AEK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AEK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 131

Appeal from: AEK15 v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 1060
File number: NSD 815 of 2016
Judges: MCKERRACHER, GRIFFITHS AND PERRY JJ
Date of judgment: 21 September 2016
Catchwords:

MIGRATION  – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred in rejecting appellant’s claim that the reconstituted Refugee Review Tribunal’s (Tribunal) failure to invite the applicant to another hearing under s 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) amounted to jurisdictional error – whether earlier Full Court decision is plainly wrong or clearly erroneous – whether the Tribunal has a discretion to invite the appellant to a fresh hearing under s 425 – whether primary judge erred in failing to find the Tribunal was unreasonable in the legal sense and whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness – Held: appeal dismissed.

COSTS – public interest litigation.

Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 33(1)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), Div 4, Pt 7, ss 410, 412, 414, 420, 420(1), 421, 422, 422(2), 422A, 422B, 422B(1), 422B(3), 424, 424A, 424A(1)(c), 424B(2), 425, 425(1), 425(2), 427(3)(a), 428, 428(5), 430

Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 1998 (Cth)

Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Ahmed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 506; 184 ALR 343

Applicant NAFF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] HCA 62; 221 CLR 1

Endeavour Energy v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia [2016] FCAFC 82

Liu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 49

Liu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1362; 113 FCR 541

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH [2015] HCA 40; 256 CLR 326

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship v SZRNY [2013] FCAFC 104; 214 FCR 374

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Wang [2003] HCA 11; 215 CLR 518

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21; 197 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR [2003] FCAFC 126; 128 FCR 553

Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; 193 CLR 72

Ruddock v Vadarlis (No 2) [2001] FCA 1865; 115 FCR 229

SXXB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 537

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; 228 CLR 152

SZEPZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 107; 159 FCR 291

SZHKA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 138; 172 FCR 1

Transurban City Link Ltd v Allan [1999] FCA 1723; 95 FCR 553.

WZARH v…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 131
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal was heard by the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, comprising of Justices Gilmour, Gordon, and North. The appellant, a citizen of Bangladesh, sought judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal to affirm the delegate’s refusal to grant him a protection visa. The appellant contended that the Tribunal erred in not inviting him to a further hearing after it was reconstituted, and in not providing him with procedural fairness. The primary judge had dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal's failure to invite the appellant to a further hearing did not amount to jurisdictional error, and that the Tribunal was not required to provide procedural fairness in the manner claimed by the appellant.

The key legal issues before the Full Court were whether the primary judge erred in rejecting the appellant's claim that the Tribunal's failure to invite him to a further hearing amounted to jurisdictional error, and whether the primary judge erred in failing to find the Tribunal was unreasonable in the legal sense and whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness. The Full Court considered the relevant statutory provisions, including sections 422, 425, and 428 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and the Full Court’s earlier decision in Liu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.

The Full Court found that the primary judge did not err in rejecting the appellant’s jurisdictional error claim. The Court held that the statutory provisions did not require the Tribunal to invite the appellant to a further hearing after it was reconstituted. The Court noted that the statutory framework for the conduct of a merits review of a protection visa decision, as it then stood, did not mandate a further hearing in such circumstances. The Court also found that the Tribunal was not required to provide procedural fairness in the manner claimed by the appellant. The Court held that the Tribunal had provided the appellant with an opportunity to give evidence and present arguments at the initial hearing, and that the Tribunal’s decision was not unreasonable or unfair.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent. The Full Court held that the primary judge’s decision was not plainly wrong or clearly erroneous, and that there was no basis for the Court to overrule its earlier decision in Liu. The Court also found that the appellant had not demonstrated that the primary judge’s decision involved an error of law or a failure to consider relevant material.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the following reasons, the appeal will be dismissed. Summary of background facts The parties were essentially agreed on the relevant background facts. They may be summarised as follows (drawing heavily on the primary judge’s summary in AEK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 1060 (AEK15)). The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He arrived in Australia on 17 June 2012 and, on 30 July 2012, he applied for a protection visa. He claimed that he was an active member of the local Hindu community and had been targeted by Muslim fundamentalists. On 28 March 2013, the Minister’s delegate refused to grant the appellant a protection visa. The appellant sought a review in the then Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Tribunal). The appellant was represented by a registered migration agent in the Tribunal review proceedings. On 7 March 2014, the appellant was invited by the Tribunal to attend a hearing to give evidence and to present argument in relation to the issues arising on the review. The appellant attended that hearing. On 1 October 2014 (i.e. seven months after the initial Tribunal hearing), a Tribunal officer wrote two letters, one addressed to the appellant and one addressed to his migration agent, and informed them that, because the original Tribunal member was no longer available to review the appellant’s case, a different Tribunal member “will finish the review”. The appellant was told that all documents and other material previously considered by the initial member had been given to the new member, including recordings of any Tribunal hearings. He was informed that the Tribunal would write to him if the new member required any further information. The appellant and his migration agent were both invited to contact the Tribunal officer or the Tribunal’s national enquiry line if they had any questions. The appellant did not reply to the Tribunal’s letter, nor was the appellant invited by the new member to attend a further hearing. On 25 February 2015, the new Tribunal member handed down his decision and gave reasons for affirming the delegate’s decision. Although the Tribunal’s statement of decision and reasons made no reference to the Tribunal having been reconstituted, it is evident from the reasons that the new member had at least listened to a recording of the earlier Tribunal hearing. The Tribunal’s reasons for affirming the delegate’s decision included findings based on the appellant’s evidence at the earlier hearing. For example, when explaining the reasons for the Tribunal’s serious concerns regarding the credibility of aspects of the appellant’s claims, it noted that when the appellant was asked to explain an inconsistency in his evidence at the hearing, he “provided a muddled and evasive response as to when he learned” of particular matters (see [43] of the Tribunal’s reasons). The Federal Circuit Court proceeding On 13 March 2015, the appellant commenced judicial review proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA). He was represented by counsel. In his amended application for review, he raised the following two grounds:1.The Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by failing to invite the Applicant to a further hearing under s 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) after the Tribunal had been reconstituted under s 422 of the Act.2.In the alternative Tribunal ([sic]) fell into jurisdictional error by exercising its discretion to not invite the Applicant to a new hearing before the reconstituted Tribunal in a manner that was so unreasonable that no reasonable Tribunal could have made it.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As will shortly emerge, s 428 is also relevant. This provision was also in Div 4 of Pt 7 and, therefore, was included in the set of provisions which constituted an exhaustive statement of the natural justice hearing rule in accordance with s 422B(1). Section 428 provided:428 Tribunal member may authorise another person to take evidence(1)The power of the Tribunal under paragraph 427(1)(a) to take evidence on oath or affirmation for the purpose of a review may be exercised by the Tribunal or on behalf of the Tribunal by:(a)a person appointed or engaged under the Public Service Act 1999; or(b)another person approved in writing by the Minister for the purposes of this section;who is authorised in writing by the Tribunal.(2) The power of the Tribunal may be exercised under subsection (1):(a) inside or outside Australia; and(b) subject to such limitations (if any) as are specified by the Tribunal.(3)If a person other than the Tribunal is authorised under subsection (1) to take evidence for the purpose of a review:(a) the person has, for the purpose of taking that evidence:(i) all the powers of the Tribunal under subsection 427(1); and(ii)the power to administer an oath or affirmation to a person appearing before the first‑mentioned person to give evidence; and(b)for the purpose of the exercise of those powers by that person, this Part has effect (except where the context otherwise requires) as if a reference to the Tribunal included a reference to that person.(4)If a person (other than the Tribunal as constituted for the purpose of the review) exercises the power of the Tribunal to take evidence on oath or affirmation for the purpose of a review, the person must cause a written record of the evidence taken to be made and sent to the Tribunal.(5)If the Tribunal receives, under subsection (4), a record of evidence given by the applicant, the Tribunal, for the purposes of section 425, is taken to have given the applicant an opportunity to appear before it to give evidence. Finally, it is relevant to note s 430, which provided that where the Tribunal made a decision on a review it must prepare a written statement as specified in that provision (other provisions operated to oblige the Tribunal to notify the review applicant and other persons of its decision and to provide a copy of its written statement under s 430). Consideration of the parties’ contentions and determination of the appealGround 1 – Is Liu plainly incorrect? The appellant submitted that Liu should be overruled for the reasons given in SZHKA at [20]-[21] per Gray J and at [29]-[34] per Gyles J. In oral address the appellant’s counsel went so far as to submit that these two decisions of the Full Court represented “a double standard” in the Court’s prior jurisprudence, there was an “apparent duplicitousness of the authorities” and there was “no coherent justification” for treating the circumstances in Liu and SZHKA differently. He submitted that the Court had no option but to “pick one” of those authorities and to overrule the other, which “has to be plainly wrong”.

Decision

Reasons for decision

A close analysis of the reasoning in Liu and the obiter observations made on that decision by Gray and Gyles JJ in SZHKA is required. The Full Court’s decision in Liu Liu involved two appeals which were heard together, one involving Mr Liu and the other involving Mr Ahmed. The appeals were from the first instance decisions of Wilcox J in Liu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 49 and Hely J in Ahmed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 506; 184 ALR 343. The same Tribunal member had conducted separate hearings in respect of these two matters but the member resigned before making any decision. The Tribunal was then reconstituted under s 422 by a different Tribunal member to finalise both reviews. Neither appellant was invited to appear before the reconstituted Tribunal, however, in Mr Ahmed’s case, the new member informed him that no further hearing was to be conducted unless Mr Ahmed could provide reasons as to why that was necessary. He was also given 12 weeks to provide any further information. Mr Ahmed, acting through an immigration consultant, responded and asked the Tribunal to consider his application on the basis of the documents on the file. In contrast, Mr Liu was not contacted by the Tribunal after it was reconstituted and was not given any opportunity to provide any further information. Another difference between the two cases, as identified by the Full Court in [13], is that, it was common ground in Mr Liu’s case, that the new member had listened to the tape recording and read the transcript of the previous Tribunal hearing, but Hely J found in Mr Ahmed’s case that, while the new member had read the transcript of the Tribunal’s hearing in Mr Ahmed’s matter, the new member had not listened to the tape recording of that hearing. The Tribunal affirmed the primary decisions in both cases and concluded on the basis of the documents before it that the appellants were not credible witnesses. The judicial review applications in both cases were dismissed. Both decisions were appealed. The Full Court described the common issue in the two appeals in the following terms (at [3]):If the Tribunal member who constitutes the Tribunal for the purposes of a particular review stops being a member after there has been an oral hearing, and the Tribunal is reconstituted by another member to finish the review, is the second member required to invite the applicant to appear and give evidence and present arguments in accordance with s 425 of the Act? In resolving the central issue, which involved the proper construction of s 425, the Court emphasised the need to consider that provision within its statutory context, which included the system of merits review of protection visa decisions created by Pt 7 of the Migration Act as it then stood. The Court noted many of the statutory provisions which are outlined above (it should be noted, however, that s 422B was not in force when Liu was decided). The Court traced the history of Pt 7 since its introduction by the Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth) and also some further amendments to the framework for the conduct of such a review by the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 1998 (Cth) (the Amendment Act). The Full Court summarised the relevant significance of the Amendment Act in [36]:Thus, on the one hand, the Amendment Act introduced amendments to enhance the Principal Member's control over the efficient conduct of the merits review process, and to introduce time limits (capable of being extended by the Tribunal) for the applicant to exercise certain rights in relation to the review process. But on the other hand, the Amendment Act introduced two new rights, namely to be invited to comment on adverse information, and to be invited to appear before the Tribunal to present arguments about issues arising in relation to the decision under review.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, it is relevant to note s 430, which provided that where the Tribunal made a decision on a review it must prepare a written statement as specified in that provision (other provisions operated to oblige the Tribunal to notify the review applicant and other persons of its decision and to provide a copy of its written statement under s 430). Consideration of the parties’ contentions and determination of the appealGround 1 – Is Liu plainly incorrect? The appellant submitted that Liu should be overruled for the reasons given in SZHKA at [20]-[21] per Gray J and at [29]-[34] per Gyles J. In oral address the appellant’s counsel went so far as to submit that these two decisions of the Full Court represented “a double standard” in the Court’s prior jurisprudence, there was an “apparent duplicitousness of the authorities” and there was “no coherent justification” for treating the circumstances in Liu and SZHKA differently. He submitted that the Court had no option but to “pick one” of those authorities and to overrule the other, which “has to be plainly wrong”. For the reasons which follow, we do not consider that the two decisions are irreconcilable or that Liu is plainly wrong. It is well settled that the Full Court will follow an earlier indistinguishable Full Court decision unless it is satisfied that the earlier decision is “plainly wrong” or “clearly erroneous” and that it is insufficient to so conclude merely because the matter is one on which minds might differ (see for example, Endeavour Energy v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia [2016] FCAFC 82 at [13] per North, Jessup and Reeves JJ and the cases cited therein and Transurban City Link Ltd v Allan [1999] FCA 1723; 95 FCR 553 at [29] per Black CJ, Hill, Sundberg, Marshall and Kenny JJ). The parties accepted that this was the proper test. It was also common ground that the relevant statutory provisions in the Migration Act as set out above were in the same form when Liu and SZHKA were decided. A close analysis of the reasoning in Liu and the obiter observations made on that decision by Gray and Gyles JJ in SZHKA is required. The Full Court’s decision in Liu Liu involved two appeals which were heard together, one involving Mr Liu and the other involving Mr Ahmed. The appeals were from the first instance decisions of Wilcox J in Liu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 49 and Hely J in Ahmed v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 506; 184 ALR 343. The same Tribunal member had conducted separate hearings in respect of these two matters but the member resigned before making any decision. The Tribunal was then reconstituted under s 422 by a different Tribunal member to finalise both reviews. Neither appellant was invited to appear before the reconstituted Tribunal, however, in Mr Ahmed’s case, the new member informed him that no further hearing was to be conducted unless Mr Ahmed could provide reasons as to why that was necessary. He was also given 12 weeks to provide any further information. Mr Ahmed, acting through an immigration consultant, responded and asked the Tribunal to consider his application on the basis of the documents on the file. In contrast, Mr Liu was not contacted by the Tribunal after it was reconstituted and was not given any opportunity to provide any further information.