(The Honourable Chief Justice Doyle, The Honourable Justice Bleby and The Honourable Justice Kelly)
21 August 2009
CORPORATIONS - WINDING UP - WINDING UP IN INSOLVENCY - STATUTORY DEMAND - APPLICATION TO SET ASIDE DEMAND - FOR DEFECT OR SOME OTHER REASON - SOME OTHER REASON
Respondent served a statutory demand on the appellant in respect of a debt that was secured by a mortgage – appellant sought order setting aside the demand – Master dismissed application – single Judge dismissed appeal against decision of Master – appeal against decision of single Judge – whether compliance with a statutory demand can amount to ‘some other reason’ to set aside the demand for the purposes of s 459J(1)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – whether security provided prior to the service of a demand can provide a basis for a finding that the demand has been complied with – whether the fact that the relevant debt is secured amounts to ‘some other reason’ to set aside the demand pursuant to s 459J(1)(b).
HELD: compliance with a statutory demand cannot provide a basis for setting aside the demand pursuant to s 459J(1)(b) – security provided prior to the service of a statutory demand cannot provide a basis for a finding that the demand has been complied with – of itself, the fact that the debt the subject of the demand is secured does not give rise to ‘some other reason’ to set a statutory demand aside – concept of impropriety of purpose is relevant to the application of s 459J(1)(b) – value of the mortgaged premises did not clearly exceed the amount of the debt or the substantiated amount of the demand – no reason to conclude that respondent was using the statutory demand procedure for an improper purpose – appeal dismissed.
ACCORDENT PTY LTD v RMBL INVESTMENTS LTD [2009] SASC 248
Full Court: Doyle CJ, Bleby and Kelly JJ
DOYLE CJ: This is an appeal by permission against…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Accordent Pty Ltd v RMBL Investments Ltd and more:
Accordent Pty Ltd was involved in a legal dispute with RMBL Investments Ltd concerning a statutory demand that was issued in respect of a debt secured by a mortgage. Accordent sought an order setting aside the demand, which was dismissed by the Master. The single Judge also dismissed Accordent's appeal against the decision of the Master. Accordent then appealed the decision of the single Judge. The central legal issues before the court were whether compliance with a statutory demand could amount to 'some other reason' to set aside the demand under section 459J(1)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), whether security provided prior to the service of a demand can provide a basis for a finding that the demand has been complied with, and whether the fact that the relevant debt is secured amounts to 'some other reason' to set aside a statutory demand.
The court held that compliance with a statutory demand cannot provide a basis for setting aside the demand under section 459J(1)(b). It also found that security provided prior to the service of a statutory demand cannot provide a basis for a finding that the demand has been complied with. Furthermore, the court determined that the fact that the debt the subject of the demand is secured does not, by itself, give rise to 'some other reason' to set aside a statutory demand pursuant to section 459J(1)(b). The concept of impropriety of purpose is relevant to the application of section 459J(1)(b). In this case, the value of the mortgaged premises did not clearly exceed the amount of the debt or the substantiated amount of the demand, and there was no reason to conclude that the respondent was using the statutory demand procedure for an improper purpose. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Mr Rochow SC, counsel for Accordent, applied for permission to appeal on a further ground, namely:The learned judge failed to find that the fact and value of the security held by the Respondent amounted to some other reason why the demand should be set aside pursuant to Section 459J(1)(b).The Court reserved its decision on that application, but heard submissions from Mr Rochow and Mr Keen, counsel for RMBL, on the proposed further ground.Facts I take the facts mainly from the reasons of the Judge. In August 2005 RMBL entered into a loan agreement with Accordent. RMBL advanced to Accordent a total of $12,408,000 pursuant to the agreement. Those advances are secured by, among other things, a mortgage by Accordent in favour of RMBL over property known as Windsor Park Shopping Centre (“the Centre”). On 26 February 2008 RMBL gave to Accordent notice of default under the loan agreement. The default was a failure to pay interest. The whole amount of the loan became due. At the same time RMBL entered into possession of the Centre as mortgagee. It remains in possession of the Centre. On 11 September 2008 RMBL offered the Centre for sale by auction, exercising its powers as mortgagee. The highest bid, which was not accepted, was $11,750,000. On 12 September 2008 RMBL served on Accordent a demand under s 459E of the CA. The demand related to the debt of $12,408,000. The debt specified in the notice of demand does not include interest and costs that might be payable to RMBL under the agreement. There was no suggestion before the Master or before the Judge that Accordent had paid the amount of the principal, or that after service of the demand Accordent had offered to RMBL to pay the debt or to secure the debt in any way. Before the Master, Accordent argued that RMBL had failed to take reasonable care to sell the Centre for its market value, as required by s 420A of the CA. That is not a matter that can be raised under the ground of appeal on which permission to appeal was granted. The Master found that Accordent had established a genuine dispute as to part of the debt claimed, and an offsetting claim, together amounting to $2,326,075.05. Acting under s 459H the Master calculated the substantiated amount of the demand to be $10,081,924.95. RMBL does not challenge that finding. Before the Master, Accordent tendered an affidavit sworn by a solicitor to which was exhibited a valuation of the Centre, the valuation having been prepared by a certified practising valuer. The written valuation stated that the market value of the Centre, as at 23 September 2008, was $16,500,000 or $14,500,000, the difference depending upon the assumptions made as to the income that could be earned from the Centre. I gather that the valuation was admitted into evidence before the Master. RMBL did not tender any valuation of the Centre, but made two points about the valuation tendered by Accordent. The first is that the valuation makes no reference to the auction or attempted auction by RMBL. The second is that the letter of instructions to the valuer had not been produced. On the hearing of the appeal Mr Rochow told us that these criticisms were raised for the first time before the Judge. That led to an application by Mr Rochow to tender further evidence on the hearing of the appeal, a matter to which I will come in due course.The Judge’s decision
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
I am not persuaded that the mattes identified by Mr Rochow are a reason to set aside the demand under s 459J.Further evidence As mentioned earlier, at the hearing of the appeal Mr Rochow tendered an affidavit to which was exhibited correspondence between the solicitors for Accordent and the valuer who prepared the valuation in question. Exhibited to the affidavit is the letter of instructions to the valuer which had not previously been tendered. Also annexed to the affidavit is a letter from the solicitor to the valuer informing the valuer of the fact of the auction and that the property had been passed in with the highest bid at $11,750,000. There is also a letter from the valuer stating that when preparing his valuation he had been aware of the auction and of the result of the auction. However, as Mr Keen pointed out, the further material provides no explanation for the failure to refer to the auction in the valuation, nor does it explain why, if it is the case, the result of the auction has no bearing upon the opinion as to value expressed in the valuation. Ordinarily, the court will admit further evidence on the hearing of an appeal only if it is shown that the failure to tender the evidence at an earlier stage was not due to a lack of due diligence, and if it is shown further that the evidence is credible and is likely to have a material bearing on the outcome of the appeal: see Ventura v Sustek (1976) 14 SASR 395 at 399-400; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Quade [1991] HCA 61; (1991) 178 CLR 134 at 140. In my opinion, the further evidence does not provide a basis, alone or in combination with the other material, for disturbing the Judge’s conclusion about the value of the Centre. I would reject the tender of the further evidence, because it has no material bearing on the outcome. A further pertinent point was made by Mr Keen. It is that had the letter been tendered before the Judge, he would have applied for permission to cross-examine the valuer, with a view to exploring the reasons why the result of the auction had no bearing upon the valuer’s opinion as to value. If such an application were made, it must have been granted. Accordingly, the admission now of the evidence would prejudice the respondent to the appeal. For that further reason I would reject the tender of the further evidence.Conclusion I would grant permission to appeal on the further ground, but would dismiss the appeal. I agree that the appeal should be dismissed. I agree with the reasons of the Chief Justice and have nothing to add. KELLY J: I agree that the appeal should be dismissed. I agree with the reasons of the Chief Justice.
Decision
Reasons for decision
BLEBY J
Before the Master, Accordent tendered an affidavit sworn by a solicitor to which was exhibited a valuation of the Centre, the valuation having been prepared by a certified practising valuer. The written valuation stated that the market value of the Centre, as at 23 September 2008, was $16,500,000 or $14,500,000, the difference depending upon the assumptions made as to the income that could be earned from the Centre. I gather that the valuation was admitted into evidence before the Master. RMBL did not tender any valuation of the Centre, but made two points about the valuation tendered by Accordent. The first is that the valuation makes no reference to the auction or attempted auction by RMBL. The second is that the letter of instructions to the valuer had not been produced. On the hearing of the appeal Mr Rochow told us that these criticisms were raised for the first time before the Judge. That led to an application by Mr Rochow to tender further evidence on the hearing of the appeal, a matter to which I will come in due course.The Judge’s decision There are only three aspects of the Judge’s decision to which I need refer. First, it does not appear to have been argued before the Judge that the issue of compliance with the demand could not be raised on an application under s 459G to set aside the demand and could be raised only on an application for an order that Accordent be wound up. Second, the Judge appears to have held that in support of the application for an order setting aside the demand, Accordent could rely only upon security provided after the demand was served. It is not completely clear that the Judge so decided, but this is what the Master held, and if the Judge had intended to differ from the Master it is likely that he would have said so. Third, the Judge was not prepared to find that the market value of the Centre was the amount stated in the valuation. The Judge accordingly was not prepared to find that RMBL held more than adequate security for the debt claimed by it. These conclusions by the Judge were made in answer to a submission that for the purposes of s 459J there was “some other reason why the demand should be set aside”, namely, the value of the security held by RMBL. It must follow, I consider, that the Judge was not prepared to find that the security held by RMBL was such that, were it to be taken into account, it would have led to a finding that Accordent had secured the amount of the debt to RMBL’s reasonable satisfaction.The statutory scheme Part 5.4 of the CA is headed “Winding up in insolvency”. Part 5.4 comprises four Divisions. The provisions relating to statutory demands are found in these Divisions. The issues that arise on appeal are to be considered in light of the purpose of Part 5.4. The purpose of Part 5.4 is summarised as follows by Gummow J (with whom the other members of the High Court agreed) in David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation [1995] HCA 43; (1995) 184 CLR 265 at 270 as follows:The provisions of the new Pt 5.4 constitute a legislative scheme for quick resolution of the issue of solvency and the determination of whether the company should be wound up without the interposition of disputes about debts, unless they are raised promptly…Similarly, in Aussie Vic Plant Hire Pty Ltd v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd [2008] HCA 9; (2008) 232 CLR 314 the majority (Gleeson CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ) said at [14];[14]The evident purposes of Pt 5.4 of the Act include speedy resolution of applications to wind up companies in insolvency. One particular feature of the way in which that purpose is carried into effect is to focus principal attention at the hearing of the winding up application upon whether a company is insolvent rather than upon defects in the procedures that precede the institution of the application for winding up.