Yangtze Industrial Cooperation Ltd v Lee
[2024] NZHC 3552
•26 November 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2024-404-2837
[2024] NZHC 3552
IN THE MATTER of the liquidation of Yangtze Industrial Cooperation Limited (in liquidation), Harbour Basin Investment Limited (in liquidation) and Nestling Limited (in
liquidation)
BETWEEN
YANGTZE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)
First Applicant/First Plaintiff
HARBOUR BASIN INVESTMENT LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)
Second Applicant/Second Plaintiff
NESTLING LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)
Third Applicant/Third PlaintiffAND
MARTYN PAUL LEE
Respondent/Defendant
Hearing: On the papers Counsel:
G Neil and M Tan for the Applicants/Plaintiffs
Judgment:
26 November 2024
JUDGMENT OF GORDON J
This judgment was delivered by me
on 26 November 2024 at 3 pm, pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:
Solicitors:
Meredith Connell, Auckland
YANGTZE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION LTD (IN LIQ) v LEE [2024] NZHC 3552 [26 November 2024]
[1] The first, second and third applicants, Yangtze Industrial Cooperation Ltd (in liq) (Yangtze), Harbour Basin Investment Ltd (in liq) (Harbour) and Nestling Ltd (in liq) (Nestling), respectively (together, the applicants) seek freezing and ancillary orders under pt 32 of the High Court Rules 2016 in respect of property of the respondent Martyn Lee, who was a former director and shareholder of the applicants.
[2] The applicants also seek ancillary orders to require the production of financial statements for landholding and other companies of which Mr Lee is the director and shareholder. The applicants say this is to enable the equity position of those companies to be assessed and the value of Mr Lee’s shareholdings to be estimated.
[3] The application is made without notice pursuant to rr 7.23, 7.46 and 32.2(1) of the High Court Rules on the basis that proceeding on notice would cause undue delay or prejudice to the applicants.
[4] The application was filed together with a statement of claim, notice of proceeding, four affidavits, memorandum of counsel and an undertaking as to damages. One of those affidavits is from Jared Booth of Baker Tilly Staples Rodway Auckland Ltd, who is one of the two liquidators of the applicants.
The application
[5] The applicants seek a freezing order to prevent Mr Lee from disposing of, or otherwise dissipating the following property:
(a)Any funds held within any bank accounts in Mr Lee’s name or for his benefit.
(b)Any debts or other moneys that are payable to Mr Lee.
(c)Interests in three properties that are registered solely or jointly in his name. One of the three properties is presently listed for sale.
(d)100 per cent shareholdings in Neo-Concept Ltd (Neo-Concept), Bright-Fortune Trustee Ltd (Bright-Fortune), Grand Stations Ltd
(Grand Stations) and Dunkirk Development Ltd (Dunkirk). Neo-Concept owns properties in Orakei Road, Remuera.
(e)76 per cent shareholding in Metar Investment Ltd (Metar). Metar owns properties in Tennyson Avenue, Takapuna. These properties are advertised for sale.
(f)50 per cent shareholding in Matric Ltd (Matric). Matric owns property in Bracken Avenue, Takapuna. This property is advertised for sale.
[6] Mr Lee is the sole director of Neo-Concept, Bright-Fortune, Grand Stations and Dunkirk. As the sole director and shareholder Mr Lee has total control of those four companies. As Mr Neil, counsel for the applicants, submits, it follows that Mr Lee has the means to transfer their assets and to render his shareholding of no value.
[7] The same largely applies, as Mr Neil also submits, in relation to Metar in that Mr Lee is one of two directors and he is the majority shareholder.
[8] The applicants are, therefore, seeking that leave be reserved to apply to extend the freezing order to the actual assets of those five companies should the applicants consider that necessary to preserve the value of Mr Lee’s shareholdings.
The law
[9]There are three requirements for a freezing order:
(a)the applicant must have a good arguable case;
(b)it must be shown that there are assets to which the order can apply; and
(c)the applicant must show a real risk of dissipation.
[10] The Court may make a freezing order or any ancillary order against a respondent even if the respondent is not a party to a proceeding in which substantive relief is sought against the respondent.1
[11]Mr Neil also refers to r 32.5(5)(a) which provides:
(5)The court may make a freezing order or an ancillary order or both against a person other than a judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor (a third party) if the court is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that—
(a)there is a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied because—
(i)the third party holds or is using, or has exercised or is exercising, a power of disposition over assets (including claims and expectancies) of the judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor; or
(ii)the third party is in possession of, or in a position of control or influence concerning, assets (including claims and expectancies) of the judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor; or
…
[12] The above rule is arguably applicable to the companies in which Mr Lee has a full or majority shareholding. The rule would enable the Court to make ancillary orders requiring disclosure of the financial statements of those companies notwithstanding they are not parties to the proceeding. As well, the rule may enable freezing orders to be made against the assets of those companies, again notwithstanding that the companies are not parties to the proceeding.
[13] As regards ancillary orders, the Court may make an order ancillary to a freezing order or prospective freezing order if the Court considers it just.2 Without limiting the generality of r 32.3(1), the Court may make an ancillary order for the purpose of “eliciting information relating to assets relevant to the freezing order or prospective freezing order”.3 That rule is arguably relevant here having regard to the ancillary orders that are sought seeking disclosure of financial information of the companies
1 High Court Rules 2016, r 32.4.
2 Rule 32.3.
3 Rule 32.3(2)(a).
that are wholly or partly owned by Mr Lee. The purpose of an order under s 32.3(2)(a) is to ascertain the existence, value and whereabouts of the relevant assets and thereby ensuring that any freezing orders made can be properly policed and are effective.4
Good arguable case against respondent
[14] A good arguable case is established if the allegations in the proposed claim are capable of tenable argument and are supported by sufficient evidence, bearing in mind the early stage at which the application is likely to be brought.5
Causes of action
[15] There are four causes of action in the statement of claim. I address the issue of whether there is a good arguable case for each of them.
First cause of action: current account debt due and owing to Yangtze
[16] There is evidence that as at 13 October 2021, Yangtze was indebted to Mr Lee on his shareholder current account with Yangtze (Yangtze current account).
[17] Thereafter, Mr Lee took a substantial sum of drawings from Yangtze that overdrew the Yangtze current account, meaning that Mr Lee became indebted to Yangtze. As at 2 May 2023 the Yangtze current account remained overdrawn by
$997,118.75, meaning that Mr Lee was indebted to Yangtze for that amount. Yangtze says that $997,118.75 is a loan repayable by Mr Lee to Yangtze on demand.
[18]On 23 October 2024 Yangtze made demand on Mr Lee for repayment of
$997,118.75 (being the amount of the alleged current account debt). Mr Lee acknowledged receiving the demand but no payment has been received by Yangtze from Mr Lee.
[19]Yangtze seeks judgment for the sum of $997,118.75 together with interest.
4 Jessica Gorman and others McGechan on Procedure (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at [HR32.3(a)].
5 Dotcom v Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp [2014] NZCA 509, (2014) 22 PRNZ 479 at [18] and [31].
[20] As to the legal principles that apply in relation to this claim, a shareholder current account is an account maintained in a company’s balance sheet to record transactions between the company and an individual shareholder. It will be shown as overdrawn if the shareholder is indebted to the company.6
[21] Advances made on a shareholder current account are a debt owed by the shareholder to the company that are repayable on demand.7
[22] A liquidator is entitled to rely on financial statements and other accounting records prepared by the company before liquidation to establish the company’s assets and liabilities.8 Yangtze’s accounting records are relied on by the applicants in bringing their claims.
[23]I am satisfied there is a good arguable case on the first cause of action.
Second cause of action: current account debt due and owing to Harbour
[24] By reference to Harbour’s Xero accounting file it is apparent that as at 26 October 2021 Harbour was indebted to Mr Lee for $1,713,333.10 (as a consequence of funds Mr Lee had introduced to Harbour between 24 June 2021 and 26 October 2021).
[25] During the period 18 November 2021 to 11 October 2022 Mr Lee took drawings from Harbour totalling $1,713,000.
[26] On the face of it then, following the consolidation of the two account ledgers (funds introduced account ledger and drawings account ledger), Harbour was indebted to Mr Lee for $333.10.
[27] However, the impact of insolvency set-off under s 310 of the Companies Act 1993 requires consideration. The applicants say that Mr Lee was prevented from
6 Monnery v Convendium Ltd (in liq) [2020] NZCA 345, [2020] NZCCLR 23 at [22] and [24].
7 Kelstworural Ltd (in liq) v Mounsey-Ross [2019] NZHC 752 at [10]. See also Mizeen Painters Ltd (in liq) v Tapusoa [2015] NZHC 826, [2016] NZAR 423 at [25] cited with approval in Monnery v Convendium Ltd (in liq), above n 6, at [34].
8 Kelstworural Ltd (in liq) v Mounsey-Ross, above n 7, at [10].
setting off one account ledger against the other as from January 2022. This is because it is submitted that Harbour was unable to pay its debts as they fell due from that date and Mr Lee had knowledge of Harbour’s financial position. There is evidence that supports both of those propositions.
[28] Accepting, for the purposes of this application, that Mr Lee is not able to claim the benefit of a set-off of transactions that were made after 15 January 2022, then the position is that Mr Lee is indebted to Harbour for unpaid drawings of $952,000.
[29] On 23 October 2024, a letter of demand was emailed to Mr Lee for repayment of $952,000. Payment has not been made to Harbour.
[30] Harbour seeks judgment for the sum of $952,000 together with interest. The same principles as referred to in [20]–[22] above apply to this claim.
[31]I am satisfied there is a good arguable case on the second cause of action.
Third cause of action: breach of fiduciary duties owed to Harbour
[32]This cause of action is a partial alternative to the second cause of action.
[33] As a director of Harbour, Mr Lee owed Harbour fiduciary duties including: not to profit personally from his position as director; not to allow a conflict to arise between his duties as director and his own self-interest; and to exercise his powers in good faith for the best interests of the company.
[34] There is a good arguable case that Mr Lee breached the above obligations by acting in his own self-interest: he caused Harbour to pay him $952,000 as referred to in relation to the second cause of action and he advanced $420,000 to Nestling as an inter-company loan (together, the Remittances). Payment of the Remittances rendered Harbour unable to pay two GST debts that were due on two separate dates.
[35] The Remittances enabled Mr Lee to obtain repayment of $952,000 of the sum that Harbour owed him and $207,500 of the sum Nestling owed him, both from his funds introduced account ledger.
[36] The Remittances provided Mr Lee and Nestling with priority over the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Inland Revenue) for a preferential core GST debt plus penalties and interest. Further, Harbour advanced the loan to Nestling on an unsecured basis and at a time when Nestling had realised its primary asset, ceased trading and had no realistic means of repaying the loan.
[37]Harbour seeks judgment for an account of the Remittances which total
$1,159,500 plus interest. The inter-company loan from Harbour to Nestling enabled Mr Lee to obtain repayment of $207,500 to the detriment of Inland Revenue. There is a good arguable case that Mr Lee’s actions in causing or allowing payment to him constitutes a breach of the fiduciary duties Mr Lee owed to Harbour (and also to Nestling).
[38] In relation to the payment of $952,000, there is a good arguable case that sum ought properly to have been made by Harbour to Inland Revenue and that in causing or allowing Harbour to make that payment to Mr Lee, Mr Lee acted with self-interest and in breach of the fiduciary duties that he owed to Harbour.
[39] I am satisfied that Harbour has a good arguable case on the third cause of action.
Fourth cause of action: breach of fiduciary duties owed to Nestling
[40] The fiduciary duties referred to in [33] above apply in relation to this cause of action.
[41] There is evidence that supports a good arguable case that Mr Lee breached these fiduciary obligations by acting in his own self-interest as follows:
(a)Nestling purchased the property at 12 Claude Road Epsom (Epsom Property) for $5,100,000 (inclusive of GST) in or around June 2021.
(b)Nestling sold the Epsom Property for $3,680,000 (zero-rated for GST) under an agreement for sale and purchase dated 12 December 2022.
[42] The sale of the Epsom Property settled on 21 December 2022. Nestling made a substantial loss of around $1,300,000 as a result of its sale of the Epsom Property.
[43]On 21 March 2023 Nestling received an inter-company loan from Harbour of
$420,000 (Harbour loan) as referred to in [34] above. Nestling then primarily distributed the Harbour loan by way of $207,500 to Mr Lee and $207,500 to Ms Fang (the sole shareholder of Harbour at the time) by way of drawings on 22 March 2023.
[44] The distribution of the Harbour loan rendered Nestling insolvent and unable to repay the Harbour loan. Nestling remained indebted to Harbour for the Harbour loan as at its liquidation on 2 May 2023.
[45] At the time of advancing the Harbour loan, Harbour had been balance sheet and/or cashflow insolvent and indebted to Inland Revenue for around $686,000 of preferential GST debt, plus penalties and interest.
[46] Mr Lee, as a director of Nestling, had knowledge that the distribution of the Harbour loan rendered Nestling insolvent.
[47] Nestling seeks an account of the drawings in the sum of $207,500 plus interest. There is a good arguable case that Mr Lee breached the fiduciary duties he owed to Nestling for the following reasons: in causing Nestling to pay him $207,500 on 22 March 2023 he rendered Nestling insolvent and unable to pay the Harbour loan; and the drawings enabled Mr Lee to obtain priority in repayment over Inland Revenue. In causing Nestling to pay the drawings, Mr Lee acted in his own self-interest and personally benefited to the detriment of Harbour and the Commissioner of Inland Revenue.
[48] Accordingly, I am satisfied there is a good arguable case on the fourth cause of action.
Assets to which the order can apply
[49] Mr Lee’s publicly identifiable assets to which the orders can apply are as follows:
(a)The property located at 14A Queensway, Three Kings, Auckland (Three Kings Property) jointly owned by Mr Lee and Chunhong Han.
(b)The property located at 55 Stanley Point Road, Stanley Point, Auckland (Stanley Point Property) solely owned by Mr Lee.
(c)The property located at 120 Cossey Road, Drury, Auckland (Drury Property) jointly owned by Mr Lee and Fulu Zheng.
(d)100 per cent shareholding in:
(i)Neo-Concept, which in turn has the properties located at Flats 1 and 2, 105 Orakei Road, Remuera (Remuera Properties) registered under its name;
(ii)Bright-Fortune;
(iii)Grand Stations; and
(iv)Dunkirk.
(e)76 per cent shareholding in Metar, which in turn has the properties located at Flats 1 to 3, 3A Tennyson Avenue, Takapuna, and 3 Tennyson Avenue, Takapuna (Tennyson Ave Properties) registered under its name.
(f)50 per cent shareholding in Matric, which in turn has a property located at 1/29 Bracken Avenue, Takapuna (Bracken Ave Property) registered under its name.
[50] The Drury Property, Tennyson Ave Properties and Bracken Ave Property are all presently advertised for sale.
[51] This requirement, namely that there are assets of Mr Lee to which the order can apply, is satisfied.
Real risk of dissipation
[52] The applicant for a freezing order must point to circumstances from which “a prudent, sensible commercial [person] can properly infer a danger of default”, a test which is “not unduly exacting”.9
[53]Mr Neil submits that this test is satisfied on the basis of the following:
(a)Mr Lee’s pre-liquidation conduct in order to obtain priority of repayment over Inland Revenue as referred to above.
(b)The liquidators have been unable to ascertain whether Mr Lee remains in New Zealand:
(i)Mr Lee was not located at his known addresses (namely the Three Kings Property, Stanley Point Property and Drury Property) despite repeated attempts to locate him.
(ii)The Stanley Point Property appears to have been vacant for at least approximately three years.
(iii)The Drury Property is presently listed for sale, and it appears that no one has lived there for some time. The residence looks to be derelict.
(iv)Although the Three Kings Property appears to be occupied, the liquidators are unable to ascertain whether Mr Lee resides at
9 Raukura Moana Fisheries Ltd v The Ship “Irina Zharkikh” [2001] 2 NZLR 801 (HC) at [122] citing Third Chandris Shipping Corporation v Unimarine SA [1979] QB 645 (CA) at 671.
that property. It is gated, and mail is uncollected and built up in the mailbox.
(v)Mr Lee did not (when asked) provide his current physical address and merely said that he “travels overseas most of the time”.
(vi)The liquidators have not been able to identify:
(A)any publicly searchable and reliable online trading presence in relation to Neo-Concept, Bright-Fortune,
Grand Stations and Dunkirk within New Zealand; or
(B)any general or specific security agreements registered against any assets of Neo-Concept, Bright-Fortune, Grand Stations and Dunkirk on the Personal Property Securities Register (PPSR).
(c)It was only after repeated attempts to contact Mr Lee at his known addresses, through his known contacts (namely Ms Fang, an accountant, a real estate agent, and a conveyancing lawyer) and through direct email to him that the liquidators finally got hold of Mr Lee by phone on 30 October 2024. Even when the liquidators contacted him, Mr Lee did not meaningfully engage with them.
(d)Mr Lee said that Ms Fang would be responding to the liquidators on his behalf but no response has been forthcoming from her.
(e)There is an inference that Mr Lee is avoiding engaging with the liquidators or the applicants. Further, there is an available inference that Mr Lee has not provided any physical address to avoid personal contact (and potentially service). He was asked to advise whether he would accept service by email. He acknowledged receiving the
correspondence to the liquidators verbally, but he has not agreed to accept service in that manner or any other manner.
(f)Mr Lee owns real properties that are readily susceptible to a sale, any proceeds of which are readily removeable from New Zealand (especially if Mr Lee is actually now outside of New Zealand). In particular:
Drury Property
(i)Mr Lee is a joint owner of the Drury Property. The property is advertised for sale and is mortgage-free. It does not appear to have been occupied for some time. Once sold, Mr Lee’s share of the sale proceeds would readily be susceptible to disposal or dissipation. They could be readily remitted to an overseas bank account.
Three Kings Property
(ii)Mr Lee is a joint owner of the Three Kings Property. While not advertised for sale, the property is mortgage-free and therefore readily susceptible to a sale and/or other disposition.
Stanley Point Property
(iii)Mr Lee is the sole owner of the Stanley Point Property. While it is not advertised for sale and is subject to a mortgage, it appears to have been vacant for at least three years and remains susceptible to a sale and/or other disposition.
(g)Mr Lee also owns shares in Neo-Concept, Metar and Matric. Mr Neil suggests the shareholdings may have considerable value. The disposition of the companies’ assets for nothing (or less than full value)
would erode the value of Mr Lee’s shareholdings (possibly rendering
the shareholdings valueless). In particular:
Remuera Properties
(i)Mr Lee is the sole director and shareholder of Neo-Concept, and Neo-Concept owns the Remuera Properties.
(ii)The Remuera Properties are not subject to any mortgages and, with Mr Lee being the sole director and shareholder of Neo-Concept, the properties are readily susceptible to a sale or other disposition.
Tennyson Ave Properties
(iii)Mr Lee is a director of Metar and owns 76 per cent of the shareholdings.
(iv)Metar in turn owns the Tennyson Ave Properties. The Tennyson Ave Properties are being advertised for sale.
(v)Once sold, the sale proceeds would be readily susceptible to dissipation, which could in turn erode the value of Mr Lee’s shareholdings in Metar.
Bracken Ave Property
(vi)Mr Lee is a director of Matric and owns 50 per cent of the shareholdings.
(vii)Matric in turn owns the Bracken Ave Property. The Bracken Ave Property is being advertised for sale.
(viii)Once sold, the sale proceeds would be readily susceptible to dissipation, which could in turn erode the value of Mr Lee’s shareholdings in Matric.
[54] I accept Mr Neil’s submissions, as set out above, that there is a real risk of dissipation if the freezing order is not made. The evidence summarised in Mr Neil’s submissions above also supports the orders being made on a without notice basis.
Balance of convenience and overall justice
[55] I accept that the balance of convenience and overall justice of the case support freezing orders being granted.
[56] There has been significant effort made to contact Mr Lee. When the liquidators finally contacted him, he did not meaningfully engage with them. The liquidators are still unable to ascertain whether Mr Lee remains in New Zealand. If Mr Lee’s evasion continues, the real properties he owns and/or that are under his control by his companies may be disposed of. That would leave no known assets of any value against which to enforce a prospective judgment in the order of just over $2.1 million plus interest and costs.
[57] Any potential hardship that Mr Lee may incur is mitigated by r 32.6(3) which provides that a freezing order must not prohibit a respondent from dealing with the assets covered by the order for the purposes of:
(a)paying ordinary living expenses; or
(b)paying legal expenses related to the freezing order; or
(c)disposing of assets, or making payments, in the ordinary course of the respondent’s business, including business expenses incurred in good faith.
Undertaking as to damages
[58] Under r 32.6(4), where there are “special circumstances”, the Court may excuse the requirement under r 32.2(5) for an applicant for a freezing order to file a signed undertaking as to damages.
[59] In Auckland Steel Fixes Ltd (in liq) v Watson the Court referred to an undertaking given by an impecunious company in liquidation as follows:10
[20] Rule 32.6(4) requires an applicant for a freezing order to give an undertaking as to damages unless there are special circumstances. While we accept the company’s undertaking lacks substance, we accept that special circumstances apply in this case given that the applicant’s financial position and impecuniosity has been caused, at least on the information currently before the Court, by the actions of Mr Watson against whom proceedings have been issued ...
[60] In the present case there is evidence that the applicants have been rendered insolvent through the actions of Mr Lee and that Harbour and Nestling have been stripped of their assets (so as to be unable to provide a meaningful undertaking) through the actions and governance of Mr Lee in various respects for the benefit of himself.
[61] Further, at least two of the three real properties (the Drury Property and Stanley Point Property) that are sought to be frozen, appear to be vacant and/or investment properties such that the likelihood of a damages claim is reduced.
[62] In the circumstances of this case the Court accepts the undertaking that has been provided by the applicants.
[63] Any prejudice to Mr Lee may be minimised by reserving leave, as I propose to do, for him to apply for a variation of the freezing order if there is a need to sell any of the properties and invest the proceeds.
10 Auckland Steel Fixes Ltd (in liq) v Watson [2015] NZCA 274, [2018] NZAR 864 at [20]. See also DE & KM Gale Ltd (in liq) v Gale [2022] NZHC 828; Willburn Furniture Restorations Ltd (in liq) v Gledhill [2016] NZHC 99; and Queensland Maintenance Services (NZ) Ltd (in liq) v Zullo Property Group (NZ) Ltd [2016] NZHC 1755.
Duration and discharge/variation of the freezing order
[64] A freezing order made without notice to a respondent must state that it is limited to a particular date, which should be as early as practicable after the freezing order is made.11
[65] Mr Neil suggests and the Court accepts that the freezing order should be continued until 5 pm on the day following the first call of the application. At the first call Mr Lee, following service of the orders, may be given an opportunity to be heard regarding their continuation.12 Mr Neil suggests, and I agree, that a date for first call be allocated in the Duty Judge list in approximately 10 working days from the date of the making of the orders. I direct that the date of the first call is Wednesday 11 December 2024 at 10 am. The freezing order will have no effect after 5 pm on Thursday 12 December 2024 unless it is renewed on 11 December 2024.
[66] A freezing order must reserve leave to the respondent to apply to the Court to discharge or vary the freezing order on whatever period of notice to the applicant the Court considers just.13
[67]I direct a notice period of two working days.
Form of freezing order
[68] I approve the form of the draft freezing order attached to the without notice application. The dates referred to in [65] above will need to be added to the draft order.
Ancillary order sought
[69] The applicants’ position is that they have no visibility over the assets held by Mr Lee’s wholly or partly owned companies nor the equity position of the companies.
11 High Court Rules, r 32.7(1).
12 Rule 32.7(2).
13 Rule 32.8(1).
[70] After considering the principles relating to the granting of ancillary orders set out in [10]–[13] above, I accept this is a case where an ancillary order is appropriate.
[71] I will make an ancillary order requiring Mr Lee to disclose the financial statements for his wholly or partly owned companies for the financial years ending 31 March 2023 and 31 March 2024 and to provide a balance sheet that is current as at the date the disclosure is made for each of those companies.
Summary of result and orders
[72] I make freezing and ancillary orders in terms of the draft order filed with the application..
[73] The application is to be called in the Duty Judge list on Wednesday 11 December 2024 at 10 am.
[74] The freezing and ancillary orders will expire at 5 pm on Thursday 12 December 2024 unless renewed on 11 December 2024.
[75] I make an order deeming the undertaking given by the applicants sufficient for the purposes of r 32.2(5) of the High Court Rules 2016.
[76]I make an order dispensing with service of this application on the respondent.
[77] Leave is reserved to the applicants to apply to extend the freezing order to the assets of Neo-Concept Ltd, Bright-Fortune Trustee Ltd, Grand Stations Ltd, Dunkirk Development Ltd and Metar Investment Ltd should the applicants consider that necessary to preserve the value of Mr Lee’s shareholdings.
[78] I reserve leave to Mr Lee to apply for a variation of the freezing order if there is a need to sell any of the properties and invest the proceeds of sale.
Gordon J
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