Appellant Respondent

David Etherington QC David Perry QC

Stephen Rose Tom Little

(Instructed by Taylor (Instructed by Crown
Haldane & Barlex) Prosecution Service

Appeals and Review Unit)

LORD HUGHES: (with whom Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Kerr, Lord
Reed, Lord Toulson and Lord Thomas agree)
1. The appellant Mark Golds was convicted by a jury of the murder of his partner. He had admitted in court that he had killed her, and the sole issue at his trial had been whether he had made out the partial defence of diminished responsibility, and so fell to be convicted of manslaughter rather than of murder. The law to be applied was section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 after its recent revision by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The issue is the correct approach to the statutory test
of whether his abilities were in specified respects “substantially impaired”: see
section 2(1)(b).
2. The appellant had attacked his partner with a knife at their home in front of her young children after a running argument which had taken place on and off throughout much of the day. He had inflicted some 22 knife wounds together with blunt impact internal injuries. He had a history of mental disorder leading to outpatient treatment and medication. Two consultant forensic psychiatrists gave evidence that there was an abnormality of mental functioning arising from a recognised medical condition, although they disagreed what that condition was. There was no contradictory psychiatric evidence. The judge correctly identified the questions which the jury needed to address (see para 8 below) and helpfully provided a written summary of the ingredients of diminished responsibility. He also provided
a crystal clear written “route to verdict” document. On the issue of substantial
impairment of ability he told the jury:
“Mr Rose [counsel for the defence] did suggest to you in his
closing address that you would get some further help from me when giving you directions in law as to what the word substantially means, where it says substantially impaired his ability to exercise those qualities. I am not going to give you any help on the meaning of the word substantially, because unless it creates real difficulty and you require further elucidation, the general principle of English law is that where
an everyday word is used, don’t tell juries what it means. They
are bright enough and sensible enough to work it out for themselves, so I am not going to paraphrase substantially. Substantially is the word that is in the Act of Parliament and
that’s the word that you have to work with. If it becomes a
stumbling block in some way, well at the end of the day, you can send me a note and…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Golds (Appellant)

Details

AGLC: R v Golds (Appellant) [2016] UKSC 61
Case: [2016] UKSC 61
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Golds involved an appeal by the appellant, Mark Golds, who was convicted of murder but sought to establish the partial defence of diminished responsibility to reduce his conviction to manslaughter. The central issue before the court was the interpretation of the statutory term "substantially impaired" in section 2(1)(b) of the Homicide Act 1957, as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The appellant argued that the trial judge should have directed the jury on the meaning of "substantially impaired" and that the correct interpretation was any impairment beyond the merely trivial. The Court of Appeal certified two questions on this point for resolution by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court examined the historical context and legal authorities on the meaning of "substantially impaired" in the context of diminished responsibility. It concluded that the term should be understood in the sense of an impairment of consequence or weight, rather than merely any impairment beyond the trivial. This interpretation aligns with the principle that diminished responsibility should only reduce a murder conviction to manslaughter where there is a significant, not merely trivial, impairment of the defendant's mental abilities. The court emphasized that while the term "substantially" is an ordinary English word, it carries a specific meaning in this statutory context, which should be conveyed to the jury without unnecessary elaboration. The court also noted that while the term should not be re-defined for the jury, judges may use illustrative phrases to clarify the sense in which it is used, so long as they ensure the jury understands that the impairment must be more than trivial but not necessarily total.

In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed that the trial judge was not required to provide additional direction on the meaning of "substantially impaired" unless specific circumstances in the case suggested a risk of misunderstanding. The court underscored the importance of expert psychiatric evidence in assessing the level of impairment and the role of the jury in determining whether the impairment was substantial based on all the evidence presented. The court also highlighted the Crown's responsibility to assess and challenge expert evidence appropriately and the judge's role in ensuring that any challenge is rationally based and properly explained to the jury.

Orders