Island Grace (Fiji) Limited (in receivership and in liquidation) v Griffiths
[2025] NZHC 2756
•22 September 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND HAMILTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA KIRIKIRIROA ROHE
CIV-2024-419-319
[2025] NZHC 2756
BETWEEN ISLAND GRACE (FIJI) LIMITED (IN RECEIVERSHIP AND IN LIQUIDATION)
Applicant
AND
ANDREW HUGH GRIFFITHS
First Respondent
BLUE VIEWS LLC
Second RespondentCOLIN GRIFFITHS AND MARGARET GRIFFITHS
Third Respondents
Hearing: On the papers Appearances:
S Barker for Applicant First respondent in person
No appearance for Second Respondent T A Castle for Third Respondents
Judgment:
22 September 2025
JUDGMENT OF McHERRON J
(Costs and leave to apply to vary/discharge freezing order)
[1] In my judgment dated 8 August 2025, I determined that the applicant is entitled to costs.1 I directed the parties to attempt to agree costs in accordance with Category 2B. However, if agreement was not reached then the parties could file memoranda.
1 Island Grace (Fiji) Limited (In Receivership and Liquidation) v Griffiths [2025] NZHC 2247 [8 August 2025].
ISLAND GRACE (FIJI) LIMITED (IN RECEIVERSHIP AND IN LIQUIDATION) v GRIFFITHS [2025]
NZHC 2756 [22 September 2025]
[2] I have received memoranda of counsel for the applicant dated 22 August 2025. I have also received:
(a)a copy of a letter from the first respondent addressed to the solicitor for the applicant setting out a settlement proposal in relation to costs; and
(b)a copy of an email from counsel for the third respondents indicating that they are comfortable with their position on costs being expressed via the first respondent’s memorandum.
[3] The applicant seeks an order that the first and third respondents are jointly and severally to pay $10,635.50 in costs to Island Grace as well as $885 of disbursements (exclusive of GST). The following table is annexed to counsel’s memorandum itemising the costs claimed in accordance with the High Court Rules 2016, sch 3:
Item Step Time Allocation 22 Filing interlocutory application 0.6 11 Filing memorandum for mentions hearing 0.4 12 Appearance at mentions hearings 0.2 x 3 = 0.6 24 Preparation of written submissions 1.5 25 Preparation by applicant of bundle for hearing 0.6 26 Appearance at hearing 0.75 Total (4.45 days @ $2,390/day) $10,635.50 Disbursements (excl GST) Amount $ Filing fees 650 Service fees – Colin and Margaret Griffiths 235 Total $885
[4] The respondents argue that the time allocations set out in the above schedule should be reduced:
(a)By 0.25 days in respect of the hearing appearance time because the hearing was unnecessarily extended over two days due to connectivity issues experienced by counsel for the applicant.
(b)By 0.7 days in respect of the preparation of written submissions, on the basis that the legal principles for ancillary orders are well established and therefore 1.5 days for written submissions is excessive. In addition, the respondents note that much of the factual material was already available from the primary proceeding and that the application, while important, was not of unusual complexity requiring extensive novel research.
(c)By 0.3 days in respect of the appearances at mentions hearings as the claim for 0.2 days per mention hearing is excessive, equating to approximately 288 minutes in total, which is “unrealistic for what were brief administrative directions hearings”.
[5]The respondents take no issue with the applicant’s claim for disbursements.
My assessment
[6] I propose to uphold the respondents’ objection in relation to the time for appearance at the hearing, but not in any other respect.
[7] As the respondents point out, the hearing ran over into a second day because counsel for the applicant experienced technical difficulties at the overseas remote location from which he was appearing. After a few minutes attempting to resolve these difficulties, without success, I arranged for the hearing to resume for a brief period on 25 June 2025 to allow completion of the applicant’s submissions in reply. This was somewhat inconvenient for all parties concerned. I suspect it also had the effect of prolonging the submissions the next day which would otherwise have been briefer if they had been able to be completed on 24 June. Accordingly, I uphold the reduction of the hearing time claimed from 0.75 days to 0.5 days. In monetary terms this amounts to a reduction of $597.50.
[8] I do not intend to uphold the other objections of the respondents. One of the purposes of the costs regime in pt 14 of the High Court Rules is to provide a relatively predictable itemisation of costs that can be claimed, avoiding in most cases the need to assess the time actually incurred for each step.
[9] For the hearing, the time that can be claimed is intended to represent accurately the actual amount of hearing time (rounded to the nearest quarter day). However, in respect of the other items, a time allocation is given that may or may not represent the actual time spent on the activity concerned. Overall, costs claimed are intended to represent approximately a two thirds contribution to actual and reasonable costs incurred. That is achieved broadly through the time allocations specified in sch 3. These time allocations can be adjusted but, more often than not, the Court will apply any reduction to the overall sum of costs rather than to individual items, unless there is a clear reason for doing so.
[10] Accordingly, it is not necessary to assess the actual time spent at mentions hearings or the actual time required to prepare written submissions. Nor am I persuaded in the present case that any global reduction is warranted. As I indicated in my judgment, the present application is well suited to an award of costs on a Category 2B basis because I consider a normal amount of time was reasonable for those steps. Overall, as expected for a Category 2 proceeding, this is a proceeding of average complexity requiring counsel of skill and experience considered average in the High Court.
[11] Accordingly, the applicant’s costs claim is upheld, but reduced by $597.50. I order that the respondents are jointly and severely liable to pay the applicant $10,038 plus $885 disbursements, a total of $10,923.
Memorandum of Mr Griffiths
[12] The first respondent filed a memorandum dated 22 August 2025 confirming that he had complied with the orders for additional disclosure in my judgment of 8 August 2025. However, he sought to draw my attention to a reference in his affidavit of disclosure in which he invited the Court to consider the immediate revocation of all orders in relation to the third respondents. Mr Griffiths said he would propose to the third respondents that they make a formal application “if needs be”.
[13] I note that r 32.8 of the High Court Rules provides that a freezing order must reserve leave to the respondent to apply to the Court to discharge or vary the freezing order on whatever period of notice to the applicant the Court considers just. An
application by the respondent to discharge or vary the freezing order must then be treated as an urgent application by the Court. I note that neither the original freezing order nor my ancillary orders expressly reserve leave to apply to discharge or vary the freezing order. Accordingly, I note that leave is reserved to any of the respondents to apply to discharge or vary the freezing order (including the ancillary orders) on three working days’ notice to the applicant.
McHerron J
Solicitors:
Buddle Findlay, Wellington for Applicant
Burley Castle Hawkins, Tauranga for Third Respondents
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