Island Grace (Fiji) Limited (in receivership and in liquidation) v Griffths
[2025] NZHC 2247
•8 August 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND HAMILTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA KIRIKIRIROA ROHE
CIV-2024-419-319 [2025] NZHC 2247
BETWEEN ISLAND GRACE (FIJI) LIMITED (IN
RECEIVERSHIP AND IN LIQUIDATION)
Applicant
AND ANDREW HUGH GRIFFITHS
First Respondent
BLUE VIEWS LLC
Second RespondentCOLIN GRIFFITHS AND MARGARET GRIFFITHS
Third Respondents
Hearing: 24 and 25 June 2025 Appearances: S Barker for Applicant
D J Friar and C McCardle for First Respondent (granted leave to withdraw following hearing)
No appearance for Second Respondent T A Castle for Third Respondents
Judgment: 8 August 2025
JUDGMENT OF McHERRON J
[1]This is an application for orders ancillary to a freezing order.1
1 An amendment to the freezing order was also sought in the application. The amendment concerned the amount of ordinary living expenses the first respondent, Mr Griffiths, could take from the assets covered by the order. However, this aspect of the application was not pursued pending consideration of the documents in respect of which disclosure is sought under the ancillary orders.
ISLAND GRACE (FIJI) LIMITED (IN RECEIVERSHIP AND IN LIQUIDATION) v GRIFFITHS [2025] NZHC 2247 [8 August 2025]
[2] The further ancillary orders are sought against the first respondent, Andrew Griffiths, and against the third respondents, Colin and Margaret Griffiths, who are his parents.
[3] The applicant, Island Grace (Fiji) Ltd (in receivership and in liquidation) (Island Grace), seeks disclosure of information connected with the transfer of 99 per cent of Mr Griffiths’ membership interest in the second respondent, Blue Views LLC (Blue Views), to the third respondents as trustees of the Beryl Griffiths Family Trust.
[4] Accordingly, this judgment only relates to the application for ancillary orders. The categories of information sought are set out in the Schedule.
Background
[5] The background to this matter is summarised in the reasons judgment of van Bohemen J dated 25 November 2024 (Reasons Judgment).2 A dispute arose in the development of a luxury resort in Fiji by two unincorporated joint ventures, the Island Grace joint venture and the Vunabaka Bay joint venture. The first respondent was the sole director and shareholder of Satori Holdings Ltd (Satori), which was involved in these joint ventures. Satori was placed into liquidation due to insolvency, with substantial debts owed to Island Grace and Sequitur Capital Pty Ltd.
[6] The first respondent allegedly caused Satori to distribute FJD 3.6 million from the sale of a property (lot 47) to himself and associated entities, including Blue Views. It is alleged these distributions breach directors’ duties under the Companies Act 1993, ss 131, 135(b) and 137. Island Grace seeks recovery under s 301 of the Companies Act.
[7] In his reasons judgment, van Bohemen J confirmed the Court has jurisdiction to make freezing orders over assets located outside New Zealand, including Fiji. The Court found the receivers of Island Grace have a good arguable case under s 301, particularly regarding breaches of directors’ duties. The Court held there is a real risk that assets may be dissipated, frustrating any prospective judgment. Therefore,
2 Island Grace (Fiji) Ltd v Griffiths [2024] NZHC 3529 [Reasons Judgment].
van Bohemen J held a freezing order is justified to preserve assets pending resolution of the substantive claim. Despite being a separate entity, the Court found sufficient grounds to extend the freezing order to Blue Views’ assets, due to the first respondent’s control and use of that company as a personal vehicle.
[8] The freezing order applies to specified assets including a residence, bank accounts and other property in Fiji. The Court also made an ancillary order that the first respondent file an affidavit by 4 December 2024, detailing his assets owned legally or beneficially and their locations.
Reasons for the application for further ancillary orders
[9]Since the Reasons Judgment, Island Grace has learned that:
(a)The third respondents have advanced funds to the first respondent by way of a series of loans since at least 2015, which are captured in a membership interest pledge agreement.
(b)On 13 September 2019, the first respondent and the third respondents executed the pledge agreement and an accompanying promissory note.
(c)On 26 September 2024, the third respondents issued formal demand on the first respondent under the pledge agreement and promissory note, which triggered their automatic enforcement rights under those instruments.
[10] The effect of these steps is that, after the interim freezing orders were made, 99 per cent of the first respondent’s membership in Blue Views transferred to the third respondents with, Island Grace says, no additional consideration.
[11]Island Grace considers that this is:
(a)part of a stratagem to defeat prospective judgment creditors; and
(b)a contempt in respect of the freezing order.
[12]Island Grace says:
(a)As well as being a related party transaction for no consideration, the first respondent granted the security to the third respondents three days after learning he would be a defendant to claims of FJD 29.2 million.
(b)Absent any explanation why the third respondents started enforcing the security on 26 September 2024, it seeks ancillary orders in order to verify whether there has been a contempt and whether further protective steps are required.
(c)The further ancillary orders are necessary to ensure the freezing order is properly policed and effective. For that reason, Island Grace says, the ancillary orders are in the interests of justice.
Jurisdiction to make ancillary orders
[13] The Court has a broad and flexible jurisdiction to make ancillary orders under r 32.3 of the High Court Rules 2016. The purpose of ancillary orders is generally to ensure that a freezing order can be properly policed and is effective.3
[14] Without limiting the generality of r 32.3(1), an ancillary order may be made for the purpose of eliciting information about assets relevant to the freezing order.4
[15] A common type of ancillary order is a disclosure order, where a defendant’s affairs are complex and opaque. In these circumstances, an ancillary order may assist in ascertaining information about the defendant’s assets, including their existence, value and whereabouts.5
3 Monasterio v Bujak HC Christchurch CIV-2008-409-1901, 21 August 2009 at [26]; Yangtze Industrial Corporation Ltd (in liq) v Lee [2024] NZHC 3552 at [13].
4 High Court Rules 2016, r 32.3(2)(a).
5 Tim Stephens and Sarah Armstrong Injunctions and other Emergency Relief (NZLS CLE Ltd, Wellington, 2018) at 54.
[16] The Court may make an ancillary order against a person even if substantive relief is not sought against that person.6 Therefore, it is not necessary for the third respondents to be a party to the underlying claim by Island Grace against the first respondent under s 301 of the Companies Act.
[17] An applicant can obtain ancillary orders if they have a good arguable case on an accrued cause of action that is justiciable.7 The applicant submits that requirement has been met according to van Bohemen J’s conclusion in the Reasons Judgment that the Island Grace receivers have a good arguable case in the s 301 proceeding.8
[18] The specific rule Island Grace relies on for the ancillary orders sought against the third respondents is r 32.5(5), which provides:
32.5 Order against judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor or third party
…
(5)The court may make a freezing order or an ancillary order or both against a person other than a judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor (a third party) if the court is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that—
(a) there is a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied because—
(i)the third party holds or is using, or has exercised or is exercising, a power of disposition over assets (including claims and expectancies) of the judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor; or
(ii)the third party is in possession of, or in a position of control or influence concerning, assets (including claims and expectancies) of the judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor; or
(b) a process in the court is or may ultimately be available to the applicant, as a result of a judgment or prospective judgment, under which the third party may be obliged to disgorge assets or contribute toward satisfying the judgment or prospective judgment.
6 High Court Rules, r 32.4.
7 Rule 32.5(1)(b).
8 Reasons Judgment, above n 2, at [66].
[19]Specifically, Island Grace relies on rr 32.5(5)(a)(i) and 32.5(5)(b).
[20] In respect of r 32.5(5)(a)(i), Island Grace submits that after the disposition of the first respondent’s 99 per cent membership interest in Blue Views, there is a danger that a prospective judgment in the s 301 claim will be unsatisfied. This is because the third respondents have exercised a power of disposition over the first respondent’s assets by enforcing their security over his membership interest.
[21] As an alternative argument, Island Grace submits that r 32.5(5)(b) is also satisfied. Under s 347(1)(a) of the Property Law Act 2007, a creditor who claims to be prejudiced by the disposition of property to which subpt 6 of pt 6 of the Property Law Act 2007 applies (whether the disposition was made before or after the debtor became indebted to the creditor) may apply for an order under s 348.
[22]An applicant for orders under s 348 of the Property Law Act must establish:
(a)there was a disposition of property of a type described in s 345(2);
(b)that the disposition was undertaken by a debtor who:9
(i)was insolvent at the time; or
(ii)intended to incur, or believed, or reasonably should have believed, that the debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor’s ability to pay; and
(c)either:10
(i)the disposition was made with the intent to prejudice a creditor; or
(ii)the debtor did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange.
9 Property Law Act 2007, s 346(2)(a) and (c).
10 Section 346(1)(b).
[23]Under this scenario, Island Grace may:
(a)challenge, as dispositions prejudicial to creditors other than the third respondents:
(i)the granting by first respondent to them of security over 100 per cent of his membership interest in Blue Views; and
(ii)the transfer of 99 per cent of that interest to them pursuant to the enforcement process; and
(b)seek compensation under the Property Law Act from the third respondents.
[24] However, Mr Barker emphasised that while the applicant may commence a Property Law Act claim against the third respondents in due course, the purpose of the present application for ancillary orders is solely to monitor and police effective compliance with the freezing order.
Respondents’ submissions
First respondent
[25] After his previous counsel was given leave to withdraw, the first respondent was, as of early June 2025, represented by new counsel, Mr Friar. He indicated, for the purposes of the ancillary orders application, that he was not in a position to make submissions in relation to the applicant’s substantive allegations against the first respondent.
[26] Responsibly, Mr Friar accepted that it would have been preferable if the first respondent had disclosed the transfer to the third respondents of an ownership interest in Blue Views at the time of the original hearing of the application for freezing orders. However, Mr Friar submitted there are no grounds for the Court to make the further ancillary disclosure orders sought by Island Grace. He submitted it is improper to seek
discovery in respect of a potential claim against the first respondent for prejudicial disposition of assets, by way of an ancillary order to a freezing order.
[27] Mr Friar also raised concerns about fairness in relation to affidavit evidence which was filed late. He submitted that the first respondent did not have a proper opportunity to consider that evidence and reply if necessary.
[28] Further, Mr Friar submitted that the ancillary orders sought appear to go beyond what is needed for the purpose of the freezing orders against the first respondent. He submitted that the purpose of an ancillary order for disclosure is to ascertain the identity of the respondent’s assets so they can be restrained.11
[29] Mr Friar submitted that this purpose has already been achieved. He highlights that the existence and whereabouts of the ownership interest in Blue Views has been disclosed.
[30] Moreover in relation to the claim that the orders are necessary to police the freezing order, again Mr Friar submitted such policing is intended to occur within the context of a requirement to identify the assets on oath.12
[31] Mr Friar also expressed concern that the substantive proceeding to which the freezing order relates could now be delayed by the further investigation sought by Island Grace. Further, he submitted the contempt process should not be used to pursue what would be a separate dispute about the transfer.
[32] Mr Friar submitted that it is not the purpose of an ancillary order to seek discovery in respect of a claim, beyond the identification of assets for the purpose of the freezing order.
Clarification sought as to use of assets for living and legal expenses
[33]Mr Friar sought clarification as to whether:
11 Americhip Inc v Dean [2015] NZHC 1534 at [102]; Jessica Gorman and others McGechan on Procedure (online ed, LexisNexis) at HR32.3.01(1).
12 Hortus v Ashlesha Holdings Ltd [2023] NZHC 2851 at [13].
(a)The freezing order permits the respondents to use assets to pay legal expenses related to the defence of the present (substantive) proceeding or other related proceedings. Mr Friar referred to r 32.6(3)(a) and (c) and TGB Holdings Ltd v BFP Trustees No 1 Ltd (TGB) to support this proposition.13 These provisions state that the freezing order must not prohibit a respondent from dealing with the assets covered by the order for the purposes of paying ordinary living expenses or paying legal expenses related to the freezing order.
(b)The first respondent and his wife are entitled under the terms of the freezing order to receive money from Blue Views to pay for his living expenses.
Third respondents
[34] Counsel for the third respondents, Mr Castle, submits they also oppose the application for further ancillary orders. They submit that the purported joinder of the third respondents for the purposes of the ancillary orders application:
(a)offends against the requirements in r 32.5(5) for valid joinder;
(b)is designed to facilitate an ulterior purpose;
(c)is not validly achieved by amending without notice the intitulement to add the third respondents.
[35] The third respondents submit that, before such a joinder would be warranted, the Court must be satisfied there is a danger that any prospective judgment will be wholly or partially unsatisfied. That could be because a third party is exercising a power of disposition over assets of the prospective judgment debtor, here the first respondent.
13 TGB Holdings Ltd v BFP Trustees No 1 Ltd HC Whangārei CIV-2009-488-566, 8 April 2011.
[36] However, the third respondents note that the freezing order does not prevent the normal exercise of a secured creditor’s own independent enforcement rights.14 Nor does the freezing order function as security for any eventual judgment.
[37] Because the claim against the first respondent does not challenge the validity of the security held by the third respondents, they submit that their right to call up their security is not amenable to the reach of the freezing order extension or ancillary order jurisdiction.
[38] They submit that r 32.5(5)(a)(i) does not apply here because the third respondents’ asset cannot be utilised by Island Grace as part of satisfying any prospective judgment against the first respondent. The third respondents submit that they had no ability to transfer ownership or otherwise assert any control over the asset unless they had grounds to enforce their security and completed the enforcement process. Once this occurred, the asset was validly owned by the trust, not by the first respondent. This means, they say, the third respondents did not exercise a power of disposition as contemplated by r 32.5(5)(a)(i).
[39] The third respondents also submit that Island Grace’s reliance on r 32.5(5)(b) is misconceived, effectively for the same reason. The third respondents’ asset cannot be used by the creditor as part of satisfying any prospective judgment against the first respondent.
[40] Further, they submit that the process relied on is too speculative and does not meet the good arguable case requirement inherent in r 32.5(5)(b). They submit that Island Grace’s proposed claim under s 348 of the Property Law Act is one of “recent invention” and has not been properly pleaded or disclosed in its application. They note that reliance on the Property Law Act claim is designed to “shoehorn” this otherwise inappropriate application into an assertion requiring a substantive response, but which is contrived and should be dismissed.
14 Taylor v Van Dutch Marine Holding Limited (2017) EWHC 636, [2017] 4 All ER 627 (Ch).
My assessment
[41] I consider in all the circumstances that the ancillary orders are justified for the following reasons. These are largely those articulated by Island Grace in its submissions.
The first respondent’s prior misconduct
[42] I accept Island Grace’s submissions that it has already met the threshold for making freezing orders by reason of the matters summarised in van Bohemen J’s reasons judgment.15 These include:
(a)transferring assets to a related party for nil consideration when faced with the prospect of liability to put assets beyond the reach of creditors;
(b)a previous attempt to transfer assets at nil value to a related party to put those assets beyond the reach of creditors.16
Related party transaction for no additional consideration
[43] I accept Island Grace’s submission that the security in question appears to have been given in respect of loans already advanced and for no additional consideration to related parties, namely his parents as trustees of the trust of which the first respondent appears to be a beneficiary. Island Grace points to a history of:
(a)lending by the trust;
(b)payment by the trust of legal fees to fund the liquidation of Satori; and
(c)the third respondents’ willingness to allow trust funds to be used to meet the first respondent’s living expenses and other debts.
[44] Here, it appears the first respondent granted the third respondents a security interest over his membership asset in Blue Views (his most valuable asset). In doing
15 Reasons Judgment, above n 2, at [67]–[68].
16 At [68(b)].
so, he put the third respondents in a position to enforce this security at any future time which had the effect of protecting the Trust’s beneficiaries (including himself), but to the detriment of his other creditors.
No legitimate rationale for granting security in September 2019
[45] Island Grace invites the Court to infer that the security was granted by the first respondent in September 2019 to allow him to move assets beyond the reach of creditors in future. As Island Grace points out, this was only three days after he became aware he would be personally a defendant in the proceeding that Sequitur intended to commence against Satori and him seeking approximately FJD 29.2 million in damages. I accept that the information sought in the ancillary orders will allow that inference to be evaluated.
Failure to disclose enforcement process when opposing freezing orders
[46] Island Grace points out that between June 2022 and February 2025, including on the freezing order application, the first respondent failed to refer to the enforcement process for the security. Moreover, the first respondent took no steps to correct statements filed prior to the hearing that Blue Views was wholly owned and controlled by him.
[47] I agree with Island Grace that this non-disclosure invites an inference that the first respondent did not disclose the enforcement process because it would be likely to be challenged as a bad faith stratagem to defeat his creditors.
Subsequent failure to disclose
[48] I note also that despite the transfer being complete by 18 November 2024, and the first respondent knowing about it, he still did not disclose the enforcement process and has not given a satisfactory explanation for his non-disclosure.
Potential collusive enforcement of the security
[49] I accept Island Grace’s submission that the evidence suggests the pledge has been enforced by way of agreed arrangements with the third respondents rather than
through normal enforcement processes. Again, provision of the disclosure sought under the ancillary orders will allow that proposition to be tested.
[50] The third respondents correctly submit that a freezing order does not prevent the normal exercise of the secured creditors’ independent enforcement rights. But the ancillary orders sought will not have any effect on secured creditors’ rights over the property secured. The ancillary orders are an exploratory tool for monitoring compliance with the freezing order itself and for evaluating and policing whether there has been any contemptuous conduct.
[51] Island Grace has a well-founded concern that the third respondents’ security enforcement had unusual features. For example, the fact that 99 per cent of the first respondent’s interest in Blue Views was transferred to the third respondents, rather than 100 per cent, seems to be inconsistent with it being an arms-length commercial transaction. That is because it permits him to remain manager with complete discretion to use its assets as he pleases, and resist any attempt to remove him as manager.
[52] I agree that these circumstances point to a risk of a collusive attempt to frustrate further judgment orders in breach of the freezing order. At the least, Island Grace has established the need for further investigation in this regard.
[53] Therefore, I accept that the further ancillary orders are necessary. They will ensure the freezing order is properly policed and effective and that the ancillary orders would not cause any undue prejudice to the respondents. The ancillary orders will assist Island Grace and the Court to ascertain whether any contempt has occurred in relation to the freezing order.
Categories of information sought
[54] Mr Friar submitted that if the Court makes ancillary orders, some of the categories of disclosure sought are too broad, and should be narrowed. He specifically referred to categories 1(g)–(k) in the attached Schedule.
[55] In response, Mr Barker submitted that disclosure of these categories of information is needed in the unusual circumstances of the present case. Namely, where there has been only partial (99 per cent) foreclosure but the first respondent remains in possession and is able to use Blue Views’ assets for expenses.
[56] I agree that the context justifies the broad, yet proportionate, further disclosure that is sought. Island Grace has identified several red flags, including the timing of the third respondents’ enforcement of the security and the first respondent’s failure to disclose the enforcement of the security. I am therefore satisfied that disclosure of information pertaining to all of the categories identified is appropriate.
Use of assets for living and legal expenses
[57] There was no opposition to the third respondents taking living expenses from Blue Views. That is not prohibited under the freezing order.
[58] In terms of taking legal expenses, r 32.6(3)(c) is clear that business expenses in good faith are included. The terms of this provision are expressly stated in the freezing order annexed to the Reasons Judgment at [6(c)]. In TGB this provision has been interpreted as including legal expenses incurred in good faith in the ordinary course of the respondent’s business. No contrary interpretation of these provisions was advanced by Island Grace.17 I respectfully consider that TGB correctly states the law. It follows that no amendment of the freezing order is necessary.
Result
[59]Island Grace’s application for further ancillary orders is granted.
[60] The first and third respondents must serve on Island Grace’s solicitor an affidavit verifying and disclosing the information set out in the Schedule, no later than 22 August 2025.
17 TGB Holdings v BFP Trustees No 1 Limited, above n 13.
Costs
[61] Island Grace is entitled to costs. The parties are directed to attempt to agree costs in accordance with category 2B. If agreement is not reached then the parties may file memoranda of no more than three pages.
McHerron J
Solicitors:
Buddle Findlay, Wellington for Applicant
Tompkins Wake, Hamilton for First and Second Respondents Burley Castle Hawkins, Tauranga for Third Respondents
SCHEDULE
1. Within ten working days, Mr Andrew Griffiths must serve on the applicant’s solicitor a further affidavit verifying and disclosing (in native format):
(a)In the case of each person who holds a membership / shareholding interest in Blue Views:
(i)the identify of the that person;
(ii)the size of their membership/shareholding interest;
(iii)the date, or dates, on which they took a membership/shareholding interest and the size of the membership/shareholding interest they took;
(iv)the consideration that person gave for the membership/shareholding interest acquired;
(v)the written consent of the Manager of Blue Views to any transfer of membership / shareholding interest or admission of new member(s) / shareholder(s) that has occurred;
(vi)the current amended and restated limited liability agreement of Blue Views (or equivalent agreement) specifying the membership / shareholding interest, capital contribution and percentage interest of each member of Blue Views; and
(vii)documents evidencing the date(s) on which the documents referred to in (ee) and (ff) above were executed
(b)Any “Lender’s request” referred to in clause 3 of the Membership Interest Pledge Agreement.
(c)Any documents provided by Mr Andrew Griffiths as the “Borrower” to the “Lender” pursuant to clause 3 of the Membership Interest Pledge Agreement, including the “pre-signed transfer documentation” and “pre-signed documentation” referred to at paragraphs 3 and 6 of the affidavit of Mr Andrew Griffiths dated 14 February 2025.
(d)Documents evidencing the date on which the documents referred to in (c) above were provided to the “Lender”.
(e)The email exhibited to Mr Andrew Griffiths’ affidavit dated 14 February 2025, marked “B”.
(f)Written notice by the “Lender” to the “Borrower” that the “Lender” was foreclosing on the “Borrower’s” membership interest or exercising any remedies under the Membership Interest Pledge Agreement and/or the Promissory Note exhibited to the affidavit of Mr Griffiths dated 29 October 2024, marked “M”.
(g)The management contracts referred to at paragraph 58 of Mr Andrew Griffiths’ affidavit dated 29 October 2024, paragraph 8 of Mr Andrew Griffiths’ affidavit dated 4 December 2024 and paragraph 5 of Mr Griffiths’ affidavit filed on 17 December 2024.
(h)Employment contracts between employees of Blue Views working in its property management business.
(i)Documents recording the permission referred to at paragraph 8 of Mr Andrew Griffiths’ affidavit dated 4 December 2024 given by the majority shareholder of Blue Views to Mr Andrew Griffiths to access income derived from Blue Views’ management contracts for the living costs of Mr Andrew Griffiths’ and family and “to grow the management business”.
(j)Blue Views’ bank statements from 26 September 2024 to present.
(k)Communications between Mr Andrew Griffiths and either of the third respondents relating to the interim freezing order made on 16 October 2024 or subsequent freezing orders made by the Court.
2. Within ten working days, the third respondents must serve on the applicant’s solicitor an affidavit verifying and disclosing (in native format):
(a)Any “Lender’s request” referred to in clause 3 of the Membership Interest Pledge Agreement.
(b)Any documents provided by Mr Andrew Griffiths as the “Borrower” to the “Lender” pursuant to clause 3 of the Membership Interest Pledge Agreement, including
(c)The email exhibited to Mr Andrew Griffiths’ affidavit dated 14 February 2025, marked “B”.
(d)Communications between either of them and Mr Andrew Griffiths relating to the decision to enforce the security interest under the Membership Interest Pledge Agreement and/or the Promissory Note
exhibited to the affidavit of Mr Andrew Griffiths dated 29 October 2024, marked “M” and any of the freezing orders issued by this Court.
(e)Communications between either of them and Mr Andrew Griffiths relating to the interim freezing order made on 16 October 2024 or subsequent freezing orders made by the Court.
(f)Written notice by the “Lender” to the “Borrower” that the “Lender” was foreclosing on the “Borrower’s” membership interest or exercising any remedies under the Membership Interest Pledge Agreement and/or the Promissory Note exhibited to the affidavit of Mr Andrew Griffiths dated 29 October 2024, marked “M”.
(g)Documents generated in the course of enforcing the “Borrower’s” security interest under the Membership Interest Pledge Agreement and/or the Promissory Note exhibited to the affidavit of Mr Andrew Griffiths dated 29 October 2024, marked “M”.
(h)Documents recording the terms on which the Beryl Griffiths Family Trust provided NZ$125,000 to the trust account of Molloy Hucker.
(i)Documents recording the permission referred to at paragraph 8 of Mr Andrew Griffiths’ affidavit dated 4 December 2024 given by the majority shareholder of Blue Views to Mr Andrew Griffiths to access income derived from Blue Views’ management contracts for the living costs of Mr Andrew Griffiths’ and family and “to grow the management business”.
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