Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v Hardesty & Hanover International LLC

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

ABIGROUP CONTRACTORS P/L v HARDESTY & HANOVER INTERNATIONAL LLC

[2008] SASC 369

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Justice Anderson, The Honourable Justice White and The Honourable Justice Kelly)

23 December 2008

PROCEDURE - SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEDURE UNDER RULES OF COURT - OTHER MATTERS ARISING BEFORE TRIAL

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM INTERLOCUTORY DECISIONS - LEAVE TO APPEAL

APPLICATION FOR DETERMINATION OF A PRELIMINARY ISSUE

Application for permission to appeal referred to Full Court - interlocutory application for an issue in the trial to be determined as preliminary issue was not granted - appeal from this interlocutory decision - whether a point of principle arises - whether judge erred in exercise of discretion.

Held:  Permission to appeal granted - appeal raises a question of general principle - appeal raises questions of mixed law and fact - order under r 211 for the separate hearing and determination of one discrete issue prior to the trial on other issues - appeal allowed.

Supreme Court (Civil) Rules 2006 (SA) r 211, referred to.
Duke Group Ltd (In Liq) v Alamain Investments Ltd (In Liq) & Ors (No 2) [2006] SASC 33, applied.
Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v Hardesty & Hanover International LLC [2008] SASC 244; Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v Hardesty & Hanover International LLC (No 2) [2008] SASC 272; Rogers v Baillieu Bullock Wilkinson Pty Ltd (1981) 28 SASR 595; Rivers v Rivers [2002] SASC 197; (2002) 220 LSJS 74; FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (in liq) v Sherry & Ors [2002] SASC 431; (2002) 225 LSJS 141; City of Onkaparinga v Hassell Pty Ltd & Ors [2007] SASC 163; State Bank of South Australia v Hellaby (1992) 59 SASR 304; Glenauchen Pty Ltd v Circuit Finance Pty Ltd [2001] SASC 61; Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170; Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334, discussed.

ABIGROUP CONTRACTORS P/L v HARDESTY & HANOVER INTERNATIONAL LLC
[2008] SASC 369

Full Court:  Anderson, White and Kelly JJ

ANDERSON J.

Introduction

  1. In this matter, Hardesty & Hanover International LLC (“HHI”) is seeking permission to appeal from a decision of a judge of this Court. The application for permission was initially made to the judge. However, the judge did not grant permission and referred the application to the Full Court (Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006, r 282(2)(b)).

  2. Although it was an application for permission to appeal which would normally be heard in private on the papers, an order was made directing that the matter be heard in open court as the hearing of the appeal.

  3. The judge who referred the matter to the Full Court published reasons in Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v Hardesty & Hanover International LLC (No 2) [2008] SASC 272.…

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Details
Case
[2008] SASC 369
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd sought leave to appeal a decision by the Supreme Court of South Australia that declined to order a separate trial on the enforceability of an expert determination. The underlying dispute arose from the construction of twin bridges in Port Adelaide, with Abigroup being the head contractor and Hardesty & Hanover LLP (HHL) providing engineering designs. The dispute specifically related to fees payable by Abigroup to HHL, which had been referred to expert determination in favor of HHL. Clause SC12 of their Consultant Services Agreement outlined a dispute resolution process that culminated in an independent expert’s determination if the dispute was unresolved after a series of meetings between the parties’ representatives.

The legal issues in the appeal centered around the enforceability of the expert determination under Clause SC12 and whether the court should have ordered a separate trial to address this issue before proceeding to the main trial. Mr. Walsh QC for the respondent argued that the decision on the separate trial was discretionary and involved no error. Conversely, Mr. Fenwick Elliott contended that the enforceability of the expert determination was a discrete issue that did not require evidence from the main trial and should be decided in advance to expedite the proceedings.

The court found that the enforceability of the expert determination was indeed a discrete issue that could be resolved without overlapping with the main trial’s evidence and factual issues. The court was persuaded by the principle that expert determinations should be honored if the parties agreed to be bound by them. The judge’s discretion in declining to order a separate trial was considered to have miscarried, as the enforceability issue was significant and should be decided in advance. Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and ordered a separate trial limited to the issue of whether the expert determination was final and binding on the parties.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant made an application to this Court on 10 November 2008 for an extension of time within which to commence an application for permission to the appeal. The respondent did not object to the application, and insofar as it may be necessary I would grant the extension.Background The underlying dispute arises from the construction of twin bridges which now span the Port River at Port Adelaide. The plaintiff in the action is Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd (“Abigroup”). Abigroup was the head contractor and engaged Hardesty & Hanover LLP (“HHL”) through a Tender Services Agreement (“TSA”) dated 3 June 2004 to provide engineering designs for the opening sections of the rail and road bridges. HHI and HHL are based in New York. To date, there have been three types of disputes between Abigroup and the two Hardesty companies. The dispute with HHL relates to a professional negligence claim in relation to the design of the bridges. It has been referred to as the ship impact claim and includes a dispute about HHI’s entitlement to further consultants fees. This present dispute and another in similar terms relates to fees payable by Abigroup to HHI. Both have been referred for expert determination and the expert has determined in favour of HHI in both cases. Clause SC12 is a special condition within part 3 of the Consultant Services Agreement (“CSA”) entered into by Abigroup and HHI. The CSA is incorporated into the TSA as Annexure 4. The clause provides a methodology for dispute resolution, commencing with a meeting of the parties’ nominated representatives and progressing through an ascending hierarchy of meetings to a meeting of the parties’ respective General Managers. If that procedure is not successful, SC12.1 then provides for an independent expert in the relevant field, to be agreed by the parties, to determine the dispute. Clause SC 12 reads:SC12. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTIONIn substitution of the provisions of clauses GC 12(c) and GC 12(d) of the Agreement, within 7 days of a party receiving the notice referred to in clause GC 12(b) of the Agreement, the Abigroup Representative and the Consultant’s Representative must meet and, in good faith, attempt to resolve the dispute or difference. If, within 14 days of this meeting, the dispute or difference is not resolved, the Division Managers (or their equivalents) of the parties must meet within 7 days of the expiry of that 14 day period and, in good faith, attempt to resolve the dispute or difference. If, within 21 days of the Division Manager’s meeting (sic), the dispute or difference is not resolved, the General Managers (or their equivalents) of the respective parties must meet within 7 days of the expiry of that 21 day period and, in good faith, attempt to resolve the dispute or difference.SC 12.1Dispute resolution(a)Unless otherwise agreed, if, within 14 days of the General Managers’ meeting under Clause SC 12, the dispute or difference is not resolved, it must:(i) be dealt with in accordance with this Clause SC 12.1; and(ii) be determined by an Independent expert in the relevant field agreed upon and appointed jointly by Abigroup and the Consultant.(b)If, within 7 days of the end of the period referred to in Clause SC 12.1(a) Abigroup and the Consultant cannot agree on the appointment of a person to act as the independent expert, they must appoint the person nominated (on the application by either party) by the Chairperson or other senior officer for the time being of the Institution of Engineers, Australia or his or her nominee.(c)The dispute or difference must be referred to the expert (agreed or nominated pursuant to Clause SC 12.1(b)) by written notice in the form of Attachment 1 signed by both Abigroup and the Chief Executive Officer of the Consultant.(d)The expert determination must be made in accordance with the rules for the expert determination process in Attachment 2.(e)The expert must act in accordance with the code of conduct for an expert in Attachment 3.(f)The expert:(i) acts at all times as an expert and not as an arbitrator; and(ii) may open up, review, decide again and substitute any Direction of Abigroup’s Representative under this Agreement.(g)Abigroup and the Consultant must share equally the costs of the expert determination process.(h)Any determination made by an expert pursuant to this Clause SC 12.1 is final and binding upon Abigroup and the Consultant except where the determination:(i) requires a party to pay an amount in excess of $500,000; or(ii) relates to a dispute or difference with respect to a Claim for greater than $2,000,000,in which event the expert is deemed to be giving a non-binding appraisal and either party may commence litigation in respect of the dispute if it has not been resolved within 28 days of the expert giving his or her decision.(i)If a dispute or difference between Abigroup and the Consultant which is referred to an expert under this clause is not determined within 90 days of the date of the expert’s acceptance of appointment, Abigroup and the Consultant may agree to arbitrate, or either party may commence litigation in respect of, that dispute or difference.(j)Any arbitrator agreed upon or court of competent jurisdiction in which litigation is commenced under Clauses SC 12.1(h) or SC 12.1(j) may open up and review any Direction of Abigroup’s Representative under this Agreement.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Mr Walsh QC for the respondent emphasised in his submissions that the decision by the judge refusing the application for a separate trial was an order involving a matter of practice and procedure on an interlocutory matter, and involving the exercise of discretion by the judge. He submitted that there was no error in the reasoning of the judge and therefore the permission to appeal should be refused.Is evidence required to resolve the question of enforceability? Mr Fenwick Elliott challenged Mr Walsh to demonstrate any areas where he could point to an overlap between the issues to be decided on the suggested preliminary point and the issues to be decided later in the trial. He suggested that there was no evidence required to argue the enforceability point. Mr Walsh was unable to direct the court to any specific evidence which he said would be called. Mr Walsh submitted that several witnesses may have to be called to dispute matters which had been raised by the appellant. He made only general references to questions of credibility of witnesses and the complexity of the issues raised for consideration on the separate issue of the expert determination. Mr Fenwick Elliott submitted that the judge did not in his reasons identify any overlap of issues and did not consider issues of evidence or credibility of witnesses. It was argued by him that the judge was occupied with the totality of issues and the fact that those issues were complex. Mr Walsh referred to the plea in the statement of claim seeking to recover amounts which had been paid by Abigroup to HHI for construction support services. He submitted that this was clearly an area which would involve evidence. He referred to the fact that there were detailed designs involved and that the services provided in relation to those designs would also require evidence. He was, however, restricted to talking in general terms and could not be specific as to what evidence would be led. He made his submissions on the basis that these matters would be issues on the preliminary hearing, but it seems that would not be so if the narrower view taken by Mr Fenwick Elliott prevails. Mr Walsh then referred to the plea which related to the recovery of the amounts which Abigroup had expended on what he called the sham expert determination. He submitted that the expert determination, because of the contractual provisions, required that all issues constituting any dispute must be referred to the expert. He submitted that this therefore included Abigroup’s claim for the additional work and costs associated with the ship impact protection which was not accounted for in the preliminary work. In my view, those submissions miss the point that although there was a combination of issues for the mediation, HHI is claiming its right under the agreement to have an expert determination on separate and discrete issues.The judge’s reasons for declining to order a separate trial The judge isolated five areas in his reasons to which he indicated he had paid particular regard in refusing the application for a separate trial. The items are set out at [18] of the reasons published on 8 September 2008, [2008] SASC 244. They are as follows:In reaching my conclusions with respect to the application of HHI, I have had regard to all of the submissions advanced and in particular the following:–An apparently reasonable and sensible offer has been made by Abigroup to pay disputed claims as assessed by the expert. The only difficulty with the arrangement appears to be with the problems in giving security, and that appears to be within the control of HHI.–The initiating proceedings related to Abigroup’s claim concerning defective design work. HHI elected to not only defend those proceedings, but to counterclaim in the same proceedings with respect to their money claim the subject of the expert determination. It would have been open to HHI to issue separate proceedings with respect to their claim. They did not do so.–The legal issues concerning the expert determination are not simple. The contractual documents, part only of which have been provided to the Court, are complex and to the uninitiated, suggest there may be considerable ambiguity and lack of clarity in relevant terms. For example, two sets of competing clauses deal with expert determination and involve material levels of conflict and, with a clause in the contract, suggesting precedence to one set over another. This technique of simply lumping together apparently conflicting procedures in the contract, and then suggesting precedence to one over another, provides a circumstance that may give rise to potential confusion.–The claim, as finally submitted to the expert, as earlier observed, is said to be manipulated in a way that distorts the true dispute, so as to bring the amount claimed under the $500,000 cap. These are potentially complex and difficult issues to resolve.–Attempts by Courts to separate out discrete issues for determination often lead to complication and confusion, and have the consequence of delaying ultimate judicial determination of a dispute. The splintering of the case, consequent appeals, cost and delay are unattractive. The Court has a responsibility to provide an expedient and cost effective procedure for the resolution of disputes. The Court must be mindful that the procedure of the Court may be used to attempt to gain a commercial advantage, and its processes should not be unfairly used in this way. I do not suggest that the above considerations are the only considerations, but they are issues of particular concern.

Decision

Reasons for decision

ANDERSON J KELLY J
It was for those reasons that His Honour declined to grant permission to appeal and referred the matter to this Court.Conclusion It is my view that Mr Walsh is unable to point to anything specific regarding the need to call evidence on the enforceability issue. He was only able to speak in general terms of the possibility of evidence having to be called. The principles emerging from the judgment of Walters J in Rogers, although in relation to a point of law only, are in my view relevant. I am persuaded that this is a case where there is much to be said for Mr Fenwick Elliott’s approach. I take account of the warnings as to ordering separate trials expressed in the decisions referred to, but consider it appropriate in this matter. I have formed the view that the question of enforceability of the expert determination is a discrete issue which should be argued in advance of the main trial. There are no conflicting factual issues involved in determining the question of enforceability. It is a matter of importance that expert determinations should be given effect to if the parties have agreed to be bound by such determinations. I consider that the judge erred in his decision not to order a separate trial. Although his decision involved discretionary considerations in an interlocutory matter, it is my view that the discretion has miscarried for the reasons I have given. Although it is my view that, given the history of this matter, the unsuccessful party in any determination of the preliminary point may appeal, it is still appropriate to have the separate point dealt with. This will not impede the progress of the matter generally towards the main trial. Procedural steps can be ordered to progress the main trial while at the same time setting down a time for the hearing of the separate issue. It seems to me that it is important to start channelling the parties’ energies in the direction of the ultimate trial but at the same time disposing of the separate issue. The matter is a complex commercial matter and I would request the Chief Justice to consider placing it in the Long and Complex List, to be managed by a judge so that a timetable can be set to expedite the matter for trial. In the circumstances outlined earlier, I would extend to 29 September 2008 the time within which the appellant may commence its application for permission to appeal. I would therefore allow an extension of time to appeal, grant permission to appeal and allow the appeal. I would order that there be a separate trial limited to the issue of whether the expert determination made by Mr Fullerton on 28 February 2008 is final and binding on the parties. I would hear the parties as to costs.WHITE J: The circumstances giving rise to this application for permission to appeal are set out in the reasons of Anderson J. I agree that permission to appeal should be granted and that the appeal should be allowed. In my opinion, an order should be made under r 211 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (the 2006 Rules) for the separate hearing and determination of one of the issues between the parties to this action. I agree generally with the reasons of Anderson J.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: ANDERSON J, KELLY J

The Court's decision in Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v Hardesty & Hanover International LLC addressed several key issues concerning interlocutory appeals, the enforceability of expert determinations, and the expediting of complex commercial litigation. Firstly, the Court determined that it had jurisdiction to grant an extension of time for the appellant to apply for leave to appeal an interlocutory decision. This was based on the premise that granting such an extension is within the court's inherent jurisdiction to control its own procedures, and no statutory or rule-based limitations were identified that would prevent the court from exercising this discretion.

Secondly, the Court examined whether the trial judge's refusal to order a separate trial on the issue of the enforceability of an expert determination constituted an error of law or an abuse of discretion. The Court found that while the refusal involved discretionary considerations, the trial judge's discretion had miscarried. The judge had not properly isolated the discrete issue of enforceability from the broader trial proceedings, thereby making a decision that was not in line with established principles regarding the separation of discrete issues for judicial efficiency and clarity.

Thirdly, the Court addressed whether the issue of enforceability could be determined without the need for evidence and separately from the main trial. The Court concluded that the enforceability of the expert determination could indeed be decided without the need for evidence, as it was primarily a question of interpreting the contractual terms and assessing whether the expert's determination fell within the agreed scope and binding nature of the contractual provisions. This conclusion aligned with the principle that discrete legal issues can often be resolved prior to the main trial, thereby streamlining the litigation process.

Fourthly, regarding the expediting of the trial process, the Court agreed that the matter should be placed on the Long and Complex List. This decision was based on the complexity of the commercial dispute and the need to manage the case efficiently to ensure timely resolution. Placing the matter on this list would facilitate the setting of a clear timetable and the allocation of judicial resources to expedite the trial.

Lastly, the Court granted the appellant an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal the interlocutory decision. The extension was granted to allow the appellant sufficient time to prepare and present its appeal, considering the complexity of the issues and the need for thorough legal arguments.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the Supreme Court has the inherent jurisdiction to extend the time for an appellant to apply for leave to appeal an interlocutory decision. Furthermore, the Court has the discretion to order a separate trial on discrete issues, such as the enforceability of an expert determination, even if this involves an interlocutory matter. This discretion should be exercised in a manner that promotes judicial efficiency and clarity, without impeding the overall progress of the litigation. The Court also emphasized the importance of placing complex commercial cases on the Long and Complex List to expedite their resolution.