AAY15 v Minister for Immigration and Anor

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AAY15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2017] FCCA 476
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for review of former Refugee Review Tribunal decision – whether Tribunal failed to deal with a claim expressly made or clearly arising in the circumstances – jurisdictional error established.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.476

Cases cited:

NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 197 ALR 389
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSWB [2014] FCAFC 106
SZUTM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2016]
FCA 45; (2016) 241 FCR 214

Applicant: AAY15
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 464 of 2015
Judgment of: Judge Nicholls
Hearing date: 7 February 2017
Date of Last Submission: 7 February 2017
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 16 March 2017

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr L Karp
Solicitors for the Applicant:

Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales

Solicitors for the Respondents: Ms S Burnett of Clayton Utz

ORDERS

  1. The name of the second respondent is amended to read “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.

  2. A writ in the nature of certiorari issue to quash the decision of the second respondent dated 12 September 2014.

  3. A writ in the nature of mandamus issue directing the second respondent to reconsider and determine the matter according to law.

  4. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs set in the amount of $6825.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 464 of 2015

AAY15

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(As corrected)

  1. This is an application made pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) on 26 February 2015, and amended on 4 December 2015, seeking review of the decision of the then Refugee Review Tribunal, now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), made on 28 January 2015 which affirmed the decision of the Minister’s delegate to refuse a protection (Class XA) visa to the applicant.

  2. In evidence before the Court is a bundle of relevant documents filed and tendered by the Minister (the Court Book – “CB”, “RE1”).

Background

  1. The relevant background is as follows. The applicant is a national of Pakistan. He arrived in Australia without authority, by boat, in August 2012 (CB 39). Following the Minister’s relevant determination, the applicant applied for a protection visa on 6 March 2013 (CB 24 to CB 25). He was assisted by a registered migration agent.

  2. The applicant claimed to have come from a village in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (“the Kurram Agency”). He said he was of Pashtun ethnicity, a member of the Turi tribe, and a Shia Muslim. The applicant claimed to fear harm from the Taliban because of his religion, race (ethnicity) and his actual, or perceived, opposition…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCCA 476
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, AAY15, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The Minister for Immigration and Anor was the respondent. The core of the dispute concerned the Tribunal's assessment of country information presented by the applicant, which the applicant argued constituted "findings" that the Tribunal was bound to consider.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal had failed to make a finding on a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts, and whether this failure amounted to a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction or a breach of procedural fairness. The court was also required to determine whether the material presented by the applicant to the Tribunal constituted actual "findings" by other Tribunal members or merely a presentation of available country information.

Judge Nicholls reasoned that the applicant's submissions to the Tribunal, which referred to "findings" in other cases, did not establish that the current Tribunal member was bound by those previous determinations, as there is no principle of comity that obliges such adherence. Furthermore, the judge found that the extracted text from the "other" Tribunal's decision was, in fact, a presentation of country information from a publication titled "Dawn," not binding findings. The judge noted ambiguity and potential contradiction within the quoted "Dawn" material regarding the targeting of wealthy versus poor individuals for kidnapping. The Minister argued that the applicant had not established that the purported claim was raised by the evidence in a way that could have been dispositive of the review, nor that the Tribunal had failed to give proper consideration to the claims arising from the material before it. Citing *Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs*, the court affirmed that a failure by the Tribunal to make a finding on a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts can amount to a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction and a breach of procedural fairness.

The court found that the applicant had not established that the Tribunal had failed to make a finding on a substantial, clearly articulated argument. The judge concluded that the material relied upon by the applicant was not a "finding" but rather country information, and that the Tribunal had considered the material before it. Consequently, the application for judicial review was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Two things may immediately be said. First, the applicant’s submissions to the Tribunal state that they rely on “findings” made by other Tribunal members in other cases. That is made plain with the words “[w]e refer to a few RRT decisions where the Tribunal found…” [Emphasis added] (at CB 173.5). It is trite to say that the Tribunal member in the current case is not bound by findings made by other Tribunal members in other cases. There are no principles of comity that bind Tribunal members, although a consistency of approach is desirable. Second, despite what is said in the applicant’s submission to the Tribunal, what is extracted in those submissions from the “other” Tribunal’s decision (see [18] above), is, on any plain reading, a presentation of available country information taken from a publication “Dawn”, and not “findings” by any Tribunal member. The last two sentences quoted from “Dawn”, and as set out at [18] above, are at least unclear, if not contradictory, when read in isolation. The penultimate sentence states that the kidnappers “know” who is wealthy in the Turi tribe, and kidnap those who can pay money. The last sentence states that the poor kidnapped for ransom who cannot pay, are killed. This raises the question that if the kidnappers “know” who the wealthy Turis are, and who can pay, then why would they kidnap Turis who are not wealthy and cannot pay the ransom. The Minister’s position was that the applicant’s argument failed for two reasons. One, that the applicant had not established that the purported claim was raised by the evidence such that the issue could have been dispositive of the review. Two, the Tribunal, in any event, gave proper consideration to the claims as they arose from the material before the Tribunal. I understood the Minister’s reading of what is set out at [18] above, to be that the extract states that the kidnapper’s targets include “other residents of the [town]”, the words “particularly members of the Turi tribe”, allow that not all the targets are Turis (CB 173.6). In that context, the kidnappers target Turis whom they “know” are wealthy (the penultimate sentence) and “other residents” (as in people who are not Turis) who are not wealthy and are poor, are killed (the last sentence). The Minister argued that the applicant has not established that the purported claim was raised on the evidence as necessarily in light of NABE (No 2) at [63] (see above at [15]). In this context, the Minister also sought to further explain what is set out at [63] in NABE (No 2) with reference to what the Full Federal Court also said at [55] in that case, citing Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 197 ALR 389 (“Dranichnikov”):“Although the discussion in S20 did not set any precise limit upon the scope of factual error which may amount to or indicate jurisdictional error there is, in the case of Refugee Review Tribunal decisions, one circumstance in which it is clearly established that the absence of a finding of a relevant fact may amount to jurisdictional error. Where the Tribunal fails to make a finding on ‘… a substantial clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts’ that failure can amount to a failure to accord procedural fairness and a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction – Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 197 ALR 389 at 394 [24] per Gummow and Callinan JJ, Hayne J agreeing at 408 [95]. Although not expressly so identified in that case, the constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction may be seen as a failure to carry out the review required by the Act. The joint judgment of Gummow and Callinan JJ in Dranichnikov described the task of the Tribunal where the applicant relied upon membership of a particular social group. Their Honours said (at 394 [26]):‘…the task of the tribunal involves a number of steps. First the tribunal needs to determine whether the group or class to which an applicant claims to belong is capable of constituting a social group for the purposes of the Convention. That determination in part at least involves a question of law. If that question is answered affirmatively, the next question, one of fact, is whether the applicant is a member of that class. There then follow the questions whether the applicant has a fear, whether the fear is well-founded, and if it is, whether it is for a Convention reason.’In that case the Tribunal should have decided the matter which was put to it by reference to the particular social group defined in the applicant’s submissions – namely entrepreneurs and businessmen in Russia who publicly criticise law enforcement authorities for failing to take action against crime or criminals. Instead it decided whether the applicant’s membership of the group of ‘businessmen in Russia’ was a reason for his persecution.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established