’s case, the new member informed him that no further hearing was to be conducted unless Mr Ahmed could provide reasons as to why that was necessary. He was also given 12 weeks to provide any further information. Mr Ahmed, acting through an immigration consultant, responded and asked the Tribunal to consider his application on the basis of the documents on the file. In contrast, Mr Liu was not contacted by the Tribunal after it was reconstituted and was not given any opportunity to provide any further information.