Zhang v Telco Asset Management Limited

Link copied
Case Copied 2 min read

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND

I TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA

 CA18/2020
 [2020] NZCA 380

BETWEEN

YAN ZHANG
Appellant

AND

TELCO ASSET MANAGEMENT LIMITED
Respondent

CA150/2020

BETWEEN

YAN ZHANG
Appellant

AND

TELCO ASSET MANAGEMENT LIMITED
Respondent

Court:

Kós P and Courtney J

Counsel:

Appellant in Person
T P Cleary for Respondent

Judgment:
(On the papers)

1 September 2020 at 10 am

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
[Costs]

Costs are ordered in accordance with the respondent’s memorandum as to costs

dated 10 June 2020. 

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Courtney J)

  1. Mr Zhang applied for leave to appeal a substantive decision of the Employment Court and a related costs decision.  He required an extension of time to make the leave application.  This Court granted an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal but dismissed both applications for leave.[1] 

  2. The respondent, Telco Asset Management Ltd (Telco) has applied for costs for a standard appeal.[2]  Its calculation, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005 (the Rules), puts the total costs at $11,233: $1,673 for the application to extend time and $6,214 and $3,346 for the respective applications for leave to appeal.  No disbursements are sought.

    [2]Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005, rr 53C(1)(a); 53G; and 53GA.

  3. Mr Zhang responded by way of an email to the Registry.  He does not dispute Telco’s calculation but says that he ought not to have to pay costs because there was no order to that effect in the judgment.  He invites the Court to ignore Telco’s costs memorandum. 

  4. The fact that no order was made in the judgment of 8 June 2020 does not preclude Telco from applying for costs by way of memorandum, which is quite usual.  Costs are at the discretion of the Court but normally determined in accordance with the principles stated in the Rules.[3]  Relevantly, the general principle is that the party who fails in an appeal or application should pay costs to the party who succeeds. 

    [3]Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules, rr 53 and 53A.

  5. Mr Zhang’s application for leave to appeal posed more than a dozen questions of law.  None had any merit but Telco had to respond to them nevertheless.  There is no good reason to depart from the usual principle.  There is an order for costs in accordance with Telco’s memorandum as to costs dated 10 June 2020.

Solicitors:
Charles McGuiness Barrister and Solicitor Limited, Wellington for Respondent


CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Zhang v Telco Asset Management Limited and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2020] NZCA 380
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Yan Zhang appealed against a decision of the Employment Court and a related costs decision, which were made in favour of Telco Asset Management Limited. The appeal was heard by the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, consisting of Kós P and Courtney J. The appellant, Zhang, appeared in person while the respondent was represented by T P Cleary. The court dismissed Zhang’s application for leave to appeal and granted Telco’s application for costs.

The central legal issues in the appeal were the validity of the appellant’s application for leave to appeal and the entitlement of the respondent to costs for the appeal. Zhang’s application for leave to appeal raised over a dozen questions of law, none of which had any merit. The court had to determine whether Telco was entitled to costs for the appeal, despite the fact that the judgment did not explicitly order Zhang to pay costs.

In dismissing Zhang’s application for leave to appeal, the Court of Appeal found that none of the questions of law raised had merit, and Telco had to respond to them. The court held that there was no good reason to depart from the usual principle that the party who fails in an appeal or application should pay costs to the party who succeeds. As such, the court ruled that Zhang should pay costs in accordance with Telco’s memorandum as to costs dated 10 June 2020. Zhang did not dispute the amount of costs claimed by Telco, and the court ordered costs of $11,233, which included $1,673 for the application to extend time and $6,214 and $3,346 for the respective applications for leave to appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Yan Zhang, the appellant, applied to the Employment Court against Telco Asset Management Limited, the respondent, in a substantive matter. He subsequently sought an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal the Employment Court's decision and a related costs decision. The Court of Appeal granted the extension but dismissed both applications for leave to appeal. The respondent then applied for costs for a standard appeal, calculating the total costs as $11,233. Zhang did not dispute the calculation but argued he should not have to pay costs because there was no order to that effect in the judgment.

Yan Zhang first made an application to the Employment Court. Following the dismissal of his substantive case, he applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal the Employment Court's decision and a related costs decision. An extension of time was granted to make the leave application, but both applications for leave were subsequently dismissed. The respondent then applied for costs for a standard appeal, which were calculated and submitted in accordance with the Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules 2005. Zhang responded to the costs application by email, arguing he should not be required to pay costs as there was no order to that effect in the judgment.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Should the appellant be required to pay costs to the respondent for the standard appeal despite there being no order to that effect in the judgment?
2. Is there a good reason to depart from the usual principle that the party who fails in an appeal or application should pay costs to the party who succeeds?

Held
1. The appellant should be required to pay costs to the respondent for the standard appeal, despite there being no order to that effect in the judgment. The Court ordered costs in accordance with the respondent's memorandum as to costs dated 10 June 2020.
2. There is no good reason to depart from the usual principle that the party who fails in an appeal or application should pay costs to the party who succeeds. The Court found no merit in the appellant's arguments and upheld the usual principle.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's applications for leave to appeal and the appellant was required to pay costs for the standard appeal. The appellant did not dispute the respondent's calculation of costs but argued that no order for costs was made in the judgment. The Court noted that the absence of an order in the judgment does not preclude the respondent from applying for costs by way of a memorandum, which is common practice. The Court of Appeal (Civil) Rules provide that costs are at the discretion of the Court but normally determined in accordance with the principles stated in the Rules, including the general principle that the party who fails in an appeal or application should pay costs to the party who succeeds. The Court found that the appellant's application for leave to appeal posed more than a dozen questions of law, none of which had any merit, and that there was no good reason to depart from the usual principle. Therefore, the Court ordered costs in accordance with the respondent's memorandum as to costs dated 10 June 2020. The ratio decidendi of this case is that where a party fails in an appeal or application, they should pay costs to the party who succeeds, even if no order for costs is made in the judgment.